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Abstract 
 
The Maritime Labour Convention amendments concerning abandonment of 
seafarers are expected to come into force in 2017, something long sought by seafarers’ 
representatives. The Convention is already considered a success, being referred to as a 
‘super convention’ or ‘seafarers’ bill of rights’, and the amendments are expected to 
receive a similar reception.  Although it is an international legal instrument, the 
Maritime Labour Convention also establishes, for contracting states, soft guidelines on 
how its provisions should be implemented. The Convention recognises that the seafarer 
is a transnational worker in that different states are entitled to adopt varying approaches 
to achieving the objectives of the law where the seafarer is concerned. 
 
It is argued in this thesis that seafarers are transnational workers, hence that 
‘abandonment of seafarers’ is a transnational phenomenon. That in turn means that the 
concept should not be confined merely to current international legal definitions. From 
a legal point of view, abandonment is a contractual breach committed by the employer. 
From a moral point of view, it is the employer severing their responsibility for their 
employees. Although this analysis is made largely through an English law lens, 
legislations of different countries are also studied. The evaluation undertaken in this 
study proves that there is in reality only a nominal differences between the legal rules 
of these countries in this area.  
 
The thesis will also assert that third parties in the employer-worker relationship, 
the so-called ‘private actors’, also have responsibilities in preventing abandonment 
from occurring, or in providing assistance when abandonment does happen. These 
private actors are essentially those persons involved in the maritime trade network – 
including those having responsibility for safety, such as flag states, port states, 
classification societies and P&I Clubs. 
 
In this regard, it is also stressed in this thesis that substandard shipping is 
directly connected to abandonment of seafarers; indeed, the Maritime Labour 
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Convention should thus be seen as an important tool to help combat substandard 
shipping.  
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Introduction 
 
Seafaring is one of the oldest existent professions, however for a long time it 
was overlooked, and seafarers remained within the fringes of society.1 This does not 
seem to be the reality anymore, though, and in many countries seafaring is considered 
a prestigious career2.  Indeed, the importance of the profession can be said to have been 
internationally recognised in 2009, when it was declared by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) that 2010 would be the year of the seafarer.3 
                                                        
1 See Chapter I 
2 For instance, in honour of the International day of the seafarer in 2015, a tribute to Filipino seafarers 
was published in one of the most prestigious newspapers of the country. The Tribute read: 
“We honour each and every seafarer—the cornerstone of an industry that moves 90 percent of world 
trade. Over the years, our seafarers have largely contributed to the socio-economic development of our 
nation, with their ever growing annual dollar remittances, which for 2014 alone was estimated by the 
Bangko Central ng Pilipinas at $5.6 Billion. They have continued to be a pillar of financial stability for 
the country, helping provide employment to other Filipinos in ancillary services that support the seafaring 
industry. 
“We commend our Filipino seafarers whose efficiency, resiliency, and competency continually make 
them the seafarer of choice worldwide. Indeed they are our country’s source of pride, as they are a living 
testament to the Filipinos’ dedication to duty and commitment to excellence. 
“We extend our heartfelt thanks to the Philippine Government for their recognition of, and support for 
the maritime industry which plays a vital role in the socio-economic progress of our country. 
“We would also like to thank ANGKLA Party-List, represented by Congressman Jesulito A. Manalo, for 
its successful enactment of R.A. 10635 which guarantees the protection of jobs for our Filipino seafarers. 
“Finally, as a way of giving back to our Filipino Global Maritime Professionals for their contribution to 
the country, we implore all the stakeholders of the maritime industry, to continue supporting our seafarers 
and to help in the strict and proper implementation of laws and policies for their full protection.” - - A 
Tribute to Our Filipino Seafarers. Mabuhay ang mga Marinong Pilipino! Philippine Daily Inquirer 
(Manila,25 May 2015) quoted in Jose “Pepe” Abueva, ‘Filipino Seafarers—Most In Demand In The 
World’ (The Bohol Chronicle, 28 June 2015) <http://boholchronicle.com.ph/2015/06/28/filipino-
seafarers-most-in-demand-in-the-world> 
3 In the 102nd session in London (29 June to 3 July 2009), the Council of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) agreed that the theme for the World Maritime Day would be "2010: Year of the 
Seafarer" – In February 2011, the then IMO Secretary – General Efthimios E. Mitropoulos release an 
open letter stating the three main objectives in naming 2010 as the year of the seafarer: 
● “To increase awareness among the general public of the indispensable services you render to 
international seaborne trade, the world economy and society at large; 
● To send a clear message to you that we recognize and appreciate your services; that we 
understand the extraordinary conditions and circumstances of your profession; that we care 
about you, and that we do all that we can to look after and protect you when the circumstances 
of your life at sea so warrant; and  
● To redouble our efforts at the regulatory level to create a better, safer and more secure world in 
which you can operate.” 
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The profession is far from an ordinary one, and is full of peculiarities. Not only 
does the seafarer spend most of his working hours on board a vessel, often in 
international waters, but seafarers are often employed by a company based in a country 
other than their own, and may work in a vessel flagged to a third country. On top of 
this, their work may be based in a fourth country! These are just some of the particular 
characteristics of the profession. These peculiarities can be said to make seafaring a 
unique profession, as they may cause the seafarer to face situations that most 
professionals will never have to face during their careers, and also characterise the 
transnationality4 of the profession.  
 
Indeed, seafarers’ work crosses borders and it is exactly this transnational 
element of the profession that causes seafaring regulation to differ from others.  In order 
to have effective regulation, international and national regulations should be observed, 
as well as all the “actors” 5involved in the employment of seafarers. 
 
This thesis will examine the scope of transnationalism and seafaring, using 
“abandonment of seafarers” as a platform for such scrutiny. Therefore, as a starting 
point for the further development of this thesis, it is necessary to explore the 
conceptualization of the abandonment of seafarers, and in order to do this it seems 
sensible first to look at the definitions of the word ‘abandonment’. 
  
A common dictionary defines Abandonment as:  
 
“To withdraw support or help despite allegiance or responsibility”6. 
 
Whereas a legal dictionary defines it as:  
                                                        
(IMO, ‘IMO Secretary-General Mitropoulos reaches out to seafarers in open letter’, (Briefing: 10, March 
3, 2011) http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/10-letter-to-
seafarers.aspx#.V8F28umsKlK, last accessed on 12/02/2014)  
4 One of the premises of this thesis that will be supported through its entirety is that seafarers are neither 
international nor national employees, but transnational employees. See: Chapter 1 
5 The concept of Actors in Transnational shall be explained better in the justification of this thesis. 
6  Farlex clipart collection Based on WordNet 3.0 (Princeton University, Farlex Inc. 2003-2011) 
12 
 
 
“1.The relinquishing of a right or interest with the intention of never again 
claiming it. An abandonment is merely the acceptance by one party of the 
situation that a non performing party has caused.  But a rescission due to 
a material breach by the other party is a termination or discharge of the 
contract for all purposes. 2. Family Law. The act of leaving a spouse or 
child wilfully and without an intention to return.”7  
 
A simplistic interpretation of both definitions will lead to the conclusion that 
abandonment is a rather broad concept, and accordingly abandonment of seafarer can 
arise in numerous situations. For instance, abandonment of seafarer will have occurred 
when: 
 
● The shipowner breaches the seafarer’s employment contract  
● The seafarer is left unsupported despite the existence of an allegiance, 
which can be considered to be an indirect, rather than direct, obligation 
towards the seafarer 
 
 Abandonment of seafarers however has received special attention from the 
international community, which decided to first define it in 2001 by ILO Resolution 
A.930(22) “Guidelines on Provision of Financial Security in Cases of Abandonment of 
Seafarers”. According to the Resolution abandonment of seafarer is:  
“(…) the severance of ties between the shipowner and the seafarer. 
Abandonment occurs when the shipowner fails to fulfil certain fundamental 
obligations to the seafarer relating to timely repatriation and payment of 
outstanding remuneration and to provision of the basic necessities of life 
inter alia adequate food, accommodation and medical care. Abandonment 
will have occurred when the master of the ship has been left without any 
                                                        
7  Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, (Abridged 7th Edition, West Group Minn. 2000), page 1 
13 
 
financial means in respect of ship operation”.  
 In 2006, abandonment of seafarers was once more defined. The Maritime 
Labour Convention8 provides that a seafarer will be considered abandoned:  
“(…) where, in violation of the requirements of this Convention or the terms 
of the seafarers’ employment agreement, the shipowner: (a) fails to cover 
the cost of the seafarers’ repatriation; or (b) has left the seafarer without 
the necessary maintenance and support; or (c) has otherwise unilaterally 
severed their ties with the seafarer including failure to pay contractual 
wages for a period of at least two months.”  
 
 The MLC definition can be perceived as a more broad approach than the one 
provided by IMO, because in the former case, it is only necessary for one of the 
requisites described to be fulfilled in order for it to be considered ‘abandonment’, hence 
the use of the word ‘or’, instead of the word ‘and’ as is used in the IMO definition. 
Furthermore, the words used in the fourth situation provided by the MLC for when a 
seafarer can be considered abandoned, i.e. “has otherwise unilaterally severed their ties 
with the seafarer” 9 suggests that a seafarer will be deemed to have been abandoned 
whenever the employment contract has been unilaterally breached by the shipowner.  
Nevertheless, the MLC’s definition is still considered to offer an exhaustive list of 
situations when a seafarer will be deemed to have been abandoned, with members of 
the industry perceiving abandonment of seafarers (as defined by the Convention) as 
specific breaches of contract caused by the shipowner. 10 This can be clearly perceived 
                                                        
8 Amendments to the Code implementing Regulation 2.5 – Repatriation of the MLC, 2006 (and 
appendices), adopted by the Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, Amendments relating to 
Standard A2.5 , Standard A2.5.2 (2), due to come into force in 2017. 
9 Ibid 
10 See:  Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, 
in Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p.125 paragraph 6.41 and p.130, paragraph 6.65 
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in the current policies provided by insurers in order to fulfil the Financial Security 
system established by the Convention.11  
 
Indeed, it is essentially understood by the maritime industry that a seafarer will 
be deemed to have been abandoned when he/ she is not duly repatriated, has been left 
without basic necessities of life (including food, accommodation and medical care) and 
has not been paid properly. This understanding is clearly seen in the most recent IMO 
document regarding abandonment of seafarers. When highlighting the importance of 
the 2014 amendments to the MLC specifically in cases of abandonment, the document 
states that the “new requirement will help prevent the unfortunate situation of seafarers 
being stranded in port for long periods when shipowners abandon their crews without 
paying their wages or repatriating them”12 hence limiting abandonment of seafarers to 
the situations mentioned above. 
 
 In practical terms it makes sense for both definitions to be limiting, and to 
confine abandonment of seafarers to an exhaustive list of contractual breaches, since 
the intention of International Instruments was to create a security fund for situations 
where seafarers were deemed to have been abandoned. If the Resolution or the MLC 
were to provide for a non-exhaustive list of contractual breaches, most likely, the 
Financial Security would not become a reality, since the risks of abandonment 
occurring would increase, hence also increasing the price of any means of Financial 
Security to be set. The downside is that the definition can also be said to set a limitation 
upon the shipowner’s liability, as the security fund is limited to four months of unpaid 
wages and seafarers in abandonment situations are often left unpaid for longer periods 
of time. 13 
 
                                                        
11 Ibid. See Chapter V pp.272 -285 
12 IMO LEG 104/4, p.2 § 7 
13 It is recognized that in terms of employment law, the shipowner would still be liable for the seafarers’ 
remaining unpaid wages, as pointed out abandonment of seafarer is often a consequence or is followed 
by the shipowner’s insolvency, making it difficult for the seafarer to have his rights enforced. 
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 More importantly, the amendments shall definitely make a difference on the life 
of seafarers, preventing these from remaining stranded in ports around the globe 
waiting for the vessel judicial sale in order to receive their outstanding wages.  
According to IMO/ILO joint database for abandonment of seafarers since its 
establishment until 31 January 2017, there have been 248 reported incidents, affecting 
3,037 seafarers, who would now thanks to the Financial Security Fund would be able 
to be timely repatriated and  paid (at least part)14 of the outstanding wages.  
 
 It is important to note that the term ‘abandonment of seafarer’ was first 
introduced into the international arena in order to raise awareness of specific situations 
faced by seafarers. The word ‘abandoned’ at that point seemed to have been used in 
line with its general definition, rather than a legal one.15 
 
 Therefore, although the existing international legal definitions of ‘abandonment 
of seafarer’ are limited to specific situations, if one considers the legal and general 
definition of abandonment, a conclusion can be drawn that abandonment of seafarers 
should embrace many more situations than the ones described in the exhaustive list 
provided by the MLC,.Its common usage or understanding should be adopted instead 
of a strict and narrow legal definition. After all, its common usage better reflects the 
ordinary and extraordinary situations actually faced by seafarers. Indeed, abandonment 
should simply be perceived as a severance of ties unilaterally caused by the 
shipowners16. Therefore, any breach of a contract, either of an implied or express term, 
caused by solely by the shipowner should be perceived as  abandonment of the seafarer. 
This is the approach advocated in this thesis.  
 
                                                        
14 The Financial Security Schemes might not cover all the wages due to the seafarers, as they contain 
specific numbers of unpaid wages covered by it. See pp. 274 -285 
15 See: The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, International Organizations and the Law of the 
Sea Documentary Yearbook (Volume 14, Martinus Nijhof Publishers1998), p. 37 and ILO, Final Report: 
Joint Maritime Commission (29th Session), Geneva, 22-26 January 2001, (International Labour Office, 
2001) , p.22 
16 As mentioned earlier it seems that the legislators when drafting the 2014 amendments to the MLC 
also had this idea on the back of their mind when defining abandonment of seafarers. See p.13 
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Most cases causes of ‘abandonment of seafarer’ involve:  
 
● The arrest of the vessel; 
● Accident – Shipwreck, grounding or sinking; 
● Bankruptcy or insolvency.17 
 
 The year 1992-3, similar to the year 2009 but on a smaller scale according to 
IMO’s abandonment database, was marked by several cases of shipping companies 
going bankrupt leading to a substantial number of abandonment cases, which reflects 
the third cause of abandonment listed above.18 One of the companies was the Pakistan-
based Gulf East Ship Management owned by thefinacial  Gokal brothers, whose fortune 
was linked to the collapsed BCCI bank. In 1992, the company abandoned 21 
crewmembers (Pakistanis and Maldivians) in Chittagong, Bangladesh. The crew were 
without wages since the previous year and were left without water, food and fuel for a 
period of more than a year, until the ship was finally sold and the judge decided the 
amount to be paid to the crew.19  
 
 Currently, the ship industry is said to be facing its worse downturn in the past 
few decades20, and not unexpectedly this has had a direct impact on the number of 
abandonment of seafarer cases, even though this does not seem to have yet been 
reflected in the ILO abandonment of seafarers database (as some cases are not reported 
to the ILO or the reports can come with substantial delay).  Two recent examples of 
                                                        
17 Ibid.  
18 ILO Database on reported incidents of abandonment of seafarers, available on ILO’s website. 
19 See: ITF Seafarers’ bulletin 1993. Pages 22 -23 and ILO Database on reported incidents of 
abandonment of seafarers, available on ILO’s website. 
20 Robert Wright, ‘Container shipping lines mired in crisis’, (Financial Times, 19 May 2016) < 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e98963c-1853-11e6-bb7d-ee563a5a1cc1.html#axzz4IXbFfjnO>, last 
accessed on 02/07/2016; Alan Tovey, ‘Shipping industry faces worse storm than after financial crisis, 
warns Maersk boss’ (The Telegraph, 10 February 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/02/12/shipping-industry-faces-worse-storm-than-after-
financial-crisis/>, last accessed on 07/06/2016; and  Jackie Northam, ‘Amid Industry Downturn, Global 
Shipping Sees Record-Low Growth’ (NPR, 20 August 2016) 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/08/20/490621376/amid-industry-downturn-global-shipping-
sees-record-low-growth, last accessed on 07/07/2016 
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abandonment cases are the Five Stars Fujian, a coal carrier, and the medium-sized 
tanker Amba Bhakti, although, by the time this thesis was being written, neither case 
had been reported to ILO. Both cases are clear examples of the impact that the financial 
crisis in the shipping industry has had on the abandonment of seafarers. In the first case, 
the ship was arrested for one month on Australia’s east coast, with supplies diminishing 
and the crew of 21 Chinese men unpaid since June 2016. In the second case, the medium 
sized tanker is currently still anchored in Shanghai in desperate need of repairs, and her 
crew composed of Indian and Bangladeshi seafarers were left without basic supplies 
and unpaid since February 2016.21 
 
 As should be noted, in abandonment of seafarer cases, the responsibility and 
liability of the shipowner is as straightforward as it can be, since he has a direct 
responsibility as the seafarer’s employer that can undoubtedly either be found in 
national law or international law.  Nevertheless, considering that the seafarer, as 
previously stated and as will rest proved in this thesis, is a ‘transnational employee’, 
the action of ‘private actors’ or stakeholders, which from a legal perspective can be 
considered third parties, needs to be taken into consideration when dealing with 
abandonment of seafarers, being this exactly what this thesis proposes to do. This thesis 
shall prove that the selected ship industry stakeholders play a vital role in preventing 
abandonment of seafarers from occurring, also determining their responsibilities and 
liabilities in regards to abandonment of seafarers 
 
Justification  
 
Although many studies have been conducted or are currently being conducted 
regarding seafarers’ rights, a study like this one has never been carried out. The existent 
studies regarding seafarers’ rights are essentially descriptive in nature. Furthermore, 
they are essentially focused on the shipowners’ responsibilities and liabilities towards 
                                                        
21  Henning Gloystein, ‘Shipowners slash costs, leaving some crews unpaid, unsafe as downturn 
bites’(Hellenic Shipping News, 27 August 2016) < http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/shipowners-
slash-costs-leaving-some-crews-unpaid-unsafe-as-downturn-bites/>, last accessed on 01/11/2016 
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seafarers, and not on third party responsibilities and liabilities towards them. Indeed, 
intensive studies are already being conducted regarding shipowners’ responsibilities 
and liabilities22 towards seafarers, making further analysis on these points perhaps less 
needed. The author recognises that the same analysis conducted in a different 
(comparative) manner could arrive at significant findings regarding how seafarers’ 
rights are enforced by countries with similar political and economic regimes, traditions. 
However, that is not the aim of this thesis. 
 
This thesis will analyse the liability and responsibilities of selected shipping 
industry stakeholders and their role in abandonment of seafarer cases, either by way of 
assisting in preventing hardship or by providing for the seafarers’ rights in these cases 
to be respected. The few studies that have been conducted regarding third parties restrict 
themselves to the analysis of Flag State responsibilities.23 
 
Nevertheless, as this thesis will seek to prove, stakeholders (or private actors) 
play a vital role in abandonment of seafarer cases, being essential to guaranteeing an 
adequate protection for seafarers, and as such an assessment of their responsibilities 
and possible consequent liabilities is essential. This thesis will demonstrate that the 
chosen third parties play a crucial role in the enforcement and compliance of seafarers’ 
                                                        
22 See: D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005). Seafarers 
Rights International, a research centre located within ITF’s headquarters, is also currently conducting 
research in diverse countries in order to ascertain the protection given to seafarers according to their 
national legislation in cases of abandonment of seafarer, death or injury, ship arrest and maritime liens. 
See: SRI, Legal Guides database available at: http://seafarersrights.org/seafarers-guides/seafarers-
guides-results/?_sft_categories=abandonment-sri-guides&_sfm_file_access=Everyone, last accessed 
02/07/2016 
23 See: F. Shawna, ‘The Great Compromise: Labour Unions, Flags of Convenience and the Rights of 
Seafarers’ in 19 Windsor Review Legal & social. Issues 85 (2005) and R. R. Churchill, ‘The Meaning 
of the “Genuine Link” requirement in Relation to the Nationality of Ships’, A study Prepared for the 
International Workers Federation (October 2000), http://www.itfglobal.org/seafarers/icons-
site/images/ITF- Oct2000.pdf  last accessed on 04/09/2015 
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rights. The research question that this thesis derives from has been based on the need 
for rigorous legal research in this area, which so far seems to have been overlooked.  
 
 
 
Scope and Objectives of Study 
 
Maritime law is a subject characterized by its internationalism and 
transnationality. Most maritime ventures involve an array of international participants, 
some of which may not even possess contractual relationships with each other, but the 
individual conduct of each during the maritime undertaking will usually have an effect 
on the safety or commercial viability of the venture for the others. Moreover, 
undeniably, the involvement of the sea provides a level of internationalism to maritime 
ventures, as they mostly fall under “international jurisdiction”. 
 
 Based on the clear international aspect of maritime ventures, some might argue 
that this should be regulated by a uniform law, suggesting that a harmonization of law 
would facilitate relations between states and commercial relations between nationals of 
different states. Supposedly, a harmonization of maritime law would provide ‘clarity’ 
to individuals involved in maritime ventures hence avoiding unnecessary disputes or 
conflicts. However, what proponents of this seem to neglect is that even if a 
harmonization of law was feasible, different states would still be in charge of the 
interpretation and application of the particular piece of legislation and thus most likely 
these would differ from one state to another. Furthermore, in practical terms, this 
uniformity of law seems very difficult to achieve since countries around the world 
experience different realities and circumstances, and accordingly have different 
needs.24 
                                                        
24Professor Willian Tetley in William Tetley, ‘Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The 
Pros, Cons, and Alternatives to International Conventions-How to Adopt an International Convention’ 
in 24 Tul. Mar. L.J. 775 1999-2000, pp.797-811 points out the some of the advantages and disadvantages 
in uniformity of maritime law. 
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 Discussions on uniformity of law aside, more importantly, particularly within 
the scope of this thesis, is the analysis of which field of law maritime law falls into. A 
maritime venture will more often than not cross national borders and while doing so it 
cannot be left unregulated. Therefore, due to this international element, maritime law 
can hardly be considered to fall only under the scope of national law. Nevertheless, 
maritime law does not seem to fall solely under the field of international law since it 
can hardly be considered to be fully embodied in the current concept of international 
law, even taking the broadest definition25 found in the American Black’ Law Dictionary 
into consideration: 
 
“International law. The legal principles governing the relationships 
between nations; more modernly, the law of international relations, 
embracing not only nations but also such participants as international 
organizations, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, 
and even individuals (such as those who invoke their human rights or 
commit war crimes).- Also termed public international law; law of nations; 
law of nature and nations; jus gentium; jus gentium publicum; inter gentes; 
inter-foreign- relations law, interstate law; law between states (the word 
state, in the latter two phrases, being equivalent to nation or country). 
Customary international law. International law that derives from customary 
law and serves to supplement codified norms. 
Private international law. International conflict of laws; legal scholars 
frequently lament the name "private international law" because it 
                                                        
25 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines international law as: 1. The rules and principles which govern the 
relations and dealings of nations with each other. New Jersey v Delaware, 291 US 361, 78 L Ed 847, 54 
S Ct 407. The usage of all civilized nations. 
2. International law in its widest and most comprehensive sense includes not only questions of rights 
between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations, but also questions 
arising under what is generally called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning 
the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, 
done within the dominion of another nation. Such was the force accorded to the term "jus gentium" by 
the Roman juris-consults, but today private international law is deemed quite separate and distinct from 
the law of nations.” (Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3rd Edition,  Lexinexs, 2010)) 
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misleadingly suggests a body of law somehow parallel to (public) 
international law, when in fact it is merely a part of each legal system's 
private law.”26 
  
  As it can be seen by the above definition maritime law can hardly be said to 
fall into the scope of it entirely. Firstly, maritime law does not only embrace the 
relationship between nations, and secondly, it does not deal exclusively with conflict 
of laws. Maritime law also governs commercial relationships between businesses (or 
corporations), regulates international maritime commerce, governs personal liabilities 
in maritime transport, and even regulates maritime employment relationships. 
Accordingly, it seems that maritime law can neither be defined as purely international, 
nor national law, falling instead in the scope of what is now considered to be 
transnational law. 
 
 Transnational law27 was first defined by Judge Philip Jessup in his 1956 Storrs 
Lectures. According to him, transnational law is: 
 
“(…) all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national 
frontiers…[including] [b]oth public and private international law…[plus] 
other rules that do not wholly fit into such standards categories… 
Transnational situations, then, may involve individuals, corporations, 
states, organizations of states, or other groups."28 
                                                        
26  Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, (Abridged 7th Edition, West Group Minn. 2000), p. 658 
27 It is not the intention of this thesis to engage in a deep discussion of transnational law, this being a 
concept that can be considered relatively new and therefore the subject of intense debate. The discussion 
of transnational law in this thesis is only necessary to justify the premise that seafarers are transnational 
employees. Thus, the choice was of a simplistic approach to the subject by choosing to exploit Jessup’s 
conceptualization of transnational law, since he was the first one to substantially deal with the topic in 
his 1956 Storrs Lectures, and his conception is still considered the leading one. See: Christian Tietje and 
Nowrot Karsten, ‘ Laying Conceptual Ghosts to Rest: The Rise of Philip C. Jessup’s “Transnational 
Law” in the Regulatory Governance of the International Economic System’ In Christian Tietje, Alan 
Brouder, and Karsten Nowrot (eds), Philip C. Jessup’s Transnational Law Revisited—On the Occasion 
of the 50th Anniversary of its Publication,   (Essays in Transnational Economic Law No.50, Halle- 
Wittenberg: Martin-Luther-Universität. 2006) 
28 Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law, (Yale University Press 1956), pp. 2-3 
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Christian Tietje and Nowrot Karsten, were to later summarize Jessup’s 
definition of transnational law as: 
 
“national and international law would be part of it in so far as they have 
these effects, and it could address both public (state and governmental) and 
private (nongovernmental, civil) society actors”29 
 
 Based on Jessup’s definition of transnational law the renowned Professor 
William Tetley, in one of his later works, proposed three new definitions for 
international maritime law: 
 
“International public maritime law (or public international maritime law) 
concerns the legal relationship between States in respect of maritime 
matters. 
 
 Private international maritime law (or conflict of maritime laws) is the 
collection of rules used to resolve maritime disputes as to choice of law, 
choice of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgements between 
private parties subject to the laws of different states. 
 
International private maritime law concerns the legal maritime 
relationships between private parties of different states.”30 
                                                        
29 Christian Tietje and Nowrot Karsten, ‘Laying Conceptual Ghosts to Rest: The Rise of Philip C. 
Jessup’s “Transnational Law” in the Regulatory Governance of the International Economic System’ In 
Christian Tietje, Alan Brouder, and Karsten Nowrot (eds), Philip C. Jessup’s Transnational Law 
Revisited—On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of its Publication,   (Essays in Transnational 
Economic Law No.50, Halle- Wittenberg: Martin-Luther-Universität. 2006), available at: 
http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft50.pdf. Some scholars 
however treat transnational law as conceptually distinct from national and international law, because its 
primary sources and addressees are neither nation state agencies nor international institutions founded 
on treaties or conventions, but private (individual, corporate or collective) actors involved in 
transnational relations. For further discussion see: Zumbansen, Peer. 2002. Piercing the Legal Veil: 
Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law. European Law Journal 8: 400-32. 
30  William Tetley, ‘Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons, and Alternatives 
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  Professor Tetley’s definitions of international maritime law appear to have 
been carefully considered, including all legal maritime relationships. Nevertheless, it 
seems to neglect that more than including private actors, the concept of transnational 
law also includes national and international law, and although Prof. Tetley’s intention 
might have been to include national law in his definitions, this does not seem clear upon 
reading them. Therefore, Jessup’s concept of transnational law still seems to be the 
most accurate when dealing with legal maritime relationships or maritime law in 
general. 
 
 Accordingly with the above reasoning, it can be concluded that maritime labour 
relationships are also governed by maritime law, hence seafarers31 should be perceived 
as transnational employees32. Indeed, seafarers’ rights are regulated by national and 
international legislation. Furthermore, due to the seafarer’s unique employment 
conditions, any legal relationship arising out of his employment will undoubtedly be 
governed by transnational law. This thesis develops from this particular premise, i.e. 
that seafarers are transnational employees.  
 
Furthermore, transnational labour relations are said to have an association with 
a transnational legal process which provides the base for understanding the issue of 
compliance with international law. ‘Transnational legal process’ has been defined by 
Professor Koh as having four distinct features: 
 
                                                        
to International Conventions-How to Adopt an International Convention’ in 24 Tul. Mar. L.J. 775 1999-
2000, p.782 
31 This thesis is adopting the Maritime Labour Convention definition of seafarer: “seafarer means any 
person who is employed or engaged or works in any capacity on board a ship to which this Convention 
applies”. (Maritime Labour Convention 2006, Article II, paragraph 1(f)) Therefore, within the scope of 
this thesis, the master of a vessel shall be considered a seafarer. 
32 Seafarers, due to the nature of their job are often referred to in social studies as “transnationals”. The 
social concept of transnationality differs from its legal concept but seems to find common ground in the 
fact that both refer to transnational as ‘someone’ or ‘something’ that crosses borders.  For a more detailed 
view of seafarers as transnational employees from a social perspective see: Helen Sampson, International 
Seafarers and transnationalism in the twenty-first century, Manchester University Press 
(Manchester:2013) 
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● It is non-traditional, breaking down two traditional dichotomies 
(between domestic and international, and public and private) that have 
historically dominated the study of international law.  
● It is non- statist: the actors in this process are not just, or even primarily, 
nation-states, but include non-state actors as well. 
● It is dynamic, not static. Transnational law oscillates from the public to 
the private, from the domestic to the international level and back down 
again.  
● It is normative. New rules of law emerge from the transnational legal 
process. These rules are interpreted, internalized, and enforced hence 
beginning the process all over again. Accordingly, the concept 
embraces not just the descriptive workings of a process as well as the 
normativity of that process, focusing not simply upon how international 
interaction among transnational actors shapes law, but also on how law 
shapes and guides future interactions.33 
 
This renowned legal scholar perceives the transnational legal process as 
describing the theory and practice of public and private actors, nation-states, 
international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and private individuals interacting in a variety of private and public, 
international and domestic spheres, and also how they interpret, enforce and then 
ultimately internalize the rules of international law. 34 
 
Transnational labour relations are said to incorporate a set of rules, guidelines 
and/or principles to be observed by various states and accordingly requires input from 
all actors, namely, states, trade unions, employers' associations and the applicable 
international body through a process of social dialogue.35 
                                                        
33  H. H. Koh  ‘Transnational Legal Process' in 75 Nebraska Law Review (1996), p. 184 
34 Ibid, p. 183 
35 For deeper discussion of transnational labour relations see: : Paul Smit, ‘Transnational labour relations: 
a dream or possibility in SADC?’in African Journal of International and Comparative Law 2014 
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Therefore, it is clear that private actors play an essential role in the transnational 
legal process and as such are also vital players in terms of seafarer labour relations, 
these being transnational employees. This justifies the choice of this thesis to explore 
the role of private actors in cases of abandonment of seafarers and since the work 
carried out in this thesis is legal in nature, it was reasonable to justify the choice of 
private actors to be analyzed in this thesis, by justifying their status as stakeholders in 
the ship industry as well as that of third parties in the seafarers’ employment 
relationship. Nevertheless, before justifying the selected private actors, it is necessary 
to discuss the second premise upon which this thesis is based. 
 
The other premise upon which this thesis is founded is the fact that most 
reported cases of abandonment of seafarers (even in the strict sense of the term), can be 
said to have occurred on board a substandard vessel. For instance, in 1990, during an 
inspection in the Liberian/Greek owned vessel, Nikolas K, at the port of Flushing 
(Netherlands), it was found that the ship had unsanitary accommodations, besides 
having been previously detained because of a number of structural defects and other 
irregularities by Port State Control. Furthermore, it was found that most of the crew had 
no contract of employment and were forced to accept a ‘Memorandum of Agreement’, 
specifying that overtime (which was decided at the master’s discretion) would be paid 
at one dollar per hour, and in the case of it being decided that the seafarer was causing 
problems on board, he could be instantly dismissed, having to pay not only the cost of 
his own repatriation, but also the air fare of a replacement crewmember.36A decade 
later, the Russian, Filipino and Ukranian crew on board the Greek owned St George 
would also be abandoned in Klaipedia once the ship was detained for repair. 37 More 
recently, in February 2016, the Perekopskiy vessel has reportedly been abandoned for 
a second time in Argentina, in substandard condition.38 
                                                        
36 See: ITF Seafarers’ bulletin 1991. Pages 24 
37 See: ITF Seafarers’ bulletin 2001. Pages 36 
38 IMO abandonment database 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/seafarers/seafarersbrowse.details?p_lang=en&p_abandonment_id=238&p_sea
rch_id=160827213232> last accessed on 01/10/2016. The owner seemed to be going through financial 
26 
 
 
This conclusion can easily be drawn by the OECD definition of a substandard 
ship, as essentially any vessel that fails to meet basic standards of seaworthiness due to 
its physical condition, its operation, or the activities of its crew. A substandard ship is 
said to pose threats to both human life and/or to marine environments. 39 OECD’s 
definition evidences the disastrous effect of substandard shipping on both 
environmental and human life. 
  
Accordingly, it would not be incorrect assume that substandard shipping is 
directly connected to the abandonment of seafarers. The assessment of third-party 
liabilities in these particular cases might be especially important to seafarers 
considering that not only does the shipowner have numerous statutory limitations on 
liability, but most importantly, because often the ship is the shipowner’s sole asset, and 
in case of this being substandard the chances are, especially in abandonment cases, that 
the seafarer will not be able to fully compensate the seafarer for his/her losses.  
 
The recognition of the importance of stakeholders in the protection of seafarers 
can be considered fully recognised. The ITF has for a long time been conducting 
research into flag-state responsibilities, working together with Port State control in 
                                                        
hardship as the vessel was originally abandoned in 2008 and was in need of immediate repairs. 
Nevertheless, it was not possible to find more information about the incident.  The vessel is a trailing 
suction hopper dredger, over 25 years old, having been built in 1988 
<http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:906337/mmsi:-
8510831/imo:8510831/vessel:PEREKOPSKIY>. It is important to highlight that during the years when 
this research was conducted, it was possible to form a database of reported abandonment of seafarers’ 
cases since the 90s until today, some obtained through research conducted at ITF, Seafarers Rights 
International (research which would have not been possible without the help of Deirdree Fitzpatrick, to 
whom the author is extremely thankful), others through newspapers articles and news clips, and finally 
through the ILO abandonment of seafarers database. Although the database does not always contain all 
the necessary relevant information on every case, most cases alludes to the practice of substandard 
shipping. 
39 SSY Consultancy and Research Ltd The Cost to Users of Substandard Shipping (Report Prepared for 
the OECD Maritime Transport Committee, OECD Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, 
January 2001), p. 5 
Http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/displaywithoutn av/0,3376,EN-document-notheme-1-no-
no-12906-0,00.html last accessed on 20/05/2015 
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order to ensure that seafarers have their rights protected,40 and it has for long recognised 
the role of the insurer in assuring that the seafarer will be fully compensated.41 
 
  This thesis shall demonstrate the link between substandard shipping and 
abandonment of seafarers, which shall be proven to be particularly helpful in assessing 
third party liability in cases of abandonment. Furthermore, in maritime law, life, 
property and environment are constantly included in the same boat. Thus, particularly 
in cases of third party liability, drawing a parallel among them seems to be a logical 
thing to do, especially in cases of substandard vessels when the three areas are affected; 
life, property and the environment. Since the essence of this thesis can be said to be 
definitional, it is important to highlight that “life”42 for its purposes is considered in a 
broad sense (for the period that seafarers are at sea, that is where their life is).   
 
 Considering that the Maritime Labour Convention is the primary piece of 
international legislation studied in this thesis, a few parallels shall be made with other 
pieces of international legislation with similar provisions to those contained in the 
Convention. National legislations shall be mentioned whenever relevant. For 
simplicity, and taking into consideration that it is not the intention of this thesis to 
                                                        
40 See Chapter III 
41 When advising seafarers for compensation in cases of death at sea, Seafarers Rights International 
claims that “P&I insurers can actively participate (through the use of representatives and lawyers 
worldwide) at an early stage to prevent claims being pursued, or they could attempt to settle claims at 
less than the legal entitlement of the claimant.” Thus, clear acknowledging the importance of the Insurer 
in assuring seafarers their rights. See: http://seafarersrights.org/seafarers-subjects/death-and-injuries-at-
sea/ 
42 Two of the existent definitions for life in the online oxford dictionary are “The existence of an 
individual human being or animal; usually one's life); The period between the birth and death of a living 
thing, especially a human being” - http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/life.  
 It must be borne in mind that the connection between SOLAS and MLC is clear. The latter makes express 
reference to the former in Standard A3.1 – Accommodation and recreational facilities and Guideline 
B5.1.3 – Maritime labour certificate and declaration of maritime labour compliance. The importance of 
SOLAS to seafaring has been recognized by ITF when highlighting the importance of IMO to the 
profession. See: ITF, IMO and ILO, available at; http://www.itfseafarers.org/ITI-IMO-ILO.cfm last 
accessed on 01/08/2016. The link between the two convention becomes even more clear with the reading 
of: International Labour Conference, 94th (Maritime) Session, 2006, Report I(1A) - Adoption of an 
instrument to consolidate maritime labour standards, International Labour Office Geneva: 2005, ISBN 
92-2-117915-X, available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc94/rep-i-1a.pdf last 
accessed on 01/08/2015, concerning the adoption of the MLC 
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conduct specific research into seafarers’ rights according to national law, English law 
shall be the law most often referred to as an example, whenever relevant. 
 
Defining the Private Actors 
 
 The selected private actors have a long-established importance43 in the shipping 
industry as stakeholders, which in itself should be enough to justify their selection, 
however considering the legal aspects of the research conducted in this thesis, it is 
deemed necessary to justify their roles as third parties in the seafarers’ employment 
relationship. Unfortunately, there is no single authoritative definition of a ‘third party’ 
in law. Domestic law and International Law generally deal with a ‘third party’ without 
actually defining it or doing so in a limited fashion just in order to determine to which 
third parties the legislation is referring to, but even in these cases, as in the case of the 
Vienna Convention Law of the Treaties, the flaws of the definition added to the other 
provisions of the convention leaves space for wider interpretation.44 Thus, it may be 
concluded that the concept of third parties in both legal domains is far from being a 
comprehensively defined one, all tending to refer back to the general legal concept of 
third parties45.  
 
                                                        
43 This shall be demonstrated in  chapters II, III and IV 
44 For a more detailed discussion on the subject see: Christian Tomushat, “International Organizations 
as Third Parties under the Law of International Treaties”, in The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
Convention, ed. By Enzo Cannizzaro, Oxford Scholarship Online (2011), DOI: 
10.1093.acprof:oso/9780199588916.001.0001 
45 Legal dictionaries will generally and broadly define a third party as someone outside of the transaction, 
more specifically an “outside party”. In this context, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines third party as: 
“one who is not a party to a lawsuit, agreement, or other transaction but who is somehow involved in the 
transaction; someone other than the principal parties…Also termed outside party.” (Bryan A Garner, 
Black’s Law Dictionary, Abridged 7th Edition, West Group (Minn. 2000), p. 1202)  The Oxford 
Dictionary even more broadly, simply defines third party as Oxford Dictionary defines third parties as: 
"A person or group besides the two primarily involved in a situation" <See: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/primarily#primarily__2> last accessed on 
01/11/2014 
According to this definition and thanks in great deal to its broadness, it would not be difficult to identify 
the third parties in the context of this thesis, as this could be easily said to be any party outside of the 
seafarers’ employment contract, who somehow has an interest in the claim, more specifically and for the 
purpose of this research in an abandonment of seafarer situation.  
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 According to contract law, third parties will essentially be anyone other than the 
contracting parties.46 Nonetheless, the law only provides rights for third parties when 
they are expressly provided in the contract, or when it was a contracting party’s 
intention to benefit a third party. In this context it is not difficult to perceive how P& I 
Clubs would fit in this category, since they are the ones responsible for providing 
insurance for the crew, the funds for repatriation of seafarers and most likely will be 
the ones responsible for the Financial Security Fund established by the MLC in case of 
                                                        
46 It was not until the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 that third parties to a contractual relation 
were accepted in England.  Prior to that the common law ‘privity of contract’ rule , that essentially states 
that a contract cannot impose rights or confer obligations to anyone aside from the contracting parties, 
was seen as a trammel to allowing any rights to anyone outside the contractual relationship, i.e. anyone 
besides the contracting parties. (This was subject of much judicial and academic criticism to the extent 
that the Law Commission in 1996 issued a Report on Privity of Contract-  Law Commission, Privity of 
Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (Law Com. No.242) which much of its 
recommendations were adopted by the 1999 Act.  For a more detailed discussion on the subject see: 
Catharine MacMillan, ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999’ in The Modern Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 5 (Sep., 2000), pp. 721-738 Published by: Blackwell 
Publishing, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1097046) 
The 1999 Act did not abolish the doctrine of privity of contract but merely reformed it to allow in certain 
circumstances parties others than the contracting ones to have certain rights and obligations emanating 
from the contract itself. The Act is in fact perceived as a statutory exception to the privity of contract 
doctrine, a limited one nonetheless. (Catharine MacMillan, ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ in The Modern Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 5 (Sep., 2000), 
Published by: Blackwell Publishing, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1097046.  P.721 and Hugh Beale 
QC, Chitty on Contracts - General Principles, (32nd Ed., Volume 1, Sweet & Maxwell 2012), ISBN 
978041404803, 18-002) 
Indeed, this exception provided by the 1999 Act is limited to only two situations; when the contract 
expressly provides so and when the contract intends to confer a benefit to someone other than the 
contracting parties. Thus, the act fails to cover numerous situations, which have been perceived as 
problematic, such as cases of third parties who have suffered loss in consequence of the breach of a 
contract between others and who must seek a remedy in tort against the party in breach. ( Contract (Rights 
of Third Parties) Act 1999, Section 1 and Hugh Beale QC, Chitty on Contracts - General Principles, 
(32nd Ed., Volume 1, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) , ISBN 978041404803,  18-024) 
It is important to note that the 1999 Act does not actually define Third Parties. The closest thing to a 
definition attempted by the Act, can be found in its Section 3 of its Explanatory Notes, which states:  
“The Act reforms the rule of "privity of contract" under which a person can only enforce a contract if he 
is a party to it. The rule means that, even if a contract is made with the purpose of conferring a benefit 
on someone who is not a party to it, that person (a “third party”) has no right to sue for breach of contract.” 
(Emphasis added).  
Therefore, it can be understood that the Act 1999 accepts that anyone who is not a party in the contract, 
should be perceived as a Third Party, thus accepting the general concept of third parties and applying it 
specifically to situations arising out of contracts. Nevertheless, as already discussed, even though the Act 
might be said to broadly define Third Party, it only recognized those as having any rights emanating 
from the contract in two possible scenarios, when expressly provided, or when it was the contracting 
parties’ intentions to benefit the third party. 
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abandonment of seafarers (according to the convention’s definition).  These forms of 
insurance contract are clearly for the benefit of the seafarers.  
 
 Third parties in international law proved to be an even greyer area than in 
contract law. International law seems at a first glance to only recognize states as third 
parties in inter-state relationships, not allowing any sort of responsibilities or 
obligations to be imposed upon these.47 Nevertheless, treaties and contracts share many 
                                                        
47International Law, no differently from English national law does not provide any precise definition for 
Third Parties. In international law, the relationship between third parties and treaties is regulated by the 
principle pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt, meaning that treaties do not create rights or obligations 
for a third party (State) without its consent. The principle can be seen in Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on Law of Treaties I and later in the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties II with the 
appropriate modification ratione personae to international organizations. (Christian Tomushat, 
“International Organizations as Third Parties under the Law of International Treaties”, in The Law of 
Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention  ed. By Enzo Cannizzaro, Oxford Scholarship Online (2011), 
DOI: 10.1093.acprof:oso/9780199588916.001.0001, p.1; and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Third Parties and 
the Law of Treaties, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 6, 2002, 37-137 ) 
In fact, it is in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties that there can be found a 
definition for a Third Party in international law (as imprecise as it may be). The 1969 Vienna Convention 
simply defines "third State" as a state not a party to the treaty(Article 2 para. 1 lit.(h)), and following the 
same line of thought, the 1986 Convention defines "third State" and "third organisation" as a state or an 
international organisation not a party to a treaty. (Article 2 para. 1 lit.(h)) Furthermore, according to the 
1969 Vienna Convention, a party to a treaty is "a State which expressed its consent to be bound ... and 
for which the treaty is in force"(article 2 para. 1 lit.(g)); the same is defined in the text of the 1986 Vienna 
Convention as "a party means a State or an international organisation which has consented to be bound 
by a treaty and for which the treaty is in force" (article 2 para. 1 lit.(g)) 
International law will most commonly refer to Third Party as Third State, which is easy to understand 
since States and not private individuals are parties in Treaties, international agreements and conventions. 
Indeed, States are considered to be the primary subjects of international law. Accordingly, it is easy to 
notice that international law also adopts a very general definition for Third Parties. (See: Gideon Boss, 
Public International Law, Elgaronline (2012) ISBN:9780857939555, eISBN:9780857939562, 
DOI:10.4337/9780857939562”) 
It must be observed at this point that this thesis when dealing with international law does not refer to 
treaties but to conventions, nevertheless they might be perceived as one and the same. Treaties are usually 
defined as an agreement (usually written) between two or more States (or a State/group of States and an 
IGO, or two IGOs), governed by international law and intended to create legal obligations. There should 
be little doubt at this stage that all the conventions mentioned in this thesis possess the same 
characteristics.  The main distinction to be drawn between both instruments is that all conventions will 
be treaties but not all treaties will be conventions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that relating to 
treaties, a distinction is made between law-making treaties (normative treaties) and treaty contracts. The 
former lay down rules of general or universal application and are intended for future and continuing 
observance, whereas the latter resemble contracts in that they are concluded to perform contractual rather 
than normative functions (e.g. building an aircraft). These are negotiated between two or only a few 
States, and treat a particular matter concerning those States exclusively Such as contracts, these treaties 
expire when the parties have performed their obligations. This distinction makes clear that an analogy 
between contracts and treaties can be drawn, as they possess similar features (negotiated between parties, 
considered to only create rights and obligations to the negotiating parties), to the extent that some treaties 
might have contractual rather than normative functions. This analogy might give an even clearer 
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similarities, as does the law of treaties and contract law, hence, it seems reasonable to 
consider that the same principles of the latter could apply to the former, i.e., if the 
convention was drawn for the benefit of anyone other than the contracting states, there 
seems to be no reason to not recognize that one as a third party, similar to the position 
in contract law.  
 
                                                        
perspective that international law perceives third parties the same way contract law does. (See: Alina 
Kaczorowska, Public International Law, (4th Edition, Routledge 2010) , p. 26 and Christian Tomushat 
in his work make a express parallel among treaties and contracts, acknowledging that they are both 
instruments of self-commitment. _ Christian Tomushat, “International Organizations as Third Parties 
under the Law of International Treaties”, in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the 
Vienna Convention, (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011) DOI: 
10.1093.acprof:oso/9780199588916.001.0001, p. 1) 
It is important to note that articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties I, that regulates 
inter-state treaties, expressly provides for the protection of Third States only.  Nevertheless, the Vienna 
Convention Law of Treaties II envisages the possibility of international organizations to act as Third 
Parties in international Law. Article 34 of the Convention states that: “A treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State or a third organization without the consent of that State or that 
organization”. The recognition of international organizations by international law should not come as a 
surprise, considering that these organizations were recognized by the International Court of Justice as 
subjects of international law, of a specific nature nonetheless, as they are neither sovereign nor equal to 
States, but most importantly due to the fact that diplomatic history accounts for treaties concluded 
between States intending to impose obligations on an international organization. One example of such a 
treaty would be the Peace Treaty of Versailles which provides for the German territory of Saar to be 
administrated by the League of Nations.( See: Article 49(1)). This recognition should come as no surprise 
at this point because if the parallel between contracts and treaties exists, logic will dictate that similar 
situations in both legal spheres would generate the same understanding. Thus, if contract law recognizes 
as a third party someone to whom the contract expressly imposes rights and obligations, the same would 
be expected in treaty law. ( For a more detailed discussion on International Organizations acting as Third 
Parties please refer to: Christian Tomushat, “International Organizations as Third Parties under the Law 
of International Treaties”, in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011) DOI: 10.1093.acprof:oso/9780199588916.001.0001) 
Accordingly, apparently international law only considers States and International Organisations as 
possible third parties. Although the rationale, as already explained makes sense since these are the 
recognized subjects of international law, it implies that only States have rights against other States in 
case one of them breaches a treaty. This assumption raises the question of what happen when an innocent 
individual is harmed by a breach of an international law caused by a State. Couldn’t this individual be 
considered a Third Party in this case?  This would seem to be a grey area of international law.  
Bearing in mind the similarities among treaties and contracts, and the recognition of international 
organizations as possible Third Parties in treaties, it can be concluded that if a convention is drafted for 
the benefit of a Party (individual) and imposes rights and responsibilities upon another Party (individual), 
these should also be considered Third Parties in International Law in the same way they are in Contract 
Law. Henceforth, this will be the approach taken by this thesis. Nevertheless, differently from contract 
law, unfortunately, as this thesis will demonstrate, International Law does not provide a remedy to an 
injured Third Party in these scenarios. 
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Accordingly, it does not seem wrong that in conventions drafted for the benefit 
of seafarers, as is the case of the MLC and several other ILO instruments analysed in 
this thesis, for seafarers to be considered third parties. Specifically, as in the case of the 
MLC, if these conventions expressly establish responsibilities and obligations upon 
states in order to guarantee the seafarers’ rights. Thus, in these cases, states might be 
perceived on occasion as even having a direct obligation towards seafarers, but most of 
the time any obligation would not be as direct a responsibility as the one between 
shipowner and seafarer, but an indirect one. 
 
 Therefore, in any circumstance, the ratifying states do have responsibilities and 
obligations ensuring seafarers’ rights.  It is the understanding of this author that coastal, 
port and Flag States respectively share a responsibility towards seafarers according to 
the Conventions they have ratified. Consequently, it should not be difficult to perceive 
the seafarer as an injured third party if a state fails to fulfil its international obligations. 
Therefore, even with the remote possibility that seafarers are not perceived as the 
beneficiary of the convention (as they might be, looking at SOLAS for instance, which 
was designed to ensure safety of life at sea, hence benefiting the seafarer even if 
indirectly), they should still be perceived as third parties. The problem lies in the fact 
that although contract law has progressed a bit further than international law, currently 
providing for the first type of situation (when the contract is made for the benefit of a 
third party), international law currently does not provide for either type of situation.  
 
 Neither contract law nor international law provide (direct remedies) for 
situations when someone outside the contractual relationship has suffered an injury or 
a loss. However, the lack of provision covering these types of situations, does not 
prevent the injured party from being classified as a third party. The third party in this 
type of situation will only be able to seek a remedy in tort law. classification societies 
will fall into this category, as it will be later demonstrated in this research, a breach by 
a Classification Society of its contract with the shipowner may directly and indirectly 
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affect the seafarer. The same is true for classification societies functioning as 
recognized organizations. 
 
 When analysing third parties in tort law48, it was clear that the subject is still in 
need of much further analysis and discussion, which is not the intention nor the focus 
                                                        
48 There does not seem to be a definition, or anything close to it, of Third Parties in Tort Law. The reason 
for it might be that the idea of making someone responsible for the harm committed by another directly 
opposes to the basic notion of individual moral responsibility, which is the core of the English corrective-
justice-led tort system. Nevertheless, the existence of a Third Party liability is accepted as a form of 
tortious liability.( For a deeper discussion on the subject please see: Claire McIvor, Third Party Liability 
in Tort  (Hart Publishing 2006) ) 
There are not many academic works written on this particular form of tortious liability. Apparently, the 
only extensive research conducted on the subject was made by Dr. Claire McIvor, who suggests in her 
work that third party liability in tort is intrinsically connected to the rule of omission, so much so that the 
misconceptions existing in the latter would be the core of the current “state of unintelligibility” of the 
former. (Claire McIvor, Third Party Liability in Tort, (E-theses – Durham University 2003) p.3, available 
at: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3693/>) 
McIvor’s premise seems to be very accurate, explaining in great deal the difficulty, discussed later in 
this chapter, of imposing liability on third parties in tort. It is not difficult to perceive that in tort cases it 
is a lot easier to rule the defendant liable for a positive action than for a negative one, most commonly in 
cases of negligence, as McIvor’s argues the “term ‘omission’ should be used exclusively for the purpose 
of referring to the alleged source of the defendant’s negligence”.  (Claire McIvor, Third Party Liability 
in Tort, (E-theses – Durham University 2003) , available at: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3693/>, p.5) The 
problem lies with the fact that the law of tort does not recognise a duty of care for omission thus 
negligence cases based solely on omissions are deemed to fail, unless they fall into the plethora of 
exceptions established over the years on an ad hoc basis which is itself problematic. For the purposes of 
this thesis, perhaps the more relevant discussion on the subject of omissions in tort would be the one 
drawn by Honore, who argues that it is possible to designate certain “norms imposing distinct duties” as 
being so important that their violation by whatever means would attract reproach. According to the 
renowned scholar, one distinction to be made between a distinct duty and a mere background duty 
imposed by an ordinary norm is that the former is owed to specific persons as imposed by the particular 
circumstances of the individual agent involved, whereas the latter is owned by each to all. One example 
of these distinct duties would be those owed by persons who create a danger, to those endangered. 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that these distinct duties are high-ranking social or moral duties to 
which strong arguments may support their translation into legal duties. According to Honore, and the 
majority of academic accounts on the subject, these strong arguments would be: 
● The agent has positively created a risk of harm 
● The agent occupies an office or position of responsibility 
● The agent is well placed to meet a need, such position creating a situation of 
dependency 
● The agent is recipient of a benefit 
● The agent has given an undertaking   
(See T. Honore, “Are Omissions less culpable?”, in P. Cane and J. Stapleton (ed.s), The Law of 
Obligations: Essays for Patrick Atiyag, (Clarendon Press1991), p.33; J. Logie, ‘Affirmative Action in 
the Law of Tort: The Case of the Duty to Warn’ in (1989) 48 CLJ 115; J.C. Smith and P. Burns, 
‘Donaghue V Stevenson – The Not So Golden Anniversary’ in (1983) 46 MLR 147, p.173;  Claire 
McIvor, Third Party Liability in Tort, (E-theses – Durham University 2003), available at: 
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3693/>) pp.8-10) 
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of the present research. Nonetheless, the analysis confirmed that third party liability 
exists in tort by way of omission (which is itself the subject of intense academic debate).  
The role of classification societies is essential to the maritime industry as a whole, 
hence as it will be seen, failure in efficiently fulfilling one of its functions can have a 
fundamental impact in maritime casualties. As will later been seen, the classification 
society’s exercise of its functions, or lack of it, can have a direct impact on seafarers. 
Thus, the rule of omissions could be seen as applicable to classification societies due 
                                                        
When establishing the well-known ‘neighbour test’, Lord Atkin seemed to share the same view of Honore 
that omissions are highly connected to moral and social duties. According to his lordship:  
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your 
neighbour; and the lawyer's question “Who is my neighbour?" receives a restricted reply. 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The 
answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my 
mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question." 
(Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562) 
Furthermore, it can be observed from the extract above that Lord Atkin shares Honore’s view of 
omissions as expanding the scope of the duty of care. Indeed, in his speech, his lordship can be said to 
have set the train of the Caparo test (discussed further along this chapter) in motion, when requiring 
foreseeability and reasonableness in order to determine a duty of care in the tort of negligence.  
 Undoubtedly, if omission exceptions were more widely accepted, there would be a lot more claims in 
tort for Third Party liability in cases of Negligence. Furthermore, it is undeniable that most cases whose 
tortfearsor is a third party involve the tort of negligence. Indeed, one of the central premises of this 
chapter is that Third Parties can be found liable in the tort of negligence for the abandonment of seafarers.  
As discussed previously, the 1999 Act did not deal with all the issues concerning third parties, in 
particular with cases when the contract generates a duty of care to a Third Party, the breach of which will 
enable the latter to sue the breaching party in tort for negligence.( Hugh Beale QC, Chitty on Contracts 
- General Principles, (32nd  Ed., Volume 1, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) , ISBN 978041404803,  18-024) In 
several cases, persons providing professional services, such as solicitors, insurance brokers, safety 
consultants, valuers and surveyors have been held liable in tort to persons other than their immediate 
clients for negligence in the performance of their contracts with these clients.(  See: Ross v Caunters 
[1980] Ch. 287; White v Jones [1995] 2 A.C. 207; cf. Smith v Clarement Haynes, The Times, September 
3, 1991 as a title of example); In these cases, the third party is not the tortfeasor but the person who 
suffered the tort is, because it refers to the Third Party in contract Law and not in Tort. Nevertheless, the 
Third Party in these situations has no recourse in contract law (as these situations are not recognised as 
an exception of the doctrine of privity by the 1999 Act), only in tort.  
It can be concluded that the Third Party in tort law is a rather grey area. Although, no current definition 
stands, it can be assumed that the accepted position is that a Third Party in tort law is the party who has 
actually not committed the wrongdoing him/herself, but can be found liable for it nonetheless, mostly in 
tort of negligence based on an omission. This assumption can be drawn from the fact that although no 
palpable definition of third party currently stands, third party liability in tort is accepted. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that in certain situations when contract law is not applicable, third parties in contract 
law can rely on tort to have a valid claim against the breaching party. 
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to their vital role, which shall become clear later in this research. Consequently, 
undoubtedly, classification societies should find their liability regulated by tort law. 
  
 Therefore, the ‘private actors’ selected to be analysed in this research are the 
following: 
 
● P&I Clubs – Insurance Companies 
● Classification Societies 
● Flag States 
● Port States 
● Coastal States 
 
Not coincidentally, all the third parties analysed are considered to be a member 
of what is known as the “Maritime safety chain”. The reason why this can be hardly 
considered a coincidence is the fact that all of the mentioned third parties are essential 
not only to ensure the safety of the sea, but also to regulate shipping in general. All of 
them perform vital functions for the sustainability of shipping as whole. Indeed, they 
could even be considered third parties in any sort of “shipping law” relationship, 
because their role in the industry has an impact in any shipping transaction, i.e. 
charterparties or pollution accidents.  Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 
they also have a vital role in ensuring seafarers’ safety at sea, to say the least. This does 
not necessarily mean that they will incur liability if they fail to do so. This shall, 
hopefully, become clear as this thesis progresses. 
 
Methodology 
 
 This thesis will prove that the selected shipping industry’s stakeholders have an 
essential role in seafarer abandonment cases, incurring responsibilities and possible 
liabilities. Two premises were relied upon in order to justify such a hypothesis: 
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● Seafarers are transnational employees 
● The existence of a link between substandard shipping 
and abandonment of seafarers 
 
These two premises are validated throughout this thesis. Chapters II and III in 
particular, focus on the validation of both premises. In order to prove these premises 
the concept of transnational law, abandonment of seafarer and substandard shipping 
were analysed.   
 
The research demonstrated that the concept of transnationality is still an 
evolving one, having its roots in the United States but having been incorporated in other 
nations as well. The lack of material in this area is evident, with all the leading materials 
being written by American academics. The problematic nature of transnational law 
seems to be founded upon the fact that some legal scholars conducting research in 
different fields will justify the use of the concept of transnationality for relationships 
that have “crossed borders”, without further elaborating on that, it not being clear if the 
concept is as laid out by Jessup, the pioneer in the field, or if the principle is adopted in 
the same manner in each piece of research. It seems clear, nonetheless, that most 
scholars will justify the notion of transnational law through an already settled analysis 
of international and national law concepts and the subsequent realization that the legal 
relationship studied does not necessarily fall under either concept, as in the case of 
maritime law for instance.49In this thesis the concept of transnational law developed by 
Jessup and subsequently Kohl was adopted; their being considered the pioneering 
authorities in the field avoids the need for fruitless further discussion. 
 
When considering the term “abandonment of seafarer”, the legal and normative 
approach towards it was researched and analysed.  Although the term can be said to 
have acquired a specific legal definition in this decade, the research demonstrated that 
the terminology has been used in previous decades also to raise awareness of seafarers’ 
                                                        
49 See pp.18-23 
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conditions. The normative approach proved that the term has been used even before 
seafarers were granted any minimum rights and was always used in a context of calling 
attention to the struggles faced by these employees. Undoubtedly, the current definition 
contained in the MLC took into consideration the normative approach confining 
“abandonment of seafarers” to extreme contractual breaches of employment.  
 
In order to analyse “abandonment of seafarers” it was deemed necessary to 
analyse the evolution of seafaring and seafarers’ rights, taking into consideration 
historical developments and normative characteristics. This was also necessary in order 
to demonstrate the transnational character of seafarers’ labour relations.  
 
The analysis conducted regarding the practice of substandard shipping was 
essential in order to determine the choice of private actors to be analysed in this thesis. 
The research demonstrated that these selected shipping industry’ stakeholders are 
essential in the prevention of substandard shipping, having been held liable on certain 
occasions by determined jurisdictions when such substandard shipping had been 
confirmed. Furthermore, the research demonstrated the existent link between 
abandonment and substandard shipping. 
 
 Finally, except for in chapter IV, a comparative study was not carried out in 
this thesis, as English law was used as a primary source of legislation throughout, hence 
used as example whenever analysis of national legislation was deemed necessary. 
National laws of other jurisdictions were referred to wherever relevant. Accordingly, 
in chapter IV, the legislations chosen to be analysed were those of the United States of 
America and France, due to the eminent judgments handed down in those jurisdictions 
in relation to classification societies and their part in the most infamous maritime 
incidents involving substandard shipping, i.e. the Prestige and the Erika incidents. 
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Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter I seeks to prove the transnationality of seafarers’ rights, or rather of maritime 
labour law. The chapter shall trace a timeline of the development of seafarers’ rights 
over the years. The chapter will demonstrate the effect that international organisations 
had on seafarers’ rights and how such dynamics work, and shall assist in understanding 
the connection made throughout this thesis with international conventions not 
specifically designed to protect seafarers but that do have an impact in assuring their 
protection. It shall determine the impact that the perception of seafarers had on the 
development of their rights and the origin of the terminology of “abandonment of 
seafarer”. 
 
Chapter II intends to analyse what is known as the ‘maritime safety chain’. Chapter II 
shall be dedicated to the analysis of the network of responsibilities in the maritime 
industry and the liability of its entities, especially towards third parties. The focus of 
the chapter will not rest solely on shipowner liability, but also on the responsibilities 
and liabilities of the other members of the chain, namely the flag State, port State, 
Classification Society and insurer, and P&I Clubs. Special attention will be given to the 
impact that the safety chain has on seafaring.  Accordingly, chapter II will make a 
general analysis of these parties’ roles within the industry, in order to demonstrate the 
link between “substandard shipping” and “abandonment of seafarers”, which is 
essential in order to determine third parties’ liabilities and responsibilities in relation to 
abandonment of seafarers. The chapter shall demonstrate the relevance that the chosen 
third parties have as regards abandonment of seafarers. 
 
Chapter III focuses on demonstrating states’ responsibilities and liabilities, in their 
roles of flag, coastal or Port State.  As this chapter will prove, states not only by 
emanating rights regarding seafarers play a vital role in assuring that seafarers have 
their rights enforced, they also play a role in preventing abandonment of seafarers from 
happening. States, more than being mere regulators or convention signatories, play an 
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active role preventing abandonment of seafarer from happening and as such may incur 
responsibilities and liabilities if abandonment happens. 
 
Chapter IV consists of arguing the classification societies’ responsibilities and 
possible liabilities towards seafarers. In order to ascertain this, the chapter will explain 
classification societies’ roles and their importance within the shipping industry. The 
chapter will prove that these stakeholders are relied upon to ensure that the shipowner 
complies with some of his basic responsibilities towards seafarers. Considering that 
classification societies do not have a contractual relationship with seafarers and can 
hardly be considered legislated upon by international regulations, their liability shall be 
ascertained by tort law, hence some national legislations shall be analysed. The 
legislations selected, apart from English Law - which as explained previously was taken 
as a base for this thesis - were chosen based on renowned cases concerning the liability 
of classification societies in substandard shipping, which as will be demonstrated in 
chapter II, has a direct link with abandonment. Additionally, all the cases were 
considered in tort law, since the claimants in the cases were, similarly to the position 
of seafarers as against classification societies, not in a contractual relationship. 
 
Chapter V focuses on demonstrating P&I Clubs’ responsibilities and obligations 
towards seafarers. This chapter shall also cover the new responsibilities brought to 
insurers by the Maritime Labour Convention with regards to abandonment of seafarers.  
It draws a comparison between the Financial Security Scheme provided for by the 
Convention in cases of abandonment of seafarers, with compulsory insurance provided 
by other international instruments. Considering the importance of English Law to the 
marine insurance industry, this is the only national legislation analysed in this part. The 
chapter shall prove that P&I clubs are crucial players in assuring that seafarers have 
their rights respected. 
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Chapter I – Developments in seafarers’ employment 
“As long as there have been labourers – under ancient slavery, under feudalism, and 
in the social systems of the modern world – there have been seamen”50 
 
 This chapter will trace a timeline demonstrating how seafarers’ employment has 
evolved over the years until the present day. The purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate the changes of and developments in regards to seafarers’ rights, going from 
national legislation to international regulations and a combination of both. It seeks to 
prove how international organisations and other private actors have had a direct impact 
on the development of seafarers’ rights and consequently on ‘abandonment of 
seafarers’. Indeed, this chapter shall confirm the transnationality of seafaring, by 
showing how seafarers have had their rights developed through a combination of 
national and international regulations, as well as through the action of private actors. 
Furthermore, the chapter will show the origin of the terminology ‘abandonment of 
seafarers’. Thus it will be demonstrated how the transnational legal process has had and 
continues to have a direct impact on abandonment of seafarers. 
 
 The chapter will start with the regulation and perception of seafarers during 
early periods in legal history, which is indispensable to confirm the origin of the 
terminology of ‘abandonment of seafarer’, to the development of trade unions and 
international organisations. Finally, it will discuss the newest international piece of 
regulation on seafarers’ rights, the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC).  The reason 
for the MLC being the only regulation discussed in this chapter is a matter of concision, 
and further and primarily because the Convention encompasses the majority of 
international instruments regarding seafarers’ rights. Most importantly, the Convention 
deals with the term ‘abandonment of seafarers’ bringing specific regulation to the 
situations that according to the convention constitute abandonment of seafarers, 
imposing new responsibilities and liabilities that before were only found in guidelines. 
Furthermore, the Convention has been considered a tool in the combatting of 
                                                        
50 Bruce Nelson, Workers on the waterfront : seamen, longshoremen, and unionism in the 1930s., 
(University of Illinois Press,1988), page 11 
41 
 
substandard shipping, which confirms the connection between substandard shipping 
and abandonment. 51 
 
This chapter will deal with a few social aspects of seafaring. The reason for this 
is that for this chapter to achieve its full purpose in demonstrating how seafarers’ rights 
have developed, and demonstrating the rationale behind why their rights might be 
considered to have taken longer to develop than other employment rights, the analysis 
of their social and political status over the years is crucial. Furthermore, this is also 
necessary in order to demonstrate when and how the term “abandonment of seafarers” 
developed, proving that the terminology was born far prior to any international 
instrument, having historical roots.  
 
I. 1. - From 3100 BC until the 19th Century – The earliest traceable regulations 
 
Seafaring is undoubtedly one of the world’s oldest professions, with the history 
of the sea being traceable back to shortly before 3100 BC52. Nevertheless, the regulation 
of seafarers’ employment can hardly be traced as far back, unsurprisingly, since records 
indicate that seafaring was initially a profession performed by slaves.53  
 
I.1.1 – The Praetor’s Edict 
 
A truly large scale of international transportation and commerce started being 
experienced by the world during the early days of the Roman Empire.54 The Roman 
law at the time, the Praetor’s Edict, which epitomized the law applicable to the whole 
population of the Empire, the Roman citizen or Barbarian, the Jus Gentium, contained 
a section on nautae, which can be translated as sailor, and therefore seafarer. The 
provisions of the section were also extended to innkeepers and stable keepers and its 
                                                        
51 See Chapter I pp.77-86 
52. Lione Casson, The Ancient Mariners, (2nd Edition, Princeton University Press 1991), page 4. – The 
book first points out the use of slaves by Egyptians, one of the first Nations to start trading with other 
countries by sea, tracing back to 2600 b.c. References about slaves being seafarers are also made on the 
Rhodian Sea Code; See: Water Ashburner, The Rhodian Sea Law, (Clarendon Press, 1909) 
53 Ibid, p.6 
54 http://www.jaysromanhistory.com/romeweb/transprt/shiptrav.htm, last accessed on 20/10/2015 
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purpose was to impose strict duties upon providers of services to travellers, regarding 
their belongings and goods. Deirdre Fitzpatrick and Michael Anderson in their book 
Seafarer’s Rights argue that in this context the term Nautae is perhaps better understood 
as shipowners.55 
 
I.I.2 – The custumals 
 
In Medieval Europe, a collection of rules were made, described and presented 
as the customs of the sea. These were rules of behaviour, common at the time, where 
members of a particular group expected and accepted the customs or custumals 
applicable to them. Medieval lawyers accepted the idea that a person might to some 
extent carry his law with him as part of his recognized legal personality. During the 
Medieval age, trade by sea was at full steam; merchants began importing silks, cottons 
and rare spices from all over the then-known world56. Therefore, it was vital for courts 
in cities and countries with constant contact with seafarers to set forth the customs of 
the sea since these courts had to settle seafaring disputes. 
 
The custumals are best considered as practice guides for judges instead of 
legislative codes or statutes in the modern sense, since this set of rules appears to derive 
from the particular solutions adopted by courts with substantial relevant experience, 
particularly those in seaports. Their guidance was given by describing accepted and 
usual practice, and were written down and promulgated.  
 
                                                        
55 D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), page 2  - It is 
difficult to attest the accuracy of Fitzpatrick and Anderson’s statement due to the difficulty of finding 
records of how those responsibilities and obligations were exercised. Thus, a contrary argument to the 
statement could be that shipowners were responsible for the hiring of seafarers to provide such services 
to travellers in relation to their belongings and goods, and thus the primary responsibility for the 
performance of this obligation was on the seafarers. Nevertheless, as seafarers were often slaves, and 
hence an extension of their owners, their actions would reflect the actions of the latter, which would 
justify Fitzpatrick and Anderson’s assumption of the true meaning of the word ‘nautae’. 
56 http://www.medieval-life.net/history_main.htm., last accessed on 10/10/2015 
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Similar to private shipping law, the custumals were concerned primarily with 
the rights and obligations of carriers and cargo owners. Despite having some provisions 
specifically addressed to seafarers, there is nothing approaching a code of law 
governing their rights and duties. Usually, what the custumals have to say on seafarers 
is limited and obscure. Both, the Praetor’s Edict and the custumals provided only for 
the seafarer’s obligations, omitting, or leaving aside their rights and liabilities.  
 
I.1.3 – The Rhodian Sea Code 
 
The Rhodian Sea Code57 is the earliest codification of written maritime customs. 
Even though it was a Byzantine creation, probably written in the 7th and 8th58 century, 
it reflects the customary law of the previous centuries. The Rhodian Sea Code covers 
all aspects of commercial shipping. Seafarers are specifically covered by chapters 5 to 
7, which establish their liability for fights and the responsibility of the shipowner for 
seafarers’ personal injuries.  
 
The Code provides in its Chapter 46 that if the long boat was to break off from 
the ship and the seafarers were lost, the captain had to pay their representatives their 
earlier wages to a complete year. However, it is clear that it refers to seafarers that 
sailed ad partem, which is to say that received an aliquot part of the profits in lieu of 
wages. Nevertheless, chapter 46 apparently refers to a fixed wage, contemplating a 
hiring by the year commencing from the time when presumably the sea was open to 
navigation until it was closed. In the case of a seafarer being killed under the 
circumstances mentioned in the chapter in the course of the year, his representatives 
were entitled to wages due to him until the end of the year. 59These provisions are of 
                                                        
57 Rhodes is a small Greek island and it was a famous and prosperous port in the second or third century 
B.C. Due to their flourishing commerce, they had many commercial and maritime customs which they 
would carry with them to all the ports to which they sailed. That is why the compilation of these customs 
was named ‘The Rhodian Sea Law’ – L Pleionis, The Influence of the Rodhian Sea Law to the other 
maritime Codes , (Extrait de la Revue Hellenique de droit international, 1967), page 173 
58 Water Ashburner, The Rhodian Sea Law, (Clarendon Press, 1909). Ashburner, claims the codification 
period as being in the 7th or 8th Century AD  
59Ibid, page clxviii 
44 
 
enormous value; until today families often have to face endless legal battles only to 
receive what was owed to their deceased family member, not to mention compensation 
for the loss. 
 
Although the manuscripts of the code are slightly obscure, they seem to 
distinguish between three classes of seafarers: the one who receives a share under the 
term of the contract (c.I); the seafarer who hires himself out, receiving a fixed wage 
(c.III); and a slave who is let out by his master as seafarer (c. IV). 
 
Furthermore, the Rhodian Sea Code contained two statutes, Ragusa and Zara, 
describing in detail as to the various systems under which the mariner may be hired. 
Furthermore, the statute of Ragusa provides for the case of the seafarer falling ill, but 
it lacks clarity. Article VII, 23 provides that if the mariner falls ill before the ship leaves 
Ragusa, he is not bound to the ship and that if he falls ill outside Ragusa and is put 
ashore, he is entitled to his share for that voyage, as if he were present, and to his 
expenses, i.e. an allowance for food. However articles that appear to be later additions, 
provide that if the seafarer fell ill during the voyage and was put ashore, or died, he was 
only entitled to pay for the period of his actual service (VII, 24, 25; St. Lesina, V, 5, 
p.212) and nothing is mentioned about any allowance, much less about the seafarer 
repatriation. 
 
Under the statute of Zara, the seafarers received a fixed wage and as a rule they 
were hired for the whole period the sea was open, i.e. from 1st March until 30th 
November, and wages were payable in thirds (IV, 43; IV, 44).  Whenever the seafarer 
remained on board the ship after the 30th of November, the ship not being in Zara by 
the date, he was entitled to a proportional increase of wages (IV, 43, 76). In the case of 
the seafarer dying in the first period of three months, his representatives were entitled 
to his wages for the whole of that period. If his death was to occur after this period, his 
representatives were entitle to his wages apportioned up to day of his death (IV, 63).  
However, there is an exception to this rule, in the case of the seafarer dying in defending 
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the ship or in the course of service, then his heirs are entitle to the whole period of nine 
months (IV, 78). It is hard to determine however, what would be considered “in the 
course of service”. 
 
Most importantly, the statute provided that the seafarer who fell ill during a 
voyage and was left behind was entitled to his wages up to the time of his leaving the 
ship, and to a small payment per day for a month (IV, 61). 
 
The Rhodian Sea Code was proven to be of extreme relevance to the Codes that 
followed it. For instance, the Basilica was a civil law code compiled about the year 
A.D. 890 by the Byzantine Emperor Leo the Wise. Its book 53 dealt with maritime law, 
and is divided into eight titles. The first title dealt specifically with captains, owners’ 
agents, mariners and inn-keepers and writs brought by them or against them. The eighth 
title is about the Rhodian Sea Law. Although some authors understand that the Rhodian 
Sea Law formed a part of the Basilica, most authors agree that ‘The Sea Law fills up 
gaps in the law of the Basilica. It deals with matters which that law does not deal with 
at all, or deals with only imperfectly…’ The former deals with maritime offenses that 
are not dealt with in the Basilica. The Basilica Code was different from the other codes 
of this period, because it was a compilation of positive rules enacted by Byzantine 
Emperors while the other embodied customs60, giving it a special place in the history 
of maritime legislation. 
 
 
In terms of seafarers’ rights, is odd that the Rhodian Sea Code contains many 
gaps and confusing articles regarding seafarers’ rights, whist it was expected to fill the 
gaps and imperfections in past legislations. This is evidence of the fact that at the time, 
seafarers’ rights were not a main concern at all.  
 
                                                        
60 L Pleionis, The Influence of the Rodhian Sea Law to the other maritime Codes , (Extrait de la Revue 
Hellenique de droit international, 1967), page 177/ 178 
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I.1.4 - ‘La Court de la Chaene’ and ‘La Court de la Fond’ 
 
Once the Crusaders conquered the Holy Land and the other lands of Eastern 
Mediterranean, the settlers that followed them tried to keep their own customs distinct 
from those of the native population but nevertheless influenced by them.   
 
The most famous of the new kingdom was the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
established by the end of the first Crusades at the end of the 11th century. Two Courts 
were founded in the Kingdom by its first King, the ‘The High Court of the Barons’ and 
the ‘The court of Bourgeois”. Two codes, compilations of the usages and customs taken 
by the Leaders of the Crusades, followed the creation of the courts.61 
 
The court of the Bourgeois was later on divided, creating two new Courts on 
Maritime, ‘ La Court de la Chaene’, and one mercantile, ‘La Court de la Fond’ to settle 
all the disputes among merchants and various nations who resorted there. These courts 
are of extreme importance to maritime law, since they can be considered the first courts 
that had international jurisdiction in commercial and maritime matters, and which 
applied a common law to merchants and mariners of different origins.  
 
I.1.5 - The ‘Livre des Assises’ 
 
The ‘Livre des Assises’ was the codification of the Maritime Law of the 
Kingdom of Jerusalem. It was divided in seven chapters.  Chapter IV dealt with the 
obligation of the sailor towards the shipmaster. It provided that a seafarer that refuses 
to go on the voyage must pay back double the amount he has received in advance. Once 
again, seafarers’ rights were not mentioned.  All these codes make it clear how seafarers 
were the weak part of the relationship, with their rights barely been mentioned, and in 
a confusing manner when mentioned, and provided seafarers with the minimal 
compensation possible, if any at all. 
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I.1.6 – The ‘consoli del mare’ 
 
Following the collapse of the Roman Empire in A.D. 476, some Italian seaports 
became famous for their commerce, especially the port of Venice and the Port of Genoa. 
Later on a regime similar to that of city-states was established in these towns. In order 
to secure their trade and to avoid disputes with foreign merchants they established the 
‘consoli del mare’. These ‘maritime consuls’ were appointed by the authorities of the 
city states of which they were citizens and they were supposed to apply the already 
existing maritime customs in disputes in which foreign merchants were involved. At 
the time, there were ‘the console dell’arte del mare’ at Pisa, ‘the console del 
commercio’ at Florence, ‘ the Magistratura degli Stranieri’ at Venice and some other 
at Trani, Almafi, and Genoa. The contribution of these ‘consolidation of customs’ was 
enormous for the uniformity of the rules of Mediterranean Trade, with their 
appointment also being one of the first steps toward the creation of international law.62 
 
By the eleventh century, compilations of the maritime customs applied by these 
‘consuls of the sea’ appeared. The most relevant of them are: The Tabula Amalfitana, 
The Constitutum Usus of Pisa and The Decisions of Trani. 63 
 
The Tabula Amalfitana was a compilation of maritime customs based on Roman 
Law and Byzantine tradition from the first quarter of the 11th Century and contains 66 
articles, a great number of which deal with trade in association.  
 
 An interesting aspect of the Tabula, is that its article 15 provides for a common 
fund, perhaps the capital of association, from which was supposed to be paid the ransom 
of associates or mariners who may be captured in the exercise of their duties. When 
reading this provision, the author could not avoid making an analogy between this fund 
and the Financial Security system provided in the proposal for the amendment of the 
                                                        
62 Ibid, page 180 
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Maritime Labour Convention 2006.64 Both funds are fruits of an association of 
shipowners and intend to provide for seamen when they face a distinct ‘stressful and 
inhumane’ situation. At the time of the creation of The Tabula Amalfitana pirate attacks 
were common. Nowadays, pirate attacks with a whole crew being kept prisoner are 
frequently reported, often requiring assistance from shipowners. Nevertheless, what 
happens to the crew after they are freed is another problem to be discussed later on. 
 
The Tabula Alamafitana provided for seafarers in its articles 1-3, 14 and 26. 
Articles 1-3 provided for the seafarers to receive their wages in advance, but in cases 
of their refusal to continue their services, they were accused of fraud and had to pay a 
fine which passed into the common fund. Article 26 provided that a seafarer was to 
have their wages as long as the ship was in service, but if she was captured or wrecked, 
the wages received in advance should be returned. Article 14 provided that the 
association would pay for the seafarers’ medical treatment. Once again it is hard to 
visualize many rights of the seafarers at the time, if any.65 
 
The Constitutum Usus of Pisa had a very clear influence on the Rhodian Sea 
Law, it contained customs and usages in maritime law. It is a compilation of the customs 
which ‘the consuls of the sea’ had applied.  Its article 30 is about salvage and the reward 
for seafarers, which is to be 5 % of the goods saved.66 
 
The Decisions of Trani consisted of 32 ‘decisions’ which started with the words: 
‘The said consuls of the sea propound …”. Decision 10 provided that the seafarers 
engaged for the voyage share in its profits, and they continue to do so during any period 
of illness, however decision 12 provided that if they left the ship they would lose half 
of their share.  Nevertheless, according to decision 11, a seafarer was entitled to leave 
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65 L Pleionis, The Influence of the Rodhian Sea Law to the other maritime Codes , (Extrait de la Revue 
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in some cases without any loss, for instance, when he was appointed the captain of 
another ship. Furthermore, Chapter 9 provided that the master of the ship could only 
dismiss a seafarer for blasphemy, quarrelling, stealing, or debauchery.  Decision 28 
(which is similar to the provision of Chapter 6 of the Rhodian Sea Law) provided that 
the seafarer had the right of self-defence if the master struck him, even though he passed 
to the other side of the chain which separates the rowers from the rest of the ship.67 
 
I.1.7 - The Rolls of Oleron 
 
Once cities in Northern Europe became involved in the maritime trade, they 
adopted similar customs of the sea to deal with the ships that came within their 
jurisdiction. Both in common law and civil law jurisdictions, the first recorded source 
of modern maritime law and the most important and influential of the medieval Sea 
Codes, are the Rolls of Oleron.68 It cannot be determined with certainty the date of the 
promulgation of the Rolls, but most scholars accept as a date the second half of the 13th 
century or even earlier, although the oldest existing manuscript is from the early 14th 
century.69  The Rolls are a collection of maritime customs made in the form of 
judgments accepted by the maritime court of the island of Oleron, and they are also the 
first accepted collection of maritime customs made in an Atlantic Seaport. 70They 
reflect the indirect influence of the Rhodian Sea Law. The Rolls contains many basic 
principles of modern maritime law, including the notion that the shipowner is relieved 
from responsibility for damage to cargo caused by damnum fatale, such as pirates and 
shipwreck, being therefore of central importance in the development of maritime law 
in Northern Europe.71 
 
                                                        
67Ibid, page 182 
68  D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), page 6 
69 The most detailed research into the origin of the Rolls was done by Krieger who reached the conclusion 
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The Rolls recognized two kinds of seafarers: those who served for the entire 
voyage and those who did so for monthly periods (and payments) (Article 20). Articles 
6 and 7 provided for the seafarer’s medical expenses as part of the expenses of the ship, 
and they were supposed to be paid during their illness. Nevertheless, article 19 provided 
that seafarers were bound to serve the ship up to the end of the voyage, if they came 
within the first category defined in article 20, regardless whether they fell ill. It is hard 
to envisage, especially when dealing with special types of infirmities contracted at sea, 
how the seafarer would be able to carry on his duties in such a state.72 
 
The ‘Consulate of the Sea’ is another collection of maritime customs, which 
possessed the force of law in the consular Court of Barcelona during the 13th Century. 
It contains 334 Chapters and is divided into three parts. The first part includes the code 
of proceedings of the court of the Consuls of the Sea of the city of Valencia, to which 
a special jurisdiction within maritime commerce had been granted. This first part 
comprised 45 chapters. The second part of the code contained 252 chapters and 
included the written customs of the sea, dealing with disputes arising between 
merchants or seafarers, and shipowners. The third part contained 37 chapters, 
concerning municipal government usages of warships, the duty of, and the relations 
between the owners, officers and crew of these vessels, and concerning privateering 
expeditions at a time when a permanent state of war existed in the Mediterranean.73 
 
In its second part, the Consulate of the Sea recognized four different types of 
arrangement for the seafarer’s service: sailing on shares, which meant receiving some 
of the voyage’s profits, serving monthly, or by the mile, or at the discretion of the 
shipowner in charge who would pay the seafarer at the end of the voyage.74The Code 
provided that the seafarers had to obey the captain, who had the right of punishing them, 
even by imprisonment in the case of a quarrel75. However, seafarers had the right of 
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self-defence if while trying to escape to the bow of the ship, they were attacked by the 
captain.76 
 
 Furthermore, the Consulate provided that the association of shipowners had an 
obligation to equip the ship with all its necessities, and in the case of a refusal by any 
of them, the captain was entitled to borrow money on the account of that part owner.77 
Although there is no specification of what the ship’s ‘necessities’ are, one may assume 
that at least fuel and food would be included. This provision carries a remarkable 
resemblance, in the author’s opinion, with the shipowner’s obligations provided by the 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006 articles, particularly article 5 (c) of the Proposal for 
the text of an amendment to the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, to be presented to 
the future Special Tripartite Committee, with a view to adoption in accordance with 
Article XV of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006. 
 
 The Rolls of Oleron provided the foundation for other medieval collections, for 
instance the Rules of Wisby, and the Laws of the Hanse league. Also, the English Court 
of Admiralty used to rely on the Rolls, incorporating it into the 14th century book of 
Admiralty practice known as the Black Book of the Admiralty. Furthermore, once the 
power of nation states was consolidated in Europe, the Rolls of Oleron, together with 
the Judgements of the Damme and the Rules of Wisby became the foundation for the 
elaboration of national maritime and commercial codes.78 
 
 It is clear that all of these earlier Codes were of immeasurable value for maritime 
law in general. However, in general, they barely dealt with seafarers’ rights, much less 
provided positively for them, which is not strange considering the fact that mention is 
made to seafarers having been slaves, and in other cases, it can be assumed that they 
were generally from the society’s lower classes. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the extent to which the few rules relating 
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to seafarers’ rights were enforced. 
 
I.2 – The 19th Century 
 
The situation may have started to change during the 19th century, however the 
perception of the profession and its men seems to have remained derogatory. In 1850, 
James Milne wrote the book ‘Ocean life: Or an appeal on behalf of the mental, moral, 
and religious improvement of seamen’. The book is nothing if not a written document 
showing how people of the time perceived seafarers, and an analysis of this group’s 
social behaviour.  
 
“To a very lamentable extent, our sea-faring population consists of men 
who are far inferior to what it is their privilege to be, in point of morality, 
intellect, and general intelligence, the masses of whom, generally speaking, 
spring from the lowest grades of corrupted society, uneducated and 
depraved, and who exert a powerful an baneful influence over those who 
have had a superior training, when they become associated in the seafaring 
capacity.”79 
 
 Although Milne’s book is apparently an attempt to attract Church sympathy 
towards the seafarer community, oddly enough it is also keen in attributing 
responsibility to seafarers for property lost at sea, due to their “negligence, 
inexperience, drunkenness, and dissipated habits”.80 
  
 Nevertheless, Milne’s book is undoubtedly a call to the population of the time to 
acknowledge seafarers, and their need for more rights and better life conditions. “It is 
therefore the duty of every man who fears God and loves his country, to feel interested 
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in the social, moral, and religious condition of the seamen”.81 
 
Lord Stowell had already noticed the injustice placed upon seafarers, who were 
often taken advantage of.  In the Minerva (1825) case, he pointed out the necessity of 
their protection:  
 
“ On the one side there are gentlemen possessed of wealth, and intent, I 
mean not unfairly upon augmenting it, conversant in business, and 
possessing the means of calling in the aid of practical and professional 
knowledge. On the other side is a set of men, generally ignorant and 
illiterate, notoriously and proverbially reckless and improvident, ill 
provided with the means of procuring useful information, and almost ready 
to sign any instrument that may be proffered to them; and by all accounts 
requiring protection, even against themselves.”82 
 
In the Minerva case it was shown that the settled printed form (i.e. the seafarer’s 
employment contract), which seafarers were required to execute contained an 
engagement to submit themselves to all the penalties and forfeitures of an Act passed 
for the express regulation of the West India Trade and confined exclusively to that 
commerce.83 
 
  Although by that time, the court of Admiralty had asserted its rights to examine 
whether the clauses of a ship’s articles were reasonable and therefore binding upon 
seafarers, in the courts of Westminster Hall stricter principles of construction obtained, 
and the ignorance and improvidence of seafarers, and their inability to appreciate the 
meaning and effect of such instruments, led to frequent scandal in cases of great cruelty 
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and injustice. Finally, the 5&6 Will. 4, c.19, which repealed all previous acts on the 
subject, was passed. By this act, the written agreement between the master and the 
seafarer was required to specify the wages to be paid, the capacity in which the seafarer 
was to act, and the nature of the intended voyage. The Act was repealed by the General 
Merchant Seamen act (GMSA), which re- enacted the requirements of the former act 
as to the nature of agreements with the seamen, and provided that they should also 
contain a statement as to the quantity of provision the seamen was to receive. Later on, 
the GMSA was consolidated by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.84 
 
 In a subsequent case, the George Home (1825), regarding seafarers’ wages, Lord 
Stowell said it would take him inordinately long to point out half the impertinencies 
with which seafarers’ contracts were stuffed, and that it was high time to correct this.85 
 
In 1887, The Supreme Court of the USA left clear that it shared the same 
position as the parliament of the UK, by stating in the Arago that :“seamen are treated 
by the congress as well as by the Parliament of the UK as deficient in that full intelligent 
responsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults”. The court’s ruling 
affirmed that the provision of the 13th Amendment and subsequent legislation barring 
involuntary servitude did not apply to seafarers. Meaning that seafarers were still 
subject to arrest and imprisonment for desertion and absence without leave. 86 
 
Perhaps due to the close ties between the merchant marine and the navy, and 
the fact of seafarers being considered pariahs, the latter were subject to a code of 
discipline unthinkable even in the worst sweatshops and lumber camps of early 
industrial capitalism. Flogging was a traditional form of correction in the British navy 
and was lawful in the American merchant marine as well. Flogging was finally 
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outlawed in 1850. However, Frederick Law Olmsted in his book of 1861 about slavery 
in America, stated with apparently no exaggeration that American seafarers were “more 
wretched and are governed more by threats of force than any other civilized labourers 
in the world.” Olmsted was one of the many that compared seafarers with chattel slaves, 
being well qualified to do so.  Besides having travelled extensively through the ‘cotton 
kingdom’, in the 1840s he sailed before the mast for two years.87 
 
The outlawing of flogging in 1859, although putting an end to that most 
notorious form of punishment, did not end the sadistic brutality to which seafarers were 
subjected. Thus, in 1895 the sailor’s union published a pamphlet about the death of 
fourteen seafarers as a result of shipboard discipline “under circumstances which justify 
the charge of murder”, but where only three convictions had been obtained. As wrong 
as it may seem today, in 1893, T.F. Oakes, the then president of the Northern Pacific 
Railway Company ruled: “a shipmaster has the right to a beat a seaman who is 
unruly”.88 
 
Remarkably, for centuries, the seafarer was regarded by law and custom as less 
than human, often treated worse than a chattel slave, or a pack animal. He (the idea of 
female seafarers was not even considered) felt the burden of an archaic, semi-feudal 
tradition of the sea, and a code of laws that perpetuated this bondage. 
 
The truth of that time was that everyone regarded seafarers’ living and working 
conditions as deplorable. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a general consensus that a 
seafarer was not only a reflection of his conditions, but was also in some significant 
measure responsible for them.89Therefore, a very prejudiced vision of seafarers 
emerged placing them in the fringes of society, with the latter unwilling to consider the 
needs of seafarers. 
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I.2.1 - “Abandonment” in the 19th Century 
 
 The Shipowner’s Manual written in 180490 titled one of its topics 
“Abandonment”. Basically, the topic deals with the right of a shipowner to abandon his 
ship and be covered by the insurance, entitling a shipowner the right to abandon the 
ship when it was taken or kept by the enemy or detained by any foreigner power, or 
seized for the service of the government. The topic mentions the goods on board the 
ship, and the value of these to be recovered. Nevertheless, the topic fails to mention the 
crew on board the ship when it was abandoned. It is almost like the only things of value 
on board a vessel, at its time of abandonment, were goods.91  
 
  Nevertheless, the Manual provides for the repatriation of seafarers in a previous 
section. It provided that British governors, ministers, and consuls residing abroad were 
required to provide for British seafarers’ repatriation, when stranded in a foreign port 
by reason of shipwreck, capture, or other unavoidable accident (note that the reasons 
for a seafarer being stranded in a port are the same as the ones given for abandonment 
of a ship).92 Seafarers were supposed to be sent home in any ship of the Royal Navy or 
in any merchant ship. The provision also required that every master of a merchant ship 
homeward bound take all seafarers on board ‘home’.93 The master of a merchant ship 
was to receive payment for each seafarer that he would bring to England that was not 
originally part of his crew.94 Notably, the Manual provided that in the event of the 
master failing to pay the crew, even if having money to do so, the shipowners remained 
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liable for the payment, in proportion to their respective shares in the ship.95 
 
The subsequent act, the Merchant Shipping Act 1984 (MSA) provided that if 
the ship was transferred or disposed to a foreign port, and the seafarer did not consent 
in writing to complete the voyage if this was to continue, or if the service terminated in 
that port, the master was bound in addition to pay the seaman due wages, to provide 
him with adequate employment on board some other British ship bound to the British 
port at which he was originally shipped, or to any port in the United Kingdom agreed 
by him with a passage home, or to deposit a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of 
his maintenance and passage home. This deposit was to be made with the British 
consular officer, or, in the absence of any such officer, with one of the British merchants 
residing in the Port, and not interested in the ship. The seafarer was supposed to 
determine the amount to be deposited, and no appeal was possible from his decision 
even if the named sum was insufficient. Seafarers were to indorse upon the agreement 
with the crew the particulars of any such payment, provision or deposit to be made. If 
the master failed without reasonable cause to comply with any of the above agreement 
regarding expenses of maintenance or passage home, the seaman was entitled to recover 
them as wages due. And in the case of these being defrayed by any other person, and 
unless the seamen was guilty of barratry, they were considered a charge upon the ship 
and upon the owner, and were recoverable from the owner. 96 The only questionable 
part of this provision, in the author’s opinion, is the seafarer having to determine the 
amount of his repatriation expenses. As previously observed, seafarers were often 
illiterate and incapable of performing these kinds of calculations. 
 
The MSA went further on the subject and provided that if a seafarer was 
wrongfully forced onto shore, or left behind by any person belonging to a British ship, 
the offence was punishable as a misdemeanour. The seafarer was not to be discharged 
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or left behind by the master unless he first obtained sanction or certificate at any place 
elsewhere than in a British possession, of the British Consular Officer. Furthermore, it 
provided for the delivery of accounts of wages due, and for the payment of those wages 
by the shipmaster on the basis of leaving a seafarer ashore on grounds of unfitness or 
inability to proceed.97 
 
 Therefore, as it may be perceived in these two acts, even the earliest 19th century 
legislation provided for the seafarer’s repatriation and the payment of due wages. 
Furthermore, it can be noted by the reading of both acts’ provisions that masters at the 
time were considered agents of the shipowner. 
 
It is important to note that in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, most European 
countries, in particular the most well-known maritime nations, all had similar maritime 
legislation, based on the Rhodian Code and the Roles of Oleron.98 
 
I.2.1.1 - The East India Company’s Maritime case  
 
 The East India Company’s Maritime case of 1834 is extremely interesting, as it 
might be the first reported case of ‘abandonment of seafarer’, and it demonstrates that 
even prior to the advent of international instruments, seafarers could already find 
protection in national legislation. In the case, seafarers are compared to regular 
employees, and thus have the same rights as conferred upon the latter. 
 
 The East India Company was a trading company that went bankrupt. The aim of 
the 1834 case was to compensate seafarers previously hired for their losses that 
followed the company’s insolvency. The case tries to demonstrate that seafarers were 
indeed company employees; “the Commander and Officers were allowed to be 
                                                        
97 Ibid s 187, 188 and 189 
98 See D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005) – L Pleionis, 
The Influence of the Rodhian Sea Law to the other maritime Codes, (Extrait de la Revue Hellenique de 
droit international, 1967) 
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recommended by the Shipowners; but they were recommended to the service of the 
Company. They were examined and approved by the Honourable Court, and sworn into 
the service of the Company; they were paid by the Company, and not by the Owners.” 
99 Also, the Company didn’t always charter the ships from voyage to voyage; some 
were owned by the Company, and officers serving in the chartered ships were placed 
on the same footing of those serving in Company ships.100 101 Furthermore, the 
seafarers’ pledge tries to demonstrate that their employment relationship should be 
considered the same as the Company’s inland employees, with the seafarers being 
entitled to the same rights.102 
 
 Unfortunately, there are no records on how the case was resolved. Nevertheless, 
this does not remove its importance, it being one of the first cases demanding 
compensation for seafarers. Furthermore, the case considers a question still debated 
today, which hopefully will be resolved with the advent of the MLC103, i.e., ‘who is the 
                                                        
99 East India Memorial, 1834, page 4 
100 East India Memorial, 1834, page 12 
101 An Appeal to the Majesty’s Government and the East India Company for justice in the claims of 
Compensation, 1834, page 2/3. 
102 An Appeal to the Majesty’s Government and the East India Company for justice in the claims of 
Compensation, 1834, page 14/16 
103 The MLC broad definition of shipowner, intends to cover not only the ‘traditional shipowners’ but 
also manning agencies, charterers (…), anyone that would have assumed the responsibility of the 
operation of the ship from the owner.  According to the MLC a shipowner is:  
“(…) the owner of the ship or another organization or person, such as the manager, agent or bareboat 
charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the ship from the owner and who, on 
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over the duties and responsibilities imposed on 
shipowners in accordance with this Convention, regardless of whether any other organization or persons 
fulfil certain of the duties or responsibilities on behalf of the shipowner.”( MLC, Article II. 1 (a)) 
The definition has raised a lot of debate as some believed that it did not make very clear who the 
shipowner should be, since apparently according to it a shipowner could be a third-party manager even 
if another entity carries out certain MLC shipowner duties and responsibilities.  However, this confusion 
according to Dr Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry (ILO department of standards director) seems to be due to a 
misunderstanding when reading the ‘regardless’ part of the definition. According to Dr. Doumbia-Henry 
the “regardless ...” phrase simply clarifies that the entity identified as an MLC shipowner, whether the 
owner of the ship, ship manager or other entity, may indeed not be the one fulfilling all the duties and 
responsibilities of the shipowner under the MLC..( Liz MacMahon, ‘ILO stands by labour convention’s 
shipowner’ (lloydslist, August 2013)) 
According to the IMO Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006) Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ) document; “this comprehensive definition was adopted to reflect the idea that irrespective of the 
particular commercial or other arrangements regarding a ship‘s operations, there must be a single 
entity, ―the shipowner, that is responsible for seafarers‘ living and working conditions. This idea is also 
reflected in the requirement that all seafarers‘ employment agreements must be signed by the shipowner 
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seafarer’s employer?104 Indeed, the case is remarkably similar to current abandonment 
of seafarer cases, especially considering that the Company was facing financial 
hardship at the time of the incident, which, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, is the 
main cause of abandonment of seafarers until today.  
 
I.2.2– The beginning of the ‘internationalization’ of seafaring and the consequent 
unionism 
 
 The seafarer era of ‘sailing’ (lasting from the 16th to the 19th centuries) mainly 
involved the British Isles and northern Europe. Traditionally, the deck sailors were 
Scandinavian. They formed the backbone of the Sailor’s Union of the Pacific long after 
the demise of sailing ships. The ‘black gang’ was by tradition from the province of the 
Irish, and the cooks and stewards were of many nationalities. Nevertheless, gradually, 
on the West Coast, the shipowners began to employ Chinese and Filipino workers, first 
in the stewards’ department and then in all the unlicensed ratings. This led the ISU 
leadership to engage in increasingly strident calls for ‘Asiatic Exclusion’.105 
 
 The late 19th Century was marked by the beginning of ‘internationalized crews’; 
more and more seafarers from China, India, Africa, Somalia, and South East Asia could 
                                                        
or a representative of the shipowner”. ( IMO, ‘Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006) 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)’ (Online revised Edition, ILO 2012) <www.ilo.org/mlc>, last 
accessed on 10/11/2015)  
This definition could indeed represent a significant change in seafarers’ rights being enforced, since 
sometimes the owner of the ship may not be as easily located as the charterer or the manning agency. 
Nonetheless, ship managers could not disagree more with the understanding that they could be 
considered to be the shipowner for the purpose of the MLC as the Director of V.Ships group Mr. Matt 
Dunlop stated: “We fail to understand how anybody can consider how a service provider, such as a third-
party manager, can come under the definition of MLC shipowner. There is no ambiguity in the 
definition”. (Liz MacMahon, ‘MLC 2006: Who is the shipowner and why does it matter?’ (lloydslist, 
August 2013)).It is up to Member States of the MLC to clarify the definition of the shipowner when 
implementing the convention.  
104 The Company tried to place the seafarers as employers of the Shipowners initially. East India 
Memorial, 1834, page 5. Until today, discussions occurred about who are seafarers’ rightful employer, 
shipowners or manning agencies.  
105 Bruce Nelson, Workers on the waterfront : seamen, longshoremen, and unionism in the 1930s., 
(University of Illinois Press,1988), page 32 
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be seen on board ships.106 British, Australian and American seafarers felt threatened by 
this new trend. The Australian Seamen trade union, recently formed at the time (1878), 
began a strike to prevent ‘non- white’ cheap labour on Australian ships, reinforced by 
the White Australia Policy of 1891-1901. The Seamen’s Bill 1915 in the US gave 
support to the US union demands of ‘US Jobs for US Seamen’. The Bill also expanded 
the parameters of seafarers’ rights and required that at least three-quarters of the crew 
be able to understand English.107 
  
 In the 1880s, trade unions began to spread on an international scale, generating a 
view from more progressive leaders that conditions on ships had to be raised for 
everyone at sea. Clearly the establishment of these trade unions was of extreme 
importance to giving seafarers more rights. Throughout collective bargaining 
agreements they were able to assure seafarers’ rights, and by being able to ‘speak’ in 
the name of seafarers in front of government authorities, their protection was 
increased.108 
 
 From the beginning of the unions’ inception, seafarers demanded that their 
union create a method of hiring that would free them from the enslavement of crimps. 
In 1886, in the US, the sailortown boarding masters were not only determining who 
would work on board ships, but  were also receiving an advance of the seamen’s wages 
in return for providing them with bed, board, booze and clothing. As a response to the 
seafarers’ demands, the Coast Seamen’s Union, less than one month after its 
establishment, opened its own shipping office in San Francisco. For the first time 
anywhere in the world seamen appointed their own job dispatcher and attempted to take 
control of the hiring process.109 
 
                                                        
106 D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), page 19, p. 19 
107 Ibid 
108 Ibid 
109  Bruce Nelson, Workers on the waterfront : seamen, longshoremen, and unionism in the 1930s., 
(University of Illinois Press,1988), page 40 
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Nevertheless, shipowners like seafarers, perceived control of hiring as a life and 
death matter. Therefore, in June 1886 they formed an employer’s association that 
operated its own shipping office. All hiring was to be conducted through this agency 
and no man was eligible for a job unless he surrendered his union book and obtained a 
grade book in return. This black listing or ‘fink book’, as the seafarers used to call it, 
was to be a bone of contention in maritime labour relations for more than half a century 
in the US. 110 
 
Finally, in 1895, The Maguire Act in the USA represented a victory for 
seafarers, by outlawing imprisonment for desertion in the coastwise trade. 
Nevertheless, the biggest victory would come with the La Follette Seamen’s act 1915. 
The act extended the earlier ban against imprisonment to American seafarers in 
overseas and inter-coastal trades and also decreed that foreign seafarers deserting their 
ships in US ports could not be imprisoned. It allowed American seafarers to receive 
half of their pay on-demand in virtually any port, and specifically prohibited the 
payment of an advance on the seamen’s wages to crimps or other “landsharks”111. 
 
 The most important accomplishment of the La Follete act, however, was its 
dramatic impact on the wages of foreign seafarers. The law granted them the right to 
abandon ship in US ports without fear of imprisonment, thus virtually compelling 
foreign shipowners to pay their men higher wages in order to keep them from deserting 
to American vessels. 112 Therefore, the act in this sense seems to be even better than the 
MLC in granting rights to international seafarers. 
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I.2.2.1 – The International Transport Workers’ Federation 
 
In 1896 the International Transports Workers Federation113 was founded, 
intending to protect seafarers’ rights on an international scale.114. The Federation is said 
to have been created out of the urgent and practical need for international solidarity in 
a time when port employers and shipowners in northern Europe set out to break a series 
of dockers’ and seafarers’ strikes and to crush the unions which had organized them.115  
 
On the ITF’s website, in a section discussing the ITF and seafarers, there exists 
a statement which clearly demonstrates the international nature of the institution, it 
reads:  
 
“The ITF has been helping seafarers since 1896 and today represents the 
interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 600,000 are members of 
ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for 
seafarers of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the 
shipping industry to protect the interests and rights of the workers. The ITF 
helps crews regardless of their nationality or the flag of their ship.” 116 
 
Currently, the Federation is said to comprise around 700 unions, representing 
more than 4.5 million transport workers from 150 countries. 117 Since 1948, ITF runs a 
                                                        
113It is interesting to note that the beginning of trade unions comes shortly after the anti-slavery 
movements and the consequent abolition of slavery, which seems sensible since it was when seafarers 
(who initially appeared to be slaves) started to acquire rights.  See: Bob Reinalda, Routledge history of 
international organizations: from 1815 to the present day,(Routledge 2009) ISBN: 6612234830, 
9786612234835, pp. 35-56 
114 D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), page 19 
115 Harold Lewis, The International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) 1945-1965: an organizational 
and political anatomy, (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2003. U174147.), pp.2-3 
116 http://www.itfseafarers.org/itf_and_seafarers.cfm, last accessed on 14/11/2015 
117 http://www.itfglobal.org/en/about-itf/ last accessed 10/09/2014 
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campaign aimed at the elimination of Flag of Convenience vessels.118 The campaign is 
said to aim at ensuring that seafarers employed on FOC ships are not exploited. The 
establishment of a proper regulatory framework for global shipping is also said to be 
promoted in the campaign.  The Federation is in charge of seafarer’s representation at 
the tripartite negotiations at ILO Maritime Sessions and meetings in the ILO Joint 
Maritime Commission and is a non-governmental organisation at the IMO.119 
  
As Northrup pointed out, ITF is a union with very distinguishing features: 
 
“The International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) is unique among 
the International trade union Secretariats (ITSs) in several ways. Unlike the 
other ITSs, the ITF directly represents employees, sometimes with their 
consent, and often without authorization; it signs' agreements with 
individual companies; it has even negotiated an agreement with its 
counterpart, the International Shipping Federation [ISF]; by virtue of the 
strategic location of many of its affiliates, it has been able to exert enormous 
economic power through boycotts in order to gain its objectives; and as a 
result of this power, it has accumulated considerable financial reserves”120 
  
 Although the ITF nowadays is said to protect seafarers in diverse nations, 
including Third World countries, its original purpose at the time of its inception and 
which persisted for a few decades, does not seem to differ much from the purposes of 
the general trade unions created at the time, discussed in I.2.4. 121This can be perceived 
                                                        
118 The campaign however is not free from criticism. See:  Unknown Author, ‘ITF in the Campaign 
against the Flags of Convenience and the Danger of dancing with wolves’ in UNIFICAR – Revista do 
Sindicato Nacional dos Oficiais da Marinha Mercante SINDIMAR n. 35 (2013), pp 66-69  and  Julia 
Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders of a FOC Country’, in M. Musi (ed), New 
Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and International Trade Law (Libreria Bonomo 
Editrice: Bologna, 2014) pp. 234-237 
119  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 167 
120 Herbert R. Northrup and R.l. Rowan, The International Transport Workers' Federation And Flag Of 
Convenience Shipping, (Olin Inst November 1983), ISBN-13: 978-0895460424 p. 1 
121 The ITF was founded by European socialist oriented unions thus it is not surprising that the ITF FOC 
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in the then ITF general secretary speech in 1994, when addressing ITF’s FOC 
Campaign: 
 
“The ITF is, and has always been an organization led by its members. The 
majority of those members come from the traditional maritime countries 
[32 percent from Western Europe in December 1993] - the shipowning 
countries, and the Flag of Convenience Campaign ... has been and still is 
led primarily by the desire of those unions to defend and maintain their 
jobs”122 
 
Furthermore, policies concerning the FOC campaign are established by the 
ITF's Fair Practice Committee ("FPC"), which was originally operated almost 
exclusively by delegates from unions in developed countries. The structure of the FOC 
only changed after several incidents almost led to the rupture of the ITF with unions in 
Asia, particularly India and Singapore. Since then, the FPC was enlarged to include 
representation from developing countries also.123 
 
I. 3 - The 20th and 21st Centuries 
 
The Internationalization of seafaring continued and has continued throughout 
the 20th and 21st centuries. By the end of the 1990s, black seamen constituted a large 
percentage of the deck sailors in US coastwise trade. By 1915 more than half of East 
Coast firemen were Spanish or Latin American. 
 
                                                        
campaign quickly evolved into one to "regain the lost jobs”, which meant to transfer the jobs back from 
Third World seafarers to those in developed nations. (H. Northrup, ‘The International Transport Workers 
Federation Flag of  Convenience Shipping Campaign 1983-1995’ in 23 Transp. L.J. 369 1995-1996, 
p.374) 
122 David Cockroft, Address to the 1994 North American Maritime Ministry Conference, The ITF and 
the Maritime Ministry at 4 (1994) (on file with the ITF) in H. Northrup, ‘The International Transport 
Workers Federation Flag of  Convenience Shipping Campaign 1983-1995’ in 23 Transp. L.J. 369 1995-
1996, p.374 
123 H. Northrup, ‘The International Transport Workers Federation Flag of  Convenience Shipping 
Campaign 1983-1995’ in 23 Transp. L.J. 369 1995-1996, p.374 
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Ethnic hostilities became common on board ships. In the engine rooms, ethnic 
hostilities were so divisive that even the xenophobic Furuseth, the then International 
Seafarers Union (ISU) president, openly in favour of white supremacy, noted that 
“nationality prejudice is running mad” among the firemen. He complained that the ‘the 
Irish and the Liverpool Irish in Boston… think themselves superior to everyone else”.  
The antagonism between the entrenched Irish Minority and the Spanish speaking 
majority became so intense that the latter voted to take the marine firemen’s union out 
of the ISU and into IWW in 1913.124 
 
Furthermore, as if differences of nationality were not enough, the unity of the 
common seafarer was disrupted by craft separation and by rivalry between the men on 
different kinds of ships. The sense of separation and rivalry could even be felt within 
the International Seamen’s union. 125 
 
In 1979, Charles Rubin, a seafarer himself, recalled: ‘I had nothing but contempt 
for the guys on the passenger ships” – especially for the stewards that worked for tips. 
They had to cater to the passengers all the time. And sailors were the same. A lot of the 
guys didn’t act natural when passengers were around. They’d get all ‘perfumed up’ and 
worry about how they looked”. However, said Rubin, it was different on the freighters. 
We did not have to worry about catering passengers. We could act natural, dress as we 
pleased and concentrated on [the fight for] conditions”.126 As can be noted, seafarers, 
despite having begun to demand their rights, had a degree of separation among 
themselves. It was like they believed in the need to acquire more rights, but only for 
some seafarers, not for others.  
 
Maritime law and tradition were often used to thwart resistance to authority, on 
the high seas or even in a port. An example of this is the ‘mutiny’ of the SS California 
                                                        
124  Bruce Nelson, Workers on the waterfront : seamen, longshoremen, and unionism in the 1930s., 
(University of Illinois Press,1988), page 32 
125 Ibid 
126  Lawrenson, Stranger at the Party, (1st ed.,  Random House 1975), p.212, and  R. Boyer, the Dark 
Ship, (Little, Brown 1947), p.240; interview with Charles Rubin, Oct. 6, 1979 
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in 1936, which was actually a sit down strike. It occurred while the vessel was docked 
at the port of San Pedro and even though the charge of mutiny could only apply to acts 
of resistance at sea, shipowners and the department of commerce exerted extreme 
pressure to arrest the strikers as mutineers. Another example of the concept of mutiny 
being wrongly applied in order to favour shipowners, is the case of the Steamship 
Colombia. As the vessel approached the Panama Canal, three Filipino stewards refused 
to do work assigned to them because they were duties usually performed by deck 
seafarers. They were put in irons, upon which 28 other stewards decided to stop work, 
endangering the safety and life of passengers, and the latter had to make their own beds.  
On the next day the three stewards (for obvious reasons) changed their minds, being 
released and returned to work. Despite the return of the three seafarers to work, once 
onshore all the twenty eight stewards were arrested and taken to trial, and charged with 
mutiny on the high seas, an offense that under American Law was punishable by as 
much as five years in prison and fine of $1000 (a rather hefty sum at the time).127 
 
Therefore, seafarers faced a legal system that time and again proved to be 
weighed against them in favour of their employers, but the unique conditions of 
seafaring life, and the lack of an international agreement on these matters confronted 
them with obstacles to effective organization and mobilization for further rights.128 
 
I.3.1 – International Organizations 
 
 At the beginning of the 20th century, the necessity for an international legal 
regime of the sea was clear. Globalization was at full steam, with most crews becoming 
internationalized. Thus, by 1908, shipowners had formed their own international 
organization, the International Shipping Federation (ISF), and in 1919, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) was established. The negotiations of the ILO of several 
international conventions dealing with seafarers’ labour conditions were participated in 
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by the ITF, ISF and other bodies. Within a year of its establishment, three conventions 
of the ILO addressed specific seafarers’ issues: The ILO Minimum Age (Sea) 
Convention 1920, the ILO Unemployment Indemnity (Shipwreck) Convention 1920 
and the ILO Placing Seamen Convention 1920. The latter convention aimed at 
eliminating commercial agent charging fees for seafarers, instead seeking to have these 
fees paid by shipowners. Nevertheless, an insignificant number of seafaring countries 
ratified this convention. The Convention was after more than 70 years replaced by the 
ILO Recruitment and Placement of Seafarers’ Convention 1996, which recognized the 
recruitment of seafarers as part of a global market, most seafarers being tied to private 
recruitment agencies. However, little has changed, and illegal payments continue to be 
extracted from seafarers. Furthermore, there continue to be few guaranteed measures 
for repatriation in cases of seafarer abandonment.129 
 
I.3.1.1 – The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
  
The establishment of the ILO can be considered to have originated from the 
support of labour movements of the time, which had begun to understand that 
international cooperation in the fields of labour relations and social security was 
essential in preventing different national legislations from affecting international 
competitiveness of workers. Indeed, socialist parties and trade unions alike realised that 
in order to avoid unfair international competitive practices, it was necessary to have an 
internationally coordinated national compact, including regulations for the labour 
market and systems of social insurance. Accordingly, trade unions realised that an 
international regime with common standards in the fields of labour relations and social 
insurance was needed in order to prevent the welfare state from failing before it had 
even started. Moreover, in 1919 the international trade union movement, noting the 
importance of establishing an international framework of employment relations, unlike 
previously, manifested its desire to be engaged in these international arrangements.130 
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The ILO was formed after World War I as part of the peace settlement under 
the Treaty of Versailles, reflecting the belief that universal and lasting peace can be 
accomplished only if it is based on social justice.131 Its inception was part of the 
beginning of what was described as “[o]ne of the most creative innovations of the 
international diplomatic community in the 20th Century…”132 
 
One of ILO’s unique characteristics is its tripartite decision-making structure 
composed of governments, trade unions and employers, being the only United Nations’ 
(U.N.) agency so constituted. ILO’s tripartite structure makes it a unique forum, which 
allows governments and the social partners of economies and Member States to freely 
and openly debate and devise labour standards and policies. Currently, the ILO 
comprises 186 Member States.133  
 
The ILO structure comprises three main organs: the International Labour 
Conference, the Governing Body and the International Labour Office, headed by a 
director. The annual International Labour Conference is the general assembly of the 
Member States; the Governing Body a kind of executive committee with a coordinating 
function; and the International Labour Office the permanent secretariat. According with 
ILO’s tripartite structure, every national delegation to the ILO’s annual Labour 
Conference is composed of two government representatives, one trade union 
representative and one employer representative.134 
 
The ILO’s tripartism, together with effective social dialogue is believed to be 
                                                        
 
131 ILO, Origins and history, available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--
en/index.htm 
132 Douglas M. Johnston and W. Michael Reisman, The Historical Foundations of World Order: The 
Tower and the Arena (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008), p. 730 
133 ILO, Tripartite constituents, available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-
are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.htm 
134 Bob Reinalda, Routledge history of international organizations: from 1815 to the present 
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necessary in order to achieve effective promotion of better wages and working 
conditions, as well as peace and social justice. These instruments of good governance 
foster cooperation and economic performance, assisting in the creation of an enabling 
environment for the realization of the objective of ‘Decent Work’ at the national level. 
According to the ILO, Social dialogue and Tripartism cover: 
 
• “Negotiation, consultation and information exchange between and 
among the different actors; 
• Collective bargaining; 
• Dispute prevention and resolution; and 
•  Other instruments of social dialogue, including corporate social 
responsibility and international framework agreements.”135 
 
The scope of the ILO can be found in the preamble of its constitution, which reads 
as follows: 
 
“Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based 
upon social justice; 
And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship 
and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that 
the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of 
those conditions is urgently required; as, for example, by the regulation of 
the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day 
and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of 
unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of 
the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his 
employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, 
provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when 
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employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of 
equal remuneration for work of equal value, recognition of the principle of 
freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical 
education and other measures; 
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour 
is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries;”136 
 
 These stated ILO concerns and values were applied since the very beginning to 
seafarers’ labour conditions, as it can be seen in an extract from the Preamble of the 
ILO National Seamen’s Code Recommendation 1920: 
 
“In order that, as a result of the clear and systematic codification of the 
national law in each country, the seamen of the world, whether engaged on 
ships of their own or foreign countries, may have a better comprehension 
of their rights and obligations, and in order that the task of establishing an 
International Seamen's Code may be advanced and facilitated, the 
International Labour Conference recommends that each Member of the 
International Labour Organisation undertake the embodiment in a seamen's 
code of all its laws and regulations relating to seamen in their activities as 
such.”137 
 
 The ILO seems to have achieved the above recommendation a few decades 
later, with the advent of the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC). Nevertheless, 
seafarers have never been left totally unprotected, especially considering that the MLC 
is nothing if not the consolidation of several ILO instruments regarding seafarers’ 
rights. Therefore, since the ILO’s early days, seafarers have always been under the 
                                                        
136 ILO Constitution, Preamble,  available at: 
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auspices of the organization.138 
 
I.3.1.2 – International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
 
It has long been acknowledged that the best way of improving safety at sea is 
by developing international regulations intended to be followed by all shipping nations, 
and thus the concept of a permanent international body to implement and oversee 
uniform international standards for the safety of ships started to be debated during the 
nineteenth century.139 In 1889, during an international maritime conference held in 
Washington, the creation of such a body was recommended, however, the concept was 
not considered convenient, so the idea was rejected. Nevertheless, the truth was that the 
shipping industry of the day would not agree to any imposition capable of restricting 
its activities and commercial freedom, correctly perceived as unavoidable under the 
mandated activities of an international regulatory organisation. This view remained 
during the twentieth century and cause protracted delays in the ratification of the 
founding instrument for the eventual international body, the IMCO Convention.140 
 
Nevertheless, maritime disasters led states to adopt a series of treaties relating 
to the safety of ships and tonnage measurement (treaties covering signalling, and 
prevention of collisions had been adopted in the first half of the twentieth century) 
141even prior of the establishment of the IMO. Nevertheless, these treaties did not 
achieve a wide acceptance, hence were not implemented by all maritime countries, 
resulting in non-uniform international standards being applied, with the risk even of 
                                                        
138 See: ILO, Seafarers’ Rights Overview, available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---normes/documents/presentation/wcms: _230030.pdf, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
139 IMO, Brief history of IMO, available at 
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September 1910; International Convention on the Safety of life at Sea. London, 31 May 1929; 
International Convention Respecting Load Lines. London, 5 July 1930; and the Convention Relating to 
the Tonnage Measurement of Merchant Ships. Warsaw, 1934. 
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some treaties contradicting others.142 
 
Despite the states’ early manifestations regarding the need for establishing an 
international body to regulate shipping, it was only after the establishment of the United 
Nations itself that this would become a reality. It was only in 1948 at an international 
conference in Geneva that a convention formally establishing the IMO was adopted.143 
The Convention only came into force a decade later, in 1958, with the organization 
meeting for the first time the following year.144 
 
It is interesting to note that the aims of the IMO, outlined in Article 1
 
of its 
Convention, make no reference to marine pollution, and only a passing reference to 
safety. A dominant emphasis in the Convention was given to economic action for the 
promotion of “freedom” and to “end discrimination”, which, along with references to a 
“world without discrimination” and action against “unfair restrictive practices” caused 
a number of states to enter reservations when they became signatories to it.  
 
“Article 1: (a) To provide machinery for co-operation among Governments 
in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical 
matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and 
to encourage the general adoption of the highest practical standards in 
matters concerning maritime safety and efficiency of navigation; (b) To 
encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary 
restrictions by Governments affecting shipping engaged in international 
trade so as to promote the availability of shipping services to the commerce 
of the world without discrimination; assistance and encouragement given 
                                                        
142  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 121 and IMO, Brief 
history of IMO, available at http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx, last 
accessed on 15/09/2015) 
143 IMO’s  original name was Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, or IMCO. The 
name was changed in 1982 to IMO 
144 IMO, Brief history of IMO, available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
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by a Government for the development of its national shipping and for the 
purposes of security does not in itself constitute discrimination, provided 
that such assistance and encouragement is not based on measures designed 
to restrict the freedom of shipping of all flags to take part in international 
trade; (c) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters 
concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping concerns in accordance 
with Part II; (d) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of any 
matters concerning shipping that may be referred to it by any organ or 
specialised agency of the United Nations; (e) To provide for the exchange 
of information among Governments on matters under consideration by the 
Organization.”145 
 
The focus in Article 1 of the IMO Convention upon matters unrelated to the 
safety of ships or protection of the marine environment raised suspicion in the maritime 
community about the role of the new organization, resulting in slow entry into force of 
the Convention (10 years after it was first formed). There was a general belief that the 
Convention was constructed largely for the benefit of the dominant shipping nations of 
the time (IMO 1998, p. 4). Many of the 18 States
 
which ratified the Convention during 
the 1950s registered declarations or reservations
 
that resulted in a very limited scope 
for the Organization when the Convention finally received the necessary number of 
ratifications to enter into force in 1958. Accordingly, it was clear from the large number 
of reservations made, that economic and commercial matters should not be a part of the 
organization’s mandate.146 
                                                        
145 “It was no coincidence that all the Scandinavian countries made a statement – and an unusually strong 
one – to the effect that they would consider a renunciation of the Convention if IMCO were to assume 
competence in matters of the kind mentioned in Articles 1(b) and (c). The Scandinavian countries (led 
by Norway), as well as Greece, have always been strong supporters of the principle of the freedom of 
international shipping, which according to their philosophy, should be upheld through virtually 
unrestricted maritime shipping regulated by nothing but free and fair competition” John N. K. Mansell, 
Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues (Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 121 and IMO, Brief history of IMO, available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx) 
146 For instance, Denmark’s reservation reads:  
       "The Government of Denmark supports the work programme adopted during the first 
Assembly of the Organization in January 1959 and holds the view that it is in the field of 
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It was not until 1975 that Article I (a) of the IMO Convention would be amended 
by Res. A.358 (IX) to add the words “and the prevention and control of marine pollution 
from ships; and to deal with legal matters related to the purposes set out in this Article”. 
 
Article 2 of the IMO Convention, deals with the functions of the Organization, 
limiting its role to a consultative and advisory one. Article 3, in stating that the 
Organization should “provide for the drafting of conventions, agreements, or other 
suitable instruments, and recommend these to governments and to international 
organisations, and to convene such conferences as necessary”, made clear that the 
Organization did not have the authority to adopt or amend treaties. 147 
 
Nevertheless, the reason behind the creation of the IMO is left clear by the 
organisation’s first task which was to adopt a new version of the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the most important of all treaties 
dealing with maritime safety, which took place after the infamous Titanic accident. 148 
  
The ITF holds a consultative status at the IMO, being a permanent 
representative to the organization, and monitors ITF affiliated unions who participate 
                                                        
technical and nautical matters that the Organization can make its contribution towards the 
development of shipping and seaborne trade throughout the world.” 
       "If the Organization were to extend its activities to matters of purely commercial or 
economic nature, a situation might arise where the Government of Denmark would have 
to consider resorting to the provisions regarding withdrawal contained in article 59 of the 
Convention." Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XII-
1&chapter=12&lang=en last accessed on 01/10/2016 
See Also:  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary 
Issues (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 123 
147 The full text of the Convention is available at: 
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/il/pdf/1948%20Convention%20on%20the%20International%20Maritime%20
Organization-pdf.pdf, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
148 IMO, Brief history of IMO, available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx and IMO. History of SOLAS (The 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ), available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Pages/default.asp
x, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
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in the various committees, aiming to ensure that seafarers’ interests are addressed and 
protected when any new regulation is being considered. According to the ITF, IMO 
conventions are important to Seafarers “because they have a direct impact on living and 
working conditions.” 149 
 
I.4 – The “Human Element” 
 
The importance of institutions focused on protecting and generating more 
seafarer rights is undeniable. For instance, in 1972, The United Seamen’s Service150, 
promoted the XVIth International Conference on Social Welfare. The Conference was 
pioneering in having as one of its subjects the “human factor in safety of the sea”, 
heightening seafarers’ importance in shipping operations.151 Later, in 1997, twenty five 
years after the Conference, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) started 
using the term ‘human element’152 in reference to a complex multi-dimensional issue 
affecting maritime safety, security and marine environmental protection involving the 
entire spectrum of human activities performed by ships' crews, shore based 
management, regulatory bodies and others’, adopting Resolution A.850(20).153 This 
demonstrates the importance of such institutions visioning the protection of seafarers’ 
rights. 
 
The referred-to resolution evoked a previous resolution (A.680(17)) which 
invited governments to encourage those responsible for the management and operation 
of ships to develop, implement and assess safety and pollution prevention management 
systems and also resolution (A.772(18)), concerning fatigue factors in manning and 
                                                        
149 ITF, Inside the Issues - IMO and ILO, available at: http://www.itfseafarers.org/ITI-IMO-ILO.cfm 
150 An institution founded in 1942 to promote welfare of American seafarers and their dependents, 
seafarers of all nations. http://unitedseamensservice.org/ 
151 United Seamen’s Service, The Maritime Industrial Revolution and the Modern Seafarer: Sessions 
Sponsored by United Seamen's Service, Reporting a Symposium at the XVIth International Conference 
on Social Welfare (United Seamen's Service 1972), page 8. 
152 http://www.imo.org/ourwork/humanelement/Pages/Default.aspx, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
153http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/VisionPrinciplesGoals/Pages/Default.aspx, last 
accessed on 15/09/2015 
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safety, aiming at increasing awareness of the complexity of fatigue and encouraging all 
parties involved in ship operations to take these factors into account when making 
operational decisions.154 
 
Furthermore, resolution A.850(20) acknowledged the need for increased focus 
on human-related activities in the safe operation of ships, and the need for achieving 
and maintaining high standards of safety and environmental protection for the purpose 
of significantly reducing maritime casualties.155 
 
The recognition of the importance of the ‘Human Element” in shipping is of 
extreme importance. In 2001, IMO “noting the importance in the plan of action of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) of the human element, which is central for 
the promotion of quality shipping, and the core mandate of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), which is to promote decent conditions of work”,156 created 
Resolution A.930(22). The resolution was the first international instrument offering 
guidelines on provision of Financial Security in cases of abandonment of seafarers.157 
Later on, in 2006 the ILO conceived the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) providing 
comprehensive rights and protection at work for the world's more than 1.2 million 
seafarers. The convention came into force on 20th August 2013.158 
 
Furthermore, recognizing once again the importance of the ‘Human element” 
to the maritime industry, the IMO proclaimed 2010 the “year of the seafarer”. 
Secretary-General Mitropoulos, when proposing it, reportedly said, "the unique hazards 
confronting the 1.5 million seafarers of the world - including pirate attacks, 
                                                        
154http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/VisionPrinciplesGoals/Pages/Default.aspx, last 
accessed on 15/09/2015 
155 The resolution was updated by resolution A.947(23) Human element vision, principles and goals for 
the Organization adopted by the 23rd Assembly in November-December 2003 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/VisionPrinciplesGoals/Pages/Default.aspx, last accessed 
on 15/09/2015 
156 Extract from the text of the IMO Resolution A.930(22) 
157 IMO Resolution A.930(22) 
158 http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/lang--en/index.htm , last accessed 
on 15/09/2015 
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unwarranted detention and abandonment - coupled with the predicted looming shortage 
of ships' officers, make it ever more incumbent to take immediate and effective action 
to forestall a situation from developing in which ships are not manned with sufficient 
skilled personnel".159 
 
 Coincidence or not, also in 2010, Seafarers’ Rights International (SRI) was 
founded. The institution was created in response to “the growing need to raise 
awareness of seafarers’ rights and to provide a resource for seafarers and for all 
stakeholders with a genuine concern for the legal protection of seafarers around the 
world.”160 One of the areas worked in by SRI is the conduct of research and analysis on 
subjects of importance for seafarers,161 such as abandonment. 
 
I.5 – The Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) – The ultimate recognition of the 
transnationality of seafaring and most importantly of ‘abandonment of seafarers’ 
 
The MLC is considered to be the “fourth pillar” of quality shipping, since it 
supposedly complements three main IMO Conventions: the International Convention 
for the Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS); The International Conventions on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 1978, as amended (STCW); and 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 73/78 
(MARPOL). It is often referred to as the “super convention”, a “charter of rights” and 
the “seafarers’ bill of rights”.162  
 
                                                        
159 http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=11506, last accessed on 
15/09/2015 
160 http://www.seafarersrights.org/about-us/, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
161 http://www.seafarersrights.org/about-us/what-we-do/, last accessed on 15/09/2015 
162 Moira L. McConnell: “Making Labour History and the Maritime Labour Convention: Implications 
for International Law-Making (and Responses to the Dynamics of Globalization)” in Aldo Chircop, 
Theodore McDorman and Susan Rolston (eds.) The Future of Ocean Regime-Building (Brill Online 
Books and Journals: 2009) DOI: 10.1163/ej97809004172618.i-786, E-ISBN: 9789047426141, pp 349-
384 
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The Convention is in essence a consolidation of 68 ILO instruments163, 
including conventions and recommendations, some of which are 94 years old, some of 
which never entered into force for lack of ratification and some of which (despite the 
number of ratifications) were only enforced by an insignificant number of countries. 
Therefore, the Convention includes the majority of existing International Maritime 
Labour instruments, which are 72 in number.164 
 
The MLC is already considered to be a historic mark in ILO convention 
drafting. The Convention is even considered to be a “global pilot project for exploring 
innovative approaches to implement the concept of decent work for transnational 
workers and employers”.165 (Emphasis added) 
 
 The Convention, which runs to more than 100 pages, was adopted by the 94th 
(Maritime) Session of the International Labour Conference
 
(ILC) of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) by a record vote
 
of 314 in favour, none against, and two
 
abstentions for reasons unrelated to the core of the Convention. This is a reflection of 
the tripartite support given to the Convention, which is the combined work of ILO 
Member States, International Shipping Federation (ISF) representatives and the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). Furthermore, the relative shortage 
of amendments
 
submitted to the final text proposed by the International Labour Office
 
for such a comprehensive and complex convention was almost unprecedented. The 
Convention is even more remarkable, considering that it: 
 
● Adopts an entirely new format for ILO conventions; bringing in a new 
                                                        
163 A few examples are the : C007 - Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 (No. 7), C022 - Seamen's 
Articles of Agreement Convention, 1926 (No. 22) and C178 - Labour Inspection (Seafarers) Convention, 
1996 (No. 178) 
164 ILO, Compendium Of Maritime Labour Instruments - Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, Seafarers’ 
Identity Documents (Revised) Convention, 2003 Work in Fishing Convention and Recommendation, 
2007, Second (Revised) edition, 2015, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_
093523.pdff., last accessed on 01/02/2016 
165 Interview with Cleopatra Doumbia Henry. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/ standards/ma 
ritime-lab our-convention/news/WCMS_23 6264 /lang- en/index.htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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approach to the updating/amendment of ILO conventions; It sets out a 
code that lays out the more technical and evolving dimensions 
governing labour conditions in the maritime transport industry.166  
● Covers close to the full gamut of socio-economic issues in the maritime 
sector, including the very controversial question of social security 
protection, shipowner’s liability and repatriation; and  
● Sets out a new comprehensive enforcement and compliance system 
based on Flag State inspection and certification of the requirements of 
the Convention, complemented by Port State control inspections and on 
board and onshore complaint handling systems.  At the time of its 
adoption, the Director-General of the ILO was moved to describe this 
Convention, and the process by which it was developed, as “historic”, 
and as a model for a way forward to achieving “fair globalization”.  The 
Convention requires Flag States to inspect the vessel and issue a 
Maritime Labour Certificate covering the 14 points set out in Appendix 
A5-I (16 when the 2014 amendments will enter into force). The 
Certificate is valid for five years, subject to an intermediate inspection 
required to take place between the second and third anniversary of the 
date the certificate was issued by the competent authority (also in 
charge of the intermediary inspection). Furthermore, in order to ensure 
compliance between inspections, the Convention provides for a 
Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance (DMLC). Part I is 
completed by the competent authority and identifies the national 
requirements, while Part II is drawn up by the shipowner and identifies 
the measures adopted to ensure ongoing compliance with the national 
                                                        
166 This represents a novelty in ILO Convention’s structure, as is the inclusion of a simplified amendment 
process for the Code (Article XV) via the Special Tripartite Committee (Article XIII), meaning that the 
Code can be amended without the need to adopt a protocol, which would require a new ratification from 
Member States. ( See: ( See: Jon Whitlow and Ruwan Subasinghe,  ‘The Maritime Labour Convention, 
2006: A model for other industries?’ in International Journal of Labour Research (2015), Vol.7, Issue 1-
2, p.119) 
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requirements between inspections.167 
 
The Convention’s success is attributed in large part to the MLC’s philosophy, 
“promoting decent work and a fair globalization”. This is said to translate into secure 
decent work for seafarers and a level playing field for shipowners, since the Convention 
will help prevent unscrupulous shipowners and inept Flag States from continuing 
engagement in unfair competition by effectively permitting substandard working 
conditions.168 
 
 The Maritime Labour Convention undoubtedly ‘personifies’ the Seamen’s 
Code intended by the ILO since its formation. The Convention is a clear, effective 
instrument in enforcing minimum rights of seafarers. In addition, the Convention 
clearly recognizes the transnationality of the seafarers’ employment relationship, not 
only by establishing a network of responsibilities between Flag States, Port States and 
even seafarers’ exporter states but by recognizing the role of national legislations in 
ensuring seafarers’ rights. The Convention more often than not provides for rights 
without actually establishing how this is supposed to be achieved, leaving it up to 
Member States to decide how to implement the Convention,169 which contains more 
guidelines than detailed regulations. The Convention guidelines often refer to national 
legislations to determine how supplemental rights are to be provided, and it utilizes the 
word ‘should’  more often than the word ‘must’170, meaning that the Convention offers 
                                                        
167  Moira L. McConnell: “Making Labour History and the Maritime Labour Convention: Implications 
for International Law-Making (and Responses to the Dynamics of Globalization)” in Aldo Chircop, 
Theodore McDorman and Susan Rolston (eds.) The Future of Ocean Regime-Building (Brill Online 
Books and Journals: 2009) DOI: 10.1163/ej97809004172618.i-786, E-ISBN: 9789047426141, pp 349-
351 and Jon Whitlow and Ruwan Subasinghe,  ‘The Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: A model for 
other industries?’ in International Journal of Labour Research (2015), Vol.7, Issue 1-2, pp.119-120 
168 Jon Whitlow and Ruwan Subasinghe,  ‘The Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: A model for other 
industries?’ in International Journal of Labour Research (2015), Vol.7, Issue 1-2, p.124 
169 For an idea, see the guidance provided in: International Labour Standards Department, Maritime 
Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006), Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Fourth Edition 2015, ILO 
www.ilo.org/mlc, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
170 Just as a title of example, Guideline B2.2.2 – Calculation and payment provides: 
“1 (…) 
2.(…) 
3. National laws or regulations or collective agreements may provide for compensation for overtime or 
for work performed on the weekly day of rest and on public holidays by at least equivalent time off duty 
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Member States a large amount of discretion in how to apply and enforce Convention 
provisions.  
 
I.5.1 – Abandonment provisions in the Maritime Labour Convention 
 
As mentioned in the introduction171 of this thesis, the Maritime Labour 
Convention is the second international instrument bringing a specific definition to 
‘abandonment of seafarers’, the first one being IMO Resolution A.930. The MLC 
definition is found in the first set of amendments to the Convention which were 
approved by the Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April of 2014 at the 103rd session 
of the International Labour Conference, at ILO headquarters in Geneva. The 
amendments are expected to come into force at the beginning of 2017.172 Thus, 
currently, the original version of the MLC remains the only text in force. 
 
The amendment covering abandonment will expand the requirements for 
Financial Security provided in Regulation (and Standards and Guidelines) 2.5, which 
covers repatriation of the seafarer. In summary, the amendments provide a definition 
of the term ‘abandonment of seafarer’, and require a Financial Security to be provided 
through a social security system, or insurance or national fund, by the shipowner. The 
Financial Security must cover up to four months’ wages and entitlements, repatriation 
costs and essential needs such as food, accommodation and medical care.  The 
amendment entrusts Flag States to ensure that such Financial Security is available by 
                                                        
and off the ship or additional leave in lieu of remuneration or any other compensation so provided. 
4. National laws and regulations adopted after consulting the representative shipowners’ and seafarers’ 
organizations or, as appropriate, collective agreements should take into account the following principles: 
(…) 
5. Each Member should, after consulting with representative shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations, 
have procedures to investigate complaints relating to any matter contained in this Guideline” (highlight 
added) 
171  See Introduction pp.12-13 
172 ILO, International Labour Organization overwhelmingly supports new international law to protect 
abandoned seafarers and provide Financial Security for death or long-term disability of seafarers, 11 
June 2014 
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means of certificates to be displayed on board, the form of which is also provided by 
the amendments. 173 
 
It is important to note that although the current text of the MLC does not 
currently include the specific abandonment provisions found in the amendment, the 
Convention already has provisions dealing with accommodation, provisions, medical 
care, wages and repatriation, which are the rights which must be infringed in order for 
the seafarer to be considered ‘abandoned’. In fact, accordingly to the amendment of the 
MLC definition of abandonment of seafarers, only one of these rights needs to be 
fulfilled in order for the seafarer to be considered abandoned.  
 
For instance, MLC Regulation 2.5 covers repatriation of seafarers, providing 
for seafarers the right to be repatriated at no cost to themselves, except when the 
seafarer is found to be in serious default of his or her obligations according to national 
laws and collective bargaining agreements.174 The current text provides in Standard 
A2.5 for the modalities of repatriation at the end of the seafarer’s service, whether at 
the end of the contract or in case of early termination, as long as the latter amounts to 
fair dismissal. Matters regulated, and which must be seen to by Member States, include 
when and how the payment for repatriation is to be made, and eligible costs. The 
Regulation places secondary responsibility for the repatriation of the seafarer upon the 
Flag State, even providing that the state where the seafarer is to repatriate to, or the 
state of the seafarer’s nationality, is entitled to claim repatriation expenses from the 
Flag State in situations where the former end up footing the cost.175 
 
Nevertheless, the regulations, as they currently stand, fail to tackle one of the 
most common reasons for the occurrence of ‘abandonment of seafarers’. As previously 
                                                        
173Amendments to the Code implementing Regulations 2.5and 4.2 and appendices of the Maritime 
Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006), adopted by the Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, 
I. Amendments to the Code implementing Regulation 2.5 – Repatriation of the MLC, 2006 (and 
appendices), Standard A2.5.2 – The Financial Security provided by the MLC will be discussed in more 
details in Chapter V of this thesis. 
174 See MLC Regulation 2.5 and Standard A2.5 paragraph 3 
175 See  MLC  Standard A2.5.5 
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mentioned in this work176, at the root of failure to repatriate are often financial 
difficulties faced by the shipowner, and although the original text places some burden 
on Member States, the drafters of the original text did not devise any solution for 
circumstances where the shipowner is no longer in the picture or refuses to contribute. 
The Financial Security provided by the amendment covering abandonment intends to 
exactly solve this situation, as it will be seen in Chapter V. 
 
Seafarers’ wage provisions are found in Regulation 2.2 of the Convention. 
Essentially, the regulation places a responsibility on Flag States to ensure that seafarers 
are paid monthly and in accordance with collective agreement, that they receive 
monthly accounts of the payments due and that they are provided with means to send 
their earning to their families, dependants or legal beneficiaries.177 Thus, the 
Convention places the burden of ensuring that the shipowner is complying with its 
obligations regarding wages on Flag States. Nevertheless, the convention has no 
provisions contemplating the possible failure of the shipowner to fulfil their 
obligations, leaving it for Member States to decide what happens in that event.178  
 
Title three of the MLC deals exclusively with accommodation, recreational 
facilities and food. It provides that each Member State shall ensure that ships flying its 
flags provide for decent living accommodations and recreational facilities and their 
maintenance. It requires Member States to adopt laws and regulations requiring the 
shipowner to comply with minimum standards for safe and decent living 
accommodation.179  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
176 See pp. 15-16 
177 See MLC Regulation 2.2, Standard A2.2, paragraphs. 1, 2 and 3 
178 See MLC guideline B2.2.2, paragraph 3 
179 See: MLC Title 3, Regulation 3.1 and Standard A.3.1 
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I.5.2 – Further and possible amendments to the MLC 
 
The second set of amendments also approved by the Special Tripartite 
Committee on 11 April of 2014, falls under Title 4. Health Protection, Medical Care, 
Welfare and Social Security Protection, more specifically under Regulation (and 
Standards and Guideline) 4.2, entitled ‘Shipowner’s liability’. The current provision in 
its brevity provides that the shipowner must provide Financial Security and cover 
certain expenses in the event of the need for medical intervention. The amendment adds 
seven additional paragraphs to the existing seven. The added paragraphs provide for 
seafarer’s rights in relation to payment of expenses and the modalities for Financial 
Security. Furthermore, a new segment Standard A4.2.2 entitled Treatment of 
contractual terms has been added. Standard A4.2.2 defines ‘contractual claims’, the 
nature of the Financial Security scheme, encouraging Member States to put in place 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms for this purpose. The amendment provides 
forms for the evidence that Financial Security has been set. The appendix provides for 
a model release and receipt form for the seafarer to sign upon receipt of funds.180 
  
 A second group of amendments to the Convention has been approved in the 
Second meeting of the Special Tripartite Committee in Geneva on February 2016, and 
still does not have provision regarding when it will come into force. The new group of 
amendments concern Regulation 5.1, regarding Flag State responsibilities of the MLC 
and 4.3, titled Health and safety protection and accident prevention, with the first 
amendment proposed by shipowners’ representatives and the latter by seafarers’ 
representatives.181 
  
                                                        
180Amendments to the Code implementing Regulations 2.5and 4.2 and appendices of the Maritime 
Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006), adopted by the Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, 
II. Amendments to the Code implementing Regulation 4.2 – Shipowners’ liability of the MLC, 2006 and 
Appendix B4-i Model Receipt and Release Form  
181 ILO,  Final Report Second meeting of the Special Tripartite Committee established under Article XIII 
of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006) (Geneva, 8–10 February 2016), 
STCMLC/2016/7, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_459566.pdf, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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 The first set of the second approved amendments shall add a new paragraph to 
Standard A5.1.3 – Maritime labour certificate and declaration of maritime labour 
compliance. The new standard essentially provides that when a new certificate of 
compliance cannot immediately be issued and made available to a ship, but a renewal 
inspection has been completed - prior to the expiration of the maritime labour certificate 
- which found the ship compliant with MLC requirements, the competent authority, or 
the recognized organization duly authorized for this purpose, may extend the validity 
of the expired certificate for a further period not exceeding five months from the expiry 
date, and endorse the certificate accordingly. 182 
  
 The second set of amendments was proposed by the seafarers’ representatives 
and essentially concerns the elimination of harassment and bullying on-board ships. 
Essentially two new subparagraphs were added to Guideline B4.3.1 – Provisions on 
occupational accidents, injuries and diseases and Guideline B4.3.6 – Investigations, 
respectively. The first guideline provides for Members States of the Convention to 
ensure that national guidelines for the management of occupational safety and health 
address certain issues such as HIV, emergency and accident response, and now 
harassment and bullying.183 The second guideline provides for Members States to 
investigate “the causes and circumstances of all occupational accidents and 
occupational injuries and diseases resulting in loss of life or serious personal injury, 
and such other cases as may be specified in national laws or regulations”, providing an 
exhaustive list of cases, which shall soon include bullying and harassment, to be 
followed by investigations.184 
 
 During the Second Tripartite meeting in February 2006, consideration was also 
given to the seafarers’ amendment proposal concerning the payment of full wages to 
seafarers who are being held captive by pirates. Nevertheless, shipowners and 
                                                        
182 Amendments to the Code relating to Regulation 5.1 of the MLC, 2006 Standard A5.1.3 – Maritime 
labour certificate and declaration of maritime labour compliance  
183 MLC, Guideline B4.3.1 – Provisions on occupational accidents, injuries and diseases (2) 
184 MLC, Guideline B4.3.6 – Investigations 
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government representatives expressed a negative view of the amendment185, leading 
the committee to establish a working group to examine all relevant issues and prepare 
appropriate amendments to the MLC Code for consideration at the next meeting of the 
Special Tripartite Committee. 186 It is important to note, however, that some countries 
like Denmark already provide for situations like this hence the proposed amendment 
seems a practicable one. 187Furthermore, this author believes that the only way that 
seafarers cannot be considered entitled to their full wages once held captive by pirates 
would be if their employment contract was deemed frustrated, or if the pirate attack 
was considered a force majeure event. Otherwise, the employment contract should still 
be considered valid, with the seafarers entitled to the full wages. Otherwise, the 
seafarers should be considered as having been abandoned by the shipowner.188 
  
I.6 - Concluding Remarks 
 
 As it has been demonstrated, although seafaring is one of the oldest professions, 
the evolution of its regulation occurred at a much slower pace than the evolution of 
shipping and trade regulations themselves. This lack of regulation was highly connected 
to the societal perception of seafarers, who were often slaves, illiterate and in the 
majority considered a lowly part of society. Thus, it would have appeared that society 
had ‘abandoned’ them and neglected to give them their rights, ‘abandonment’ at sea 
being just a natural consequence of this.  
                                                        
185 ILO,  Final Report Second meeting of the Special Tripartite Committee established under Article XIII 
of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006) (Geneva, 8–10 February 2016), 
STCMLC/2016/7, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_459566.pdf 
186 ILO, Second meeting of the Special Tripartite Committee established under the Maritime Labour 
Convention, 2006, Resolution concerning the establishment of a working group of the Special Tripartite 
Committee, (8-10 February 2016) STCMLC/2016, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_452072.pdf, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
187 Ibid 
188 Unfortunately, a more intrinsic and profound discussion of the subject, although interesting, cannot 
be made in this thesis for reasons of concision and coherence, since this would cover the study of national 
legislations and the shipowner’s responsibilities accordingly, this not being within the scope of this 
thesis. For a more detailed discussion on the subject see:  Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘Abandonment 
of seafarers following a piracy attack – breach or no breach of the employment contract?’ in MarIus nr. 
424, 2013 
88 
 
 
 Legislation covering seafarers’ rights started to develop faster once society was 
made aware of their legitimacy and importance. The growth of trade unions, a result of 
the industrial revolution itself, particularly in maritime nations, raised awareness of 
seafarers’ struggles and the consequent need to improve their rights. Therefore, national 
legislations were improved and amended. The subsequent advent of International 
Organizations such as the IMO and ILO helped ensure that seafarers were better 
protected at an international level, with the creation of international instruments to be 
followed by their member states. 
 
 The advent of the ILO represented a minimum set of standards being established 
internationally, including a minimum wage, and although these changes might have 
been welcomed by some, it represented a step back for others since the minimum wage 
established by the organization was lower than the minimum wage in most developed 
countries189; some countries had also managed to develop seafarers’ rights much further 
than the minimum rights established by the Organisation’s international instruments. In 
a way, the minimum rights established by the ILO made seafaring a more attractive 
career to developing countries, more so than developed ones, and it can be considered 
to have “legalized” once and for all the hiring of international crews.  
 
Nevertheless, although the perception of seafarers might have changed in some 
countries as proven by their national legislations, and at an international level, some 
countries still demonstrate reluctance in enforcing seafarers’ minimum rights. For 
instance, in Myanmar, seafarers were obliged to join the Myanmar Overseas Seafarers' 
Association (MOSA), a state-linked seafarer's organization, not affiliated with the ITF, 
as a condition of employment. The 340th Report of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association published by the International Labour Organization (ILO) points out that 
membership in MOSA "explicitly limits seafarers' right to establish and join 
                                                        
189  See: Malcolm Latarche, ‘Working for the Yankee dollar’(shippinginsight in 11 April 2016) < 
https://www.shipinsight.com/working-for-the-yankee-dollar>, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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associations of their own choosing”190. Furthermore, accordingly to sources, when 
MOSA was launched, then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt urged seafarers to 
"'refrain by their words and actions from harming the State'".191 To make matters worse, 
according to The International Trade Union Confederation, another state-controlled 
organization, the Seaman's Employment Control Division (SECD) charges a fee for 
issuing the documents required for employment as a seafarer and gives mandatory 
lectures warning prospective seafarers not to complain about working conditions 
aboard ships, and to stay away from the Seafarers' Union of Burma (SUB) and the 
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF).192 Thus, it seems fair to say that the 
Myanmar government is more concerned with pleasing shipowners than with 
protecting seafarer interests.   
 
The situation of seafarers in Myanmar is not an isolated case. Several other 
governments, besides that of Myanmar, have chosen to overlook their seafarers’ rights, 
in order to attract more investments from the shipping industry. And as the above 
example demonstrates, a seafarer will many times remain silent about their rights being 
violated, since failure to do so may result in strong government disapproval or sanction, 
with the risk even of the seafarer being placed in jail.193  
 
 Nevertheless, what is important to highlight in these cases is that national 
governments refusing to enforce minimum rights of seafarers are constantly the 
subjects of harsh criticism and scrutiny from the international community. In the case 
of Myanmar’s seafarers, even a human rights violation representation has been made 
                                                        
190  ILO, 340th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association published by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO Mar. 2006, Sec. 1099). 
191  International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). ‘Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights’ (Burma 2007) http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=MMR&IDLang=, last 
accessed on 01/02/2016 
192  International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). ‘Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights’ (Burma 2007) http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=MMR&IDLang=, last 
accessed on 01/02/2016 
193  See: ITF, Out of Sight, Out of Mind. Seafarers, Fishers and Human Rights. A report by the 
International Transports Workers Federation ( International Workers Federation,  June 2006 ISBN: 1-
904676-18-9) <http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/extranet/-1/2259/HumanRights.pdf>, last accessed on 
01/02/2016 
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against the government.194 Furthermore, the system of compliance contained in the 
MLC is likely to prevent situations like these from arising, as it provides for cooperation 
between States. 
  
 As this chapter demonstrated, seafarers’ rights are contained in a combination 
of national and international regulations, with their development being highly depended 
upon “Private Actors”, i.e. trade unions and International Organisations. Nevertheless, 
as this thesis will prove there are other private actors necessary to ensure the better 
protection of seafarers’ rights. Indeed, the shipping industry is composed of several 
stakeholders who have their share of responsibility in ensuring seafarers’ rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
194  International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). ‘Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights’ (Burma 2007) http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=MMR&IDLang=, last 
accessed on 10/07/2014 
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Chapter II- The Maritime Safety Chain and the connection between substandard 
shipping and abandonment 
 
 The notion of the existence of a safety chain in the Maritime Industry can be 
found in International Instruments, such as the ISM Code195, SOLAS196, MARPOL197, 
STCW198 and more recently in the MLC199. All these instruments provide expressly for 
shipowners, Flag States and Port States’ obligations. The insurance and classification 
societies’ obligations are not expressly provided for in these instruments as they derive 
from shipowners’ and Flag States obligations, as will be explained in detail further 
along this thesis.  
 
 The maritime safety chain is known to be indispensable to the shipping industry 
as it forms a network of protection, ensuring that standards established by international 
instruments are complied with, assisting in the prevention of accidents. The failure of 
one of the members of the safety chain in fulfilling its function may lead to a domino 
effect, with an accident being the result. As this chapter will demonstrate, substandard 
shipping is one of the main causes of accidents, and in the most recorded major 
                                                        
195 International Safety Management Code. The purpose of the code is to “provide an international 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention”. See: 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/SafetyManagement/Pages/ISMCode.aspx, last accessed 
on 01/02/2016 
196 IMO Convention for Safety life at Sea 1974, the convention provides for the safety of merchant ship 
and it was conceived after the infamous TITANIC accident. See IMO website for more information: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
197 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Adoption: 1973 
(Convention), 1978 (1978 Protocol), 1997 (Protocol - Annex VI); Entry into force: 2 October 1983 
(Annexes I and II). The main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. For more information see: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
198 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 
1978, For more information see 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/STCW-Convention.aspx 
199Maritime Labour Convention 2006. See ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-
labour-convention/lang--en/index.htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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accidents, the failure of one or more members of the maritime safety chain was 
confirmed.  
  
 Furthermore, this chapter shall illustrate the link between abandonment of 
seafarers and substandard shipping, as many of the reported cases of abandonment of 
seafarers concerned substandard vessels. Indeed, there might be abandonment of 
seafarer cases occurring in relation to vessels that are not substandard, but there will 
rarely be a case of substandard shipping where a seafarer will not be deemed to have 
been ‘abandoned’, as a substandard vessel will most likely not be considered a safe 
place to work. 
 
 Accordingly, this chapter shall demonstrate the link between substandard 
shipping and abandonment of seafarers, and the importance of the selected Private 
Actors in preventing both. This shall essentially be done by the analysis of major 
accidents caused by substandard vessels. 
 
II.1 – The Erika and the Prestige incidents 
 
 Analysis of two of the most well-known Maritime disasters of all time, those of 
the Erika and the Prestige, demonstrates how the maritime safety chain works and how 
essential it is for participants in the chain to work effectively and in unison. Such 
concerted action would not only to avoid substandard shipping practices and 
consequent ‘abandonment’ but also, accidents which directly endanger seafarers’ lives. 
The two cases are major examples until today of pollution accidents, but also of total 
abandonment of seafarers, and disregard of any sort for their lives. In the case of the 
Prestige, the 27 year old oil tanker was so clearly substandard that at the time of the 
accident not only had two major oil companies, Repsol and BP (British Petroleum), 
already declassified the ship, advising against its use200, but its former captain, Mr 
                                                        
200 Judgment No. 865/2015, Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, January 14th 2016, par. 1, p. 6 
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Kostazos, had relinquished command of the vessel due to its “poor condition”.201 Thus, 
there was already enough evidence to conclude that the vessel could not be considered 
a safe work environment, an implied term of the employment contract202, for its crew, 
which in itself amounts to ‘abandonment’. 
 
The Erika incident polluted over 400km of French coast in 1999. The accident 
was caused by the vessel’s failure to resist a storm, due to its undoubtedly substandard 
condition. The incident pointed out the failure of several members of the chain, who 
had failed to fulfil their obligations. First, the accident demonstrated the lack of an 
efficient Port State control, as the vessel had been inspected numerous times by Port 
State inspectors and never detained despite its substandard condition. Secondly, the 
vessel was classed with an IACS203-member Classification Society at the time of the 
accident, and had just completed a five year survey with all its statutory reports up-to-
date. 204 Thirdly, the shipowner clearly failed to keep his/her vessel seaworthy. Finally, 
the Erika incident was attributed to the fact that the vessel was registered in a so called 
Flag of Convenience country, which popularly and in summary means a country with 
lax regulations, thus making it easier to avoid international regulatory compliance 
burdens.205 
                                                        
201 Ibid., par. 8, p. 40 
202 Section 9 of the MGN 20 (M+F), which implements the EC Directive 89/391  
Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessels (Health and Safety at Work) Regulations 1997 in the UK provide 
that the shipowner needs to provide a safe workplace and working environment. Furthermore, Section 2 
of the Regulation provides that it is the shipowner’s duty “to protect the health and safety of workers and 
others affected by their activities so far as is reasonably practicable”. The section defines two of the 
principles for ensuring health and safety to be:  
1. “(a)  the avoidance of risks, which among other things includes the combating of risks 
at source and the replacement of dangerous practices, substances or equipment by 
non- dangerous or less dangerous practices, substances or equipment;  
2. (b)  the evaluation of unavoidable risks and the taking of action to reduce them;” 
Clearly, none of these obligations were observed in the case of the Prestige or are observed in cases of 
any other substandard vessel. 
203 IACS stands for ‘International Association of Classification Societies’, and as will be explained 
further along in this chapter, the Association Members are supposed to be the most well renowned and 
trustworthy classification societies, in charge of the classification of more than half the world’s fleets. 
204 R. M. F. Coles and E. Watt, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, (2nd Edition, Informa law for 
Routledge, 2009) 
205See for instance: L. J. Herman, ‘Flags of Convenience – New Dimensions to an Old Problem’ in 
McGill Law Journal Vol. 24 No 1, Montreal, 1978  
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The Erika had clear warning signs that something was not quite right with the 
vessel. She had changed ownership seven times, changed classification societies 
repeatedly between four different classifications, and changed the Flag State three times 
from Panama to Liberia to Malta.206 Nevertheless, the vessel apparently never raised 
Port Stated control suspicion, never being detained in any of the inspections to which 
she was submitted despite the fact, as it was confirmed later on, that the ship was clearly 
substandard. 
 
The Prestige incident happened a couple of years after the Erika, in 2002. The 
oil tanker split into two and sank 30 miles off the coast of Spain, leaking over six 
thousand tonnes of fuel off the Galician Coast. The oil impacted more than 200 
kilometres of the Galician coast, in northern Spain. Once again, the vessel had not ever 
been detained in any Port Inspection and had been duly classified by the American 
Bureau of Shipping over the years. Furthermore, the vessel was also registered in a 
country considered to be a Flag of Convenience state.207 
 
The similarities between the two incidents are clear; both vessels were 
undeniably substandard. Nonetheless they passed Classification Society surveys, and 
Flag and Port State Control. The similarities do not stop there. In both cases the crew 
was criminalized and arrested under different accusations, which included the crime of 
                                                        
The definition of a Flag of Convenience Country will be discussed in more detail on Chapter III, pp.112-
117  
206 Tribunal de Grande Instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, L l`eme ch. , Jan. 
16, 2008, No.9934895010, slip op.at 123-25 (Erika), translated in The Language Works, Inc., Erika 
Judgement 123-25 (April 22, 2008) at 103 
207  See: WWF, The Prestige Oil Tanker Disaster – facts, available at: 
http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/prestige.pdf; IOPC, Incidents involving the IOPC Fund Report 
2010, (IOPC, 2010) 
<http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/2010_ENGLISH_INCIDENT_REPORT.pdf> 
last accessed on 01/02/2016, pp. 12-13, and I. Naeemullah, ‘A Decade Later, $ 1 Billion Saved: The 
Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental 
and Economic Damages in Reino Unido de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping Inc.’ in  37 Tul. 
Mar. L.J. 639 2012 -2013, p. 639 
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marine pollution caused by the vessels and endangering innocent lives208, despite the 
undeniable fact that the crew had also been endangered by the accident. Moreover, it 
was questioned in both cases if the refusal of the Coastal States to offer refuge to both 
vessels in distress was also a contributing factor to the accidents.209 All the facts of the 
incidents and the issues raised by them will be discussed in further detail later in this 
paper. Nevertheless, even before engaging in a more detailed discussion about the 
incidents, one thing is crystal clear: in both incidents, several members of the safety 
chain failed to fulfil their obligations.  
 
The impact of both accidents was so great that the European Commission 
decided to take measures to improve maritime safety in 2003, introducing stricter rules 
in the European Union, such as to forbid single-hull oil tankers transporting heavy fuel 
oil to enter or leave European ports, and to adopt a timetable for the withdrawal of 
single hull oil tankers by the year 2010, allowing the Union to call on the European 
Maritime Safety Agency, which is responsible for monitoring the effective 
implementation of European maritime safety legislation and finally by strengthening 
the legislation relating to the inspection of ships by the Port State, classification 
societies and traffic monitoring and information systems aimed at improved traffic 
monitoring in European waters. 210 All these changes introduced by the European 
Commission will be discussed in the following sections.  It is interesting to note that 
the Commission in its ‘3rd set of measures in favour of maritime safety’ recognizes the 
existence of a “safety chain” and is clear that its goal is to combat substandard 
shipping.211 
 
                                                        
208 See: IOPC, Incidents involving the IOPC Fund Report 2010, (IOPC, 2010) 
<http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/2010_ENGLISH_INCIDENT_REPORT.pdf>, 
last accessed on 01/02/2016 
209  S. Baughen, ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) 
Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability,   (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), pp.226 
210 European Commission Directorate General for Energy and Transport, A new step forward for 
maritime safety in Europe – The 3rd set of measures in favour of maritime safety, (European 
Commission, March 2007), p.1 
211 Ibid, p. 2 
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Another case study which clearly demonstrates the flaws in safety chains is the 
San Marco case. The vessel was initially known as MV Soral, a 1968 Panamax dry bulk 
carrier, owned by a succession of one ship brass companies until it eventually was sold 
to a company named Sea management, in March 1991, for $ 3.2 million, then 
subsequently traded as the San Marco under the ownership of another brass plate 
company, Shipping of Nicosia, Cyprus.  The vessel was ultimately detained by the 
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) in May 1993. The reasons for the detention were serious 
structural, fire-fighting and life endangering defects. Following the detention the 
vessel’s P&I Club withdrew its cover. Upon the owner’s refusal to conduct immediate 
repairs, its Classification Society, Bureau Veritas (BV), withdrew class after an 
inspection. The irony of this event relies on the fact that in that same month, the vessel 
had been inspected by an Hellenic Register of Shipping (HRS) surveyor for a class 
transfer from BV and found to be in “good condition and well- maintained” hence being 
issued clean class certificates, without any repair recommendations were issued for the 
vessel. Furthermore, the vessel had BV clean certificates, without any 
recommendations, valid until 1995. 212 
 
In that same year, towards the end of June, the CCG allowed the vessel to depart 
from the Vancouver port under tow at the request of the shipowner. However, despite 
the HRS issuing a clean class certificate and the vessel having BV certificates valid 
until 1995, the Canadian port authority only allowed the vessel to be towed unmanned. 
Nevertheless, shortly after leaving Canadian waters the tow to San Marco was cut and 
a crew put on board by a helicopter. From then on the vessel continued to trade, 
unrepaired, with clean HRS certificates. It is arguable that if the Canadian Port State 
control had the legal power to demand repairs before departure, the vessel would have 
been prevented from trading in such a dangerously unseaworthy condition (it is 
important to remember that it may also be costly to a Port State to keep a vessel berthed 
                                                        
212 Ian Middleton, ‘Holes in the System’ (Seatrade Review, January 1994), pp. 6-7 cited in Steyn Theuns, 
‘Port State Control: The Buck Stops Here-Does It, Should It, Can It?’ (Australian National University) 
<http://www.anu.edu.au/law/pub/icl/portstat/PORTSTATECONTROL.html>, last accessed on 
01/02/2016 
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for a long period of time).  Nevertheless, as this was not the case, the San Marco 
managed to “slip through the safety net”.213 
 
Not long after being detained by the Canadian Port State Control, on November 
1993, the San Marco, whilst around 150-200 miles off the South African coast on a 
voyage from Morocco to Indonesia, lost some 14x7 metres of shell plating from both 
sides of her No.1 hold and all 5000 tons of cargo in that hold. The vessel found refuge 
in Cape Town and was soon detained by the Department of Transport. As is often the 
case, the vessel was subsequently sold for scrap at public auction, as it was clear that 
she could not continue to trade without a substantial and costly amount of repairs.214 
 
Therefore, the San Marco case demonstrates that even prior to the Erika or the 
Prestige, it was already clear that in order to avoid the practice of substandard shipping, 
it is necessary for shipowners, classification societies, insurers, Flag State 
administrators, and even Port State authorities215, to do their jobs properly. 
 
II. 2 - Substandard Shipping and abandonment 
 
Indeed, substandard Shipping has been pointed out as the main cause of oil 
pollution. Researchers consider that oil pollution can be largely attributed to “the poorly 
equipped and maintained vessels, inadequate crews, and unregulated on-board 
operations that result from the failure of convenience nations to exercise due control 
over the vessels”.216 In the case of the Erika and the Prestige most commentators will 
                                                        
213  Oya Özçayır, ‘Port State Control’, Paper Presented At “The Impact Of Caspian Oil And Gas 
Development On Turkey And Challenges Facing The Turkish Straits” conference held by İstanbul Bilgi 
University Maritime Law Research Center and the Department of International Relations in İstanbul on 
9 November 2001., <www.dieselduck.net> last accessed on 01/02/2016 , p.2 
214 Ibid 
215 It is argued here that the Canadian Port Authority acted within its legal limits. However, it is necessary 
to bear in mind that the vessel definitely had been submitted to Port State control prior to her detention 
in Canada having never been previously detained.  
216  M. Boos, ‘The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Striking the Flags of Convenience?’ in 2 Colo. J. Int’l 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 407 1991, page 419 
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argue that all these outline factors were present in both cases (inadequate crewing to a 
lesser extent)217. 
 
Furthermore, substandard shipping does not only cause environmental disasters. 
As may be noted from the above, the crew in those cases was left at their own risk, and 
had their lives and physical integrity put at risk, and were later jailed for it, though it 
was questionable whether they were to blame. 218Realistically, they were as much 
victims as were the Spanish and French coasts, suffering almost equally drastic 
consequences as a result of the accident. They remained in custody for several months 
and had to wait years for trials and, luckily219, were eventually acquitted220. It is 
unnecessary to discuss the impact which pending criminal decisions can have on 
anyone’s life, either in a personal or professional level context, as this is obvious. In 
the case of the Prestige, the shipowner could not be located at the time of the incident 
and the bail of the crew ended up being paid by the London P&I Club.221 Thus, it is not 
difficult to perceive, especially in the case of the Prestige, how situations like these 
could be considered ‘abandonment of seafarers’, since the shipowner not only failed to 
provide seafarers with a safe work environment, but  failed to own up to his/hers 
                                                        
217 In the Case of the Erika a few general articles partially blamed the Filipino Master for the accident. 
Nonetheless, academic and technical articles abstained themselves from commenting about the adequacy 
of the crew. Most articles written about the crews of both vessels were about their criminalization.  See: 
Anders Björkman, ‘Not Learning From Marine Accidents - Some Lessons Which Have Not Been Learnt’ 
- Paper presented at the 'Learning from Marine Incidents II' conference in London 14 March 2002, Heiwa 
Co, France <http://heiwaco.tripod.com/rinapaper.htm.>, last accessed on 01/02/2016. See also: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/883110.stm 
218 See: Ove Oving, Criminalisation of the ship's master and his crew ( Swedish National Road and 
Transport Research Institute, 2012), available at: http://lnu.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:603791/FULLTEXT01.pdf, last accessed on 10/11/2016 
219 In a recent decision, January 2016, the Supreme Criminal Court of Spain held the Master of the 
Prestige criminally liable for the incident, giving him a two year prison sentence, and ordering him to 
pay a twelve month fine at a daily rate of 10 euros, as well as ordering an 18-month disqualification from 
the exercise of his profession as a ship’s captain, plus payment of one twelfth part of the costs of the trial 
at first instance, and making him also civilly liable to pay compensation. See: Cassation Appeal 
No.:1167/2014, Judgment No.: 865/2015, Incidents Involving The IOPC Funds – 1992 Fund – Prestige, 
Available At: Http://Www.Iopcfunds.Org 
220 See: Dr. F. Arizon, ‘The Prestige; the Court of Appeal's judgment, 2014’ (Arizon Abogados SLP 
2014) < http://www.arizon.es/the-prestige/> and Seafarers’ Rights International, High Profile Cases>, 
last accessed on 01/02/2016 
221  See: Unknown author,  ‘London Club agrees to put up bail for Prestige master’ (Maritime Risk 
International, February 2003) 
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responsibilities after the accident since even if the master is to have been found to have 
acted negligently, the shipowner remains liable vicariously222 , and the responsibility 
to pay due wages and to repatriate the crew still belongs with the shipowner.  
                                                        
222 Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability, not based on the breach of any personal duty. As held 
in E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and another, vicarious liability imposes on the 
corporation/ employer a duty to compensate the victim for the damage resulting from the negligent or 
other tortious act of its employee even though the employer was not personally at fault, hence being a 
form of strict liability. (9[2012] EWCA Civ 938;  [2012] WLR (D)  204, para 19) In summary, vicarious 
liability is founded on the responsibility of a corporation/ employer for those it uses as helpers to carry 
out its activities, i.e. employees.  It is important to note that due to changes in “employment relationships” 
during times such as the use of agency workers, in order for vicarious liability to be established, there 
must be an employment relationship or a relationship akin to an employment relationship and that there 
is a sufficiently close connection between the employment and the tortious acts such that it would be fair, 
just and reasonable to hold the defendant liable.( Andrew Hogarth and Thea Wilson, ‘Vicarious Liability 
and Non – Delegable Duties’, paper presented at the Annual Personal Injury and Employment 
Conference, London (22 May 2014 – Kings Bench Walk), p.5) 
In the case The Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants and the Institute of the Brothers of 
Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56 at [35]. Lord Phillips identified five “policy reasons that usually 
make it fair, just and reasonable” to impose vicarious liability.  
• The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee  - 
the “deep pocket” argument.  
• The tort was committed as a result of an activity undertaken by the employee on behalf of the 
employer- the “delegation of task” argument.  
• The employee’s activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer - the 
“enterprise liability” argument.  
• The employer by employing the employee created the risk of the tort -the “risk creation” 
argument 
•  The employee will have been under the control of the employer - the “control” argument.  
The importance of the control argument nevertheless should be perceived as a limited one in order to 
establish liability, as recognised by Lord Phillips himself, as well as academics (See: Simon Deakin, 
Angus Johnston, and Sir Basil Markesinis QC,  Markesinis and Deakin Tort Law (7th Edition, Oxford 
Press 2012), pp. 558–9; and Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A comparative perspective 
(Cambridge University Press 2010), ch. 3. (cf. Philip Morgan, ‘Recasting Vicarious Liability’ in [2012] 
C.L.J. 615, 642–7.)    The reasoning seems to be that is “no longer realistic that a superior can direct how 
a person performs a task (John Bell, ‘The Basis Of Vicarious Liability’ in The Cambridge Law Journal, 
72 (2013)., p 18, doi:10.1017/S0008197313000238.See also: Cassidy v Minister of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 
343) 
Moreover, normally vicarious liability will arise out of offenses of strict liability, which are those that do 
not require intention, recklessness, or even negligence as to one or more elements in the actus reus. 
However, the UK Crown Prosecution Services (CPS, “Corporate Prosecutions”, available at < 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/corporate_prosecutions/>) recognizes that there might be offenses 
of strict liability which do not impose vicarious liability, at the same pace that there might be offences 
requiring meas rea and yet imposing vicarious liability, by application of the identification principle, 
where 'the acts and state of mind' of those who represent the directing mind and will will be imputed to 
the company (Lennards Carrying Co and Asiatic Petroleum [1915] AC 705, Bolton Engineering Co v 
Graham [1957] 1 QB 159 (per Denning LJ) and R v Andrews Weatherfoil 56 C App R 31 CA.) 
According to the CPS the “identification principle acknowledges the existence of corporate officers who 
are the embodiment of the company when acting in its business. Their acts and states of mind are deemed 
to be those of the company and they are deemed to be 'controlling officers' of the company. Criminal 
acts by such officers will not only be offences for which they can be prosecuted as individuals, but also 
offences for which the company can be prosecuted because of their status within the company. A 
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Leaving aside the criminal charges223, the abandonment of seafarers in the 
above mentioned cases can also be said to have occurred in part due to the actions of 
the Coastal State, in refusing to offer a place of refuge to the vessel, giving priority to 
saving costs of a possible environmental disaster and its aftermath (such as any 
inevitable clean up), instead of prioritizing the human “life at sea”. Furthermore, the 
classification societies when classifying a clearly substandard vessel also showed very 
                                                        
company may be liable for the act of its servant even though that act was done in fraud of the company 
itself” (Moore v I. Bressler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515) – undoubtedly, the master of the vessel would fall 
into this category. 
Therefore, according to the existing understanding of vicarious liability, there should be no doubt that in 
the “criminalization” cases quoted in this thesis, the shipowner was vicariously liable for the criminal 
liability imposed on the shipowner. It is curious to note that most likely in every seafarer criminalization 
case the shipowner could be held vicariously liable, at least according to English law.  
New Zealand seems to follow a similar approach to that of the UK. In the case of the MV Rena - a 
Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned, 235-metre container vessel that struck into a Reef in New Zealand, 
polluting the coast of the country. The master and the Second officer were charged under the New 
Zealand Maritime Transport Act 1994 with "operating a vessel in a manner causing unnecessary danger 
or risk" and under the Resource Management Act 1991 for "discharging a harmful substance from a 
ship”, with the latter also suffering further chargers under the Crimes Act 1961 for wilfully attempting 
to pervert the course of justice by altering ship's documents. It seems that the master and the second 
officer acted without the knowledge of the shipowner, without a direct order.  Nevertheless, the 
shipowner was also charged under section 338 (1B) and 15(B) of the Resource Management Act 1991, 
which relates to the “discharge of harmful substances from ships” in the coastal marine area. See: 
Maritime New Zealand, ‘Maritime New Zealand Charges Owner of Rena’, (World Maritime News, 5 
April 2012) http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/51394/maritime-new-zealand-charges-owner-of-
rena andChris Browne and Kerryn Webster, ‘Charges laid in relation to MV Rena grounding’ 
(International Law Office,  2 August 2012) 
<http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Shipping-Transport/New-Zealand/Wilson-
Harle/Charges-laid-in-relation-to-MV-Rena-grounding>) 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that although apparently vicarious liability can be found in the case 
of the Rina, the case is not relevant for the purpose of this thesis, as it does not seem to amount to an 
abandonment case, as, different from all the cases quoted in this thesis, there is no report that the vessel 
was substandard, the only reported (and admitted) cause of the accident being the deviation and attempt 
to make the voyage timely. 
223 It is important to highlight that this thesis does not intend to produce an analysis of “criminalization 
of seafarers”, i.e. to study the different cases when seafarers were found criminally liable for actions 
which they bear very little responsibility for, since, as stated previously, it seems that not every seafarer 
criminalization case will involve abandonment.  A study like that would have to include a comparative 
analysis of national criminal laws and the liabilities, as well as their limitations provided by international 
conventions, such as MARPOL. Therefore, the analysis of cases of criminalization of seafarers are only 
included in the present study to the extent that cases like these can be considered abandonment according 
to the concept adopted by this thesis. For a deeper discussion on “criminalization of seafarers” see:  Ove 
Oving, Criminalisation of the ship's master and his crew ( Swedish National Road and Transport 
Research Institute, 2012), available at: http://lnu.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:603791/FULLTEXT01.pdf and Elizabeth Fortugne, ‘Dismantling the Exxon 
Valdez: How Misunderstanding One Maritime Accident Led to the Criminalization of an Entire 
Profession’in Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, Vol. 46, April. 2015, pp. 201-259 
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little regard for the seafarers whose lives would be put in danger, with the same being 
able to be said for the Port States and Flag States, it being difficult however to include, 
at least at this stage, the insurer as a responsible party. 224 
 
The above cases therefore illustrate how substandard shipping can have a severe 
impact on seafarers’ lives. Indeed, in most cases of abandonment of seafarers, they were 
working aboard substandard ships, which most likely were carrying cheap cargo, hence 
being able to be easily ‘disposed of by the shipowner’.  It is no wonder that the 
International Transports Workers’ Federation is strongly against substandard 
shipping.225 As well as that pointed out by Professor John Hare: 
 
“While oil pollution casualties may well have highlighted substandard 
shipping as a green issue, the continuing loss of seamen’s lives is the crux 
of the issue and the catalyst that has given strength to the arms of the ILO, 
the IMO, and the ITF in coordinating international reaction.”226 
 
 The European Commission also recognized the impact that substandard vessels 
have in the “human element” of shipping:  
 
 “These efforts had to be continued in order to address enduring weak points 
in the safety system and to guarantee competitive, high quality maritime 
transport, more appropriate to the human and natural environment and 
                                                        
224 One point that should be made is the fact that in cases of criminalization of seafarers, it is a fact that 
the industry, and even all the members of the ‘safety net’, can be considered to bear responsibility for 
the abandonment of the seafarer. As already stated in the case of the Prestige, the London P&I Club paid 
for the master’s and crew bail. Also, one must note the commotion that the most recent judgment in the 
Prestige case condemning the Shipmaster has caused in the industry, which has not spared any criticism 
regarding the decision. See:  Tom Leander, ‘ASF blasts latest Prestige judgment’ (lloydslist, London, 10 
March 2016); Andrew Spurrier, ‘Prestige master sentenced to two years in prison’, Fairplay (London, 28 
January 2016) and  Namrata Nadkarni, ‘Spain sentences Prestige captain to prison’, (The Marine 
Professional, 28 January 2016) <http://www.imarest.org/themarineprofessional/item/2131-spain-
sentences-prestige-captain-to-prison>, last accessed on 11/08/2016 
225 ITF,  ‘ITF’s Campaign against flags of convenience and substandard shipping, Annual report 2004’ 
(ITF 2004) www.itfglobal.org, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
226  J. Hare, ‘Port State Control: Strong Medicine to cure a Sick Industry’ in 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
571 1996-1997, page 574 
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without the problems posed by “dustbin ships”.227 
 
In the case of the Rhone, there was no environmental disaster, only fourteen 
Turkish seafarers stranded in the Port of Ceuta- Spain. The seafarers had neither been 
repatriated, nor had their wages been paid.228 The only real similarity between the 
Rhone and the case of the Prestige and the Erika is the fact that the three ships fell in 
the category of substandard ships/shipping. Since the Rhone only really impacted the 
lives or livelihoods of these ‘unlucky’ fourteen seafarers, and in part the Port of Ceuta 
since the vessel took up a profitable berth for quite some time due to the refusal of the 
crew to leave the ship before receiving their wages, the Rhone case was not nearly as 
drastic nor as costly as the other two cases, hence it was much less publicized and 
studied, so further details on the case have not been made publically available.229 
Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the vessel had not suffered previous Port 
detentions and it had been accessed and cleared by a Classification Society, otherwise 
it would not be transiting in international waters.  
 
Another example of substandard shipping and abandonment is the case of the 
Playtera, a Greek-owned Maltese vessel, arrested in the port of Rotterdam in 1993 
because of its clear lack of condition to sail. The crew’s accommodation was totally 
unliveable, besides the fact that the ship was completely unseaworthy. After twenty 
days of negotiations the owners agreed to pay the crew back-dated wages and 
repatriation.230 This particular case also demonstrates the importance of an effective 
Port Control and how the performance of one member of the maritime safety chain can 
help in preventing abandonment from happening.  
                                                        
227  European Commission Directorate General for Energy and Transport, A new step forward for 
maritime safety in Europe – The 3rd set of measures in favour of maritime safety, (European 
Commission, March 2007), p.2 
228 See: http://www.seafarersrights.org/seafarers_subjects/abandonment_topic/case_study__rhone.htm 
229 The author could not find any more information about the vessel with the available data, not even in 
the IMO abandonment database as the vessel is not listed there. See: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/seafarers/seafarersBrowse.list?p_lang=en, last accessed on 01/02/2016. 
Unfortunately, the IMO relies on Port States and ITF to report abandonment cases in order to keep an 
updated database, and it is not always the case that abandonment cases are reported to the organization.  
230 See: ITF Seafarers’ bulletin 1993. Page 12 
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II.3 – International Recognition of the need of the Maritime Safety Chain to 
prevent substandard shipping and consequently abandonment 
 
The International Maritime Organization recognizes the need for a functional 
network of responsibilities, hence recognizing the importance of the safety chain, in 
order to prevent substandard shipping as it can be perceived by an extract from one of 
the IMO’s former Directors, Mr. William O’ Neil, whilst in his second term (1994-
1998); “the organization acknowledges that is not the deliberate intent of states to allow 
substandard vessels to operate under their flags. A few States, specially developing 
nations, do not have adequate resources for policing their fleet, even lesser the fleet of 
other vessels arriving at their ports”.231 What can be concluded from the former IMO 
Director’s thoughts is his recognition of the importance of States’ cooperation in the 
elimination of substandard vessels, and given that this was a statement on Port and Flag 
State Implementation and Port State control, it can be inferred that the only way of 
effectively doing this is through an effective ‘network of cooperation’, which the 
Director acknowledges. 
 
Another important international organization can also be said to have 
recognized the importance of an effective network of responsibilities. Since 2004, the 
ILO contains a list of abandoned vessels, specifically including information on 
seafarers who have been abandoned and their current status. The database was created 
in the Fifth Session of the Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Liability 
and Compensation regarding Claims for Death, Personal Injury and Abandonment of 
Seafarers (Joint Working Group), held in London at the Headquarters of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) from 12 to 14 January 2004. There is no 
specific requirement of who has to report the cases, “governments and relevant 
organizations are invited to do so”232, most reports are made by the ITF and a few by 
                                                        
231 http://www.imo.org/imo/vmd/86messag.htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 See also: J. Hare, ‘Port 
State Control: Strong Medicine to cure a Sick Industry’ in 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 571 1996-1997 
232See IMO/ILO/WGLCCS5/3 and database available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/seafarers/seafarersbrowse.home, last accessed on 11/10/2016 
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Port States and even fewer by Flag States (The USA seems to be the only Flag State 
reporting cases of abandonment). A lot of the vessels abandoned were actually detained 
by Port State authorities due to substandard conditions, with the crew later been found 
to also have been ‘abandoned’ according to the meaning given by Resolution A.930(22) 
“Guidelines on Provision of Financial Security in Cases of Abandonment of Seafarers”. 
The database itself demonstrates how there is a network of cooperation attempting to 
stop substandard shipping and the consequences that result from it.  
 
The OECD233 Maritime Committee recognized the connection between 
substandard shipping and the abandonment of seafarers as early as 2001. In a report 
conducted for the organization entitled ‘The Cost to Users of Substandard Shipping’, it 
was acknowledged that one of the costs for seafarers can be “possible non-payment of 
crew at the end of their tour of duty, plus subsequent abandonment and non-
repatriation”. It is not clear what definition was given to ‘abandonment of seafarer’ as 
mentioned in the report, as it is dated January 2001, and the first international definition 
for ‘abandonment of seafarer’ is dated November 2001 (A.930(22) Guidelines on 
Provision of Financial Security in Cases of Abandonment of Seafarers). Nevertheless, 
it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the definition used in the report may have 
been taken from the ILO/ IMO Working Group meetings carried out in November 2000, 
which discussed the issue and the proposed guidelines, hence it should be thought to 
refer to what is considered in this thesis to be the strict definition of abandonment. 234 
It is important to note however that the report points out further potential consequences 
of substandard shipping to seafarers, all of which it is asserted in this thesis constitute 
abandonment of seafarer, i.e: 
 
• Loss of life, personal injury and/or incapacitation that thereby 
impedes claimant’s livelihood. 
                                                        
233 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
234SSY Consultancy and Research Ltd, The Cost to Users of Substandard Shipping, Report Prepared for 
the OECD Maritime Transport Committee, OECD Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, 
January 2001, pp. 11/12 
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• Inadequate crew remuneration, quality of living quarters, medical 
treatment and off-duty time. 
• Negligence by the owner and/or master of a substandard vessel, in 
terms of ensuring due maintenance of on-board safety equipment. 
This can jeopardise the wellbeing of crew in the event of an 
accident.  
• Potential criminal prosecution if the ship is involved in a casualty 
incident.235 
 
II. 4 – The Role of the Insurer preventing substandard shipping 
 
The importance of safety chain members fulfilling their obligations in order to 
prevent substandard shipping should be clear at this point, and obligations of most 
members of the maritime safety chain have been mentioned, even if briefly. 
Nonetheless, one important member of this chain has not yet been mentioned: the 
Insurer. This is due to the fact that its responsibility can be said to only materialize after 
the failure of the other members of the chain. Essentially, the Insurer has the obligation 
to pay the victims of a maritime casualty. However, compulsory insurance, as is 
invariably the case, can be said to not only ensure better protection to victims but to 
“also help eliminate substandard ships and make it possible to re-establish competition 
between operators”, as stated in the Preamble of the Directive 2009/20/EC of the 
European Union and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Insurance of Shipowners 
for Maritime Claims and its purposes.236 
 
 The CLC 1969 and CLC 1992237, the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 2001, and the Nairobi International Convention on 
Removal of Wrecks 2007, EC Directive 2009/20/EC13 and most recently the Maritime 
Labour Convention, all provide for compulsory insurance which in most of these cases 
                                                        
235 Ibid 
236 Preamble, paragraph 4 
237 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 and 1992 
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is coupled with a right of direct action, the victim having the right to proceed directly 
against the insurer.  
 
Furthermore, through IMO conventions, the IOPC fund was established,238 with 
the purpose of providing financial compensation for oil pollution damage that occurs 
in Member States, resulting from spills of persistent oil from tankers. 239 Similarly, the 
confirmed amendments to the Maritime Labour Convention also provide for a Financial 
Security system in the case of abandonment of seafarers, which may be in the form of 
a social security scheme or insurance or a national fund or other similar 
arrangements.240  As the IOPC Fund was a result of incidents such as the Erika and the 
Prestige, the MLC provision is also a consequence of incidents such as the Rhone. 
Indeed, the crew of the Rhone falls within the MLC definition of abandoned seafarer, 
which reads as follows: 
 
“(…) in violation of the requirements of this Convention or the terms of the 
seafarers’ employment agreement, the shipowner: (a) fails to cover the cost 
of the seafarers’ repatriation; or (b) has left the seafarer without the 
necessary maintenance and support; or (c) has otherwise unilaterally 
severed their ties with the seafarer including failure to pay contractual 
wages for a period of at least two months.” 241 
                                                        
238 International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) 
239 The framework for the IOPC Fund was the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1969 Civil Liability Convention) and the 1971 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution (1971 Fund Convention). 
Nevertheless, Although the Funds were established under Conventions adopted under the auspices of 
IMO, they are completely independent legal entities.  
See: http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-
the-Establishment-of-an-International-Fund-for-Compensation-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-
(FUND).aspx and http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/ for more information, last accessed on 
01/02/2016 
240 MLC, A. Amendments relating to Standard A2.5, paragraph 3. The amendments are expected to be 
in force in 2017 
241 Appendix I Proposal for the text of an amendment to the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, to be 
presented to the future Special Tripartite Committee with a view to adoption in accordance with Article 
XV of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006.  – The decision confirming amendments agreed by the 
Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April this year was taken on 11 June 2014 at the 103rd session of the 
International Labour Conference at ILO headquarters in Geneva. Although these amendments will 
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 The establishment of such funds in particular, added to the mentioned 
conventions regulating safety at sea, oil pollution, and seafarers’ rights, may lead to the 
false impression that our current international legal framework is completely self 
sufficient to cover any sort of compensation claims in the event of a maritime 
casualty242, especially since all these conventions were the result of a joint effort of 
several members of the safety chain. However, this is not exactly the case. Many times 
in the event of maritime casualties, when several members of the chain fail to fulfil 
their responsibilities, the amount of compensation available in the funds will not prove 
to be enough. This was the case in three of the accidents mentioned so far. Although 
the MLC amendments are not yet in force, nor was the Convention itself at the time of 
the Rhone incident, a brief look at the case demonstrates that even if the funds were 
available, they would not have been enough to compensate the crew. 
 
II.5 – Concluding Remarks 
 
  Very little doubt should exist regarding the intrinsic relationship between 
substandard shipping and abandonment of seafarers. Most reported abandonment cases 
happen in relation to substandard vessels, and, as will be demonstrated as this thesis 
progresses, at a time when the shipowner is facing some sort of financial hardship 
(which is often the reason for the substandard condition of the vessel).   
 
  Furthermore, the importance of the members of the maritime safety chain has 
been established, since the efficiency of one member of the chain can assist in 
preventing substandard shipping (and consequently abandonment) from happening, as 
well as the fact that failures by members of the chain can be said to have caused some 
                                                        
become law, the original version of MLC remains the current text for the time being, because the 
amendments will not enter into force until 2017.  
See: http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/103/reports/WCMS_248905/lang--en/index.htm for more 
information on the amendments. 
242 Maritime casualty here means any casualty which occurred as a direct consequence of substandard 
shipping, possibly resulting in ‘abandonment of the seafarer’ in its strict or broad sense. 
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of the most severe maritime disaster and abandonment of seafarer cases of all time. 
 
  This chapter demonstrated that the Private Actors selected to be analysed in this 
thesis have an essential role in preventing abandonment from occurring, and 
accordingly their failure in fulfilling their obligations may be susceptible to legal 
consequences. These possible legal consequences for these private actors in relation to 
seafarers and the responsibility of the members of the safety chain in preventing 
abandonment, is exactly what shall be analysed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter III – States 
 
 This chapter intends to demonstrate States’ legal responsibilities and obligations 
in preventing ‘abandonment of seafarer’ from occurring. This shall be done by the 
analysis of States performing three different roles, namely those of Flag States, Port 
States and Coastal States. 243 
 
Flag States and Port States are inherent members of the maritime safety chain, 
having an indisputable responsibility in preventing malpractice within the shipping 
industry, such as substandard shipping and abandonment of seafarers. States exercise 
different functions in each role in order to prevent these incidents from happening.  
 
As already showed in Chapter I, Flag States, due to the MLC have an express 
obligation to ensure that the shipowner provides for the seafarers’ repatriation through 
a Financial Security scheme. The Convention imposed what can only be characterized 
as an express responsibility between the shipowner and the Flag State to repatriate the 
seafarer, which means that if the first fails to fulfil its obligation, the latter must do 
so.244 
 
Since the advent of the SOLAS, MARPOL and STWC exercise an inspection 
role together with the Flag State to ensure compliance with the conventions. The MLC 
has given even more inspection power to States, since now they need to also assure 
                                                        
243 The author acknowledges the fact that Seafarer exporter countries also play a vital role in preventing 
abandonment of seafarers from occurring, with this role being recognized by the MLC. See See: Julia 
Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘MLC: Much Ado About Nothing?’ in European Transport Law Journal 
(2014), pp 119-132. Nevertheless, for a matter of concession all the Private Actors selected in this thesis, 
apart from Coastal States, are considered to be members of the maritime safety chain which has for a 
long time been recognized as indispensable for the safety of life at sea, and prevention of substandard 
shipping (see Chapter II). The analysis of Coastal States was chosen to be briefly done in this chapter, 
since their role has been often questioned to have been an important part in accidents such as the Prestige, 
a case scrutinized in this thesis. Unfortunately, the analysis of seafarers’ exporter countries role would 
require to go beyond the scope of this thesis and most importantly the second premise that it intends to 
prove. 
244 MLC Standard A2.5, 5 
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compliance with the convention. Therefore, Port State control is deemed to assist the 
non-occurrence of abandonment of seafarers even as described by the MLC.245 
 
Coastal States do not exercise any sort of inspection power according to any 
convention. Nevertheless, since in this thesis the term “abandonment of seafarer” is 
considered in all its broadness, the refusal of a Coastal State to offer refuge to a vessel 
in distress can be considered “abandonment of seafarer”, since the refusal may 
endanger the seafarer’s life, as in the case of the Prestige. Often, the decision to refuse 
refuge prioritises the costs of a possible clean up over the life of the seafarers on board 
the vessel. Thus, it seems sensible to analyse the legality of a Coastal State’s denying 
refuge and consequently endangering seafarers’ lives.  
 
 In order to analyse the responsibilities and obligations of the three State’s roles 
mentioned above, i.e. Flag State, Port State and Coastal State, each topic shall begin 
with a general analysis of each role within the shipping industry, and move on to a more 
specific analysis, to finally make an analysis based on international law, of possible 
liabilities that States might have in each of their roles regarding seafarers who are 
deemed to have been abandoned. 
 
III.1 - Flag States 
 
 According to article 91 of the United Stations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), a vessel has to observe the law of the flag it flies,246 thus carrying the 
nationality of that State. This article of the Convention is in fact nothing more than the 
                                                        
245 For instance, the MV Kamil, detained by Italian Port authorities in 2014 was found in substandard 
condition, with a complaint having been made to the ITF.  The deficiencies found in the vessel clearly 
made it an unsafe place to work. See:  Paris MOU Report, M/V  Kamil, accessible at: 
https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Caught%20in%20the%20net%20Kamil.pdf, last accessed 
on 01/02/2015 
246 Article 91 of the UNCLOS reads as follows: “1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of 
its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships 
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link 
between the State and the ship. 
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect.” 
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enactment of an ancient principle of maritime law previously codified by article 5 of 
the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958. Long before these Conventions had 
been drafted in 1982, as far back as 1927, legal theorists already claimed that vessels 
were, in a juridical sense, floating portions of the state whose flag they fled.247 Although 
this fiction was later abandoned with the advent of the 1958 Convention, the 
understanding that a ship is subject to the law of its flag remained with the adoption of 
a more functional approach.248 
 
 Consequently, no doubts exist regarding the importance of a ship’s flag since it 
is through it that the law which governs the ship will be known. Shipowners are free to 
choose in which country they wish the register their ships. This so called Freedom of 
Registration finds its corollary on the Freedom of the High Seas, cornerstone of 
International Law.249 In 1916 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Muscat Dhows 
Case, where Britain challenged France to issue to subjects of Muscat registration 
documents authorising them to fly the French flag, held that:  
 
“Generally speaking it belongs to every sovereign to decide to whom he 
will accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules governing such 
grants”250 
                                                        
247 In the SS Lotus (France Vs Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J (ser.A) No 10 (Sep 7) The Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated at par. 62 that:  
“It is certainly true that – apart from certain special cases which are defined by international law - vessels 
on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the 
principle of the freedom of the seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the 
high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them. Thus, if a war 
vessel, happening to be at the spot where a collision occurs between a vessel flying its flag and a foreign 
vessel, were to send on board the latter an officer to make investigations or to take evidence, such an act 
would undoubtedly be contrary to international law” 
248 “There is an intimate connection between the ship and the state nationality she acquires which carries 
with it the application to the ship of the laws of the flag-state. It is under these laws that the captain 
exercises his authority and enforces it. The ship may be a chattel, a piece of moveable property, but she 
is governed by special laws and her independence, while on high seas, from any control other than that 
of the authorities of the flag-state is universally recognized. It is not necessary to speak of her territory.” 
- C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, (6th edition Longmans, London:1967), page 288 
249 Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders of a FOC Country’, in M. Musi (ed), 
New Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and International Trade Law (Libreria Bonomo 
Editrice: Bologna, 2014), p. 232 
250 James Brown Scott (ed.) The Hague Court Reports (Oxford University Press 1916), 93-96 
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Consequently, under UNCLOS, a Flag States must “effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control in… technical… matters over ships flying its flag.” 251 
Moreover, states are obliged to “take such measures for ships flying its flags as are 
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: (a) the construction, 
equipment and seaworthiness of ships”, which explicitly include measures to see “that 
each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate intervals, is surveyed by a 
qualified surveyor of ships.”252 These general Flag States commitments in the 
UNCLOS derive from previous maritime conventions governing specific subject areas.  
The Load Lines, SOLAS, STCW MARPOL and more recently the MLC253 conventions 
provides for the Flag State to conduct periodic surveys verifying the compliance of 
structural integrity of the ships flying their flags, the operability of essential shipboard 
engineering systems, accommodations, seafarers’ employment contracts, the existence 
of insurance, in summary the compliance of the ship with the provisions of the relevant 
convention. 254Nevertheless, each of the mentioned conventions allows the Flag States 
to delegate the survey responsibilities to recognized organizations.255 It is well known 
that Flag States routinely delegate these responsibilities to classification societies, that 
will thus work as “recognized organizations”256 In practice a vessel is only allowed to 
sail with certificates of compliance on board, these are said to constitute the ‘core 
element’ of Port State control as they are prima facie evidence of compliance. 257 
                                                        
251 UNCLOS art.94 (1) 
252 Ibid art 94 (3) (a) and (4) (a) 
253 Some relevant Flag State Responsibilities will be discussed in more detail further along in this chapter. 
254 See:. B.D. Daniel, ‘Potential Liability of Marine Classification Societies to Non Contracting Parties’ 
in 19 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 183 2006-2007, page 212. 
255 Load Lines art. 13, SOLAS  chap.1, pt. , Regulation 6; MARPOL, Annex I, regulation 4, para 3 ; and 
MLC 
256 The IMO has issued Resolutions establishing standards for “recognized organizations.” Int’l Maritime 
Org [IMO], Guidelines for the Authorization of Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration, 
IMO Assem. Res. A. 739 (18) (Nov, 4, 1993) (on file with the University of San Francisco Maritime 
Law Journal); Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines for the Authorization of Organizations Acting on 
Behalf of the Administration, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 789 (19) (Nov. 4, 1993) (on file with the University 
of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal). All the Flag States parties of SOLAS have determined that 
IACS members meet IMO Criteria. Ship Safety, Lloyd’s Register: We started with a  Cup of Coffee, 
http://www.lr.org/About+Us/Our+History .htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
257  See: O. OZCAYIR, ‘The Use of Port State Control in Maritime Industry and Application of the Paris 
MoU’ in 14 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 201 2008-2009, p. 206 
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Indeed, by formally ratifying the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea or by informally expressing commitment to its terms as done by the United States, 
essentially every maritime nation has agreed that the Flag State is primarily responsible 
for safety surveys of the vessels flying its flag. 258Likewise, by ratifying SOLAS, 
nations have agreed that the certification of vessels by classification societies, both 
under the regulations of SOLAS itself and under classification society rules, is essential 
to the flag States’ role in promoting the safety of the vessels that fly its flag. The same 
is true for the control of ocean pollution and enforcement of seafarers’ rights, and the 
corresponding importance of recognized classification societies 259in the fulfilment of 
this role. The societies represent Flag States who have ratified conventions such as the 
International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and similar safety 
and pollution control treaties as well as the Maritime Labour Convention.260 The 
importance of Flag States properly implementing their duties has been repeatedly 
highlighted by annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea.261 
 
                                                        
258 UNCLOS Article 94 (5) emphasizing the importance of internationally accepted standards and as 
highly uttered by Churchill and Lowe these are “dictated by practical necessity. While each State remains 
free in theory to apply its own legal standards relating to such matters as seaworthiness and crew 
qualifications to ships flying its flag . . . there would be chaos if these standards varied widely or were 
incompatible. Furthermore, because safety measures usually involve extra costs for shipowners, and 
because shipping is a very competitive industry, most States are reluctant to impose stricter safety 
legislation on their shipowners than other States impose upon theirs. For these reasons, therefore, the 
international community has developed a set of uniform standards to promote the safety of shipping.” 
(R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law Of The Sea, (3rd ed. Manchester University Press 1999) ISBN: 
978-0-7190-4382-6, p.265)Thus due to UNCLOS Article 94 (5) a Flag State might be bound to a standard 
even if it did not specifically adopt it, for this the standard just needs to be "generally accepted". 
Furthermore, article 217 (1) of UNCLOS legislates over Flag state Responsibility for effective 
enforcement of international rules, standards, and regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs. 
259 Their role will be explained further along in this paper. 
260  B.D. Daniel, ‘Potential Liability of Marine Classification Societies to Non Contracting Parties’ in 19 
U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 183 2006-2007, page 212 
261 See e.g. UNGA Resolution 67/78 on Oceans and the law of the sea (UN Doc. A/RES/67/78 of 11 
December 2012), para. 135; UNGA Resolution 67/79 on Sustainable fisheries, including through the 
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments (UN Doc. A/RES/67/79 of 11 December 
2012), para. 6.  
114 
 
 Therefore, the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance of ships with 
standards provided by international conventions governing safety, pollution and crew 
conditions belongs to Flag States. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, Flag States 
must have the means and the will to implement the requirements established in 
international conventions.  Ideally, Flag States should have an adequate legislative and 
regulatory apparatus as well as a maritime authority with enough staff in order to 
monitor the enforcement of standards on board their ships. Some consider that it is in 
this context precisely that Flag of Convenience Countries are lacking. FOC countries 
are considered to be unwilling and/or unable to enforce the regulations imposed by such 
international instruments ratified by them.262 Accordingly, there is a belief that it is 
easier for shipowners to register substandard vessels in the registries of these countries 
rather than in more stringent ones. 263 
 
III.1.1 – Flag of Convenience Countries 
  
 Flag of Convenience Countries are said to, irrespective of cost saving factors, 
allow shipowners to evade regulations which control vessel design, construction, 
manning and equipment, and to avoid international rules and international standards 
applied under treaties. This ‘permissiveness’ is pointed out as the reason for some of 
the major maritime pollution disasters, such as the Erika and Prestige and the reason 
for breaches of seafarers’ rights, as in the case of the Rhone. Even though this may have 
been the case with the first two, since the Erika was registered in Malta, and the Prestige 
in the Bahamas, with both countries being considered FOCCs, this is not the case with 
the Rhone, which was registered in Turkey.264   
                                                        
262 See: M. Boos, ‘The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Striking the Flags of Convenience?’ in 2 Colo. J. Int’l 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 407 1991, p. 415 
263  Camille Goodman, ‘Flag State Responsibility in International Fisheries Law – effective fact, creative 
Effective Fact, Creative Fiction, or further work required?’ in 23 Austl. &NZ. Mar. L.J. 157, 160 (2009). 
p 159 
264   See: L. J. Herman, ‘Flags of Convenience – New Dimensions to an Old Problem’ in  McGill Law 
Journal Vol. 24 No 1, Montreal, 1978  and Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders 
of a FOC Country’, in M. Musi (ed), New Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and 
International Trade Law (Libreria Bonomo Editrice: Bologna, 2014) pp. 227-25 
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 The reality is that the whole FOC concept is a rather fluid one, as currently there 
is no standard definition of a FOC. Essentially, FOC countries are considered to be 
countries typically ‘not involved in waterborne trade’, that become ship registers 
merely as a source of revenue’265, hence not possessing a strong willingness to enforce 
any relevant legislation, and especially since they want to remain as attractive as 
possible to shipowners.266 
 
A FOC Country cannot be strictly defined at this point; any definition that may 
be given to it will be deemed to be inaccurate or at the least controversial. Nonetheless, 
FOC Countries are easily identifiable, due in large part to their early connections with 
‘flagging out’ but mostly because of ITF’s list of Flag of Convenience Countries. The 
list is elaborated by the ITF's Fair Practices Committee, a joint committee of ITF 
seafarers' and dockers' unions, and part of the ITF campaign against the concept of 
FOC.  Thus, according to the current ITF list the mentioned states Malta and Bahamas 
would be considered FOCCs, but Turkey would not be.267 
 
 The countries are chosen for the list based on the fact that they allow on their 
register ships which are beneficially owned and/or controlled by companies 
incorporated elsewhere, i.e. the absence of a ‘genuine link’ between the flag and the 
owner of the vessel.268 First of all, that which constitutes a ‘genuine link’ between flag 
and ship is, since the inception of this notion at the 1957 Convention on the High Seas, 
a debatable point.269 Secondly, this does not seem to be accurate because if this was the 
                                                        
265 See: J. J. Buckley, The Business of Shipping, (8th Edition, Centreville: Cornell Maritime Press, 2008), 
page 28 
266  See: Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders of a FOC Country’, in M. Musi 
(ed), New Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and International Trade Law (Libreria 
Bonomo Editrice: Bologna, 2014) pp. 227-252 
267 See ITF website for more information and the full list of FOC countries: 
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm 
268 “ A flag of convenience ship is one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership” 
(ITF,  “What are Flags of Convenience”, available at http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-
sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-convenience-campaign/), last accessed on 01/02/2016 
269  See: S. Tache, ‘The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional Controversy and Enforcement of Genuine 
Link’ in 16 International Lawyer, 301 (1982) 
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case, as evaluated by the UNCTAD 2013 Report270, every country should be on the list, 
particularly as regards second registers. The list seems in fact to be based on countries 
whose ships were found to be failing to grant seafarers’ minimum rights. The nations 
considered to be the main FOC countries, which are Panama, Liberia and Honduras, 
are referred to collectively as ‘Panlibhonco’. Coincidentally these countries are also the 
top registers in the world.271Finally, even if the ‘genuine link’ theory was correct, this 
conceptualization would not be applicable to the case of the Rhone, which involved a 
Turkish crew, in a Turkish ship managed by a Turkish company.  
 
 This imprecision of the FOC concept and the prejudice surrounding the 
countries included in the mentioned ITF list can be clearly perceived in Carbotrade 
SpA v Bureau Veritas272.  In Carbotrade, the claimant contended that the ship ‘flew the 
United Kingdom’s flag [more specifically the flag of Gibraltar] simply as a flag of 
convenience.”273 The Second Circuit held that by registering the flag in Gibraltar rather 
than in Liberia, where the shipowner was incorporated, the latter had subjected the 
vessel to the more stringent regulation of the United Kingdom, totally refuting any 
claim that Gibraltar flag was a mere flag of convenience.274 Therefore, in this particular 
instance the claimant suggests by its claim that the ship should have been registered in 
Liberia, one of the most well-known country considered to be a FOC, in preference to 
the United Kingdom, a country known for the enforcement of international conventions 
and strict and well established maritime laws. This proves that the ‘genuine link’ theory 
cannot always explain FOCCs, as in this case the place with less of a ‘genuine link’ 
was less of a FOCC than the country suggested by the claimant, despite the possible 
absence of such a link.   
 
In the case of the Prestige a lot of criticism surrounded the fact that the 
shipowner was never located, leaving the crew to face all the criminal charges on their 
                                                        
270 UNCTDAD Report on Maritime Transport 2013 
271 Ibid 
272 99 F.3d 86, 1997 AMC 98 
273Carbotrade, 99 F, 3d at 92 
274 Ibid. at 95-96 
117 
 
own, among other things. This was attributed to the fact that vessel was registered in a 
FOC country. However, the reality was that the owner was never found because the 
underlying company was registered in Liberia, hence the vessel’s registration (which 
was in the Bahamas) had nothing to do with the non-location of the owner.275  
  
The fact is that countries considered to be Flag of Convenience ones have taken 
many steps in order to provide for better safety and regulatory compliance, aiming to 
avoid expensive detentions and remain attractive to shipowners. As was mentioned, the 
two countries considered the main FOCCs, Panama and Liberia, actually feature on the 
white list of the Paris MOU secretariat Report, which means that their ships are some 
of the least susceptible to detention.276 
 
 The Flag of Convenience States are parties to all the major safety conventions, 
including the ‘four pillars’ of shipping  (SOLAS, STCW, MARPOL and MLC) and 
more responsible registries ensure stricter compliance. For instance, Liberia requires a 
‘decision maker’ who is contactable 24 hours a day in the event of any accident arising 
from one of its ships, as a condition for the issuance of a Permanent Certificate. Further, 
the country stipulates that vessels seeking registration not be more than 20 years old, 
although subject to certain conditions vessels exceeding this age limit may be accepted 
for registration. Panama does not provide for any age limitation, however vessels over 
20 years old are subject to a special inspection before the Permanent Certificate of 
Registry can be issued. Furthermore, both countries make annual levies on ships in their 
registers for casualty investigation and international participation. 277 
 
 Furthermore, international registries are no longer dependent on smaller non –
mainstream operators for their revenues. The demolition of much of the least seaworthy 
                                                        
275  The Prestige was registered owner was a Liberian company; Mare Shipping, Inc.  However, the 
shipowner was Universe Maritime, Ltd. (Greece) – Carlos Llorente, ‘The “Prestige” in The American 
Courts’, in CMI Casualties / liabilities in the offshore sector (CMI Yearbook 2014), p 174 
276  See: R. M. F. Coles and E. Watt, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, (2nd Edition, Informa law for 
Routledge, 2009), page 2 
277  Ibid, page 7 
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tonnage during the ship recession of 1980 and the elimination of many of the smaller 
and less experienced ship operators during the same period enhanced the quality of 
vessels in the open registries, including the ‘FOC registries’. 278 
   
 Yet, the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) reportedly stated that 
in 2001, 63% of all reported ship losses at sea, measured by tonnage, were accounted 
for by  just 13 flag of convenience registers, the five worst performers being Panama, 
Cyprus, St. Vincent, Cambodia and Malta.279 Indeed, many consider the feasibility and 
permissibility of re-flagging, which consists in re-registering the vessel in a less 
stringent country, commonly a FOC one, to be detrimental to an effective Flag State 
Jurisdiction. 280 Corroborating with this is the fact that the three most well-known 
maritime disasters, i.e. Torrey Canyon, Erika and the Prestige, involved vessels 
registered in FOC countries.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this freedom of registration is much 
like the Common Law Countries’ corporate ‘internal affairs doctrine’281 which allows 
a businessman to register his/her company in any country regardless of his/ her own 
nationality or where the business is primarily carried on.  Furthermore, the European 
Court of Justice ruled that the policy attempted to be enforced by ITF in its campaign 
                                                        
278 Ibid, page 10 
279  Michael Richardson, ‘Crimes under Flag of Conveniences’ (yaleglobal, 2003) 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/crimes-under-flags-convenience>, last accessed on 10/05/2015 
280 See: Camille Goodman, ‘Flag State Responsibility in International Fisheries Law – effective fact, 
creative Effective Fact, Creative Fiction, or further work required?’ in 23 Austl. &NZ. Mar. L.J. 157, 
160 (2009),p.159 and Tamo Zwinge, ‘Duties of Flag States to Implement and Enforce International 
Standards and Regulations - And Measures to Counter 9eir Failure to Do So’ in Journal of International 
Business and Law: Vol. 10: Iss. 2, Article 5 (2011) 
281 The ‘Internal affairs doctrine’ is a choice of law rule which selects the law of the incorporating state 
to govern disputes over a corporation’s internal affairs, regardless of where the corporation conduct its 
business. Accordingly, corporations can choose the corporate law applicable to their internal affairs by 
incorporating in the state of their choice. See: J. Daammann, ‘The Incorporation Choices of Privately 
Held Corporations’ in J Law Econ Organ 2011, 27 (1): 79-112. DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewp015 First 
published online: June 26, 2009; B. L. Segal, ‘The Internal Affairs Doctrine—Rights and Duties of 
Shareholders, Directors, and Officers of Foreign Corporations Doing Business’(State Bar of Michigan, 
2007) <http://www.michbar.org/business/BLJ/Spring2007/segal.pdf> and F. Tung, ‘Before 
Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine’ in the Journal of Corporation Law (2006) 
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against FOC is not objectively justifiable, due to the restrictions of freedom of 
establishment that it would impose. 282  
 
III. 1.2. Flag States and MLC abandonment of seafarers’ provisions and eventual 
implementation challenges 
 
 Flag States have an important role in the MLC in ensuring that its provisions 
are correctly implemented and enforced. Although, the convention also imposes 
responsibilities in Coastal or/and Port States, as well as Labour-supplying States, it is 
clear that the majority of the obligations under the Convention are directed towards 
Flag States. This can be clearly perceived in the amendments covering “abandonment 
of seafarers”. It is up to Flag States to ensure that the Financial Security Scheme is set 
in place and that the ships flying its flag carry “a certificate or other documentary 
evidence of Financial Security issued by the Financial Security provider.”283 
 
III.1.3 – Flag State “exclusive” jurisdiction in regards to seafarers 
 
 Despite the fact that articles 92 (1) and article 94 (2) (b) of UNCLOS, as well 
as maritime customary law284,  give Flag States exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, 
and jurisdiction over the ship’s master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, 
technical and social matters concerning the vessel, and this being the seafarer’s place 
of work, where in factual terms he/she spends most of the time, it is questionable if 
when dealing with seafarers’ rights the law of the Flag will be the prevailing one, much 
less the exclusive one. 
                                                        
282  Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, at par.89 
283 Amendments to the Code implementing Regulation 2.5 – Repatriation of the MLC, 2006 (and 
appendices) adopted by the Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, adopted by the Special 
Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, Standard A2.5.2, 3 and 5 
284 See p.109 
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In the Queen on the application of Fleet Maritime Services (Bermuda) Limited 
v The Pensions Regulator [2015] EWHC 3744 (Admin), Mr. Justice Leggatt highlighted 
his strong and substantiated opposition to the argument that a ship should be regarded 
as a seafarer’s base of work. He pointed out that a ship could only be regarded as a 
place of work for the purpose of identifying the country where a seafarer is working at 
any given time if legally the ship was perceived as part of the territory of the Flag State. 
The distinguished Judge observed that for the purposes of the 2008 Act as well as other 
employment legislation, the determination of a seafarer’s base of work depends on 
where the ship to which the seafarer is assigned is located at the relevant time. 
Therefore, to determine if a seafarer “ordinarily works” in the UK, it is necessary to 
identify the Port or other fixed place in the UK as the seafarer’s base.285  
 
Mr Justice Leggatt’s ruling concurs with the court of Appeal’s decision in 
Diggins v. Condor Marine Crewing Services Ltd [2010] ICR 213, which rejected the 
suggestion that Mr Diggins was based on the ship where he worked. Elias LJ ruled that 
in his view “(…) if one asks where this employee’s base is, there can only be one 
sensible answer: it is where his duty begins and ends.”286 
 
Therefore, in both cases concerning the applicability of English legislation287 to 
a seafarer’s employment relationship, it was ruled that it should be determined if the 
seafarer ordinarily works in the UK, the Flag of the vessel being of very little 
importance in determining this. According to Mr. Justice Leggatt a seafarer will be 
deemed to be ordinarily working in the UK: 
 
                                                        
285 The Queen on the application of Fleet Maritime Services (Bermuda) Limited v The Pensions 
Regulator [2015] EWHC 3744 (Admin) paragraphs 60-63 
286 Diggins v. Condor Marine Crewing Services Ltd [2010] ICR 213, paragraph 30 
287 The Queen on the application of Fleet Maritime Services (Bermuda) Limited v The Pensions 
Regulator [2015] EWHC 3744 (Admin) dealt with auto enrolment in the Pensions Act 2008, whereas 
Diggins v. Condor Marine Crewing Services Ltd [2010] ICR 213 dealt with the applicability of the 
Employment Act 2002, in a unfair dismissal case 
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● During any period when the seafarer is working from a base situated in 
the UK even if the vessel on which he/she works spends most of its time 
outside the UK so that the majority of the work is performed outside the 
UK. 
● When the seafarer lives in the UK and his/her tours of duty habitually 
begin and end at a port in the UK288 
 
Therefore, the UK courts when dealing with seafarers’ rights seem not to give 
a lot or any consideration to the law of the Flag State in determining where the seafarer 
“ordinarily works” and accordingly the applicable law to the relationship.   
 
The European Court of Justice seems to believe that a Flag State should not be 
deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction when dealing specifically with seafarers’ rights. 
Although, in Poulsen and Diva Navigation289, the court ruled that the law governing 
the crew’s activities depends on in which State the ship is registered290, in Eliniko 
Dimosio v Stefanos Stroumpolis and others, the court ruled that international public law 
does not seem to contain rules reserving solely to the Flag State of a vessel the 
possibility of introducing a guarantee covering outstanding wages of seafarers. 291The 
court highlighted that the latter case differed from the previous one since it concerned 
the Directive 80/987 which unlike Regulation No 3094/86, the object of the first case, 
“is not intended to govern an activity performed on a vessel by the crew on board of 
the vessel (…) but simply to place each Member State under an obligation to guarantee 
that the outstanding wage claims of employees, especially those who had previously 
been employed on board a vessel, will be satisfied after their employer has been 
declared insolvent in that Member State.”292 
                                                        
288 The Queen on the application of Fleet Maritime Services (Bermuda) Limited v The Pensions 
Regulator [2015] EWHC 3744 (Admin), paragraph 50 
289 C 286/90, EU:C:1992:453 
290 Ibid, paragraphs 18 and 20 
291 C 292/14 Eliniko Dimosio v Stefanos Stroumpolis and others, at paragraph 62 
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It is interesting to highlight that Eliniko Dimosio v Stefanos Stroumpolis is in 
fact a case dealing with abandonment of seafarers as defined by IMO Regulation A.930 
(22) and the MLC.  The Greek seafarers had been hired to work in a Maltese flagged 
vessel berthed at the port of Piraeus in the summer of 1994. Nevertheless, the vessel 
remained detained at the port due to an attachment order and the seafarers never 
received payment after their period of engagement, terminating their contract in 
December 1995. The company owning the vessel, which had their headquarters located 
in Piraeus, was declared insolvent in June of the following year by a Greek Court. The 
seafarers ended up not receiving any payment in connection with the insolvency due to 
the lack of realisable assets, which led them to claim their payment directly from the 
Greek government under Directive 80/987 which has a social objective to guarantee 
employees a minimum of protection at EU level following the employer’s insolvency 
through payment of outstanding claims resulting from employment contracts.293  
 
In the above case, the European Union Court of Justice, took a protective 
approach towards employees taken by most employment courts, ruling that the 
Directive 80/987 applied to seafarers living in a Member State engaged in that State by 
a company with registered offices in a non-member country but its actual head office 
in that Member State.294 
 
Accordingly, it can be perceived that despite Article 94 of UNCLOS giving 
exclusive jurisdiction to Flag States, this exclusivity does not seem to apply to 
employment rights.  
 
 
 
                                                        
293 Ibid, at paragraphs 20,21, 22 and 30 
294 Ibid, at paragraph 28.1 
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III.1. 4 – Actions against Flag States 
 
The UNCLOS and IMO conventions provide for several actions which can be 
taken against Flag States by other states with regard to ship safety and pollution from 
vessels. Two types of actions (Port State control and dispute settlement procedures) 
concern states failing to discharge Flag State responsibilities.295 
 
Port State control will be discussed in a separate section of this paper. In regards 
to dispute settlement procedures, the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships provides for the possibility of unilateral reference to arbitration if 
the settlement of a dispute concerning its interpretation or application by negotiation 
between parties has proved to be impossible and if these parties do not otherwise agree. 
Moreover, any party to the Convention, which has an interest of a legal nature and may 
be affected by the decision in the case, may, after giving written notice to the parties 
which originally initiated the procedure, join the arbitration procedure with the consent 
of the Tribunal.296 
 
Furthermore, action can be taken against a Flag State in breach of its duties 
under ILO conventions concerning maritime labour standards (i.e. the MLC), in the 
context of the complaints procedure and follow-up actions under the ILO Constitution. 
France, for instance, has filed two complaints against Panama concerning the protection 
of seafarers and both of them resulted in a settlement. 297 Nonetheless, the parties of a 
complaint may propose to refer it to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if it does 
                                                        
295 See: : Takey Yoshinobu, ‘International Legal Responses to the Flag State in Breach of its Duties: 
Possibilities for Other States to Take Action against the Flag State’ in Nordicjoumal of Intemationai Law 
82 (2013) 283-31 
296 29' International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (2 November 1973, as 
modified by the 1978 Protocol (London, 1 June 1978) and the 1997 Protocol (London, 26 September 
1997) and regularly amended) 1340 UNTS 61, Article 10.And  Protocol II, Article VI  
297 Information is available on the ILO website. ILO, 'Complaints', <virww.ilo.org/global/ 
standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/complaints/lang-en/ index.htm , last 
accessed on 01/02/2016 
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not agree with the recommendations of the ILO Commission.298 There has been no case 
brought to the ICJ so far. Finally, if a member state fails to carry out a recommendation 
of the Commission of Inquiry or the decision of the ICJ within the applicable 
timeframe, the Governing Body "may recommend to the Conference such action as it 
may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith". 299Nonetheless, it is 
unclear by the reading of Article 33 of the ILO Constitution which sanctions member 
States can adopt in case of failure to comply with the Commission recommendations.300 
 
 The fact is that most of the time states will attempt to take diplomatic measures 
in disputes involving other nation states.  This was clearly the position adopted by the 
US Courts in Reino the Espana v Am. Bureau of Shipping301, which decided to take 
diplomatic sensitivities into account when dismissing Spain’s claim. The court applied 
diplomatic salve, recognizing “the gravity of the injury Spain alleges it has suffered” 
and emphasizing that it did not “mean… to diminish those injuries.”302This case will 
be discussed in further detail in this paper but summarily what happened was that Spain 
wanted the defendant to be tried under American Law, despite the fact that the cause of 
action took place in Spain and its sovereignty, because only under US law was there a 
chance of actually winning the lawsuit.303 
 
 Therefore, successful claims against Flag States can be said to not be the easiest 
thing to achieve, if at all. Furthermore, nations may create legislative immunity for 
ships flying their flags, as is the case of Bahamas, which includes in its Merchant 
                                                        
298 See Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (1 April 1919 (adopted by the Peace 
Conference and became Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles), entered into force 28 June 1919, last 
amended in 1997 (not yet in force)) (ILO Constitution), Article 29.  
299 Ibid, Article 33.  
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82 (2013) 283-31, pp. 283-31 
301 Reino de Espana, 691 F. 3d at 476 n.9, 2012 AMC at 2123 n. 9 
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303 See: Rory B.O. Halloran, ‘A decade Later $1 Billion Saved: The Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime 
Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental and Economic Damages in Reino 
de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping. Inc.’ in 37 Tul. Mar. L.J. 639 2012- 2013, pp 639-654 
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Shipping Act a legislative exception providing that any government appointee is 
immunized from liability for issuing statutory certificates of good faith.304 
 
 The OECD Maritime Transport Committee in 2001 concluded that: “Some flag 
States disregard their responsibilities to the principle of safe shipping because these, 
too, are not sufficiently exposed to real liabilities. To some degree, they are able to 
offload the notional responsibility of enforcing standards by engaging classification 
societies to perform their ship certification duties. However, there is no guarantee that 
the societies to which these duties are entrusted are those with the greatest commitment 
to rigorous enforcement of international requirements.”305 Following a similar line of 
thought, Dr. Winchester from the Seafarers International Centre at the University of 
Cardiff, recognizing the necessity of a network of responsibility in the shipping industry 
in order to achieve effective regulation, reportedly said that: 
 
"Effective regulation depends upon the existence of a network of shared 
responsibility. All stakeholders in the maritime industry need to take an 
active stance in the maintenance of vessel standards and their operation. 
However, the Flag State is often the weak link in the regulatory chain."306 
 
The conclusion of the OECD Maritime Committee seems accurate as Flag 
States do not seem to face many liabilities. Similarly, Dr. Winchester’s comment can 
accurately reflects the fact that out of all the recognized members of the safety chain, 
perhaps Flag States (especially those dedicated more to ship registry than to trade itself) 
would be the least eager to comply with their responsibilities, particularly because if 
they fail to do so, they will hardly suffer any consequence, whereas Port and Coastal 
States for instance may face costly clean ups, among other things.  Nevertheless, it 
might not be in the interests of a Flag State not to perform its responsibilities, since due 
                                                        
304 The Bahamian Merchant Shipping Act, 1976, 16 Acts of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 161 § 
278 
305  SSY Consultancy & Research Ltd, ‘The cost to users of substandard shipping’, (OECD Maritime 
Transport Committee, January 2001), p. 35 
306 http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/fsa.aspx, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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to this “network of responsibility”, lack of compliance on its part could result in 
expensive detentions and loss of interest in the Flag state as a registry location.307 
 
III.2 - Coastal State 
 
In respect of pollution threats, the UNCLOS provides Coastal States with 
degrees of enforcement authority based on the proximity of the offending vessel to 
shore and the gravity of the violation. The Convention essentially grants Coastal States 
the right to inspect and detain vessels suspected of MARPOL violations within their 
territorial waters, and limited power to investigate suspected violations within the 200 
–miles exclusive economic zone it created.308These provisions have increased Coastal 
State authority to address MARPOL violations close to shore. Nonetheless, beyond 
that, states continue to have limited powers to enforce international pollution 
agreements. 309 
 
The 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas 
in Cases of Oil Pollution governs the rights of Coastal States to take measures to prevent 
pollution. Article 1 grants member states the rights to take “measures on the high seas 
as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to 
their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, 
following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may 
reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.” 
 
Nevertheless, before taking such measures the Coastal State must consult other 
states affected by the casualty, especially the Flag State, and promptly inform of the 
proposed measures to any person physical or corporate known to the Coastal State   or 
                                                        
307 See: Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders of a FOC Country’, in M. Musi 
(ed), New Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and International Trade Law (Libreria 
Bonomo Editrice: Bologna, 2014), pp. 227-252 
308  The authority given by UNICLOS however is not unlimited. See: M. Boos, ‘The Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990: Striking the Flags of Convenience?’ in 2 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 407 1991, pp.414-415 
309  Collins, ‘The Tanker’s Rights of Harmless Discharge and Protection of Marine Environment’ in 18  
J. Mar. L. & Com. 275, 275-77 (1987), at 287 
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made known to it during the consultations, to have interests which can be affected by 
the measures to be adopted. Finally, the Coastal State should take into account the views 
of all these affected parties.310 This clearly demonstrates the existence of a network in 
the maritime industry in the case of a casualty and how the parties should seek the best 
solution for everyone involved. These requirements may only be dispensed of in cases 
of extreme urgency but even then the Coastal State must ‘use its best endeavours to 
avoid any risk to human life, and to afford persons in distress any assistance of 
which they may stand in need, and in appropriate cases to facilitate the 
repatriation to ships’ crews, and to raise no obstacle thereto”.311 
 
 Furthermore, according to Article V of the 1969 Convention, the measures 
taken by the Coastal State shall be “proportionate to the damage actual threatened to it” 
and should “not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the end mentioned 
in Article I and shall cease as soon as that end has been achieved; they shall not 
unnecessarily interfere with the rights and interests of the Flag State, third States and 
of any persons, physical or corporate concerned.” Following this provision, Article VI 
states that: “ Any Party which has taken measures in contravention of the provisions of 
the present Convention causing damage to others, shall be obliged to pay compensation 
to the extent of the damage caused by measures which exceed those reasonably 
necessary to achieve the end mentioned in Article I.” Unfortunately, the article gives 
no right of claim to any private party hence compensation would only be claimable by 
an affected state party of the convention312, which is strange considering that the 
previous article clearly provides for private parties. 
 
 In the USA, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was drafted to prevent marine oil 
pollution in US waters and to provide compensation for oil spillage by the 
                                                        
310 1969 Convention Art III (a) (b). Para (c) See  S. Baughen, ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in 
Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability,   (1st Edition, Routledge, 
2012), p. 229 
311 Ibid, para, (f) 
312 See  S. Baughen, ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) 
Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability,   (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p. 229  
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establishment of a fund to compensate the victims and by increasing the liability of 
shipowners and expanding the type of damage for which they can be held liable. 313 The 
Act goes as far as having a double-hull requirement for ships “operating on the waters 
and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ)314”315. This requirement seems to ‘run afoul of the UNCLOS316 provision 
that costal states cannot impose in its territorial waters or its EEZ, CDEM standards 
exceeding generally accepted international rules.317 Moreover, the most remarkable 
characteristic of the Act is that its grants US authorities a great deal of discretion in 
evaluating the sufficiency of foreign regulations. The fact is that vessels that do not 
comply with the standards provided by the US Act will be excluded from the country’s 
waters hence mere flag regulation (even if this means compliance with international 
regulations such as MARPOL, which has being ratified by virtually every country) will 
not suffice for the transit of vessels in US waters. Some believe that the enforcement 
schemes and manning standards provided by the vessels can be said to assist in the 
combat of substandard shipping, providing for safer vessels.318  This consideration of 
the consequences of the Act is hard to verify, however what is clear is the amount of 
power and control given to the US acting as a Coastal and Port State by its own Act. 
The Act however fails to assess what are to be the consequences if these requirements 
as laid down by it are not met.  
   
                                                        
313 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub, L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat.484 (1990) 
314 The EEZ is a zone extending up to 200 miles from a country’s shore –  M. Boos, ‘The Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990: Striking the Flags of Convenience?’ in 2 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 407 1991, p 418 
315Oil Pollution Act of 1990,  at §  4115 (a) (2), 104 Stat. 484, 518 
316 Although the USA has not ratified the UNCLOS it accepts it as customary law.  See: Iosif Sorokin, 
‘The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Why the U.S. Hasn’t Ratified It and Where It Stands Today’ 
(Travaux: The Berkeley Journal of International Law Blog, , 30 March 2015) 
<http://berkeleytravaux.com/un-convention-law-sea-u-s-hasnt-ratified-stands-today/>; Christopher 
Mirasola, ‘Why the US Should Ratify UNCLOS: A View from the South and East China Seas’ in  Harvard 
Law School National Security Journal, 15 March 2015 <http://harvardnsj.org/2015/03/why-the-us-
should-ratify-unclos-a-view-from-the-south-and-east-china-seas/>; and for an earlier criticism see: 
James L. Malone, ‘The United States And The Law Of The Sea After Unclos III’ in Law and 
Contemporary Problems Vol. 46: No.2 (1983) 
317 Bevan Martin, Port State Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International Merchant Shipping, 
(Springer 2014), p. 419 
318  Ibid and M. Boos, ‘The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Striking the Flags of Convenience?’ in 2 Colo. J. 
Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 407 1991, pp. 407-426 
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 It is unquestionable that a vessel in distress319 endangers the lives of those on 
board. Thus, in light of humanitarian reasons, customary international law generally 
recognizes that a vessel in distress has the right to enter any port.320 As stated in the 
1809 Eleanor judgement: “(…)real and irresistible distress must be at all times a 
sufficient passport for human beings under any such application of human rights”.321 
Nevertheless, it is well established that a Coastal State is not obliged to accept a 
damaged vessel in distress but that it should assist in seeking to prevent or minimize 
the loss of life while at the same time protecting its valuable natural resources and the 
security and well-being of its own coastal communities.322In the Toledo, Barr J 
concluded that the right of a foreign vessel in serious distress is not absolute and is 
mainly humanitarian and not economic. 323 Moreover, the International Law 
Commission left clear its position that human life is what needs to be considered in 
cases of distress when commenting on Article 24 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001324, which deals with 
                                                        
319 In the Eleanor case 1809, Lord Stowell attempted to define situations when a ship could be considered 
in distress: “(…) it must be something of grave necessity (…) It is not sufficient to say it was done to 
avoid a little bad weather, or in consequence of foul winds, the danger must be such as to cause 
apprehension in the mind of an honest and firm man. I do not mean to say that there must be an actual 
physical necessity existing at the moment; a moral necessity would justify the act. Where, for instance, 
the ship has sustained previous damage, so as to render it dangerous to the lives of the persons on board 
to prosecute the voyage: Such a case, though there might be no existing storm, would be viewed with 
tenderness, but there must be at least a moral necessity. Then again, where the party justifies the act upon 
the plea of distress, it must not be a distress which he has created himself, by outing on board an 
insufficient quantity of water or of provisions for such a voyage, for there the distress is only a part of 
the mechanism of the fraud, and cannot be set up in excuse for it, and in the next place the distress must 
be proved by the claimant in a clear satisfactory manner.” The Eleanor, supra. The dictum of this 
judgment was cited by the Supreme Court of Canada in The May v The King of 1931. Canada, Supreme 
Court judgements, 28 April (1931) S.C.R. 381-382 
320 See: Yoshifumi, Tanaka, Key Elements in International Law Governing Places of Refugee for ships: 
Protection of Human Life, State interests, and Marine Environment, Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 45.2 (April 2014): 157-180  
321 The Eleonor. 165 English Reports 1067 
322 IMO Resolution A.949 (23) ,1.19 
“Place of refuge means a place where a ship in need of assistance can take action to enable it to stabilize 
its condition and reduce the hazards to navigation, and to protect human life and the environment.” 
323  S. Baughen, ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) 
Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability,   (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p. 232 
324 “Article 24. Distress 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State 
is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of 
saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: 
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situations of distress (which in practice have mainly been situations involving vessels 
and aircrafts325) by stating that the article is “limited to cases where human lives are at 
stake”.326 
 
IMO Resolution A.949 (23) entitled “Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships 
in Need of Assistance’ as of December 5, 2003327 recognizes “the need to balance both 
the prerogative of a ship in need of assistance to seek a place of refuge and the 
prerogative of a Coastal State   to protect its coastline.” The guidelines provided for the 
obligation of a Coastal State  by stating that: “When permission to access a place of 
refuge is requested, there is no obligation for the Coastal State  to grant it, but the 
Coastal State  should weigh all the factors and risks in a balanced manner and give 
shelter whenever reasonably possible”328. However, the guidelines provide a clear 
distinction between “ship in need of assistance” and “ship requiring rescue of persons 
on board”, Paragraph 1.18 provides that a “ship in need of assistance means a ship in a 
situation, apart from one requiring rescue of persons on board, that could give rise to 
loss of the vessel or an environmental or navigational hazard”. Indeed, the guidelines 
were specifically drafted to handle potential pollution cases, as it is made clear by 
paragraphs 1.8 and 1.9.329 Thus, the guidelines likewise Directive 2009/17/EC  
                                                        
(a) the situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the 
State invoking it; or 
(b) the act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril.” 
325 UN, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, Article 24, 
commentary 2 
326UN,  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, Article 24, 
commentary 6 
327 The IMO guidelines were drafted after and in many regards as a consequence of the Prestige incident 
where there was reluctance from the Coastal State to provide the vessel with a place of refuge, as will be 
seen later on. See:  V. Foley and C. Nolan, ‘The Erika Judgment – Environmental Liability and Places 
of Refuge: A Sea Change in Civil Criminal Responsibility that the Maritime Community Must Heed’ in 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2008, Vol.33:41,  p. 55 
328 IMO Resolution A.949 (23), pmbl and § 3.12 
329 Ibid, §1.8 “There are circumstances under which it may be desirable to carry out a cargo transfer 
operation or other operations to prevent or minimize damage or pollution. For this purpose, it will usually 
be advantageous to take the ship to a place of refuge. 
1.9 Taking such a ship to a place of refuge would also have the advantage of limiting the extent of 
coastline threatened by damage or pollution, but the specific area chosen may be more severely 
threatened. Consideration must also be given to the possibility of taking the affected ship to a port or 
terminal where the transfer or repair work could be done relatively easily. For this reason the decision 
on the choice and use of a place of refuge will have to be carefully considered.” 
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establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and the 
Draft Instrument of Places of Refuge developed by the Committee Maritime 
International (CMI)330, neglected to consider if a Coastal State is obliged to offer a place 
of refuge in order to prevent the losses of human lives. However, it is reasonable to 
assume by the reading of these international instruments together that a State is only 
obliged to act diligently to save the lives of those in distress, and as long as this can be 
done without offering the vessel a place of refuge, the Coastal State has complied with 
its obligations under international law should it fail to so offer.  This line of thought 
also finds support in the UNCLOS, which provides in its Article 18(2)331 an exception 
for innocent passage which “shall be continuous and expeditious” except in cases when 
assistance is needed by persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress or due to force 
majeure, in which occasion passage will also include “stopping and anchoring”. 
Nonetheless, it must be note that the drafting of the article is limiting and leaves room 
for debate since it stresses that this exception will only apply to cases in cases which 
“are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or 
distress”, but failing to define ‘ordinary navigation’ or ‘force majeure’ or ‘distress’.  
 
The fact is that States often do not seem to have any problem refusing to grant 
a place of refuge to ships in distress. The Erika and The Prestige were denied a port of 
refuge numerous times. Yoshifumi Tanaka considered if this practice could have 
changed the international customary law of offering a place of refuge to ships in 
distress, under the ordinary view that customary international law results from a 
combination of two elements: an objective element of “extensively and virtually 
                                                        
330Directive 2009/17/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system in 
Article 1.2 (v) defines ship in need of assistance as: “ship in need of assistance” means, without prejudice 
to the provisions of the SAR Convention concerning the rescue of persons, a ship in a situation that could 
give rise to its loss or an environmental or navigational hazard” whereas the  Draft Instrument of Places 
of Refuge developed by the Comite Maritime International (CMI)  article 1 (b)  Defines "ship in need of 
assistance" means a ship in circumstances that could give rise to loss of the ship or its cargo or to an 
environmental or navigational hazard”. Neither instrument makes reference to human life at risk.  
331 UNCLOS, Art 18 (2) Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are 
rendered necessary by force majeure or distress, or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, 
ships or aircraft in danger or distress. 
132 
 
uniform” State practice, and the subjective or psychological element known as opinion 
juris, and he reached a negative conclusion. He noted that so far the number of cases of 
refusal remains limited, hence it is debatable if these can be considered to represent 
“extensive and uniform” State practice, and it is not possible to be assured of the State 
opinion juris on the matter. Furthermore, since the right of entry into foreign ports by 
ships in distress is a long established rule of customary international law on 
humanitarian grounds, caution must be taken before any change in the law is made, as 
international instruments most likely take this customary law into consideration, 
differentiating between ships requiring rescue of persons on board, from the category 
of ships in need of assistance where the crew is safe, to which the Coastal State can 
refuse to offer places of refuge. Furthermore, there is substantial case law recognising 
the mentioned customary law. For instance, the ICJ stated in 1949 Corfu Channel case 
that ‘elementary considerations of humanity” are “general and well recognized 
principles”, dicta confirmed by the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) in the MW Saiga (No.2) case: “Considerations of humanity must apply in the 
law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law” and in the MV Toledo 
case, the Irish High Court also indirectly accepted that ships in distress where human 
life is at risk have the right to enter into ports of foreign States.  Tanaka also underlined 
the fact that the refusal of refuge to a ship in distress can give rise to dangerous 
situations, as was said to be the case in the Prestige.332 
 
There is some suggestion that the absence of international law prohibiting a 
vessel from navigating through coastal water jurisdiction of a particular state provided 
it is upon the high seas or in ‘innocent passage’, hence permitting the traffic of 
substandard ships, leaves Coastal States more susceptible to maritime casualties. 
Especially since not every vessel that navigates in Coastal State water has been subject 
to that particular State Port-control (i.e. was not subject to Port State inspection in that 
                                                        
332  See: Tanaka Yoshifumi, ‘Key Elements in International Law Governing Places of Refugee for ships: 
Protection of Human Life, State interests, and Marine Environment’ in Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 45.2 (April 2014): 157-180, pp. 3 -4 
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particular jurisdiction). 333 Perhaps with this in mind the EC Directive 2009/16 on Port 
State control, provides in article 3.1 that : “ If a Member State performs an inspection 
of a ship in waters within its jurisdiction, other than at a port, it shall be considered as 
an inspection for the purposes of the directive”. Hence, the directive allows States to 
inspect ships navigating in the coastal waters, while in innocent passage. 
 
In the Erika the court had no apparent trouble rejecting the argument that the 
denial of a place of refuge was a factor in the accident.334  Therefore, although it is clear 
that a balance must exist between the protection of the Coastal State’s coastline and the 
protection of human life, it is not so clear what this balance should be. Some authors 
suggests that with the use of helicopters and other modern equipment, it is possible to 
preserve human life without having to offer the vessel a place of refuge however this 
author is of the opinion that this would require Coastal States to have contingency plans 
for this sort of situation which is currently not always the case.  
 
 Counterclaims in the Amoco Cadiz and Prestige incidents raise the question 
whether Coastal States can be found liable if they do not take the necessary measures 
within their power to prevent an oil spill. In the first case, the counterclaim was brought 
against France on the grounds that it had negligently failed to establish and to 
implement an effective and tested oil spill contingency plan; despite the knowledge 
since 17 March 1978 that an accident involving an oil tanker created the potential for 
pollution, it  did not take any effective initiative to prevent accidents of that kind; it had 
acted negligently under its duty to contain and clean up the oil spill hence causing or at 
least aggravating the damage.  The court accepted the counterclaims, refusing France’s 
                                                        
333  See: John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary 
Issues (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, pp 234-235 
334 Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, lleme ch., Jan. 16, 
2008, No 9934895010, slip  op. At 223 (Erika), translated in the LanguageWorks, Inc., Erika Judgment 
223 (Apr.22, 2008). The court recognized that the máster and the manager had treated the Coastal State 
with “nonchalance” and that there were failures on the “shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Program’ or 
SOPEP however it was not certain that these failures had a casual role in the sinking and resulting 
pollution. It was later decided that there was insufficient evidence that a different management of the 
crises would had prevented the outcome of the accident. (Erika judgment at 225 and 226) 
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claim for dismissal. 335In the Prestige, ABS (the Classification Society)336 filled a 
counterclaim against Spain under the allegation that the sink of the Prestige could have 
been avoided if Spain had not handled the case negligently in refusing to allow the 
vessel to enter the place of refuge on the Spanish coast despite repeated distress calls 
to Spanish authorities hence preventing the salvage efforts of the Smit Tak Salvage. 
Also impugned was the failure to seek competent expert advice as required by Spain’s 
National Plan for Contingencies caused by Accidental Marine Pollution. Although the 
counterclaim was dismissed as ABS was found not to be liable, the acceptance of the 
US Court of these counterclaims demonstrates that Coastal States may be held 
responsible, at least to a certain extent for casualties if they do not take appropriate 
measures.337 338 It is important to underline that in all the cases mentioned the crew was 
put at risk by the refusal of place of refuge by the Coastal State, having to be rescued 
(only to be arrested later on) once the vessels had ruptured and were sinking.339 
 
                                                        
335  S. Baughen, ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) 
Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p. 233 
336 This case will be analysed in further detail later on. 
337 ABS v Reino de Spana. 
338 Industry experts believe that had Spain offered the Prestige a place of Refugee, and dealt with the 
situation differently, the consequences of the incident could have been far less bad. (. (See: GardNews 
2005, ‘The criminalization of seafarers – From master mariner to “master criminal’, GardNews 
(February/ April 2005. Issue 177) <http:// www.gard.no/gard/ 
Publications/GardNews/RecentIssues/gn177/art_13.htm.>, last accessed on 01/02/2016) Moreover, the 
master of the Prestige was arrested under the charges of obstruction and deliberate pollution, since he 
refused to obey Spanish authorities’ instructions which included starting the vessel’s engines and 
proceeding to sea (i.e. international waters), and leaving Spanish coastal waters. ( See: Abelard, ‘The 
Prestige case study: the politics of irresponsibility’ (Aberlard News, 31 December 2002)) 
339 See: Permanent Commission of Inquiry into accidents at sea (CPEM), ‘Report of Enquiry into the 
sinking of the Erika off the coasts of Brittany on 12 December 1999’, available on: www.bea-
mer.development-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RET_ERIKA_En_Site.pdf, Maritime Knowledge Centre, 
‘Information Resources on The “Erika” Accident and the 2001 Amendments to Regulation 13G of Annex 
I to MARPOL 73/78’ (Last update: 28 January 2010), available on 
www.imo.org/en/knowledgeCentre/InformationResourcesOnCurrentTopicsArchives/Documents/Erika
%20_28%20January%202010.pdf; Maritime Knowledge Centre, Information Resources on the 
“Prestige”(Last update: 28 January 2010), available on 
www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/InformationResourcesOnCurrentTopicsArcives/Documents/PRES
TIGE%20_28%20January%202010.pdf, last accessed on 01/02/2016. For more in the legislatives 
changes made in safety at sea after the incidents see: Justine Wene, ‘European and International 
Regulatory Initiatives Due to the Erika and Prestige Incidents’ (2005) 19MILAANZ Journal, pp 56-73 
and Commission of European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on Improving Safety at Sea in Response to the Prestige accident’ (COM 
(2002) 681 Final, Brussels 3/12/2002) 
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 A Coastal State’s failure to exercise due diligence to prevent environmental 
damage may result in liability to other States affected by the incident.  Article 111 (3) 
of the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for oil pollution damages 
provides that: “If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or 
partially either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person 
who suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person, the owner may be 
exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to such a person”. It is important to 
note that States are included in the convention definition of ‘person’ contained in its 
Article 1(2). Furthermore, Article 195 of UNCLOS makes it a contravention for States 
“to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or 
transform one type of pollution into another” in taking measures to prevent marine 
pollution. Thus, there is basis to believe that denying a place of refuge, requiring the 
ship to seek refuge elsewhere might be an infringement of the referred article hence a 
breach of the Coastal State’s international obligations. In the case of the Prestige, 
Spain’s denying the vessel a place of refuge was so evident that the country tried to 
hold the master liable for remaining in their coastal waters after refusal. 340 It is 
important to note that this Spanish attempt would also face difficulty with UNCLOS 
Article 192 which places a general obligation on States to protect the marine 
environment in the ocean as a whole without distinguishing international waters from 
coastal waters. This general obligation was confirmed by the International Tribunal of 
the Law of the Seas (ITLOS) by stating that “(…) each Party may be entitled to claim 
compensation in light of the erga omnis character of the obligations relating to 
preservation of the environment of the high seas (…)”.341 Thus a State owes to the 
international community an obligation to protect the high seas as a whole.  
                                                        
340 See: Cassation Appeal No.:1167/2014, Judgment No.: 865/2015, Incidents Involving The IOPC Funds 
– 1992 Fund – Prestige, Available at: Http://Www.Iopcfunds.Org 
341 ITLOS advisory opinion, Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities 
with respect to activities in the Area List of cases: No. 1,ADVISORY OPINION OF 1 FEBRUARY 
2011, paragraph 180: 
“No provision of the Convention can be read as explicitly entitling the Authority to make such a claim. 
It may, however, be argued that such entitlement is implicit in article 137, paragraph 2, of the Convention, 
which states that the Authority shall act “on behalf” of mankind. Each State Party may also be entitled 
to claim compensation in light of the erga omnes character of the obligations relating to preservation of 
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 Moreover, IMO Resolution A.949(23) Guidelines on places of refuge for ships 
in need of assistance, provides for the establishment of a Maritime Assistance Service 
(MAS) by Coastal States, also recommending the establishment of procedures to 
receive and act upon requests for assistance with a view to authorising, where 
appropriate, the use of a suitable place of refuge. 342In order to assist States’ establishing 
the ‘appropriateness’ of granting a place of refuge, the guidelines enumerate factors to 
be taken into consideration when assessing the risks arising from a ship in need of 
assistance in Appendix 2.343 It is important to note that the first criteria to be assessed 
                                                        
the environment of the high seas and in the Area. In support of this view, reference may be made to 
article 48 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which provides: 
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State . . . if: 
 (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the 
protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the international 
community as a whole.” 
342 Paragraph 3.4 
343 IMO Guideline on Place of Refuge 2003, Appendix 2, article 2, Assessment of risks related to the 
identified event taking into account:  
.1 Environmental and social factors, such as: 
- safety of those on board 
- threat to public safety 
What is the nearest distance to populated areas? 
- pollution caused by the ship 
- designated environmental areas 
Are the place of refuge and its approaches located in sensitive areas such as areas of high ecological 
value which might be affected by possible pollution? Is there, on environmental grounds, a better choice 
of place of refuge close by?  
- sensitive habitats and species 
- fisheries 
Are there any offshore and fishing or shell fishing activities in the transit area or in the approaches to the 
place of refuge or vicinity which can be endangered by the incoming ship in need of assistance? 
- economic/industrial facilities 
What is the nearest distance to industrial areas? 
- amenity resources and tourism 
- facilities available 
Are there any specialist vessels and aircraft and other necessary means for carrying out the required 
operations or for providing necessary assistance? Are there transfer facilities, such as pumps, hoses, 
barges, pontoons? Are there reception facilities for harmful and dangerous cargoes? Are there repair 
facilities, such as dockyards, workshops, cranes? 
.2 Natural conditions, such as: 
Prevailing winds in the area. 
Is the place of refuge safely guarded against heavy winds and rough seas? 
Tides and tidal currents.  
- weather and sea conditions 
Local meteorological statistics and number of days of inoperability or inaccessibility of the place of 
refuge. 
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is the ‘the safety of those on board’. The appendix also provides guidelines for a 
contingency plan by Coastal States. 344Following these lines it is not difficult to 
understand how the courts of the Amoco Cadiz and the Prestige were able to accept the 
counterclaims against the Coastal States involved in the accident. 
 
 In the UK, unless there is statutory provision for compensation, the failure of a 
public body responsible for maritime pollution incidents in exercising a statutory power 
or performing a statutory duty will not give rise to a cause of action. Furthermore, a 
decision to refuse entry could not be considered a breach of a duty of care, as there is 
no basis for finding that the secretary of state has assumed responsibility for ships in 
distress seeking refuge in the UK. The same is true for a decision admitting a vessel in 
distress into UK waters. Only positive acts of the SOSREP,345 which directly could be 
                                                        
- bathymetry 
Minimum and maximum water depths in the place of refuge and its approaches. The maximum draught 
of the ship to be admitted. Information on the condition of the bottom, i.e., hard, soft, sandy, regarding 
the possibility to ground a problem vessel in the haven or its approaches.  
- seasonal effects including ice 
- navigational characteristics 
In the case of a non-sheltered place of refuge, can salvage and lightering operations be safely conducted? 
Is there sufficient space to manoeuvre the ship, even without 
propulsion? What are the dimensional restrictions of the ship, such as length, width and draught? Risk 
of stranding the ship, which may obstruct channels, approaches or vessel navigation. Description of 
anchorage and mooring facilities in the place of refuge.  
 - operational conditions, particularly in the case of a port 
  Is pilotage compulsory and are pilots available? 
Are tugs available? State their number and horsepower. Are there any restrictions? If so, whether the 
ship will be allowed in the place of refuge, e.g. escape of poisonous gases, danger of explosion, etc. Is a 
bank guarantee or other Financial Security acceptable to the Coastal State   imposed on the ship before 
admission is granted into the place of refuge? 
344 Ibid, .3 Contingency planning, such as: 
- competent MAS 
- roles and responsibilities of authorities and responders Firefighting capability 
- response equipment needs and availability 
- response techniques 
Is there a possibility of containing any pollution within a compact area? 
- international co-operation 
Is there a disaster relief plan in the area? 
- evacuation facilities 
345 Secretary of State's Representative Maritime Salvage & Intervention 
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considered to have caused more damage than if no intervention had taken place, can 
give rise to liability.346 
  
III. 3 - Port State Control 
 
 As previously stated, Flag States are primarily responsible for ensuring 
compliance of ships with standards provided by international conventions governing 
safety, pollution and crew conditions. The irritation among the international community 
at the unwillingness or inability of many Flag States, not only FOCCs but also less-
developed nations, to exercise proper control of their ships, or enforce international 
standards, led to a need for Port states to monitor the compliance with these standards. 
The concept of Port State Control is not a new one, it has been sanctioned by UNICLOS 
1982, in articles 25 and 218 and numerous other conventions, including SOLAS347, 
MARPOL348, STCW349 350 and more recently the MLC,351referred to as the four pillars 
of shipping. Thus, Port State control does not consist of the increase in the number of 
international conventions but rather to operate as a cooperative mechanism designed to 
enhance compliance with existing conventions.352  Thus, many academics suggest that 
                                                        
346  S. Baughen, ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) 
Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability,   (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), pp 238-240 
347 IMO Convention for Safety life at Sea 1974, the convention provides for the safety of merchant ship 
and it was conceived after the infamous TITANIC accident. See IMO website for more information: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
348 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Adoption: 1973 
(Convention), 1978 (1978 Protocol), 1997 (Protocol - Annex VI); Entry into force: 2 October 1983 
(Annexes I and II). The main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. For more information see: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
349 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 
1978, For more information see 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/STCW-Convention.aspx, 
last accessed on 01/02/2016 
350  See O. Ozcayir, ‘Flags of Convenience and the need for international Cooperation’ in 7 Int’L Mar. 
L.J. 111 (2000), page 6/7 and R. M. F. Coles and E. Watt, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, (2nd 
Edition, Informa law for Routledge, 2009), page 7 
351 Maritime Labour Convention 2006. See ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-
labour-convention/lang--en/index.htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
352  Ted McDorman, ‘Port State Control: A comment on the Tokyo MOU and Issues of International 
Law’ in 7 Asian Y.B. Int’lL. 229 (1997), p. 229 
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Port State control is not an option, but an obligation under international law for 
members of these conventions.  
 
It is important to underline that the concept of Port State Control is a rather old 
one. International Maritime Conventions that entered into force at the beginning of the 
century had already provided for it based on the principle of territorial jurisdiction of a 
State.353 In 2013 the Maritime Labour Convention came into force, increasing even 
more the responsibilities of Port States.354 Regulation 5.2 is dedicated exclusively to 
Port State responsibilities, which includes onshore seafarer complaint handling 
procedures.355 
 
 As it has already been asserted the law applicable to the vessel is the law of the 
flag State, i.e. the state where the vessel was registered. Nevertheless, it is also an 
international legal principle that the Port State has absolute jurisdiction over vessels 
within its waters, as if the foreign vessel was a foreign citizen visiting the country: 
 
“It is universally acknowledged that once a ship voluntarily enters port it 
becomes fully subject to the laws and regulations prescribed by the officials 
of that territory for events relating to such use and that all types of vessels, 
military and other, are in common expectation obliged to comply with the 
coastal regulations about proper procedures to be employed and permissible 
activities within internal waters.”356 
 
 Therefore, a vessel must comply with the laws and regulations of the Port State 
regardless of its place of registration.  According to international law, the authority of 
the Port State must prevail while the ship is in the Port. Nonetheless, there are some 
potential exceptions to this principle, such as cases of government vessels or cases 
                                                        
353 Ibid, page 206 
354 The MLC is greatly a compilation of ILO instruments however most of the documents that the 
convention replaces did not have the provision of Port State Control. 
355 MLC, regulation 5.2.2 
356 M. S. Mcdougal and W. T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 156 (New Haven Press 1987) 
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where the vessel is not voluntarily in the port but is there due to a force majeure event. 
Therefore, with the exception of a few rare cases, the law of the Port State will prevail 
over the law of the Flag State while the vessel is in Port.357Article 218, 219, and 220 of 
UNCLOS 1982 regulate the enforcement of applicable international rules and standards 
for the protection of the marine environment by Port and Coastal States (“[w]hen a 
vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal”), extending the 
jurisdiction of Port State/ Coastal States to foreign vessels responsible for pollution 
accidents beyond the limit of any state jurisdiction. 358  
 
 It is important to note that the role of the Port State in the ‘safety net’ is not to 
replace the Flag State in fulfilling its responsibilities but rather to provide what can be 
called an ‘assistance’ to the latter in fulfilling its obligations, by carrying out 
inspections. The primary responsibility to prevent substandard shipping belongs to the 
Flag State, which should make sure that the vessel complies with the appropriate 
international instruments before allowing it to sail.359 Port States through inspections 
followed by notations of possible deficiencies the ship may have, notify the shipowner 
and the Flag State in order for the appropriate measures to remedy the situation to be 
taken.  Indeed, as Dr Ozcayir highlights; “When flag States fail to meet their 
commitments, port States must act as the last safety net in the control system.”360 The 
Directive 2009/16/ EC on Port State control also makes this clear in its justification:  
 
 “(…) there has been a serious failure on the part of a number of Flag 
States to implement and enforce international standards. Henceforth, as 
a second line of defence against substandard shipping, the monitoring of 
compliance with the international standards for safety, pollution 
prevention and on-board living and working conditions should also be 
                                                        
357 Ibid, p. 231 
358 See:  O. Ozcayir, ‘The Use of Port State Control in Maritime Industry and Application of the Paris 
MoU’ in 14 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 201 2008-2009, p. 20. OZCAYIR, The Use of Port State Control in 
Maritime Industry and Application of the Paris MoU, 14 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 201 2008-2009, pg 206 
359 See Chapter III.1 
360 See:  O. Ozcayir, ‘The Use of Port State Control in Maritime Industry and Application of the Paris 
MoU’ in 14 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 201 2008-2009, p. 201 
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ensured by Port States, while recognizing that Port State control 
inspection forms are not seaworthiness certificates”361 
 
III.3.1 – Consolidation of International Measures on Port State Control 
 
The IMO has since the 90s consolidated its Port State control measures through 
Resolution A.787 (19), revoked in 2011 by Resolution A.1052 (27). The Resolution 
and its annexures established the procedure for Port State Control.  They provide for 
identification of substandard ships, submission of information regarding deficiencies 
and reporting allegations under the MARPOL amongst other things. Guidelines are also 
provided for detention and reporting procedures. 362 
 
 The IMO provisions not only require surveys and inspections to ensure vessels’ 
compliance with international conventions, they enable Port State control officers to 
inspect foreign ships to check operational requirements “when there are clear grounds 
that the master or crew are not familiar with the essential ship board procedures relating 
to safety of ships”.363 The Resolution states that if conditions are not valid, or if there 
are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or of its equipment or crew 
are not adequate, more detailed inspection can be carried out. The provisions 
demonstrate a clear focus on the ability of the crew to man the vessel. Since 2000, the 
IMO has a "White List" of countries deemed to be giving "full and complete effect" 
to the revised STCW Convention (STCW 95).364 The List distinguishes the States that 
have displayed and established a plan of full compliance with the STCW-95 
Convention and Code.  It was developed by an unbiased group of “competent persons” 
at the IMO by creating criteria such as what system of licensing the administration has, 
training centre oversight, processes of certificate revalidation, Flag State control, and 
                                                        
361 Directive 2009/16/ EC, (6) 
362Resolution A.1052 (27) available at: 
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Documents/A%20-%20Assembly/105
2(27).pdf, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
363 Ibid 
364 http://www.imo.org/blast/contents.asp?topic_id=68&doc_id=513, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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Port State control. Countries who do not feature on the list are expected to face stricter 
Port State control, and a Flag State might refuse to accept seafarers with certificates 
issued from countries not featuring in the list.365 
 
The first effective step towards uniformity of Port State control on a regional 
basis was The Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)366 of 1982367, which 
superseded the so-called Hague Memorandum, signed in 1978 by the eight European 
countries, which intended to ensure that foreign vessels entering these countries ports 
complied with the Requirements of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention No.147, which provides for minimum standards for merchant shipping.368 
 
A parenthesis should be open at this point to call attention to the fact that the 
Hague memorandum was created to make sure of compliance with an ILO convention, 
and not an IMO one. It is a well-known fact that the two organizations cooperate with 
each other, but the main concern of the first is the protection of seafarer.  Furthermore, 
it can be easily understood by the preamble of ILO Convention No 147 that it was 
designed to prevent substandard vessels and guarantee a minimum level of safety and 
conditions for seafarers on board merchant vessels. This just confirms that substandard 
shipping directly affects seafarers and encourages the realization that before the 
international regulatory organisations were concerned with pollution and subsequent 
costs, they were first worried about the lives and conditions of work of those working 
                                                        
365 Ibid. It is important to note that Panama and Liberia (main FOC countries) as well as Philippines 
(main seafarer exporter country) feature on the IMO white list. See: IMO website for further information. 
366 Ratified by 28 European States plus Canada and Russia 
367 The Paris MOU is an international agreement between now 28 maritime authorities mostly from 
European Countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). It aimed 
to establish a harmonized system of Port State Control with the ultimate purpose to eliminate substandard 
shipping practices by the adoption of preventive measures The Memorandum was adopted in 1982 and 
superseded the Hague Memorandum signed in March 1978, which had eight European Countries as 
members and had a view to ensuring that seagoing ships under foreign countries flags complied once in 
their port with the requirements of ILO Convention n.147 - Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) - 
One of the instruments that now make part of the MLC. See: https://www.parismou.org 
368  Richard W.J. Schiferli, ‘Regional Concepts of Port State Control: A Regional Effort with Global 
Effects’ in 11 Ocean Y.B. 202 1994, pp 202-203 
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at sea. In fact, it was only after the Amoco Cadiz in March 1978369 that a strong political 
and public demand in Europe, especially in France, for more stringent regulations 
regarding the safety of shipping, assuming that some Flag States were negligent with 
respect to exercise proper control of vessels, emerged. This demand led to the 
conclusion that the Hague Memorandum should be upgraded to a more comprehensive 
control framework, not only covering working and living conditions but also seeing to 
the wider implications of maritime safety and pollution prevention. 370 
 
 In fulfilling their commitments under the memorandum, maritime authorities 
carry out inspections which consist in the first instance of physical inspection on board 
the ship in order to ensure that she is in possession of the necessary certificates and 
documents relevant for the purposes of the MOU; in the absence of these or if there are 
reason for believing that the condition of a vessel or her equipment and crew do not 
meet international standards, a more detailed inspection can be carried. Authorities may 
detain the ship if they feel that it does not meet the required international standards.371 
                                                        
369 The M/V Amoco Cadiz was a very large crude carrier, of approximately 230 thousand deadweight 
tons, which grounded off the Brittany coast of France while en route from Kharg Island in the Persian 
Gulf to Rotterdam, with a full cargo of crude all, resulting in an oil spillage of approximately 130 miles 
in the French Coastline. See: James W. Barlett, ‘In Re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz  - choice of law and 
a pierced corporate veil defeat The 1969 Civil Liability Convention 1969’ in 10 Mar. Law. 1 1985, pp 
1-23 
370 C147 - Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 147), Preamble. See also: 
IMO and ILO websites for more information 
371 R. M. F. Coles and E. Watt, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, (2nd Edition, Informa law for 
Routledge, 2009), pp 7/8. Schiferli, summarized the commitment of  the Paris MOU Member States as:  
● “Each Maritime authority will give effect to the provisions of the memorandum 
● Each authority will maintain an effective system of port state control to ensure that foreign 
merchant ships visiting its ports comply with the standards laid down in the relevant 
international conventions and all the amendments thereto in force. In this context, it should 
be noted that a participating maritime authority regards a ship flying the flag pf another 
partner as a foreign ship 
● There will be no discrimination as to flag 
● Each country will have to achieve an annual total of inspections corresponding to 25% of the 
estimated number of individual ships that entered the ports of its state during 12- month 
period. In practice this will result in an inspection rate of around 90% of all ships using ports 
in region. 
● Each authority will consult, cooperate, and exchange information with the other authorities 
in order to further the aims of the memorandum 
● Insofar as the relevant conventions do not contain requirements for small ships, the 
authorities should be guided by the any certificate or document as issued by the flag state will 
take, if necessary, such action to ensure that those ships are not clearly hazardous to safety, 
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III.3.1.1 – The Paris Memorandum of Understanding and its successors  
 
 The Paris MOU provides for its Secretariat to publish a raking of eighty flag 
States according to the number of vessels detained during the preceding three years. 
The countries are ranked according to the lowest number of vessels detained following 
inspection. The results of the last report published in 2012, rank Panama and Liberia at 
number 32 and 14 respectively. On the black list which contains the countries with the 
highest risk of detention, out of the fourteen countries listed, only five are considered 
to be FOC countries according to the ITF’s list.372 It is important to note that the Paris 
MOU does not permit flag discrimination, which means that even though it does not 
allow for an extension of the scope of Port State control beyond convention 
requirements, this shall not guarantee a more favourable treatment to ships that fly the 
flag of States which have not ratified a particular convention. 373 
 
 The MOU, due to its success, led to the establishment of regional port State 
control measures beyond Europe into other parts of the world. These alliances include 
the 1992 Vina del Mar Agreement between ten Latin American countries; the 1993 
Tokyo MOU signed between nineteen countries in the Asia/ Pacific region; the 1996 
MOU in the Caribbean Region; the 1996 MOU in the Caribbean Region; 1997 
Mediterranean MOU between eleven North African and Mediterranean littoral States; 
the 2000 Black Sea MOU signed by six regional States; and the Riyadh MOU signed 
in 2006 among GCC countries. Undoubtedly, this wide network of supranational 
scrutiny and enforcement is an essential factor in order to raise operating 
standards.374There are countries which are members of more than one MOU, such as 
                                                        
health, or the environment.”  Richard W.J. Schiferli, ‘Regional Concepts of Port State 
Control: A Regional Effort with Global Effects’ in 11 Ocean Y.B. 202 1994, p. 204 
372  Paris MoU, ‘2012 Annual Report on Port State Control’ (Paris MoU, 2012) 
<https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202012%20%28final%29.pdf.> pp. 
20-21, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
373  Richard W.J. Schiferli, ‘Regional Concepts of Port State Control: A Regional Effort with Global 
Effects’ in 11 Ocean Y.B. 202 1994, p. 205 
374COLES, 8/9 
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Canada and Russia, members of the Paris and Tokyo MOU, with the latter being also 
member of the Black Sea MOU; Bulgaria and Romania, members of the Paris and 
Black Sea MOU; Malta and Cyprus, members of the Paris and Mediterranean MOU; 
and the Netherlands and France, members of the Paris and Caribbean MOU, with the 
latter also having ties with the Indian Ocean MOU.375376 
 
III.3.2- National Approaches 
  
In Europe, Council Directive 35/21/ EC established common criteria for control 
of ships by Port States and harmonizing procedures of inspection and detention 
throughout EU. Moreover, in 2002 the European Parliament and Council created the 
body proposed initially in 1993377, founding the Committee on Safe Seas and the 
Prevention of Pollution from ships (COSS). The committee must ensure conformity 
between maritime legislation of the European Union and International Conventions 
concerning, inter alia Port State control, SOLAS and MARPOL as implemented by its 
Member States.378 
 
 These changes are in large part a consequence of the Erika incident, in which 
the oil spillage polluted over 400km of the French Coast. The accident demonstrated 
the lack of an efficient Port State control, as it had been inspected numerous times by 
Port State inspectors. Moreover, the vessel was classed with an IACS-member 
Classification Society at the time of the accident, and had just completed a five year 
                                                        
375  Paris MoU, ‘Port State Control, Consolidating  Progress, Annual Report 2013’ (Paris MoU 2013)   
<https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Paris%20MoU%20Annual%20Report%202013%20revis
ed_1.pdf>, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
376 For reasons of simplicity this paper will focus its analysis on the Paris and Tokyo MoU, the two most 
well-known MoUs. This is due to their relevance and available resources hence it is believed that for the 
purposes of this paper, including to demonstrate how Port State control works in preventing substandard 
shipping, and assuring ship compliance with existing international instruments in order to increase 
shipping quality, an analysis of only these two Regional forms of Port State control shall suffice. 
377  At the European Commission’s communication: A Common Policy on Safe Seas. See: See: R. M. F. 
Coles and E. Watt, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, (2nd Edition, Informa law for Routledge, 2009), 
page  9 
378 See: R. M. F. Coles and E. Watt, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, (2nd Edition, Informa law for 
Routledge, 2009), p. 9 
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survey and all its statutory reports were up-to-date, nonetheless, it failed to resist a 
storm.379 As a matter of fact, even the Paris MOU itself was a consequence of a 
Maritime casualty. The Amoco Cadiz in March 1978 generated a strong political and 
public demand for stronger regulation in regards to shipping safety as it was concluded 
that a few Flag States were negligent in regards to their international obligations in this 
respect. Hence, it was necessary that the Hague memorandum would only certify ship 
compliance with ILO Convention 147380 to be upgraded to a more comprehensive 
control framework, not only covering working and living conditions, but also including 
wider implications of maritime safety and pollution prevention.381 
 
 The United States has since 1994 promoted a rigorous public policy of foreign 
vessel inspection, conducted by the United States Coast Guard (“USCG”).  Their 
mission statement states that “Coast Guard members protect marine resources and 
maritime commerce, as well as those who live, work, or recreate on the water.”382The 
USCG established a probing Port State system, aiming to eradicate the presence of 
substandard ships in U.S. waters.383 
 
 The United States Code grants the USCG legislative authority.384 In 1978, the 
Coast Guard issued new procedural rules at 33 CFR Subpart 1.07, establishing an 
                                                        
379 See: Ibid 
380  James W. Barlett, ‘In Re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz  - choice of law and a pierced corporate veil 
defeat The 1969 Civil Liability Convention 1969’ in 10 Mar. Law. 1 1985, pp 1-23 
381 Richard W.J. Schiferli, ‘Regional Concepts of Port State Control: A Regional Effort with Global 
Effects’ in 11 Ocean Y.B. 202 1994, p. 203 
382 http://www.gocoastguard.com/about-the-coast-guard/discover-our-roles-missions/ports-waterway-
security, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
383 ‘Substandard ship’ is described by Paragraph C13 of the USCG’s Instruction Procedures as: “In 
general a vessel is regarded as substandard if the hull, machinery, or equipment, such as for life-saving, 
fire-fighting and pollution prevention, are substantially below the standards required by U.S. laws or 
international Conventions owing to: (a) the absence of required principle equipment or arrangement; (b) 
gross non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with required specification; (c) substantial 
deterioration of the vessel structure or its essential equipment; (d) non-compliance with applicable 
operation and/or manning standards; or (e) clear lack of appropriate certification or demonstrated lack of 
competence on the part of the crew. If these evident factors as a whole, or individually endanger the 
vessel, person on board, or present an unreasonable risk to the marine environment, the vessel should be 
regarded as substandard ship”. http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/msm/v2/c.19.htm, last accessed 
on 01/02/2016 
384 46 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3318 (1975 and Supp. 1997).  
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informal agency process for deciding civil penalty cases that did not require more 
formal procedures, such as the formality associated with hearings before an 
Administrative Law Judge. The rules ensure administrative due process while keeping 
the procedures simple for all concerned.385 
 
 The USCG provides that all vessels of 1600 GRT or more ought to give 
advanced notice of their arrival. It then checks the vessel details against its own records 
and that of its register and assigns points to each ship for compliance with international 
conventions, previous track records and those of sister ships in the same ownership or 
management, ratings of the flag and its classification society. The goal is to recognize 
high risk vessels, their owners, and their classification societies and to take appropriate 
action. 386 According to a rating system, the ship is then categorized as Priority I, II or 
II. Priority I as being high risk hence requiring inspection before they are even allowed 
into port limits. If possible defects should be rectified even before the vessel enters into 
port. According to USCG Regulations: 
 
“PSC examinations are not intended nor desired to be analogous to an 
inspection for certification of a U.S. flag vessel. Rather they are intended to be 
of sufficient breadth and depth to satisfy a boarding team that a vessel’s major 
systems are in compliance with applicable international standards and 
domestic requirements, and that the crew possess sufficient proficiency to 
safely operate the vessel. The Examinations are designed to determine that 
required certificates are aboard and valid, and that a vessel conforms to the 
conditions required for the issuance of required certificates. This is 
accomplished by a walk-through examination and visual assessment of a 
vessel’s relevant components, certificates and documents, and may be 
accompanied by limited testing of systems and the crew. When the 
                                                        
385 See: COMSTIST 16200.5B. available at: http://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/16000-
16999/CI_16200_5B.pdf, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
386 Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-1232 (1986). See  Hare, ‘Flag and Port State 
Control – Closing Net on Unseaworthy Ships and the Unscrupulous Owners’ in Sea Changes No. 16; 57 
– 71 (1994), p. 583 
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examination reveals questionable equipment, systems or crew incompetence, 
the board team may expand the examination to conduct such operational tests 
or examinations deemed appropriate.”387 
 
Like the MOUs, with small differences, the U.S. Coast Guard’s Port State 
control policy also publishes lists with the Flag States and classification societies which 
have failed Port State control in the past twelve months. One can say that the U.S.  Coast 
Guard unlike the MOUs offers only a black list of Flag States and classification 
societies with an additional black list of owners &operators who have also run afoul of 
Port State control.  The lists also serve as a guide to help assessing priority ratings of a 
vessel under inspection upon the declared policy that “if any of these entities fails to 
fully undertake its responsibilities for a ship’s safe operation, then the ship is likely to 
be considered a substandard vessel by the USCG.”388 The USCG publishes monthly 
detentions records giving full details of the vessel and the defects on its website and in 
Lloyds List.389 
 
Furthermore, the USCG implemented in 2001 an initiative called QUALSHIP 
21, quality shipping for the 21st century, to identify high-quality ships, and provide 
incentives to encourage quality operations. The Coast Guard noted that its efforts to 
eliminate substandard shipping focused on improving methods to identify poor-quality 
vessels provided few incentives for the well run, quality ship. Since regardless of the 
vessel position on the ranking list, all vessels entering U.S. waters were inspected at 
least once a year, hence under their policy, vessels operating with higher quality 
standards share nearly the same examination intervals as those vessels operating at 
lower-quality standards. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard recognized that numerous 
vessels are operated responsibly, and are typically found with few or no deficiencies 
                                                        
387 See: http://www.uscg.mil/hq.g-m/nmc/pubs/msm/r2/c19.htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
388 See: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/psc/detained.htm, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
389 Ibid. See See J. Hare, ‘Flag and Port State Control – Closing Net on Unseaworthy Ships and the 
Unscrupulous Owners’ in Sea Changes No. 16; 57 – 71 (1994), pp. 583/584 for more detail 
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hence deserving to be recognized as such. 390 
 
According to the USCG 2013 Report there was a slight increase in the number 
of ships detained in 2013 for environmental protection and safety related deficiencies 
from 105 to 121. Nevertheless, the total number of ships detained in 2013 for security 
related deficiencies remained at 8. There was also a decrease in Flag Administration 
safety performance for 2013 from the previous year, with the overall annual detention 
rate increasing from 1.17% to 1.29%. However, the 3-year rolling detention ratio 
dropped from 1.30% to 1.11%, representing the lowest three year safety detention ratio 
the Coast Guard ever recorded. The Flag Administrations of Antigua and Barbuda, 
Sierra Leone, Tuvalu, Italy, and Dominica were removed from the Targeted Flag List. 
Flag Administration security performance remained very high and tied with 2012 for 
the lowest recorded number of security related detentions. 391 As can be perceived in 
the Report, the USCG did not report any MLC related deficiency in the vessels 
inspected, which should not be a surprise, as the US has not ratified the convention.  
 
  It is not quite clear which incentives the QUALSHIP 21 offers, but the obvious 
conclusion ought to be that of lesser inspections. The initiative requires Flag States to 
have taken part in the IMO Voluntary Member State Audit Scheme (VMSAS) in order 
to qualify for the QUALSHIP 21 program.  The IMO Member State Audit Scheme is 
intended to provide a Member State a comprehensive and objective assessment of how 
effectively it administers and implements those mandatory IMO instruments which are 
covered by the Scheme, i.e. SOLAS, 1974, as amended; the International Convention 
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 and the 
Seafarers' Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code; the Protocol of 
1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (1988 Load Lines 
Protocol). The audit is currently voluntary, with countries such as Panama, Liberia, 
                                                        
390See: 
https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cgcvc/cvc2/safety/qualship/Qualship_Pamphlet_Updated_23Jun11.pdf. , last 
accessed on 01/02/2016 
391 See: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cgcvc/cvc2/annual_report/annualrpt13.pdf, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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Turkey and Australia among others already being audited. However from 1st of January 
2016, the audits are mandatory.392 The VMSA demonstrates the efforts of the IMO to 
ensure the full compliance of its Member States with its main conventions, often 
referred to as pillars of quality shipping. The fact that the US Coast Guard requires 
states to have taken part in the audit scheme shows the reliance upon and the 
acknowledgement of the importance of these international instruments, besides clearly 
demonstrating how the maritime safety chain parties attempt to work together in unison 
to prevent substandard shipping.  
 
 It cannot go unnoticed that Liberia, the favourite registry of U.S. Oil tankers, 
features on the 2014 list of qualified flag administrations. 393The country submitted to 
VMSA in 2007, with the result being that the Flag State had a few non-conformities 
needing attention which could be summarized as: 
 
● to make the promulgation of changes and amendments to IMO 
instruments more efficient; 
● To better document the oversight activities of Recognized 
Organizations; 
● To document a higher degree of detail the training and individual 
capabilities of the hundreds of surveyors who make up Liberia’s 
worldwide network of nautical inspectors, auditors and casualty 
investigators.  
 
Thus, two of the non-conformities found in the audit are highly connected to 
classification societies since Liberia delegates its Flag State responsibilities to these 
who act as recognized organizations.394 
                                                        
392 See: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/default.aspx and 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/AuditScheme.aspx, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
393 See: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cgcvc/cvc2/safety/qualship.asp, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
394 See: https://www.liscr.com/liscr/Portals/0/VIMSAS%20AUDIT.pdf and 
https://www.liscr.com/liscr/AboutUs/VoluntaryIMOMemberStateAuditScheme/tabid/215/Default.asp, 
last accessed on 01/02/2016 
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Nevertheless, Panama still features in the USCG target list for Flag 
Administration, alongside a few other countries, some considered to be FOC (Belize, 
Bolivia, Honduras, Cyprus, Vanuatu, Saint Vincent and Grenadines and Malta) while 
others not (Egypt, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines and 
Turkey).395Also, on the target list of Recognized Organizations feature only two 
classification societies, which have surveyed Panamanian vessels, thus working as 
Recognized Organizations for the Panamanian (Flag) State. 396 
  
 Australia is a country known for its conspicuously effective Port State control 
program.  The Australian Safety Maritime Authority (AMSA) conducts Port State 
control in Australia. It also publishes monthly statistics in the local and international 
shipping media and on its website hence making the detentions public. Australia is a 
member of the Asia Pacific MOU and as such it needs to comply with its 25% 
inspection target, which is easily surpassed by AMSA. The Commonwealth Navigation 
Act 1912 of Sec 210397 provides the basis of AMSA inspections. According to the terms 
of the section, if the Authority has grounds to suspect that a ship is unseaworthy it may 
order the ship to be provisionally detained, and shall immediately give the master of 
the ship notice of the provisional detention with a statement of the grounds for the 
detention. Following the detention a report must be commissioned as to whether the 
ship is unseaworthy or substandard398, a distinction that, as commented by Professor 
Hare, is a question of semantics rather than anything else; “Substandard ships (or let’s 
throw the euphemism aside and call them unseaworthy ships) have no place in our 
ports. They belong only in the scrapyard”.399Professor Hare’s position seems also to be 
                                                        
395 See http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cgcvc/cvc2/safety/flag_list.asp, last accessed on 01/02/2016 
396 http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cgcvc/cvc2/security/rso/targeted_rso/RSOs.pdf , last accessed on 
01/02/2016and See Hare, op Cit. pp 586-588 for more information. 
397 Commonwealth Navigation Act, 1912, sec. 210 (Autl.) (Detention of unseaworthy and substandard 
ships). 
398 See: http://www.amsa.gov.au/vessels/ship-safety/incident-reporting/, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
399 See:  J. Hare, ‘Flag and Port State Control – Closing Net on Unseaworthy Ships and the Unscrupulous 
Owners’ in Sea Changes No. 16; 57 – 71 (1994) , http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/portstat.htm., last 
accessed on 08/08/2016   
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shared by the European commission in Directive 2009/16/EC which essentially justifies 
the necessity of Port State control in combating substandard vessels but states that Port 
State inspections forms are not to be perceived as seaworthiness certificates, hence 
making a clear connection between the substandard nature or otherwise of ships, and 
their seaworthiness.400 
 
 In 2008, Australia was audited by the IMO as part of the Voluntary IMO 
Member State Audit Scheme. The Report can be considered to be an appraisal of 
Australia’s Port State Control. The two recommendations for further development 
contained in the report are incredibly specific, dare one say fussy, both regarding the 
SOLAS convention, and receiving immediate response by AMSA. The first 
recommendation essentially requires Australia to offer more assistance to a vessel 
detained at the request of the Flag State (administration) to ensure that the ship shall 
not sail until it can proceed to the sea or leave port for the purpose of proceeding to an 
appropriate repair yard without danger to the ship and persons aboard in compliance 
with SOLAS Chapter 1, regulation 6. AMSA replied to this recommendation stating 
that even though it believes that this onus should be borne by the Flag State, if requested 
it could render such assistance under the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912.  The 
Second recommendation to include into national legislation SOLAS chapter V 
regulation 7 which refers to resolutions A.225 (VII), A.530 (13), A.616(15), A.894(21)) 
which are non-mandatory, although implemented by AMSA. Australia’s response was 
that there were no specific provisions in the Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act, 
1990 (section 6(5)) which provided for the government to undertake measures 
consistent with its obligations under SOLAS. 401 
 
 New Zealand was a pioneer in semi-privatizing its state maritime 
authority.402As early as 1994, New Zealand conferred most of its maritime authority 
                                                        
400 See: Directive 2009/16/EC (6) 
401 See: http://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-publications/about-amsa/publications/AMSA-
Aboard/2009-Winter/documents/Audit_Report_Australia_05-02-09.pdf, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
402 : D. Haarmeyer and P. Yorke, Port Privatization: An International Perspective (Policy Study No. 
156,  April 1993), Available at: http://reason.org/files/6a983123788632131171e022e6466a7a.pdf; last 
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upon its newly established Maritime Safety Authority.403 New Zealand’s Maritime 
Transport Act (1994) empowers the Authority to detain any ship and impose conditions 
for its releases where the “operation or use of (the ship) endangers or is  likely to 
endanger any person or property, or the health and safety of any person”; or where “the 
appropriate prescribed maritime document is not for the time being in force in respect 
of the ship, or the master of any member of the crew of that ship.” Furthermore, “where 
the Director is satisfied, on clear grounds, that the master is not, or crew are not, familiar 
with essential shipboard procedures for the safe operation of the ship”.404 The country 
is also a party to Asia Pacific MOU.  
 
 It is important to note that both the Australian and New Zealand domestic 
legislation have taken similar proactive measures concerning the liability of their Port 
State control officers. The Australian Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912, contains 
amendments absolving officials from liability for “anything done under the provisions 
of (the Navigation Act) unless direct proof of corruption or malice given.”405 
Meanwhile, the New Zealand statute absolves members and employees of the authority 
from personal liability for acts done in “good faith in pursuance or intended pursuance 
of the functions or powers of the authority or of the director.”406 Professor John Hare 
suggests that all States should follow the Australian and New Zealand approach, 
enacting an indemnification of officials taking actions in good faith since allowing 
damages to be claimed against Port State control authority would ‘unduly inhibit Port 
State control’. 407Professor Hare’s opinion is founded upon positive actions taken by 
Port State authorities, i.e. detentions, nevertheless it is not entirely clear if Port States 
                                                        
accessed on 08/08/2016; J.Tongzon, and W. Heng, ‘Port privatization, efficiency and competitiveness: 
Some empirical evidence from container ports (terminals)’ in Transportation Research Part A: Policy 
and Practice, Volume 39, Issue 5, June 2005, pp. 405–424 
Greece to Proceed With Piraeus Port Privatization, Available at:  http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-to-
proceed-with-piraeus-port-privatization-142357399 
403 Maritime Transport Act § 55, 1994 
404 Maritime Transport Act § 55, (d) 1994 See HARE, op cit. pg 590 
405 Navigation Act, 1912 § 384 (1) 
406 Maritime Transport Act, § 34 
407 See  J. Hare, ‘Port State Control: Strong Medicine to cure a Sick Industry’ in 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. 
L. 571 1996-199, pp 591-592 
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officers and subsequently the Port State itself should be immune from any liability 
resulting from negative actions, i.e. omissions or negligence, which are harder to justify 
via the principle of good faith, and which were the cause of many maritime casualties, 
such as the Erika which, as already stated, despite its substandard  condition, cleared 
several port inspections.  
 
III.3.3 – Unilateral Vs Regional Vs Global Port State Control  
 
Schiferli in his work from 1994 created what one can call a ‘comparative chart’ 
showing the advantages and disadvantages of unilateral, global and regional Port State 
control and reached the conclusion that the latter is indeed the most efficient form of 
control hence making the MOUS the best form of Port State control and ‘weapon’ 
against substandard shipping. Schiferli appointed as the only disadvantage of Regional 
Port State control the shift of substandard shipping to other regions. 408  
 
 
PORT STATE 
CONTROL 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unilateral effort 
● It can be exercised to the extent 
deemed necessary by the Port State in 
question 
● The scope of unilateral Port State 
control can be enlarged to include 
even the Port State’s national 
requirements 
● The commitment involved is to be 
determined exclusively by the Port 
State. 
● Such efforts are less effective than when 
performed in cooperation with other Port 
States, because relevant information is 
missing; subject ships are no longer under 
surveillance once they have sailed from 
Port State’s territorial waters; and no 
enforcing or monitoring rectification of 
deficiencies is possible after the ship has 
left the Port State’s territory. 
● It is less cost effective, since all financial 
implications of performing Port State 
control rest on each individual Port State 
● It implies a high probability of a diverging 
implementation of this form of control, 
including inspections procedures. 
● It places a disproportional burden on ships’ 
staff, which may be confronted with various 
                                                        
408  Richard W.J. Schiferli, ‘Regional Concepts of Port State Control: A Regional Effort with Global 
Effects’ in 11 Ocean Y.B. 202 1994, pp. 212/132 
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Port States control regimes in consecutive 
ports. 
● It may cause distortion of competition 
between regional ports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Port State 
Control 
● It will have maximum impact on the 
operation of substandard ships, as 
ships will be under constant 
surveillance. 
● It ensures maximum availability of 
relevant information to Port States.  
● It allows for maximum harmonization 
of Port State control performances. 
● The cost of operating this system of 
Port State control will be minimal. 
● It lacks, for geographical reasons, sufficient 
commitment by participating Port States. 
● It would require an international convention 
to administer the system, which would 
imply lengthy ratification procedures; time 
consuming, rigid amendments procedures; 
time-consuming, rigid amendment 
procedures; and much compromise, which 
is detrimental to the necessary commitment. 
In other words, the commitment would be 
equivalent to the lowest common 
denominator. 
● It is difficult to adjust to maritime 
developments that require immediate – and 
often region related – response by Port 
States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional Effort  
● There is maximum commitment from 
participating region countries, 
sharing common safety and 
environmental interests.  
● This effort promotes effective use of 
regionally available information. 
● Ships remain under surveillance as 
long as they operate in the region, 
which significantly reduces the 
possibilities for substandard ships to 
operate in that region 
● The cost of operating this system is 
equally shared by all participating 
Port States. 
● A harmonized regional approach of 
Port State control procedures 
prevents excessive burden on ships’ 
● It is only effective in eradicating the 
operation of substandard ships in that 
particular region; it tends to generate a shift 
of operation of substandard ships to other 
areas. 
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staff and allows for effective  
deployment of available resources of 
participating Port States. 
● Harmonized Port State control 
procedures prevent distortion of 
competition between regional ports. 
 
Indeed, Regional Systems tend to be the best form of Port State control because 
they give participants the opportunity to ban substandard ships from their region in an 
efficient manner without jeopardising the fair competition among the regional ports 
involved, as unscrupulous shipowners will not be able to avoid their ports. 409These 
regional agreements are based on specific common interests between members; it is a 
fact that pollution accidents often affect more than just one country. 410  
 
Although regional Port State control is the most effective form of control, it is 
not flawless. Nevertheless, the fact that most countries nowadays belongs to a MOU or 
have strong Port State control measures like the United States and Australia makes it 
very  difficult (or at least it should) for substandard ships to exist, as, at least in theory, 
they have hardly any places in which they can trade. Furthermore, as could be seen in 
the previous section, Coastal States can be said to have responsibilities even when ships 
are in international waters. Thus, there is very little doubt that Port State control is an 
effective form of controlling substandard shipping. Even in the 90s, renowned 
academics were already of the opinion that it was an effective method; Dr Edgar Gold 
attributed 99.9995 per cent of safely arrived oil cargo to the work of Port State Control; 
Professor Ronald B. Mitchell attributed it to tanker owner compliance with 
international standards due to the increased possibility of detentions due to Port State 
control, and Professor John Hare noted that vessel losses had probably decreased due 
                                                        
409 It is said that initially there was a certain reluctance of Port States to exercise stronger control by 
enforcing international conventions on vessels in their waters due to economic reasons. Ports with stricter 
rules and regulations would be and are far less attractive to shipowners than those less strict. This would 
make shipowners opt to trade using the latter ports, especially if these were located in the same region. 
This follows the principle of ship registration, by with shipowners trying to find the most attractive/ 
‘beneficial’ State in which register its ship. See:  Ted McDorman, ‘Port State Control: A comment on 
the Tokyo MOU and Issues of International Law’ in 7 Asian Y.B. Int’lL. 229 (1997), p. 235 
410 Ibid, page 214 
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to the same reason. 411Nowadays, a simple glimpse at the recent MOU Reports can be 
said to demonstrate that the number of substandard vessels has decreased, as have the 
number of detentions. The latest Paris MOU report from 2013 shows the efforts of 
countries to move to the ‘White List’ or “Grey List’ to avoid inspections and detentions. 
The 2013 Report also displays that black listed flagged vessels avoid trading in ports 
of the Member States, most likely fearing the risk of detention. However, in 2013 the 
Paris MOU recorded an increase of 87% from the previous year in the number of ships 
refused access, the highest number since 2005, with 28 ships being refused entry. 
Whilst 17 of these ships were reportedly banned for multiple detentions, nine were 
banned for failing to call at an indicated repair yard. 412  This does not by any means 
represent a failure of Port State Control, especially since an increase in the number of 
bans was expected, it only demonstrates how strict Port State control is, especially 
bearing in mind that further areas of compliance have been added with the advent of 
the MLC. In contrast to the Paris MOU Report, the Tokyo MOU Report 2013 shows a 
continuous decrease in the number of detentions and detention rates for the past three 
years. It is important to note also that the two MOUs’ lists also differ, some countries 
feature in one of the lists but not in the other, probably because of an insufficient 
number of inspections. Furthermore, whereas in the Paris MOU Georgia improved its 
performance moving to the ‘Grey List’, in the Tokyo MOU it continues to be in the 
‘Black List’. Countries like Vanuatu and Malaysia which feature in the ‘Grey List’ of 
the former are in the ‘White List’ of the latter. It is important to note nonetheless, that 
the two countries considered as being the main FOC countries, i.e. Panama and Liberia, 
feature in the ‘White List’ of both MOUs.413 
                                                        
411 Ibid, p. 241 
412  In 2013 Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland moved from the ‘Grey List’ to the ‘ White list’, 
whilst Georgia, Lebanon, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Lybia and Albania moved to from the ‘Black list’ to the 
‘Grey list’.  Meanwhile Bolivia disappeared from the ‘Black List’ due to insufficient number of 
inspections.  Paris MoU, ‘Port State Control, Consolidating  Progress, Annual Report 2013’( Paris MoU, 
2013) 
<https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Paris%20MoU%20Annual%20Report%202013%20revis
ed_1.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
413  See: Tokyo MoU, ‘Annual Report on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region 2013’ (Tokyo 
MoU, 2013) <http://www.tokyo-mou.org/inspections_detentions/detention_list.php> ; Paris MoU, ‘Port 
State Control, Consolidating  Progress, Annual Report 2013’( Paris MoU, 2013) 
<https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Paris%20MoU%20Annual%20Report%202013%20revis
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It is important to note that, as already mentioned regarding 2013 with the advent 
of the Maritime Labour Convention, MOUs adopted amendments to their 
memorandums, adding new areas of compliance. These areas included employment 
agreements, hours of work and rest, payments of wages, repatriation at the end of the 
contract and seafarers’ complaint handbook.414Port State control seems to be such a 
strong weapon in the combat of substandard shipping that the shipping industry itself 
was concerned that Port States would be overzealous, increasing drastically the number 
of detentions. However, both MOUs discussed in this chapter, claim to have taken a 
very pragmatic approach in adopting the MLC. According to the Secretary General of 
the Paris MOU, through a 2013 press release, the shipping industry and Flag States 
were informed how ships would be treated at Member State ports, and ships were only 
detained in cases of significant non-compliance. Nevertheless, according to the report, 
since the entering into force of the MLC, 21 ships were detained for non-compliance 
with the convention (10 – wages, 7 - calculation and payment of wages, 5– fitness for 
duty, hours of work and rest, 4 – quantity of provisions, and 2 – sanitary facilities).415  
By the first year of the entry into force of the MLC, 20 August 2014, 113 ships were 
detained by one of the Paris MOU Authorities for MLC-related deficiencies, 
representing 17.4% of the total number of detentions (649) in the Paris MOU during 
this period.416 In 2015, in relation to the Tokyo MOU, at least four of the detentions 
                                                        
ed_1.pdf>; and Paris MoU, ‘Performance List 2013’ (Paris MoU, 2013) 
<https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/WGB%202011-2013.pdf> , last accessed on 08/08/2016 
414 The amendments containing provisions for abandonment of seafarers were only approved in June 
2014 and are still not in force.  
415 Paris MoU, ‘Port State Control, Consolidating  Progress, Annual Report 2013’( Paris MoU, 2013) 
<https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Paris%20MoU%20Annual%20Report%202013%20revis
ed_1.pdf> and Tokyo MoU, ‘Annual Report on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region 2013’ 
(Tokyo MoU, 2013) <http://www.tokyo-mou.org/inspections_detentions/detention_list.php> , last 
accessed on 08/08/2016 
416 Accordingly to the Paris MoU press release during the first year 7.4% (3,447) of the total number of 
46,798 deficiencies recorded were linked to the MLC. Of these, 160 (4.6%) were classified as having a 
ground for detention resulting in 113 detained ships. The most frequent deficiencies recorded as grounds 
for detentions were related to “payment of wages” (39,5%), and “manning levels for the ship” (28.6%). 
Other areas with high deficiency levels are “health and safety and accident prevention” (43.1%), “food 
and catering” (15.4%) and “accommodation” (10%). See: https://www.parismou.org/results-first-year-
maritime-labour-convention, last accessed on 08/08/2016. In 2016, the Paris MoU was set to conduct 
from the 1st of September to the 30th of November a Concentrated inspection Campaign (CIC) on the 
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reported can be attributed to a failure of compliance with the MLC. Therefore, it is 
evident that Port States are doing their best to assure compliance with the convention.417  
 
Therefore, it is clear that the increase of Port State control and its efficacy is 
also essential in order to guarantee Flag State compliance, since the latter will try to 
avoid unwanted detentions. Accordingly, undoubtedly Port State control is 
indispensable in order to prevent substandard shipping. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
which sort of liability Port States will encounter when failing to fulfil their duties 
efficiently. This is due to the fact that Port State control is treated more as an auxiliary 
mechanism of compliance, rather than main one.  Furthermore, Port States can be 
perceived as victims of substandard shipping, as they many times have to bear some of 
the costs of this.  
 
 III. 3- Concluding Remarks 
 
 The Chapter demonstrated that through a system of inspections, Flag and Port 
States, especially since the advent of the Maritime Labour Convention, have means of 
preventing abandonment of seafarers. Differing from Port States, Flag States have more 
direct obligations towards seafarers, such as to repatriate them if the shipowner fails to 
do so. However, seafarers are unlikely to sue Flag States for any failure in fulfilling 
their obligations.  Indeed, the failure of Flag State, Port State and Coastal States in 
fulfilling their obligations will generally only amount to a diplomatic incident.  
 
                                                        
MLC 2006. 2006). The aim of the CIC is to verify that the minimum standards for working and living 
conditions have been implemented on board of inspected vessels. Secretary General Richard Schiferli 
stated: “Working and living conditions on board have always been a prime area of attention. With the 
introduction of the MLC enforcement opportunities have greatly improved. Three years after the entry 
into force, the time is right to focus on the MLC during a concentrated inspection campaign”. See: Paris 
MoU, Press Release- ‘Launch of Concentrated Inspection Campaign on MLC,2006’ ( Paris MoU, 28th 
July 2016) https://www.parismou.org/launch-concentrated-inspection-campaign-mlc2006, last accessed 
on 08/08/2016 The launch of this CIC shows the importance attributed to the need to provide the seafarer 
with a safe and heathy work environment. 
417 It is important to bear in mind that member port State previous to the MLC already conducted 
inspections to assure compliance with relevant ILO instruments. See: https://www.parismou.org/about-
us/organisation and http://www.tokyo-mou.org/ for more information  
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that a seafarer would be successful in a claim against 
States for failure in fulfilling their international obligations. It is unlikely that a Court 
would hold a Port State, or a Flag State, liable in tort for the damage caused to a seafarer 
for their failure in performing their obligations established in international instruments.  
 
As it was shown, Coastal States, even though their responsibility towards 
preventing abandonment of seafarers is substantially lesser than of Flag and Port States, 
do hold a certain amount of responsibility for preserving life at sea. As explained in this 
thesis’ introduction, life for its purpose is understood as encompassing human life, 
hence seafarers’ lives. Leaving a seafarer in distress on the high seas cannot be 
perceived in any other way besides constituting abandonment. Nevertheless, the refusal 
of Coastal States in providing refuge will hardly lead to a legal action, especially 
considering all the legal justifications they can invoke in order to justify refusal. 
 
It is in fact the network system of compliance that ensures that international 
standards and regulations are effectively implemented.
 
The European Union already 
bans substandard ships under certain conditions from entering their ports. The adoption 
of the Third Maritime Safety Package on 11 March 2009 emphasizes even more the 
European Union’s efforts to combat substandard shipping. As Tawo Zwinge stated 
well: “It is to be hoped that collective refusal of access to ports will eventually obviate 
the need of substandard vessels to navigate at all as they would have no place to go 
anymore”418 
 
Accordingly, the chapter confirmed that States have obligations and 
responsibilities in preventing ‘abandonment of seafarers’ from occurring, and may even 
be considered as the ones committing the act of abandonment, which is particularly true 
in the case of Coastal States. 
                                                        
418 Tamo Zwinge, ‘Duties of Flag States to Implement and Enforce International Standards and 
Regulations - And Measures to Counter 9eir Failure to Do So’ in Journal of International Business and 
Law: Vol. 10: Iss. 2, Article 5 (2011), p.321 Available at: 
h:p://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol10/iss2/5, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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Chapter IV- Classification Societies 
 
Even though classification societies can still be considered an unsatisfactorily 
regulated area of transport law, their importance in the shipping industry is undeniable. 
They play a vital role in the inspections of ships and making sure these comply with 
industry standards and most importantly with international and national regulations.   
 
 A brief definition of classification societies: these are independent legal 
entities, which establish basic minimum standards for the design, construction and 
maintenance of the principal hull and machinery of vessels, issuing essential 
certificates, which are relied on by important sectors of the maritime industry as an 
assurance that the classed vessel is likely to be reasonably suited for its intended use, 
being vital for insurance and marketing purposes.419 They emerged out of a necessity 
of shipowners to provide evidence that their vessel had been built to a suitable standard 
for insurers and charterers.420 Thus, classification societies are broadly defined as: 
“organizations which survey and classify ships according to their condition for 
insurance and other purposes”.421 However, this definition can be considered to be very 
simplistic and hardly demonstrates the importance of these institutions to maritime law.  
 
As this Chapter will demonstrate, classification societies have a dual role. They 
conduct inspections on behalf of the shipowner in order to ensure that the vessel is up 
to standard, and also act as Recognised Organisations on behalf of Flag States. As such 
they must, through inspections, ensure the vessels’ compliance with International 
Conventions such as SOLAS, MARPOL and now the MLC. Flag States will often rely 
on classification societies’ expertise and knowledge in conducting these inspections, 
                                                        
419  Jan De Bruyne, ‘Liability of Classification Societies: Cases, Challenges and Future Perspectives’ in 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 45.2 (April 2014): 181:232,.p.2 
420  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 126 
421  Marine Insurance Glossary, ‘Glossary of Marine Insurance and Shipping Terms’ in 14  U.S.F. Mar. 
L.J. 332 (2001-2002) 
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since these institutions have existed prior to any International Convention. As the 
Chapter will assert by the analyses of the history and inception of classification 
societies, these can even be considered to have an auxiliary regulatory role, as the 
knowledge of their inspectors have being relied on in order to improve standards in the 
shipping industry. 
 
It is up to classification societies to certify if vessels are in compliance with the 
Conventions known as the pillars of Maritime Law, and if they are not up to standard, 
pointing out deficiencies and recommending adjustments where necessary. A vessel 
will not sail without a classification society’s report attesting her satisfactory condition. 
Accordingly, the classification society will be the one assuring that the vessel is not 
substandard and is safe to sail, hence performing a vital role in preventing 
‘abandonment of seafarers’, from happening.  As already discussed in this thesis, as a 
substandard vessel can hardly be considered a safe work place422, and although the 
primary responsibility in providing a safe place to works fall with the shipowner, it is 
questionable whether a classification society negligent while performing its duties will 
not also bear some sort of responsibility, particularly in tort. 
 
It is important to note in this regard that national regulations recognize the 
importance of third parties, essentially directors or heads of companies, and not only of 
the employer, in maintaining the safety of the working environment. 423 In the UK for 
instance, if a health and safety offence is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any 
                                                        
422 An implied obligation accordingly to most national legislations. See Section 9 of the MGN 20 
Merchant shipping and fishing vessels: health and safety, which implements the EC Directive 89/391 as 
a title of example. See Chapter I pp.92-97 
423  In France, the Labour Code requires the head of the establishment to “take the necessary action in 
order to ensure the safety and protection of the physical and mental health of the people working in the 
respective establishment, including temporary workers.” (Labour Code, Art. L-230-2 para 1)  
The Centre for Corporate Accountability prepared a survey for the Health and Safety Executive of the 
UK in 2007 regarding company’s directors’ responsibilities to ensure the health and safety of the work 
place. Most legislations analysed imposed some sort of responsibility and therefore liability in 
company’s directors. See: Centre for Corporate Accountability, International comparison of health and 
safety responsibilities of company directors, (Health and Safety Executive, 2007) < 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr535.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the organisation, or happens with 
their consent, then he or she, as well as the organisation can be prosecuted under section 
37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. According to Section 37(1) of the 1974 
Act states that: 
 
“Where an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions 
committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the 
consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the 
part of any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body 
corporate or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as 
well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable 
to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 
 
Accordingly, the section allows directors and also managers to be prosecuted 
by an offence relating to health and safety in the work environment. In R v Boal, [1992] 
3 All ER 177, managers were defined as persons who "are in a position of real authority, 
the decision-makers within the company who have both the power and responsibility 
to decide corporate policy and strategy. It is to catch those responsible for putting 
proper procedures in place; it is not meant to strike at underlings."  As this chapter will 
prove by the analysis of classification societies’ history and roles, these have an 
important and undeniable role in assuring that procedures are put into place, as policy 
makers of health and safety themselves.  
 
Truly, classification societies do not fall into either of the categories. They can 
neither be classified as directors or managers of the seafarers’ employer. Nevertheless, 
as this chapter will prove, classification societies play a vital role in deciding policies 
and assuring that proper procedures are put into place. Thus, their role in assuring the 
health and safety of the seafarers’ work environment should not be taken lightly.  
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 Furthermore, classification societies will attest to the vessel’s compliance with 
international instruments, which are essential to secure the seafarers’ safety while on 
board the vessel, such as SOLAS and MLC hence a negligent survey could possibly 
jeopardise the life of a seafarer.  
 
Accordingly, this Chapter intends to analyse classifications societies’ 
responsibilities in preventing abandonment of seafarers either by acting on behalf of 
Flag States, assuring the compliance of the vessel with International Conventions, 
particularly with the MLC, or by acting on behalf of the shipowner in assuring that the 
vessel is not substandard. 
 
This Chapter shall start by demonstrating the importance of classification 
societies through the analysis of the classification Society’s inception and its historical 
development. It will then move on to the analysis of the classification society’s dual 
role, which is also essential to demonstrating the reliance of the industry upon these 
institutions and the conflict of interests that the performance of this dual role might 
represent in terms of efficiency. Finally, classification societies’ third party liability 
shall be analysed.  
 
In order to conduct classification societies’ third party liability analysis, three 
different jurisdictions have been chosen to be analysed; England, the United States of 
America, and France. England has been chosen due to the fact that English law is the 
basis of this thesis. The USA and France were the countries of the courts which dealt 
with Classification Society third party liability in the Prestige’ and the Erika' incidents 
respectively and considering how extensively both cases have been dealt with 
throughout this thesis, they have been chosen as a further basis. 
  
It is important to note that a direct analysis of how courts deal with classification 
society liability towards seafarers was not possible to be made due to the nonexistence 
of any judgment of this kind, even though some suggestion has been made by American 
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scholars that such cases have been in the majority successful but settled out of court.424 
Therefore, it was necessary to make a general analysis of classification Societies third 
party liability according to the existent case law in order to reach a conclusion on how 
Courts would deal with cases involving seafarers and classification Societies. 
 
IV.1 –Historic Development of the Classification Society – its inception 
 
 Classification Societies are not a new concept; in fact, they existed since even 
before the IMO425 or more importantly the UNCLOS I from 1858, hence before 
governments realized the transboundary of merchant shipping and the necessity to 
regulate it in an efficient and harmonized manner in order to guarantee maritime safety. 
Its origins can be traced back as far as the late seventeenth century, with the creation of 
Lloyd’s, named after the London coffee house where merchants, marine underwriters 
and others connected to the industry would gather and “read” the printed news-sheet 
called Lloyd’s News published by the owner of establishment, Edward Lloyd, 
containing information on foreign and war news, trials, executions, parliamentary 
proceedings, and marine news and gossip. After Lloyd’s death his relatives carried out 
the business founding Lloyd’s List in 1734 with a focus upon shipping news, mainly 
gathered from correspondents, Lloyd’s agents, around the world. A Register society 
was finally incorporated in 1760 and by 1764 a Register of ships was published to give 
information on the conditions of ships to merchants and marine underwriters. 
Nevertheless, issues regarding the secrecy of classification quickly became apparent 
and although the ratings provided by classification societies became essential to 
underwriters, they were not popular among shipowners and shipbuilders as they 
discriminated against certain shipbuilding areas and the information was confidential 
to insurers. Thus, in 1797 as a direct response to the Register Publication of that year, 
shipowners opened their own register, which due to its failure in the long term merged 
                                                        
424 See Chapter IV.2.2 
425 The International Maritime Organization - IMO first known as Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization -IMCO, was created in the mid-19th Century. See: 
http://www.imo.org/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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with Lloyd’s register in 1834, forming Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign 
Shipping. This new organization, which included merchants, shipowners, and 
underwriters, published rules for the survey and classification of ships hence the name 
‘Classification Society’ or ‘Class’.426 
 
 The concept of Class only really proliferated internationally in the early 
nineteenth century, as the size and complexity of ships increased as well as the heavy 
losses of these, generating a requirement from insurers for standards of construction of 
these ships. In the winter of 1821, when 2000 ships and 200,000 seafarers were “lost” 
at sea and several French Marine Insurance Companies went bankrupt, the necessity of 
an efficient class rating system became particularly marked. It was not long after this 
that other classification societies started to emerge (as doubts emerged regarding 
Lloyd’s rating system). Thus, the Bureau Veritas (BV) in 1829, Registri Italiano Navale 
(RINA) in 1861, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in 1862 and Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) in 1864, classification societies all active to this date, were established 
in different nations across the world by marine insurers, following the Lloyd’s model 
of non-profit organizations undertaking surveys of the hull and machinery of ships for 
the underwriter so a standard construction could be classified and insurance obtained 
by the shipowner. All these societies developed similar methods of evaluating risks by 
a process of assessing the condition of the ship and ‘rating’ them, which would be done 
through a visit to the ship by an experienced captain based in the Port where the vessel 
was located.427 
 
                                                        
426 See: Lloyd’s Register, A Brief History: It started with a cup of coffee, available at 
http://www.lr.org/en/about-us/our-heritage/brief-history/, last accessed on 08/08/2016; JD. Bell, ‘The 
Role of Classification in Maritime Safety', 9Th Chua Chor Memorial Lecture, Singapore, 13 January 
1995, IMO Library; Lloyd’s Register, From Coffee House to Post-Modernist Building, Infosheet 31, 
available at http://www.lr.org/en/_images/213-35658_31-lloyds-register-pics.pdf and John N. K. 
Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues (Springer-Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, pp 126/127 
427  Ibid and WE Jenkin, ‘The OCIMF view of recent classification society progress’, Paper to the 
International Seminar on Tanker Safety, Pollution Prevention, Spill Response and Compensation, (Hong 
Kong: 06 November 2002), http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Papers/jenkins.pdf, last 
accessed on 08/08/2016 
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 In the first half of the nineteenth century several factors led classification 
societies away from solely ratings and changed the relationship between Class and the 
shipowner and eventually the Flag State. Shipowners started to demand more and more 
value from Class than just a survey of construction and the occasional rating. They 
wanted evidence by regular certification of the ongoing standard of the vessel. The 
response came through the concept of classification certificates issued by a number of 
years dependent upon a regular survey of the vessel which consequently provided the 
classification societies with a regular source of income, enabling them to develop their 
technical resources and international coverage. Another consequence was the need for 
all classification societies to produce clearly understood and uniform guidance to their 
surveyors, who would now no longer be only shipmasters but also engineers. This was 
the birth of the “Class Rules”, now paramount in the regulatory framework for the 
design and construction of the ships. 428  
 
 The class of a vessel is paramount for its value, as it will affect its price and its 
workability, as no charterer will hire a vessel without class (all contracts for operating 
merchant vessels demand the shipowner to produce a class certificate before finalizing 
the contract, which often also demands that the ship remain in class for its entire 
duration). The economic value of Class is so extensive that some commentators 
summarized it with the small and direct sentence “no cash without class”429.  Basedow 
and Wurmnest summarized the importance of Class in six bullet points: 
 
● “Purchasers of ships require a class certificate to complete a purchase. 
● Most arm’s length voyage and time charters expressly require owners 
to maintain the class of the ship throughout the term of the charter. 
Bareboat charters put this obligation on charterers. 
                                                        
428  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 128 
429  J. Basedow and W. Wurmnest, Third Party Liability of Classification Societies, Hamburg Studies on 
Maritime Affairs 2, (Springer 2005), p. 7 
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● Hull underwriters set the insurance premiums according to the class of 
a ship. Ships not holding an appropriate class will be insured only for a 
very high premium if at all. Additionally, the standard insurance 
contract clauses exclude insurance coverage for damage when the 
vessel went to sea without holding the highest class of an established 
Classification Society. The rules of the P&I Clubs also require that the 
ship holds a certain class. 
● Banks that issue ship financing loans against a ship mortgage as 
security, require proof of the class when entering into a contract, and 
make failure to maintain the mortgaged ship in a valid class a cause for 
termination under the loan agreement. 
● Parties contracting with carriers will only entrust their cargo to a ship 
with the highest class, as they would otherwise incur higher insurance 
premiums for the transportation of their goods. 
● Crew members might attempt to negotiate higher pay as a risk premium 
for sailing on a ship with a lower class.” 430 
 
Therefore it can be noted that all members of the shipping industry rely on the 
Class of a vessel, including seafarers, who will only see the vessel/ their working place 
after signing the contract – since most likely the vessel will be anchored in a different 
country from the one in which the contract was made, hence relying heavily on the 
information given, in particular the class of the vessel. Nevertheless, as Basedow and 
Wurmnest point out, not every interested party relies solely on the class certificate 
issued by a Classification Society, this being particularly true in the case of hull 
underwriters, P&I Clubs and charterers, which sometimes conduct their own ship 
inspections to validate themselves the ship’s condition (this will be analysed and 
                                                        
430 Ibid. See also: Cf Clause11 (2) Norwegian Saleform 1993, Cf only Clause 6 of the BIMCO standard 
form NYPE 93 (new York Produce Exchange Form),  Cf Clause 10 (a) (i), 13 and 15 of the BIMCO 
Standard bareboat charter form (BARECON 2001). Cf. e.g., § 58 ADS in connection with § 23.1 of the 
DTV. Kaskoklausen 1978 ( version August 1994) Cf. only the “Klassifikation-und Altersklausel” for 
insurance cover according to the DTV-Guterversicherungsbedingugen 
169 
 
explained in more depth further along in this work).431 Nevertheless, undoubtedly, the 
historical origins of the classification societies demonstrate their interrelationship with 
these sectors of the maritime industry, in particular the insurance industry. 
 
IV.1.1 – Duo Role 
 
At the same time as the birth of “Class Rules”, with the evolution of national 
legislations concerning the safety of ships, Flag States also began to carry regular 
surveys to verify the condition of the remainder of the ship and its equipment, especially 
regarding safety and navigational and they were increasingly accepting classification 
societies’ surveys of hull and machinery as verification of standards of these 
components hence avoiding duplication of surveys. Eventually, Flag States also began 
to delegate their statutory power to classification societies, which already had technical 
expertise and personnel to carry out the complex task of surveying ships. 432 
 
 Ever since, classification societies have been playing a role in assessing 
standards of vessels, consequently assuring of their seaworthiness long before the 
concept of the shipping safety chain was envisaged. Therefore, their proliferation can 
in a large part be considered a consequence of maritime casualties. Even though, the 
initial motivation behind the creation of these societies was strictly economic, they were 
playing a role in guarantying the safety of shipping since before any other member of 
the maritime safety chain, by inspecting a vessel’s seaworthiness and/or substandard 
conditions. Thus, it can even be argued that shipowners themselves were responsible 
for promoting safety at sea, by instituting regular ship inspections in order to guarantee 
standards of construction/ safety, essential requirements in ensuring a vessel’s 
seaworthiness (even though a Classification Society cannot be liable for  vessel 
                                                        
431  J. Basedow and W. Wurmnest, Third Party Liability of Classification Societies, Hamburg Studies on 
Maritime Affairs 2, (Springer 2005), p 8 
432  Ibid, pp 128/129 and JD. Bell, ‘The Role of Classification in Maritime Safety', 9Th Chua Chor 
Memorial Lecture, Singapore, 13 January 1995, IMO Library Lloyd’s Register, From Coffee House to 
Post-Modernist Building, Infosheet 31, available at http://www.lr.org/en/_images/213-35658_31-lloyds-
register-pics.pdf, p.5, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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unseaworthiness due to the time gap between surveys, among other things, it is  
undeniable that when the CS issues its survey, at that particular time at least, it is also 
attesting to the vessel’s seaworthiness), making them more appealing to charters.  
 
This dual role undertaken by classification Societies led to more responsibilities 
and most importantly conflicting interests. Therefore, in the late 19th Century to 
preclude this inherent conflict of interest, classification societies drew up detailed 
regulations regarding complete surveys of a vessel and its equipment, including their 
traditional area of hull and machinery. The consequence of this was the increase of Flag 
State reliance on classification societies, by delegating all their responsibilities under 
national and international law to the latter. This led classification societies to severe 
their traditional ties to underwriters and start offering services straight to shipowners.  
Ever since, classification societies have been carrying out regular surveys to ensure the 
ship is “in Class” for insurance purposes (private role), while concurrently undertaking 
statutory surveys on behalf of the Flag State (public roles), hence that which was to 
obviate their conflict of interests merely increased it.433 Not surprisingly there is a 
widespread misunderstanding inside and outside the shipping industry regarding the 
role of classification societies, with associated issues regarding the effective 
implementation of IMO instruments on behalf of Flag states. 434 
  
 Furthermore, after the Second World War, when Liberia and Panama registries 
started to attract a great number of Greek and American shipowners, there was an 
expansion of the coverage and mandate of Class. The fact that these Flag States and 
newly emergent nations, with hardly any maritime tradition, had a clear lack of 
infrastructure and maritime administration, and according to critics no desire to oversee 
and enforce statutory regulation (this might have been the case when some of these 
                                                        
433  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 129 
434  LD. Barchue, Making a case for the Voluntary IMO Member Audit Scheme, (IMO October 2005), 
p.1 
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registries were created however this does not seem to be the case anymore435), 
generated an increased reliance on classification societies, which at the time had already 
an important position in the shipping industry, having set up worldwide networks to 
survey the ships in Class. Thus, it seemed logical to some Flag States to delegate to 
these organizations the Class and statutory surveys as Recognized Organizations.436 In 
fact, a majority of IMO members adopted this approach. 437 Rationally, this makes total 
sense as it is more economically viable to rely on experts already with the required 
knowledge and practical experience than to train new professionals to do the job, 
besides being, theoretically at least, more efficient.  It is important to note, however, 
that Flag States can only delegate inspection, surveying and certification functions, not 
the grating of enforcement or exemptions. The instruments are clear about what 
functions can be delegated to RO, being clearly an exhaustive list. 438 SOLAS, for 
instance, makes clear that the list of functions that can be delegated is an exhaustive 
one in its Chapter I, Regulation 6 (a): 
 
“The inspection and survey of ships, so far as regards the enforcement of 
the provisions of the present regulations and the grating of exemptions 
therefrom, shall be carried out by the officers of the administration. The 
                                                        
435 All of the countries considered to be Flag of Convenience countries are parties to all the major safety 
conventions, including the ‘four pillars’ of shipping, i.e. SOLAS, STCW, MARPOL and MLC and more 
responsible registries ensure even stricter compliance. For instance, Liberia (considered to be the second 
major FOC country) requires a ‘decision maker’ who is contactable 24 hours in the event of any accident 
rising from one of its ships as a condition for the issuance of a Permanent Certificate, it also stipulates 
that vessels seeking registration not be more than twenty years old, although subject to certain conditions 
vessels exceeding this age limit may be accepted for registration. Similarly, Panama, considered the main 
FOC country, although it does not provide for any age limitation, vessels over twenty years of age are 
subject to a special inspection before the Permanent Certificate of Registry can be issued. Furthermore, 
both countries make annual levies on ships in their registers for casualty investigation and international 
participation.  ( Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders of a FOC Country’, in M. 
Musi (ed), New Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and International Trade Law (Libreria 
Bonomo Editrice: Bologna, 2014), pp. 227-252 ) 
436 “Recognized Organizations” it is a term found in IMO Resolution A.739 (18), Guidelines for the 
Authorization of Organization Acting on behalf of the Administration, to denote those survey and 
Classification Societies organizations “acting on behalf of the Administration (flag state) to perform 
statutory work on its behalf” 
437John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 131 
438 See for example MLC Regulation 5.1.1, 3.  
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Administration may, however, entrust the inspection and surveys either to 
surveyors nominated for the purpose or to organization recognized by it.” 
 
 Therefore, the ultimate responsibility to enforce compliance and grant 
exemptions still lies with the Flag State, these being clearly non-delegable, with only 
inspections and surveys representing delegable duties. 
 
IV.1.2 - International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) 
 
 At the same pace that the interest in classification societies started to increase 
so did the competition amongst them, which led to a decline in the quality of the 
services.  In 1969, due to concerns of the “traditional” classification societies regarding 
what were considered to be ‘substandard’ classification societies, the International 
Association of Classification Societies (IACS) was founded, representing the twelve 
major classification societies (including ABS, RINA, BV and DNV) and accounting 
for more than 90% of the World’s tonnage. On its website, IACS introduces itself as an 
institution “Dedicated to safe ships and clean seas, IACS makes a unique contribution 
to maritime safety and regulation through technical support, compliance verification 
and research and development.”439 Through its members’ extensive technical and 
research facilities, and its role as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) at the IMO, 
IACS is able to develop Rules hence exercising a great deal of influence upon IMO 
Instruments, where it holds consultative status since 1969440. It is important to note that 
the Prestige and the Erika had been surveyed by members of the IACS (ABS and RINA 
respectively), at the time of their accident. 
 
 It is interesting to note that despite the clear important role that IACS has in the 
maritime industry, which demonstrates without a shadow of a doubt the relevance of 
the classification societies in preventing substandard vessels, it attempts to exempt 
                                                        
439 See: http://www.iacs.org.uk, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
440  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p.131 
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these institutions of any liability whatsoever. In a document on classification societies 
available in its Website, after describing the importance of these organisations and their 
surveys, it reads: 
 
 “However, such a certificate does not imply, and should not be construed 
as, a warranty of safety, fitness for purpose or seaworthiness of the ship. It 
is an attestation only that the vessel is in compliance with the Rules that 
have been developed and published by the Society issuing the classification 
certificate. Further, Classification Societies are not guarantors of safety of 
life or property at sea or the seaworthiness of a vessel because the 
Classification Society has no control over how a vessel is manned, operated 
and maintained between the periodical surveys which it 
conducts.”441(Emphasis added).  
 
This statement seems at least odd since it seems to exempt the Classification 
Society of any liability acting either on behalf of the shipowner or on behalf of the Flag 
State, and seems to minimise the current reliance on their certificates, even though a 
ship shall not be allowed to sail without one. Seaworthiness, as it will be demonstrated 
                                                        
441 See: IACS, “Classification Societies – WHAT, WHY and HOW?’,  (IACS, 2015) 
<http://www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/explained/WHAT,%20WHY%20and%20HOW%20Jan%20
2015.PDF>, p. 4, The same “disclaimer” can also be found in another IACS Publication:  IACS, ‘IACS 
Objectives, Strategy and Action Plan (2014-2015)’ (IACS, 2015) 
http://www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/explained/IACS%20Strategy%202014.pdf., last accessed on 
08/08/2016 In the same publication it can be found IACS definition of Classification Society by defining 
its functions and goals: 
“the purpose of a Classification Society ("CS") is to provide classification and statutory services (when 
authorised by flag Administrations or other governmental organisations) and assistance to the maritime 
industry and regulatory bodies as regards maritime safety and pollution prevention, based on the 
accumulation of maritime knowledge and technology; 
2. the objective of ship classification is to verify the structural strength and integrity of essential parts of 
the ship’s hull and its appendages, and the reliability and function of the propulsion and steering systems, 
power generation and those other features and auxiliary systems which have been built into the ship in 
order to maintain essential services on board for the purpose of safe operation of a ship (taking into 
account the effect on the environment). 
3. Classification Societies aim to achieve this objective through the development and application of their 
own rules and by verifying compliance with international and/or national statutory regulations on behalf 
of flag Administrations (verification of compliance with statutory regulations includes inter alia, safety 
and security management systems and living and working conditions on board ships as stipulated in IMO 
and ILO international Conventions).”  
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further along in this thesis, it is indeed recognised as not being possible to be the 
responsibility of a Classification Society leading to liability.  It seems to be a general 
understanding among national courts that it is the shipowner’s non-delegable obligation 
to provide a seaworthy442 vessel,443 with international instruments following similar 
approaches. This approach seems to take into consideration that a valid Classification 
Society Certificate can last up to five years hence it does not assure how the vessel will 
be manned or taken care of after the certificate has been issued. Thus, it should be 
understood that the shipowner has to exercise due diligence to keep the vessel 
seaworthy.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that Article 94. 2 (a) of UNCLOS, 
clearly makes Flag States responsible to take measures to ensure the seaworthiness of 
a vessel: 
 
“Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are 
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: 
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;” 
 
 
Therefore, considering that Classifications Societies act in many occasions as 
ROs it seems wrong to assume that they would be immune of any liability for 
negligence in every case concerning the seaworthiness of a vessel, with the same being 
true to cases of safety life at sea.444 Of course that Classification Society can always 
also rely on Flag States’ immunities in order to scape liability. 
 
                                                        
442 Currently there is no universal definition for seaworthiness. It is generally understood that a seaworthy 
vessel is one that is fit for the voyage to be undertaken. In Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377 where it 
was held that the carrier should provide a vessel “fit to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and other 
incidental risks which of necessity she must be exposed in the course of the voyage” (at p.380). In 
McFadden v. Blue Star Line, [1905] 1 K.B. 697seaworthiness was defined as “that degree of fitness 
which an ordinary careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of 
her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it”. (at p 706) 
443 See pp 185-224 
444See Chapter III, pp. 124-135 
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 Despite the creation of the IACS, concerns regarding efficiency remained, 
especially due to the clear conflict of interest in the Classifications Societies’ role, 
which Mansell efficiently explained by way of an example: “a Classification Society 
requiring a shipowner to improve safety, the costs of which will inevitably result in 
reduced profits and earning capacity.” Thus, “in order to keep the shipowner’s business 
the Classification Society may reduce its requirements, or place “conditions of class” 
on the ship to enable it to continue to trend in a standard of lesser safety”. 445In the late 
seventies, marine insurers in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia became very critical 
of the clear loopholes in Class rules, such as wide variations in the delivery of Class 
services, unwarranted extensions of Class for substandard vessels and the secrecy of 
information of Class surveys. There was also criticism surrounding the fact that this 
secrecy of information was due to the contractual arrangements between the shipowner 
and his Classification Society, and the fact that Class rules disregarded the operation of 
the ship.446 The result of this was the creation of inspections teams by P&I Clubs to 
focus upon matters not covered by Class such as hatch covers, cargo holds, navigational 
aids and safety equipment.447 
 
 In 1980 one commentator noted that “it has become generally recognized that a 
vessel’s being validly ‘in Class’ with one of the major [Class] societies means very 
little to a potential charterer”448. Remarkably, in the 80s criticism against classification 
societies grew even further, with charterers of oil tankers, usually large oil companies 
also questioning the standards of the surveys. According to them, surveys were not 
detecting important safety issues such as deterioration of ship’s hull. This clear 
inefficiency of class surveys coupled with a flood of environmental disasters from oil 
spills led to the creation of comprehensive independent vetting systems for chartered 
                                                        
445John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p 132 
446 See Boisson, ‘Responsibilite des societies de classification. Fault-it remettre en cause les principles 
du droit matime?’in  [1995] DMF, p.372 and Lloys List, ‘Do we need more class distinction?’, (Lloyds 
list, October 1979) <http:lloydslist.com>, p. 9 last accessed on 08/08/2016 
447  See P Sporie, ‘Clubs keep an eye on ship standard’, (Lloyds list, 2 March 1982) <lloydslist.com>, 
p.34, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
448Lloyds Register of Shipping- Fairplay (2005) Opinion. 18 August, p.48 
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tankers, with similar initiatives also having been established for chemical tankers in 
1994.449 
 
 The questioning of classification societies’ credibility in the 90s did not stop 
there (in fact it is still an on-going issue); hull and cargo insurers, the International 
Union of Marine Insurers from 1987, had concerns regarding the clear conflict of 
interests of classification societies when performing public and private services. This 
conflict of interest is evident when there is a classification society, acting also as RO, 
requiring a shipowner to increase safety hence increasing his/her costs which will 
inevitably result in reduced profits and earning capacity. In scenarios like this most 
likely the shipowner will ‘negotiate’ with the classification society (which is also 
his/her service provider), in order to keep his/ her business going, the reduction of the 
requirements, or place “condition of class” on the ship, enabling the vessel to navigate 
in a standard of lesser safety450 (clear examples of cases like this, having already been 
quoted along this essay; Erika, Torrey Canyon, Almoco Cadiz). Indeed, a more lax 
sanction and more acceptable one by shipowners is that of Class Recommendations. 
The fact is that there are numerous Classification Societies, performing public and 
private functions451, making class a very competitive business and efforts made by 
classification societies to persuade shipowners with larger fleets to transfer Class has 
led to an unacceptable flexibility of standards452, since shipowners have the commercial 
freedom to transfer Class – “class hopping”, which can lead to Classification Societies 
reducing their standards in order to keep the shipowner, or result in lowers standards 
and reducing compliances costs from the “new” classification society. The fact that 
                                                        
449  Boisson, ‘Responsibilite des societies de classification. Fault-it remettre en cause les principles du 
droit matime?’in  [1995] DMF, p. 374 
450  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 132 
451 See: Paris MOU website an IMO 
452  Boisson, ‘Responsibilite des societies de classification. Fault-it remettre en cause les principles du 
droit matime?’in  [1995] DMF, p 373 
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there are not clear standards from transfer of Class between classification societies 
exacerbates the danger of Class hopping. 453 
 
In light of all this criticism, IACS attempted to restore classification societies’ 
liabilities, through a number of initiatives, such as establishing a permanent Secretariat 
in London in 1990 and a procedure for transferring Class was agreed between all IACS 
members. It also introduced quality management systems and an enhanced survey 
system was developed for bulk carriers and tankers. 454Furthermore, in 1998, IACS 
adopted the Transfer of Class Agreement (TOCA), which provides that a vessel’s 
“new” Classification Society has the right of access to the full classification history of 
the vessel, and the “old/ previous” Classification Society must make all the existing 
class history available. This system aims to provide a reliable exchange of information 
between the concerned societies and prevent ‘class hopping’. Moreover, it is said to 
make virtually impossible substandard vessels remaining in the organization’s 
regime.455However, this hardly seems to be the case as two of the most commented 
cases of the past two decades (the Erika and the Prestige) involved vessels which were 
eventually considered to be clearly substandard vessels, classified by members of 
IACS, as already stated. Regardless, accordingly to the latest Paris MOU list of 
Recognized Organizations meeting the low risk criteria, only one of IACS members 
does not feature in the list, i.e. the Indian Register of Shipping, which features in the 
medium risk criteria456  and according to Lloyds List, nine out of the 12 members of 
IACS are in the top 10 classification societies. 457 Even though this seems impressive 
at first sight, from the 39 RO’s inspected only two featured in the high risk list and only 
                                                        
453  LD. Barchue, Making a case for the Voluntary IMO Member Audit Scheme, (IMO October 2005), 
p.2 and John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 132 
454  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, pp. 132/133 
455 Jan De Bruyne, ‘Liability of Classification Societies: Cases, Challenges and Future Perspectives’ in 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 45.2 (April 2014): 181:232., p. 7 
456 See: https://www.parismou.org/inspections-risk/ship-risk-profile/ros-meeting-low-risk-criteria and 
https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Performance%20lists%202014%20RO.pdf, last accessed 
on 08/08/2016 
457 See: http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/top100/classification/, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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one in the very high risk list, DNV GL being the only one without any reported 
detention.458459  Furthermore, the Paris MOU project entitled “caught in the net”, which 
supposedly reports major cases of detentions where the vessel is in a clear substandard 
condition, only reported two vessels in 2014, in both cases the Classification Society 
was an IACS member, and in one of the cases (M/V Hudson) it was also the RO.460In 
the United Kingdom, out of the seven reported detentions of 2014, six had IACS 
members as classification societies and recognized organizations.461 IACS claims that 
its members represent more than 90% 462of world tonnage, however despite this, 
substandard shipping certainly does not only exist within the less than 10% not 
represented by members of the association. Nevertheless, it cannot go unmentioned that 
according to data collected between 1997 and 2011, most vessels lost at sea are over 20 
years old, a consideration taken on board by some IACS members, which will not class 
sea-going vessels above this age.463 Therefore, members of IACS seem to be 
proactively taking measures to increase safety at sea. 
 
 The establishment of several transparency-enhancing measures by IACS was 
not enough to prevent it from being criticised. The effectiveness of the activities and 
the functioning of IACS are constantly objects of criticism and for a long time it has 
                                                        
458 See: https://www.parismou.org/inspections-risk/ship-risk-profile/ros-meeting-low-risk-criteria and 
https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Performance%20lists%202014%20RO.pdf, last accessed 
on 08/08/2016 
459 It might be relevant to note that out of the eleven recognized Classification Societies by the European 
Union, ten are members of the IACS, only the Polish Register of Shipping being a non-member.  The 
European Union, through EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency) conducts regular inspections of 
EU vessels and they assess each of the authorized Classification Societies every two years to assure the 
quality of the services provides by the Classification Society. Only the eleven authorised Classification 
Societies can act as Recognized Organizations for EU member States, the same limitation is not 
applicable to the owner of an EU flagged vessel. See: http://www.emsa.europa.eu/implementation-
tasks/visits-and-inspections/assessment-of-classification-societies.html 
460See: https://www.parismou.org/publications-category/caught-net; 
https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/CINT%20Report%20Hudson%20Leader.pdf and 
https://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Caught%20in%20the%20net%20Kamil.pdf, last accessed 
on 08/08/2016 
461 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/7-foreign-flagged-ships-under-detention-in-the-uk-
during-september-2014 
462 See: http://www.iacs.org.uk, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
463  N. Butt, Prof. D. Johnson, Dr. K Pipe, N. Pryce-Roberts and N. Vigar, 15 Years of Shipping Accidents: 
A review for WWF. (Southampton Solent University 2012), p.29 
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not been considered a self-policing organization. This criticism can hardly be 
considered to be a surprise. As an example, the Association database, which registers 
compliance with the International Safety Management Code (ISM), is incorrect, 
excluding information from administrations that directly certified vessels and 
neglecting to submit their data hence underestimating the percentage of ships that 
comply with the ISM Code. Furthermore, some believe that it is essential that IACS 
restricts the margin of discretion which individual members have in relation to certain 
Unified Requirements, e.g. the Polar Code. 464 
 
 It also cannot go unnoticed that IACS inhibits competition among classification 
societies, by creating a significant competitive advantage for societies which comply 
with its requirements. It has been argued by the European Commission that some IACS 
procedures could possibly infringe Article 101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union by preventing non-members of IACS from joining the Association as 
well as their participation in IACS working groups, and finally by denying their access 
to IACS technical background documents. The Association also failed to enact 
“admission requirements that were objective and to provide sufficiently adequate 
systems for including Non-IACS [classification societies] in the process of developing 
IACS technical standards”, instead the Association established qualitative membership 
criteria and guidance for their application.  Further, as a response to the European 
Commission inquiries, the Association started to allow non-members participation in 
technical working groups and granted them full access to IACS technical resolutions 
and related background documents. These IACS commitments were eventually made 
binding by a European Commission Decision from 14 October 2009, which put an end 
to the Commission’s inquiry but did not decide if there had been an infringement of the 
competition rules.465 
 
 
                                                        
464  Jan De Bruyne, ‘Liability of Classification Societies: Cases, Challenges and Future Perspectives’ in 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 45.2 (April 2014): 181:232. 
465 Ibid 
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IV.1.3– Attempts to Regulate 
 
  In 1994, recognizing the importance of classification societies and the lack of 
regulations concerning them, the European Community (EC) made a regulatory attempt 
by introducing Council Directive 94/57/EC on common rules and standards for ship 
inspection and survey organizations and for the relevant activities of maritime 
administrations. The preamble of the Directive demonstrates the concern of the 
European community with the way classification societies were running their surveys 
and acknowledges the lack of uniform international regulation. 
 
“[A] large number of the existing Classification Societies do not ensure 
either adequate implementation of the rules or reliability when acting on 
behalf of national administrations as they do not have adequate structures 
and experience to be relied upon and to enable them to carry out their duties 
in a highly professional manner 
(…) 
Whereas at present there are not uniform international standards to which 
all ships must conform at the building stage and during their entire life, as 
regards hull, machinery and electrical and control installations; whereas 
such standards may be fixed according to the rules of recognized 
Classification Societies or to equivalent standards to be decided by the 
national administrations (…)” 466 
 
                                                        
466 A parenthesis must be made regarding this last quotation taken from the Council Directive, which 
particularly demonstrates not only the importance of classification societies as third parties in the shipping 
industry, but also the transnational character of the latter, by leaving clear the need to use the standards 
of construction recognized by these or equivalents accepted by national administrations most likely 
assisted by international regulations ratified by each particular jurisdiction. It is important to highlight 
that uniform international legislation or an international harmonization of any field of law is difficult, if 
not impossible, to achieve, considering that countries need to be willing to ratify international 
conventions, as it could be seen previously, many countries do not possess this willingness, it therefore 
being difficult, if not impossible, to find an international convention that has been ratified by every single 
country in the world. Nevertheless, this does not prevent non- ratifying countries from absorbing some of 
the provisions contained in international conventions and make customary (as the case of the USA with 
the UNCLOS) or even national law.  
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 The Directive’s objective is to ensure that only governmentally recognized 
classification societies are allowed to function within the EC and, once recognized in 
one EC country, it cannot be refused by another Member State. The Annex of the 
Directive states that only existing, well known classification societies have chances of 
recognition by EC member States.467468 
 
Regardless of the undeniable importance of Class for many years, and its wide 
acceptance by the shipping industry, including the IMO, it was only with an amendment 
in 1998 of SOLAS that Class Rules were finally codified. According to the amendment: 
 
“In addition to the requirements contained elsewhere in the (SOLAS) 
regulations, ships shall be designed, constructed and maintained in 
compliance with the structural, mechanical, and electrical requirements of 
a Classification Society which is recognized by the Administration in 
accordance with the Provisions of Chapter XI/1469, or with applicable 
national standards of the Administration which provide an equivalent level 
of safety.”470  
 
 The amendment is rather restrictive, as it only covers the design, construction, 
and electrical requirements of Classification Societies, hence only the most traditional 
mandate of Class. Furthermore, the amendment is criticised for not specifying a 
standard of Classification Society, limiting itself to references to two mandatory 
                                                        
467 See Council Directive 94/57/ EC, 15-18. See also: H. Hanku, The Classification Syste, and its 
problems with special reference to the liability of Classification Societies, 19 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1 1994-1995, 
pp.6-7 
468 At the moment only eleven authorised classification societies can act as Recognized Organizations 
for EU member States, the same limitation is not applicable to the owner of an EU flagged vessel. See 
Supra n.222 
469 SOLAS, Chapter XI, Special Measures to enhance maritime safety, Regulation 1, Authorization of 
Recognized Organization: “Organizations referred to in regulation I/6 shall comply with the guidelines 
adopted by the Organization by resolution A.789 (18) as may be amended by the Organization, and the 
specifications adopted  by the Organization by resolution A.789 (19), as may be amended by the 
Organization, provided that such amendments are adopted, brought into force, and take effect in 
accordance with the provisions of article VII of the present  Convention concerning the amendment 
procedures applicable to the annex other than Chap. 1” 
470 SOLAS Chapter II-1, Part A-1, Reg. 3-1 
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resolutions (i.e. SOLAS XI/1 and Resolution A.739 (19)).471Even though, IACS firmly 
believes that only its members meet the narrow requirements provided by the 
provisions472, the SOLAS amendments are not restricted to IACS members. 473 It is 
important to note that Resolution A.739 (19) was also adopted by the International 
Convention of Load Lines, 1966 (1988 Load Lines Protocol) under chapter I of annex 
I to annex B and by MARPOL, under Annex I and Annex II of the MARPOL 
Convention. 
 
 It was only in 1998 and 2004, with the advent of the ISM Code and the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code respectively, that the role of 
Class was finally broadened (with the delegations which would go beyond their original 
technical mandate of hull and machinery), at the same pace as the blurring of the already 
blurred boundaries between Classification Societies’ public and private roles. 474 
 
 Although, SOLAS chapter II-1, Part A-1, reg.3-1 makes reference to “the 
applicable standards of the Administration that provide an equivalent level of safety”, 
the lack of clear standards among Recognized Organization (mostly Classification 
Societies) are often targets of criticism, most often as a consequence of the views of 
many of the so called Flag of Convenience countries which would have no reason to 
enforce any level of standards (the broad discretionary powers given by several IMO 
instruments is said to permit Flag States through equivalency and exemption provisions  
a wide variance in national laws and their implementation and enforcement475)  as ship 
                                                        
471  See John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 134 
472 IACS, “Classification Societies – WHAT, WHY and HOW?’,  (IACS, 2015) 
<http://www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/explained/WHAT,%20WHY%20and%20HOW%20Jan%20
2015.PDF>, p. 4, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
473 The Tokyo MoU and the Paris MoU list of detentions and inspections list at least ninety RO/ 
Classification Societies, being clear in both cases that the list is not exhaustive as it finishes with “others” 
at the end. See:  http://www.tokyo-mou.org/doc/ANN11-corrigendum.pdf and 
https://www.parismou.org/inspection-search. , last accessed on 08/08/2016 
See also: John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary 
Issues (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8. p 134. 
474 Ibid 
475 See:  LD. Barchue, Making a case for the Voluntary IMO Member Audit Scheme, (IMO October 
2005), p.1 and John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and 
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registration was only perceived as a source of revenue. As already discussed in part 
IV.4 of this chapter, this does not seem to be the case any longer, as countries will aim 
to avoid at all costs their ships being target of Port Control, causing costly delays to the 
shipowner, a fact that may be perceived when noting that the countries with the FOC 
stigma feature in the white list of the Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU.476 Nevertheless, the 
criticism against these countries still persists and the same can be said against 
Classification Societies and apparently even more so towards Classification Societies 
hired as Recognized Organization by these countries. Mansell, in his work, goes as far 
as referring to such Classification Societies as “class of convenience”, a clear reference 
to the term Flag of Convenience.477 This author believes that Classification Societies 
could be perceived as “class of convenience” due to the legislative loophole allowing 
shipowners to easily change classifications at their convenience, and the dual 
conflicting role often performed by them, but not necessarily due to their role as 
Recognized Organizations. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that as it is recognized 
that Classification Societies cannot be held liable for the seaworthiness of a vessel, as 
they cannot be assured as to its maintenance or operation, and the Classification Society 
can only attest their seaworthiness at the time of the issuance of the certificate, so the 
same can be said as regards their role as Recognized Organizations, bearing in mind 
the validity of the certificates issued by ROs, that usually last between two and five 
years, according to international and national legislation.  
 
 Due to all this criticism, which has some foundation as already discussed in this 
essay, the IMO drafted a Code for Recognized Organizations (RO Code), which was 
adopted by the Marine Environment Protection Committee, at its 65th session, by 
                                                        
Contemporary Issues (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 
134 
476  See: Julia Constantino Chagas Lessa, ‘How wide are the shoulders of a FOC Country’, in M. Musi 
(ed), New Comparative Perspectives in Maritime, Transport and International Trade Law (Libreria 
Bonomo Editrice: Bologna, 2014), pp. 227-252 
477  John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, pp.134-135: “The 
statutory functions of many States will, as a result, inevitable be delegated to a Classification Society of 
equally dubious provenance: a “class of convenience”. 
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means of resolution MEPC.237(65) and by the Maritime Safety Committee, at its 92nd 
session, by means of resolution MSC.349(92). Most importantly, by means of 
resolutions MEPC.238(65), MSC.350(92) and MSC.356(92),  the parts 1 and 2 of the 
RO Code were made mandatory under MARPOL annexes I and II, SOLAS and the 
1988 Load Line Protocol, coming into on 1 January 2015.478 It is important to note that 
even though the Code was only adopted by these three conventions through 
amendments, and makes clear reference to these in Part 1 regulation 2.3, it should not 
be perceived as limited to only these IMO instruments, it should be perceived as 
guidelines to any other instrument which allows Flag States to delegate their obligations 
to ROs. Therefore, the Code should be perceived as guidelines also to the Maritime 
Labour Convention, for instance.479 For much of IACS’s discontentment, the Code 
clearly states that it is applicable to any RO, regardless of the size and type and many 
may not provide all types of statutory certificates and services and may have a limited 
scope of recognition; ANY Classification Society can perform as an RO if they fulfill 
the requirements of the Code.480Although, undoubtedly, IACS members would meet 
the requirements more easily, this does not mean that other Classification Societies 
cannot meet the same requirements.  
 
 The Code attempts to deal with the conflicting roles of Classification Societies 
by stating that its “staff shall not engage in any activities that may conflict with their 
independence of judgement and integrity in relation to their statutory certification and 
services. The RO and its staff responsible for carrying out the statutory certification and 
                                                        
478 See: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/RecognizedOrganizations.aspx 
479 RO Code, Part 1 Regulation 2.3: “The Code defines the functional, organizational and control 
requirements that apply to ROs conducting statutory certification and services performed under 
mandatory IMO instruments, such as, but not limited to, SOLAS, MARPOL and the Load Lines 
Conventions.” 
480  RO Code, Part1, Regulations 2.4 and 2.5: 
“2.4 All requirements of the Code are generic and applicable to all ROs, regardless of their type and size 
and the statutory certification and services provided.  
2.5 ROs subject to this Code need not offer all types of statutory certification and services and may have 
a limited scope of recognition, provided that the requirements of this Code are applied in a manner that 
is compatible with the limited scope of recognition. Where any requirement of this Code cannot be 
applied due to the scope of services delivered by an RO, this shall be clearly identified by the flag State 
and recorded in the RO's quality management system. “ 
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services shall not be the designer, manufacturer, supplier, installer, purchaser, owner, 
user or maintainer of the item subject to the statutory certification and services, nor the 
authorized representative of any of these parties” (emphasis added), and that “the 
personnel of ROs shall be free from any pressures, which might affect their judgement 
in performing statutory certification and services. Procedures shall be implemented to 
prevent persons or organizations external to the organization from influencing the 
results of services carried out.”481Therefore, the Code does not allow for Classifications 
Societies when acting as ROs to also perform duties for the shipowner, hence 
eliminating the conflict of interest existent in the dual role performed by CSs. 
 
 It has been affirmed in this paper that the RO Code could be used as guidelines, 
hence non-mandatory in nature, for other IMO instruments, including the Maritime 
Labour Convention (which is in fact an ILO instrument). However, it is important to 
note that the latter provides in its Code standards for Recognized Organizations. Even 
though mention is made about the independency of the RO, nothing is mentioned about 
its impartiality.482 Thus, it can be assumed that if the national legislation is silent, there 
is nothing preventing a Classification Society from performing its dual role (public and 
private) when issuing MLC certificates.  
 
 It can be said that one of the most difficult requirements for an RO to fulfill is 
to be able conduct work anywhere in the world. Ships do not necessarily need to be 
berthed in the port of the Flag State in order to be inspected. Indeed, Flag States must 
be able to inspect, monitor and enforce their requirements anywhere in the world.  Thus, 
ROs need to have a worldwide system of offices and surveyors as well as technical, 
managerial, and research facilities to be able to competently fulfill their obligations. 
The surveyors should be exclusively and solely employed by the RO, as it is believed 
that “non-exclusive” and Part-time surveyors were lowering standards.483The Flag 
                                                        
481 RO Code Part 2, regulations 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. 
482 See MLC Regulation 5.1.2, Standard A5.1.2 and Guideline B5. 1.2 
483  See John N. K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, p. 140 
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State should ensure the adequacy of the work performed by the RO through procedures 
for communication, reporting from the RO, additional inspections of ships by the 
administration, audits of the RO, and monitoring and evaluating Class related matters 
such as deficiencies in the ship’s structure or equipment.484 
 
 It is interesting to note that the delegation of Flag State responsibilities to ROs 
is always a vexed issue. Criticism around it, as it can be seen in this paper, is often 
related to the countries considered to be FOCCs, as these allegedly have no intention 
of enforcing high standards in the vessels registered there. This paper has already 
expressed a different view on the subject, which suggests that countries with a less 
developed maritime tradition would benefit more from hiring Classification Societies 
which already have practice experience and specialized personnel, than starting from 
scratch and training their own personnel. For instance, St. Vincent and Grenadines, a 
country considered to be an FOC, has already established a list containing only well-
known and reputable Classification Societies, mainly members of IACS (which 
guarantees an extra level of regulations, as already explained in the scope of this work) 
which are authorized to act as ROs in the conduction of MLC inspections and 
certifications. 485It would be at least in theory expected that these CS, which already 
possess all the expertise and practice plus the required worldwide network, being able 
                                                        
484 See RO Code Part 3 and MLC Standard A5.1. and Guideline B5.1.1 
485 The exhaustive list includes:  
• American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)  
• Bureau Veritas (BV)  
• China Classification Society (CCS)  
• Croatian Register of Shipping (CRS)  
• Det Norske Veritas (DNV)  
• Germanischer Lloyd (GL)  
• Indian Register of Shipping (IRS)  
• International Naval Surveys Bureau (INSB)  
• Hellenic Register of Shipping (HRS)  
• Korean Register of Shipping (KR)  
• Lloyds Register (LR)  
• Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK)  
• Polski Rejestr Statkow (PRS)  
• Registro Italiano Navale (RINA)  
• Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS)  
St. Vincent and The Grenadines Maritime Administration, Circular N° MLC 002- Rev. 4 - Procedures 
For Maritime Labour Convention Certification, 4 
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to conduct inspections anywhere in the world, will do a better job than recently trained 
inspectors. It goes without saying that is also a more practical and cheaper option for 
the Flag State. Furthermore, the international community many times seems to be 
reluctant to recognize international certificates obtained from certain countries. 
Nevertheless, the criticism is not all without grounds; one example is the case of 
Cambodia in 2003, which was then and still is considered an FOC country, according 
to the ITF list.486 
 
 In 2003, as well as currently, Cambodia had one of the worst Flag State Records, 
as indicated by its presence on the blacklist of the Paris and Tokyo MOU and the 
USCG.487 The Cambodian Government then decided to reinvent its ship register and 
delegate their administrative duties to a RO in North Korea488 in order to try to change 
the disturbing international impression of Cambodian flagged vessels, due to the high 
detention rate, putting these as easy targets for Port State Control. The problem was 
that the North Korean Organization, the International Ship Registry of Cambodia, sub 
delegated its authorities to an alarming fifteen organizations, and allegedly one of these 
sub-delegated the right to carry surveys and issue statutory certificates to a shipowner, 
who then was able to issue certificates in his own behalf.489 The Cambodian 
Government attitude was clear against IMO intents as it can be noted by Resolution 
A.739(18) and A.739(19), both non-mandatory instruments nevertheless. It is important 
to bear on mind that in 2003 the SOLAS, MARPOL, amendments regarding ROs were 
not yet in force.  Moreover, a perhaps not so impartial audit carried by the Seafarers 
International Centre in Cardiff University concluded that: 
 
                                                        
486 See: http://www.itfseafarers.org/foc-registries.cfm, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
487 See: http://www.tokyo-mou.org, https://www.parismou.org - Cambodia still features in the most 
recent blacklists of both Port Control Organizations. See also: Paper FSI 14/INF.81IMO Sub-Committee 
on Flag State Implementation, 14th Session, June 2006., last accessed on 08/08/2016 
488 Letter of 25 of February 2003 from the International Ship Registry of Cambodia to the director of 
Maritime Safety, Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand 
489 See:  N. Winchester and T. Alderton, Flag State Audit 2003, Seafarers International Research Centre 
(Cardiff University 2003) <http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/fsa.aspx >, last accessed on 08/08/2016 and John N. 
K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues (Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009) DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92933-8, pp 140- 141 
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 “The Cambodian administration accepts only the bare minimum of 
responsibilities for vessels flagged to its register. The register is run purely 
for profit, with limited interest being shown in issues of vessel safety or 
crew welfare. There are no restrictions on the ownership of any vessel 
registered in the Cambodian ship Registry. Any legal entity capable of 
owning vessels under the law of the country on which it is established or 
domiciled may be registered as an owner. Other than the official fees 
applicable to vessels, non-resident shipping companies/owners are not 
required to pay corporate/ personal taxes of any description. Since its 
reactivation in 1995 the Cambodian register has exhibited a net increase in 
tonnage of 3,230% (up from the 1995 level of 59,958 gross tons to 
1,996,738 gross tons in 2001)”490 
  
 Nevertheless, one must consider if the situation of Cambodia would be different 
if it had not delegated its international obligations to ROs. Of course, the non-
discretionary delegation of responsibilities is problematic. However, the fact is that 
Cambodia featured in the blacklists prior to the delegation, which was actually made as 
an attempted to improve its record and image, and it remains in these lists up until today 
and according to a study conduct in 2011, it was the Flag State with the most vessel 
losses in fifteen years (1997-2011). 491Besides, as stated prior the sub-delegations that 
were made in the case study, nowadays it would have been considered a breach of 
international instruments, and not only of the intents of international institutions, such 
as IMO, which does not necessarily prevent cases like this from happening (as it could 
be seen on topic, IV.4 Flag States face very little liability for not fulfilling their 
international obligations) but it makes things a lot more difficult. 
 
 It needs to be noted that Classification Societies working as RO ended up facing 
                                                        
490   Ibid and N. Winchester and T. Alderton, Flag State Audit 2003, Seafarers International Research 
Centre (Cardiff University 2003) <http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/fsa.aspx >, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
491  N. Butt, Prof. D. Johnson, Dr. K Pipe, N. Pryce-Roberts and N. Vigar, 15 Years of Shipping Accidents: 
A review for WWF. (Southampton Solent University 2012), p. 31 
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another question; that of state liability. Special tort law principles often govern the 
liability of a certain State but once these delegate their governmental authority to a 
Classification Society then the liability becomes questionable. For instance, in the case 
of a state liable for failure of exercising sufficient supervisory control, the question 
between the passivity of the state and the damages incurred could become critical. If a 
party is unable to prove this casual connection, then success against the state based on 
any theory of public law or vicarious liability by the state for the wrongdoing of 
Classification Societies would be questionable.492 
 
 The fact is that Classification Societies which perform governmental duties, like 
any other civil servant, do so within the limits of state damages liability. Generally, this 
means that any delegation of governmental authority would not relieve the state from 
liability in damages for the actions of its civil servants, presuming that the basis of 
liability is otherwise established and that there are no reasons for excluding liability, 
such as legislative immunity.493 
 
 It also possible for state liability to arise in cases in which the government has 
knowledge of a lack of proper systems and skills in a specific Classification Society 
however it has not intervened. Nevertheless, even in these situations the question 
whether the failure to remind the Classification Society or cancel the delegation of 
authority to the society actually caused the damage remains. In case the delegation of 
governmental authority failed to relieve the state from liability, then causation and 
intervention issues would be diminished as the state would remain vicariously liable. 
Alternatively, specific national laws applicable to state and tort liability should be look 
at in order to determine the basis of liability. 494 
                                                        
492  H. Honka, ‘The Classification System and its problems with special reference to the Liability of 
Classification Societies’ in 19 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1 1994-95, pp. 11-12 
493 Ibid, p. 12 
494 The Finnish Torts Act of 1974, ch.3 sec.2, refers to state liability based on fault shown in connection 
with the exercise of governmental (public) authority. The code is not clear if the fault should have been 
exercised by a civil servant.  Nonetheless, state liability arises due to fault, only if the requirements 
reasonably to be expected in the exercise of the specific public authority have been set aside, taking into 
consideration the nature and aim of the situation.  
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IV.2 – National Approaches  
 
 As it has been seen, classification societies are far from being satisfactorily 
regulated and their dual conflicting roles cannot be taken for granted. Thus, it should 
be no surprise that their liabilities are the object of much debate especially when these 
are working as Recognized Organizations hence being the Flag State’s representative 
which, as already seen, possesses a rather questionable “non-existent” liability. As 
Naeemullah well stated, classifications societies seems to “occupy a unique – and 
precarious – niche within the maritime industry because lawmakers have not carved out 
restrictions on liability for classification societies”.495 Due to this “legal void” courts 
have been left to determine the appropriate degree of exposure of such organizations. 
Courts around the world have shown reluctance in holding a classification society 
liable. Even Courts in the US, which have considered classification society liable in a 
few cases, are very careful when writing their decisions, tending to write narrow 
holdings designed to minimize the precedential effect.496 It is important, however, to 
bear in mind that is not the intention of this work to analyze all types of classification 
societies liability; its focus is solely on third party liabilities.  
 
IV.2.1 – England 
 
 English Courts tend to take a very traditional approach towards third party 
liability of classification societies. They tend to deal with cases on a case by case basis 
                                                        
In The Sundancer (799 F. Supp. 363, 1992 AMC 2946), the owner tried to sue the Classification Society 
(ABS) alleging that their survey was negligent, and should have pointed out defects, specifically the ones 
which caused the vessel to go aground. ABS had conducted surveys for the owner of the vessel and the 
Flag State, Bahamas. The USA Court ruled that the Classification Society was not liable due to 
Contractual exemption clauses and most importantly from the perspective of this thesis due to the ABS 
legislative immunity. The Bahamian Merchant Shipping Act, 1976  16 Acts of the Commonwealth of 
the Bahamas 161 § 279, includes a legislative exemption stating that any government appointee is 
immunized from liability for issuing statutory certificates in good faith. See also:  H. Honka, ‘The 
Classification System and its problems with special reference to the Liability of Classification Societies’ 
in 19 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1 1994-95, pp. 12 - 25 
495  Imran Naeemullah, ‘A Decade Later, $ 1 Billion Saved: The Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime 
Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental and Economic Damages in Reino 
de Espana v.  American Bureau of Shipping, Inc.’ in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, vol. 37:639, p.640 
496 Ibid, pp. 640-641 
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and with great care and attention to detail. The third party liability of classification 
societies in English Law is covered by the law of tort, more specifically, the tort of 
negligence. The courts tend to find it difficult to see the requirements of the Caparo 
Test497 (which will be analyzed further along) being fulfilled in classification societies 
cases.  
 
 Negligence in English law is a tort involving a person’s breach of a duty to take 
care imposed upon him, resulting in damage to the complainant. The assessment of a 
duty of care has gradually evolved in English case law.  Currently, the concept of 
reasonable foreseeability is relevant in testing whether a duty of care exists and in 
considering the question of remoteness of damage, once negligence has been 
established.  In order to determine if the duty of care arises in a particular situation, the 
English Courts adopt the three fold test established in Caparo Industries plc v. 
Dickman498. Essentially in order for the duty of care to be established the following 
three criteria must be fulfilled: foreseeability, proximity499, and general principles of 
fairness, justice and reasonableness500 
 
 Therefore, in England, in order to establish whether the Classification Society 
acted negligently, you first need to determine if it had a duty of care to a third party by 
applying the Caparo test.  Thus, in English law there is a precondition that a duty of 
care must first exist, in order for negligence to be ascertained. Often policy-
                                                        
497 In England, in order for the Tort of Negligence to be established, there is the need to assess if there 
was a duty of care in the particular case. This assessment is made by applying the three fold test 
established in the Case Caparo Industry Vs Dickman [1990] UKHL 2, [1990] 2 AC 605, known as the 
Caparo test. According to it in order for the duty of care to be established: 
• It must be reasonably foreseeable that a person in the claimant’s position would be 
injured 
• There must be sufficient proximity (closeness) between the parties 
• It must be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability on the defendant. 
See: Marc Lunney and Kent Oliphant, Tort Law Text and Materials, (Oxford 2008)  pp 447-450 
498 [1990] 1 AC 605 
499As set in Donaghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 581. per Lord Atkin, proximity is: "such close and 
direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a person whom the person alleged to be bound 
to take care would know would be directly affected by his careless act.”  
500 "Whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the 
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” 
Goldberg v Housing Authority of the City of Newark (1962) 186 A. 2d 291, 293  
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considerations influence the assessment if a duty of care exists501 (in Classification 
Society cases these tend to play a big role).502 
 
 The Nicholas H is probably the most well-known and commented-upon case of 
Classifications Society liability. The case was about a cargo owner, who was unable to 
fully recover his losses from the shipowner after the vessel sank and tried to seek the 
remaining damages from the Classification Society. An assumption is made that the 
cargo owner was aware of the existent limitations of liability of the shipowner and was 
aware that he would be unable to fully recover his losses hence he decided to sue both, 
the shipowner and the Classification Society. 
 
The Nicholas H was a vessel carrying cargo loaded in Peru and Chile under bills 
of lading incorporating the Hague Rules. During the voyage the crew discovered a crack 
in the vessel’s hull, leading the master to request a surveyor from the vessel’s 
Classification Society, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai503. The vessel was surveyed while 
anchored in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and at a first instance it was recommended to 
proceed to port and undergo permanent repair in order to remain in class.  Nevertheless, 
the shipowner did not want to undergo permanent repair hence it urged the surveyor to 
accept temporary repairs. The same NKK surveyor re-inspected the vessel and 
recommended that the vessel “be retained in class for her original voyage”, 504stating 
that it could “proceed on [its] intended voyage to [the] discharge port, Crotony, Italy. 
“Repairs now done to be further examined and dealt with as necessary…. At the earliest 
opportunity after discharging present cargo”.505It soon became evident that temporary 
repair was not enough. The vessel sank one week later with all her cargo.  The cargo 
                                                        
501  J. Basedow and W. Wurmnest, Third Party Liability of Classification Societies, Hamburg Studies on 
Maritime Affairs 2, (Springer 2005), pp. 15-16 
502 Marc Rich & Co. AG and others v Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd and others – The Nicholas H, [1995] 
3 All ER 307 (HL) 
503 Nippon Kaiji Kyokay (NKK), also known by ClassNK is one of the most reputable Classification 
Societies, having his foundation dating as far back as 1899 and being  a founding member of the IACS. 
See: http://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/en/about/history/index.html, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
504 Marc Rich & Co. AG and others v Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd and others, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
299, 310 (H.L. 1995) (The Nicholas H), at 310 
505 Ibid, at 299 
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owner sued the shipowners and NKK for negligence in the Commercial Court. The 
cargo owners eventually settled with the shipowners for $500,000 and sought the 
balance of their losses, $ 5.7 million, from NKK. The Commercial Court decided in 
favor of the cargo owners and held that NKK owed them a duty of care506, a decision 
which later was reversed by the court of Appeal.  Finally, the House of Lords, applying 
the Caparo test, affirmed the court of Appeal decision stating that it would not be fair, 
just and reasonable to impose on the classification societies a duty of care owed to cargo 
owners.  507 The majority of the House of Lords (4 votes to 1) agreed that cargo owners’ 
tort claims against a Classification Society would destroy the balanced system of the 
Hague Rules and the Hague Visby Rules to the benefit of cargo owners and their 
insurers.508 
 
Therefore, the House of Lords applied the “settled law” that in either physical 
damage or economic loss cases, foreseeability; proximity; and fairness, justice, and 
reasonableness area all relevant considerations, adopting the court of Appeal’s decision 
that the three considerations should not be treated as wholly separate and distinct 
requirements but as “convenient and helpful approaches” to the question of duty.509 His 
lordships agreed that whether a duty is imposed in a case depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the case. Thus, the court ruled that the cargo owners were incorrect in 
relying upon the Caparo for the proposition that foreseeability was only required in this 
physical damages case510, reasoning that Caparo merely underlines the qualitative 
distinction between direct physical damage and indirect economic losses, recognizing 
                                                        
506 The Commercial Court ruled that although NKK’s surveyor could not prevent the shipowner from 
allowing the ship to continue, he could have withdrawn the vessel’s class and thereby exercised actual 
control over the ship.  Marc Rich & Co. AG and others v Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd and others, [1994] 
3 All ER 686, 696 ff. 
507 Ibid, at 316-17 
508 See:  Colleen E. Feehan, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the British Perspective: The 
Nicholas H’ in Tulane Maritime Law Journal  33-Tul. Mar. L.J. 41 2008-2009, pp 163-164 and J. 
Basedow and W. Wurmnest, Third Party Liability of Classification Societies, Hamburg Studies on 
Maritime Affairs 2, (Springer 2005), pp. 16-18 
509 Marc Rich & Co V Bishop Rock Marine Co. [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.299 ( H.L. 1995) (The Nicholas 
H) at 313  
510 It is important to note that Caparo referred to economic losses. Nevertheless, the court in the Nicholas 
H felt that the test set in the Case should be able to be applied to physical damage cases as well. Ibid 
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the materiality of the distinction. 511 
 
The House of Lords grouped the relevant factor in determining if a duty of care 
should be imposed into six categories: 
 
● Did the surveyor’s carelessness cause direct physical loss? 
● Did the cargo-owners rely on the surveyor’s recommendations? 
● The impact of the contract between shipowners and cargo owners 
● The impact of the contract between the Classification Society and the 
shipowners 
● The position and the role of N.K.K 
● Policy factors arguably tending to militate against the recognition of a 
duty of care.512 
 
When accessing the first category, the court concluded that the Classification 
Society was not primarily responsible for the vessel’s seaworthiness, as this is a non-
delegable obligation of the shipowner. Thus, ruling that NKK’s role was subsidiary 
hence the physical damage was not direct.  
 
Regarding the second point, the court decided that it was a relevant but not a 
decisive factor whether the plaintiffs relied on the surveyor’s recommendations.  
Furthermore, the court decided that there had been no contact between the cargo owners 
and NKK, as well as no evidence that the cargo owners were even aware that the vessel 
had been surveyed by NKK and hence relied on their survey. The court decided that 
the cargo owners had simply relied on the shipowner to keep the vessel seaworthy and 
to care for the cargo. 
 
Thirdly, when considering the effect of the contract between the shipowners and 
                                                        
511 Ibid at 312 
512 Ibid. See also:  Colleen E. Feehan, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the British Perspective: 
The Nicholas H’ in Tulane Maritime Law Journal 33-Tul. Mar. L.J. 41 2008-2009, pp 175-176 
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the cargo owners, the House of Lords noted that the court of Appeal stated that the 
pertinent issue was whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to demand 
classification societies to bear a duty that the Hague Rules primarily placed on 
shipowners, without the benefits and protection of those rules or other international 
conventions.513Nevertheless, their lordships concurred with the cargo owners that the 
mere existence of the Hague Rules was not an appropriate reason to enforce an 
allocation of risks between cargo owners and classification societies similar to the 
allocation enforced between shipowners and cargo owners. Instead, they analyzed the 
likely impact of the imposition of a duty of care in this case on the insurance system 
and on international trade, reaching the conclusion that the first is structured around the 
fact that a shipowner’s potential liability to cargo owners is limited under the Hague 
Rules and tonnage limitations hence imposing a duty on classification societies would 
require the latter to buy liability insurance, or to bargain with shipowners for indemnity, 
which would  put an end to “limitation of liability of shipowners to cargo owners under 
the Hague Rules”.514As a consequence shipowners would have to increase their 
insurance coverage. Even though the court accepted that classification societies already 
carry liability insurance as they are not immune of all tort claims, the court urged that 
the imposition of duty of care would greatly increase the potential exposure of 
classification societies to cargo claims, most likely resulting in higher insurance 
premiums. Classification Societies would most likely pass this cost to, besides requiring 
indemnity from, shipowners, hence prejudicing the shipowners and consequently 
increasing the cost of trade. Finally, the court considered that this would impact the 
balance created by the Hague Rules and the Hague Visby Rules515, as well as tonnage 
limitation provisions. 516 
 
                                                        
513 See Nicholas H, [1995] 2 Lloyds Rep. at 314-15 (citing March Rich & Co V Bishop Rock Marine Co./ 
[1994] 1 Lloyds Rep. 492, 499 ( C.A.1994) 
514  P.F. Crane, ‘The Liability of Classification Societies’ in [1994] 3 LMCLQ 375 
1968 Protocol to Amend the 1924 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading, opened for signature February 23, 1968, Cmnd. 6944, Reprinted in Nagendra 
Singh, International Maritime Law Conventions (London, Stevens 1983), Vol 4, p 3045; - Reprinted in 
Transport: International Transport Treaties (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1986) 
516 Nicholas H [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 315 
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 In considering the effect of the contract between NKK and the shipowners, the 
court concluded that Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter517 was not applicable to the case. 
In Pacific Associates, it was held that the existence of a network of contracts weighed 
against the imposition of a duty of care on peripheral parties. Nevertheless, the court 
denied an existence of a network of contracts in the case of the Nicholas H, hence the 
contract between the shipowners and NKK had much less of an effect. 518 
 
 Fifthly, considering NKK’s position and role in acting in the interests of public 
welfare when deciding if it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care, 
the House of Lords highlighted that classification societies act in the interest of the 
public, occupying “a public and quasi-judicial position”.519Lord Steyn supporting this 
decision emphasizing that classification societies are not-for-profit entities, created and 
operating for the sole purpose of promoting collective welfare, namely the safety of 
lives and ships at sea, thereby fulfilling a role that in their absence would be fulfilled 
by states. He questioned if classification societies would be able to carry out their 
functions effectively if they were to become a target for third parties, already entitled 
to claims against the shipowner. Lord Steyn further argued that imposing a duty of care 
in the Nicholas H case due to a negligent survey, after the shipowner reported a defect 
relating to class, would make it very difficult to deny the Classification Society’s duty 
to take good care in cases of negligently conducted annual surveys, docking surveys, 
intermediate surveys or any other type of survey as it would expand the classification 
society’s liability to an unacceptable extent.  The House of Lords stated that it was 
willing to assume that “there was a sufficient degree of proximity in this case to fulfill 
that requirement for the existence of a duty of care”520. However, Lord Steyn concluded 
his argument stating that it would not be “fair, just and reasonable” to assume a duty of 
care and hold the Classification Society liable under tort law. 521  
                                                        
517 [1990] 1 Q.B. 993 (C.A. 1990) 
518 Nicholas H, [1995] 2 Lloyds Rep. at 315-16 
519 Ibid ( quoting  W. Angliss & Co V Penisular and Oriental Steam Naviagtion Co. 28 Lloyds List L. 
Rep 202, 214 (K.B. 1927)) 
520 Ibid 
521 Marc Rich & Co. AG and others v Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd and others, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
299, 310 (H.L. 1995) (The Nicholas H), at 330. See also Supra n. Basedow, 18 
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 Therefore, the House of Lords decided that cargo owners were sufficiently 
protected by the insurance system, the Hague Rules, and the Hague-Visby Rules, 
notwithstanding any limitations of this protection under the Rules and tonnage 
limitations. Their lordships concluded that “lesser injustice is done by not recognizing 
a duty of care”.522 
 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in the only dissenting opinion, observed that the Hague 
Rules only provide for a duty of care of cargo owners and carriers, as contractual 
provisions usually do not affect the question whether a duty of care should be assumed.  
He emphasized that the connection between the parties was sufficiently close since 
apparently the proximity between the shipowner and the cargo owners was with respect 
to the ship. He further argued that although the surveyor did not have the legal right to 
stop the ship from sailing, it had de facto control, as the vessel would not have sailed if 
it had not changed its original recommendation. Lord Berwick observed that it is 
difficult to imagine a closer or more direct relationship than the one that existed 
between the surveyor and the crew. 523 He argued that proximity between the parties 
must also be assumed in regards to cargo, since under English Maritime Law the ship 
and the cargo are considered as taking part in a joint venture. Furthermore, his Lordship 
argued that policy considerations also speak in favor of the existence of a duty of care, 
pointing out that classification societies do generate a large amount of profits with their 
operation and are thus able to afford insurance coverage.  Nevertheless, Lord Berwick 
emphasized that to impose a duty of care in the case in question, would not mean that 
classification societies could be held liable for all kinds of surveys they carry out; this 
should be decided on a case by case basis. According to his lordship, the deciding factor 
in the Nicholas H was that the cargo was on board the vessel when the survey was 
carried out. Thus, it was suggested, creating a close relationship between the surveyor 
and the cargo owner. However, as he noted, most of the time surveys are carried out 
                                                        
522 Ibid at 317 
523 Ibid at 318.f 
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without any cargo on board.524 
 
Lord Berwick’s reasoning seems to be quite sensible, considering all the aspects 
of the case and in particular the fact that the goods were already on board the vessel 
when the survey was being carried out. Therefore, his lordship demonstrates that 
although a Classification Society cannot be held liable for negligence after the survey 
has been conducted, since it is not responsible for the maintenance of the vessel, in the 
Nicholas H case, the vessel would not have sailed if the surveyor’s negligence had not 
occurred. 
 
 It is interesting to observe the completely divergent line of reasoning taken by 
both Lords. In particular that one believed that imposing such a duty would not be 
unreasonable as classification societies have a lot of revenue, whereas the other argued 
that a lot of times those were non-profitable organizations. The majority reasoning 
however was heavily based on the imbalance that the imposition of the duty would 
cause, ultimately affecting international trade itself, relying primarily on public policy 
reasons.  It is important to note however that both sets of reasoning stressed the fact 
that the primary responsibility of a Classification Society is promoting safety of life at 
sea, with Lord Berwick pointing out that there is not a closer relationship than the one 
of the surveyor with the crew.  Thus, one could assume that the decision reached could 
be different if it was a seafarers’ claim. 
 
 The House of Lords remarkably held that upsetting the balance in the Hague 
Rules could not be the only reason to not impose a duty, since legislature could easily 
remedied in that situation by extending limitation of liability to classification societies. 
It also appropriately analysed the effects such imposition would have on the insurance 
system and international trade, having an especially negative affect on shipowners. 
Nevertheless, the court neglected to note that insurance requires a vessel to stay “in 
class”, and as already stated numerous times throughout this work, classification 
                                                        
524 Ibid, at 314 ff. per Lord Lloyd of Berwick  
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societies compete with one another for this business. Thus, in order to attract ship 
business from shipowners, classification societies sometimes turn a blind eye to defects, 
which may cause vessels and lives to be lost. 525 
 
 English Courts up until today have shown reluctance to impose a duty of care 
upon classification societies to third Parties.  Following the same reasoning as in 
Nicholas H, Courts in England have not held a Classification Society liable for an 
erroneous confirmation of class certificate issued in the context of the sale of a vessel. 
Thus, in the Morning Watch526, the High Court dismissed an action of a ship buyer who 
claimed damages from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. The court reached the conclusion 
that the Classification Society did not owe any particular “duty of care” to a buyer in 
the course of routine inspections as the relationship between the parties is not 
sufficiently close hence there is no proximity. 527 The court rejected the general 
proposition that a Classification Society owes a duty of care to those foreseeably likely 
to suffer economic loss in consequence of their reliance on a negligent survey, because 
understanding otherwise would be to stretch the law of negligence. 528  Nevertheless, 
the decision could have been different if the Classification Society had actively worked 
together with the seller of a ship in the sale of the vessel, meeting the buyer and 
exchanging information about the condition of the ship with him. In these 
circumstances proximity between the buyer and the Classification Society could be 
assumed.529 
 
                                                        
525 Colleen E. Feehan, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the British Perspective: The Nicholas 
H’ in Tulane Maritime Law Journal 33-Tul. Mar. L.J. 41 2008-2009, p. 185 
526 Mariola Marine Corporation v Lloyd’s Register of Shipping – The Morning Watch, [1990] 1 LLoyd’s 
Rep. 547, 561 ff (QBD) In the case, the owners of the vessel engaged a Classification Society to conduct 
a special survey prior to putting the vessel on the market. The surveyor gave the vessel a clean bill of 
health, provided that localized areas of corrosion were treated. The vendor used the survey to indicate 
that the vessel was in good condition. The purchasers of the vessel agreed to undertake the remaining 
repairs necessaries for certification. Nevertheless, during the repairs, additional areas of corrosion were 
discovered. The Morning Watch [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 547,(Q.B. 1990), at 548-552 
527 Ibid, at 561 ff. (QBD) 
528 Ibid at 560 
529  See: East, ‘The Duty of Care in a Marine Context. Is there Someone to Blame?’ in Rose (ed.), Lex 
Mercatoria. Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds (Routledge 
2000)129, 131 f. and 151 
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 It is arguable that in the event of personal injury the English Courts would be 
more inclined to find the Classification Society liable. There is not an English case to 
this effect and the argument is based on the decision reached in Perret v Collins, 
regarding an aircraft and its certification society and its surveyor who acted negligently 
while issuing a survey. Although there are similarities between a Classification Society 
and a certification society, there are also fundamental differences; classification 
societies cannot be held responsible for the vessel’s seaworthiness, the shipowner being 
solely responsible for it, whereas Certification societies confirm the airworthiness of 
the aircraft as an amateur pilot is not in a position to assess it themselves.  
 
English Law provides that certain aircraft must get a certificate of the Popular 
Flying Association (PFA) to confirm their airworthiness. The absence of a certificate 
might prevent the aircraft from taking off.  In Perret V Collins530, the PFA- Inspector 
certified that the aircraft was fit to fly, after inspecting it in several stages of its 
construction, although it had a propeller which did not match its gearbox. Due to this 
structural defect, the plane hit the ground on a test flight, injuring a passenger on board. 
The court of Appeal held that PFA and its inspector owed the injured passenger a duty 
of care.  In their reasoning the court argued that the Nicholas H decision does not 
militate against finding the certification society liable. The court argued further that the 
role of a PFA-inspector in the decision to commence flying operations is not an 
ancillary role, the passenger placing reliance on the accuracy of a certificate. Thus, the 
court held that it was fair, just and reasonable to assume that a duty of care exists in this 
case. Although the court of Appeal quoted the Nicholas H, it also emphasised the 
difference between a Classification Society and certification society. 531 
 
Another tort case leads one to believe that Classifications Societies could be 
held liable in seafarers’ claims, namely: Driver v William Willett (Contractors) Ltd 
[1969] 1 All E.R. 665, when the court held that a person hired to act as a safety 
                                                        
530 Perret V Collins and others [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255 ff 
531 Ibid, at 264 -270 
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consultant in connection with the employer’s business owed a duty of care to the 
employees.  
 
There might be some truth in the argument that English Courts would be more 
inclined to impose a duty of care in classification societies in the case of personal 
injuries, but this is yet to be seen. It would be prudent to be sceptical about it due to the 
differences in responsibilities between a classification society and a PFA certification 
society, the nature of contracts in shipping and existent legislation.  Furthermore, due 
to the transnationality of maritime labour law, a lot of international policies and 
conventions have a significant role in the decision-making process and in this particular 
case it is questionable if the balance would weigh in favour of seafarers. 
 
Indeed, it is uncertain if the courts would impose liability upon classification 
societies in the case of an injured seafarer. It would be likely that the courts would have 
the same approach adopted in the Nicholas H, considering that the Maritime Labour 
Convention provides for limitation of liability of the shipowner in case of abandonment, 
plus the reliance of the seafarer on the classification society survey is questionable, 
hence putting in question the proximity between the two.  Nevertheless, it is important 
to highlight that classification societies’ main function concerns safety of life at sea, 
which could contribute towards a favourable decision for seafarers. Furthermore, in the 
case of abandonment of seafarers and a classification society working as an RO and 
giving a certificate that a vessel was in compliance with the MLC, whereas it was not; 
this could also give rise for a possible imposition of a duty to care. There are no cases 
in England involving classification societies as ROs, so one can only speculate as to 
what the outcome would be, remembering that classification societies may rely on the 
Flag State’s immunity at any rate. It must be taking into account that most of the time, 
classification societies issuing class surveys also act as ROs. And whilst it may be 
possible to find proximity and foreseeability in these cases, a possible imposition of 
liability might not be perceived as fair, just and reasonable, including for policy reasons. 
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 Professor Tetterborn seems to share the above view, regarding with scepticism 
a possible imposition of liability on classification societies. When commenting on the 
Nicholas H and a possible liability of classification societies in the case of oil pollution 
claims, the renowned Professor stated: 
 
 “One ground for the decision in The Nicholas H was the lack of any 
evidence that classification societies existed for the protection of cargo 
owners, whereas by contrast, it seems clear that such organisations 
undoubtedly do operate for the benefit of those whose interests depend on 
the integrity of the marine environment. But other points may well tell 
against liability. These include in particular the relative poverty of 
Classification Societies and their unsuitedness to act as deep-pocket 
compensators, and also the fact that at present with oil, and no doubt in 
future with other substances, there is a scheme of liability which in the event 
of doubt should incline courts against actually creating further peripheral 
liabilities.”532 
 
Nevertheless, it needs to be borne in mind that the case in law existent in the 
UK dates from before the amendments to Chapter II-1 of the SOLAS Convention533, 
which requires ships to “designed, constructed and maintained in compliance with the 
structural, mechanical and electrical requirements of a recognized Classification 
Society”. It also dates before Resolution A.739 (19), which set forth specifications of 
the survey and certification functions of the recognized classification societies.  These 
new regulations, already discussed in detail in this work enhance the reliance of 
statutory rules of compliance with class rules. As already discussed, the MLC for its 
part also provides for Recognized Organizations and the reliance on their certificates, 
which ought to serve as prima facie evidence of compliance. Thus, some academic 
                                                        
532  A. Tetterborn, “Marine Pollution: Unorthodox Suits and Unorthodox Defendants” in B. Soyer and 
A. Tetterborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability (Routledge 2012), p. 209 
533 The amendment came into force only in 1 July 1998. See. IMO website 
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commentators believe that these new provisions could expose classification societies to 
third party liability claims.  This is, again, yet to be seen.  
 
Considering that the reasoning of the Nicholas H was heavily based on the 
imbalance that such imposition would cause in trade, since it would impose a heavier 
duty on the shipowner, the decision being based solely on the Hague Rules among 
International Conventions, it seems difficult to believe that a different decision could 
be reached in terms of cargo claims, however not so much so in terms of seafarers, 
especially considering the fact that the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules’ provision for 
limitation of liability and the non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy534 vessel of the 
shipowner refers solely to cargo owners.  
                                                        
Art III rule 1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules provides: 
‘1_ The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to: 
a_ Make the ship seaworthy; 
b_ Properly man, equip and supply the ship;  
c_ Make the holds, refrigeration and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which 
goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation’. 
From the reading of the article it can be perceived that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules impose a duty on 
the shipowner to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, also specifying the elements of 
seaworthiness. Therefore, essentially, the ship owner has a duty to maintain the vessel as seaworthy 
through the entire validity period of the Class certificate.  
 It is noteworthy that most regulations that deal with the obligation of the owner to provide a seaworthy 
vessel refer to cargo owners. Even the common law classic test of seaworthiness was provided in cargo 
claim case; McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697, in which it was established that: 
"The vessel must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent owner would require 
his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances 
of it. To that extent the ship owner, as we have seen, undertakes absolutely that she is fit and ignorance 
is no excuse. If the defect existed, the question to be put is, would a prudent owner have required that it 
should be made good before sending his ship to sea had he known of it? If he would, the ship was not 
seaworthy within the meaning of the undertaking. " 
Another definition of seaworthiness can be found in the Marine Insurance Act, which provides that "a 
ship is deemed to be seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary perils 
of the seas of the adventure insured" (article 39 (1)). 
Accordingly, although there seems to be a general understanding of what a seaworthy vessel will be, it 
seems that the concept of seaworthiness may have slight variation according to different interests 
involved. Therefore, in the case of seafarers, it does not seem wrong to assume that a vessel even if fit 
for the purpose of the intended voyage, but which does not represent a safe work environment, would 
also be consider unseaworthy, it being important to note that a safe work environment includes also 
include one that is ‘mentally’ safe.  The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, provides that “risks 
arising out of or in connection with the activities of persons at work shall be treated as including risks 
attributable to the manner of conducting an undertaking, the plant or substances used for the purposes of 
an undertaking and the condition of premises so used or any part of them”(Regulation 1(3)). Therefore, 
a vessel although capable of undertaking a voyage can still be considered not to be a safe work 
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IV.2.2 – United States of America 
 
The American Courts’ approach seems to be slightly different from the English 
approach.  American Courts seem to have been discussing the responsibility of 
classification societies for a long time; whether they should be liable for conducting 
their surveys in an unacceptable manner. For instance, in 1960, District Judge Wright, 
while judging a collision case in the Mississippi River involving a Danish and a 
Panamanian Vessel (Navegation Castro Riva S.A., v. M/S Nordholm535) could not 
prevent himself commenting on the surveys conducted by the classification societies, 
despite the fact that the case did not actually involve one.   His considerations were 
made because although the Panamanian vessel was in class, the shipowner producing 
classification evidence supporting the seaworthiness of the vessel, it was considered to 
be unseaworthy as it was improperly manned and underpowered. 536 The Judge stated: 
“It has been this [c]ourt’s experience that classification societies often continue vessels 
in class long after their highest and best use would be as scrap”537. Further stating: “It 
is time that admiralty courts protect responsible shipping against old and underpowered, 
shadowy-owned tramps, flying the flag of any nation, and manned by flotsam of the 
world”. 538 
 
 Judge Wright’s considerations about classification societies undoubtedly 
represent the time when his words were spoken. At the time, the Panamanian Register 
had recently been established and indeed its attractiveness was in its lax rules. The 
International Maritime Organization had been established only a few years before and 
                                                        
environment. Accordingly, this author believes that the concept of seaworthiness as regards seafarers 
should be given a broader spectrum than the one fit for cargo claim purposes 
535 178 F. Supp. 736, 741-42, 1960 AMC 1875, 1882-83 (E.D. La. 1959), aff’d, 287 F.2d 398, 1961 AMC 
2135 (5th Cir. 1961) 
536 See: Ibid at 741-72, 1960 AMC AT 1882-83, 739, 1960 AMC AT 1878-79, 739-40, 1960 AMC AT 
1882-83 
537 Ibid (citing United Distillers of Am. V. T/S Ionian Pioneer, 130 F Supp. 647, 1955 AMC 1338 (E.D. 
La. 1955)) 
538 Ibid at 742, 1960 AMC at 1883. On Appeal, the Fifth Circuit did not comment on the role of 
Classification Societies. See: Navegation Castro Riva, S.A. v M/S Nordholm, 287 F.2d 398, 1961 AMC 
2135 
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the International Convention relating to maritime affairs which would become the 
UNCLOS 1958 was barely on its feet, hence it seems correct to say that maritime law 
was at that time quite unregulated on an international level. Nevertheless, the 
transboundary element of shipping was already present, flags from other nations, as 
well as seafarers. Furthermore, Judge Wright’s speech demonstrates that even then 
classification societies were considered an important part of the maritime industry, for 
the prevention of substandard shipping.  
 
 One of the earliest recorded cases discussing liability of a Classification Society 
dates to 1933, the American Bureau of Shipping v. Allied Oil Co.539 In the case, the 
United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit held the Classification Society liable 
for falsely certifying a vessel as being in excellent condition. The court reasoned that 
the Classification Society owed damages because it had merely undertaken a cursory 
inspection of the vessel as opposed to its assurance of thorough diligence.540 
 
 In 1972, in another early case discussing the liability of classification societies, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that a 
Classification Society assumes a duty to exercise reasonable care in discovering and 
notifying client of defects when it undertakes to survey a vessel.541Even though the 
court was discussing classification societies’ liability to a shipowner or charterer, and 
not third parties, it demonstrated an inclination towards finding classification societies 
                                                        
539 American Bureau of Shipping v. Allied Oil Co 64 F.2d 509, 1933, AMC 1217 (6th Cir. 2003) 
540 Robert G. Clyne & James A. Saville, Jr., Classification Societies and Limitation of Liability, 81 Tul. 
L, Rev. 1399 (2007), pp 1405-06 
541 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bureau Veritas, 338 F. Supp.999. 1013, 1972 AMC 1455, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) - The court outlined two duties that Classification Societies owed their clients; “to survey and 
classify vessels in accordance with rules and standards established and promulgated by the society for 
that purpose” and to provide “due care” in searching for a vessel’s defects in her survey and in 
communicating the inspection result (at 1011-12, 1972 AMC at 1472) The court suppressed the notion 
of liability under the first duty reasoning that is a ship owner’s “non-delegable duty to maintain a 
seaworthy vessel” , which would prevent any recovery under this theory(at 1012, 1972 AMC at 1472). 
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the possibility of liability arising out of the duty of “due care”, 
opening the door to recovery for “failure to detected or warn” but that there was insufficient evidentiary 
support in this regard (at 1012-13, 1972 AMC at 1473-74). 
See also: Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v Germanischer Lloys, 634 F.2d 874, 878, 1982 AMC 1969 (5th Cir. 
1981) (holding that a Classification Society owes a shipowner the duty of determining whether a ship 
meets the society’s standards of seaworthiness) 
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liable in tort. Nevertheless, based on the same premise as held in UK Courts that the 
seaworthiness of a vessel is a non-delegable duty of the shipowner, USA Courts had 
shown resistance in allowing this cause of action to proceed against classification 
societies. The courts partially feared that imposing tort liability on classification 
societies would obliterate the “ancient, absolute, responsibility of an owner for the 
condition of his ship.”542 
 
 Classification Societies’ liability has been addressed by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit several times. In Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American 
Bureau of Shipping543, while considering whether a classification society could be held 
liable for certifying a vessel as seaworthy in violation of its own rules, the court made 
reference to distinguishing a contractual party from a third party when assessing the 
liability of a classification society. The court in the Sundance granted a summary 
judgment to the defendant and explained two of the most popular arguments against 
imposing liability on classification societies (the fees charged by classification societies 
are significant less than the amount of a possible damages award, which would indicate 
that it was not the intent of the parties to hold the classification society liable and affirm 
the proposition that a shipowner has a non-delegable duty to ensure the seaworthiness 
of the vessel544) but not  without stating that the case “must be distinguished from a suit 
brought by an injured third party who relied on the classification”. 545The court 
observed that if the plaintiff had been in the position of an injured third party rather 
than the client of the defendant, recovery would have been possible. The court’s 
                                                        
542 Great Am. Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. At 1012, 1972 AMX at 1472. See also: Rory B.O. Halloran, ‘Otto 
Candies, L.L.C. V Nippon Kaiji Kyokay Corp.: In a Novel Decision, the Fifth Circuit Recognizes the 
Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation in Connection with Maritime Classification Societies and Third 
Party Plaintiffs’ in 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1377 2003-2004, p. 1391 
543 Sundance Cruises Corp. V. American Bureau of Shipping 7 F. 3d 1077, 1080, 1994 AMC 1, 3-4 (2d 
Cir, 1993) 
544In the Great American Insurance Co. 1994 AMC at 11 
545 Ibid at 26 
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observation led to the conclusion that a classification society may be found liable in tort 
as against a third party,546particularly, perhaps, a seafarer. 
 
 A renowned US maritime law professor, who happened to also be a practising 
US attorney, specialising in admiralty law as well as in product liability, when 
analysing the Sundance Cruises, drew a comparison between the two areas of law and 
reached the conclusion that court’s concern regarding the disparity between the fee 
charged by a Classification Society and the resultant exposure although “relevant and 
understandable, is perhaps overwrought”.547 The reasoning was founded in the fact that 
a survey typically costs several thousand dollars and during a vessel’s life, the fees paid 
to classification societies my run into hundred thousand dollars, and US courts have 
never shown too much concern for the disparity between price and liability in product 
liability cases, for instance in the case of a lawnmower for which the price may be quite 
low but the damage award for severing a foot due to a design defect may be quite high. 
548It is not the intention of this thesis to produce an in-depth analysis of tort liability 
cases which would be similar to those of classification societies and to draw 
comparisons. Nevertheless, the analysis made by the distinguished US Attorney might 
demonstrate not only the perhaps narrow view of the US courts in relation to the 
disparity between classification societies’ fees and a subsequent damages claim, but 
also the reasoning behind the probable acceptance of liability in cases of an injured 
party, which seems to share similarities with tortious claims arising in product liability 
cases. 
 
                                                        
546  Rory B.O. Halloran, ‘Otto Candies, L.L.C. V Nippon Kaiji Kyokay Corp.: In a Novel Decision, the 
Fifth Circuit Recognizes the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation in Connection with Maritime 
Classification Societies and Third Party Plaintiffs’ in 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1377 2003-2004, p. 1391 
547  Machale A. Miller, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the perspective of United States Law’ 
in Tulane Maritime Law Journal Vo. 22, 1997, p. 98 The author is a partner at Miller and Williamson 
LLC, firm based in New Orleans, who specializes in Civil Practice; Admiralty Law; Products Liability; 
Insurance Litigation; Commercial Litigation; Trial Practice; Arbitration, had being a maritime law 
professor at Tulane University for many years. 
548Ibid 
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The reasoning of the Sundance Cruises seems to be in agreement with previous 
decisions establishing classification societies’ liability to an injured third party.  In 
Psarianos v. Standard Marine, Ltd.549, a jury found a Classification Society liable to 
seafarers and descendants of the deceased crewmembers of a vessel that sank due to 
unseaworthy conditions of which the Classification Society was or should have been 
aware. Thus, it was determined that the Classification Society acted negligently. 
 
 The decision in Sundance Cruises Corp. can be considered not only more in 
line with previous court decisions, but also as a broader and more evolved decision 
(despite ruling in favour of the classification societies) than the one reached in the Great 
American Insurance550, as the former recognized the possibility of third party liability 
in cases of a physically injured party. In the latter case, the court whilst analysing the 
non-delegable duty of seaworthiness, stated that recognition of a cause of action 
classification societies, as against third parties, could undermine the shipowner’s 
traditional role in warrantying a vessel’s seaworthiness, observing as follows:  
 
“The unstated policy underlying the decisions not to allow surveys and 
classifications to operate as defenses to the duty of providing a seaworthy 
ship is clearly to preserve the ancient, absolute responsibility of an owner 
for the condition of his ship. This is evidenced by the fact that, were such 
surveys and classifications allowed to constitute a due diligence defense, 
the accountability of owners for the seaworthiness of their vessel for all 
practical purposes would evaporate. This in turn, would have the effect of 
leaving injured seamen and shippers with no effective effect in most cases.” 
(Emphasis added) 
 
 Therefore, in the Great American Co, the court wrongly concluded that 
attributing to the Classification Society any sort of liability would diminish the right of 
                                                        
549 728 F. Supp.438, 1990 AMC 139 (E.D. Tex. 1989) 
550  1994 AMC at 11 
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recourse of injured third parties, in particular seamen and shippers, which does not seem 
to be an entirely correct approach in the case of seafarers considering that shipowners 
have a direct responsibility towards these to provide them with a safe place of work551, 
i.e. a seaworthy vessel. Thus, the Classification Society’s liability would only be an 
indirect one, not undermining the main responsibility of the shipowner. Thus, 
recognizing this indirect liability would merely allow the seafarer a lawful recourse to 
claim for his rights, if violated, against a further party. The liability of a third party in 
tort would not seem to eliminate a direct responsibility, in particular a contractual one.  
 
 It is important to note that many of the Classification Society third party liability 
cases in the US have been settled out of court. For example, a 1991 case brought against 
the Classification Society Germanischer Lloyd in connection with the sinking of a 
vessel. The cargo claimants sought to recover from Germanischer Lloyd the difference 
between their actual losses and the package limit. The case ended with Germanischer 
settling with the cargo claimants for a substantial amount.552 
 
  Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that US Courts have always showed a more 
linear approach than courts elsewhere in establishing third party liability of 
classification societies.553 The courts there have ruled as weak the argument of some 
classification societies, namely that clauses in their rules provide that their only client 
is the shipowner and that they make no representations to third parties, hence not being 
responsible for the losses suffered by them. Indeed, even if the classification society is 
not bound by contractual law to a third party, nothing prevents there being liability in 
                                                        
551 For instance, in the UK, a distinctive consequence of the employment relationship is the employer’s 
extensive duty (both at common law and by Statute) to take measures to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of his employees, and to provide safe equipment and premises, and a safe system of working.  In 
the UK, according to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) Section 2 (1) there is an offence 
(both for individual and corporations) of failing to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the safety and 
welfare at work of employees. Therefore, it can be understood that the shipowner has a duty to provide 
the seafarer with a seaworthy vessel. 
552  Machale A. Miller, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the perspective of United States Law’ 
in Tulane Maritime Law Journal Vo. 22, 1997 , pp 98-99 
553Ibid, pp 110-111 
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tort. Most importantly, the courts perceived these clauses as being against public 
policy554 hence sharing a similar view to that of this author. 
 
 In Otto Candies, L.L.C v Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Corp555, the American Courts, 
differently from the UK courts, recognized the tort of negligent misrespresentation in 
cases involving classification societies and third parties.  The case is considered a 
‘turning point’ in the decision of classification societiy third party liability issues in the 
USA. 
 
 The US case differs from the UK case mentioned above, as the purchase of the 
vessel was conditional upon the Classification Society surveys. The plaintiff (Otto) 
engaged in a Memorandum of Agreement to purchase the M/V Speeder from Diamond 
Ferry Co., depending on NKK (the Classification Society) restoring the ship’s class, 
which was duly done. After NKK issued the required Class Maintenance Certificate, 
Otto paid the agreed sum for the purchase of the vessel.556 
 
 The vessel was then transported from Japan to the USA, where it was inspected 
by a new Classification Society, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) for the 
purpose of transferring the vessel’s classification from NKK to ABS. However, upon 
inspection ABS’s surveyor accounted for numerous and significant deficiencies 
requiring repair before a class certificate could be issued for the vessel. The repairs 
were eventually made at the plaintiff’s expense and a class certificate was issued. 
Consequently, Otto filed a suit in the US federal district court against NKK to recover 
the repair costs.  The court held that NKK owed a duty to Otto, hence it was liable for 
negligent misrepresentation. Upon Appeal, the court of Appeal held that a third party 
is capable of bringing a claim of negligent misrepresentation against a maritime 
                                                        
554 See, e.g., Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia V S.S. Ionnis Martinos, 1986 AMC 769 (E.D.N.C. 1984); 
See also the discussion of exculpatory clauses in Charles M. Davis, Maritime Law Deskbook 318 (1997) 
555 Otto Candies, L.L.C. v Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Corp., 346 F.3d 530, 532, 2003 AMC 2409, 2410 (5th 
Cir. 2003) 
556 Ibid at 532-33, 2003 AMC at 2410-11 
211 
 
Classification Society based upon statements made in a classification survey conducted 
as a prerequisite to the sale of the vessel.557  
 
 In the USA, Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for the 
Tort of Misrepresentation.558 Accordingly, the cause of action is to “[impose] liability 
on suppliers of commercial information to third persons who are intended beneficiaries 
of the information”559, hence limiting the potential class of plaintiffs to those the 
supplier of the information “intends to benefit”. The Act recognizes that the flow of 
commercial information is a critical component of transacting business that should not 
be impeded by excessive tort liability.560 Furthermore, in the case of classification 
societies, negligent misrepresentation can be used as a cause of action against other 
commercial entities561, including accounting firms and investment banks.562 The Fifth 
Circuit while judging Otto Candies undertook a straight forward application of section 
552 id Restatement (Second) of Torts to the facts of the case, reaching the conclusion 
that NKK owed Otto a legal duty and that it had acted negligently, hence it was liable 
for Otto’s pecuniary losses.563 
 
                                                        
557 Ibid 
558 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977). Section 552 states in relevant part: 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance 
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to 
them by their justifiable reliance upon information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care 
or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. 
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss 
suffered 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he 
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) Through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or 
knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction 
559 Billy v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752 (Cal.1992) (en banc). 
560 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 cmt. a 
561 See Scottish Heriatable Trust, PLC v. Paet Marwick Main & Co., 81 F3d 606, 609 (5th Cir.1996) 
(naming Peat Marwick as a defendant in its capacity as an auditor) 
562 See Great Plaints Trust Co. v. Morgan Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 609 (5th Circ. 1996) 
(naming Morgan Stanley and two of its employees as defendants in their capacity as advisors to a merger 
party) 
563 Otto Candies, L.L.C. v Nippon Kaiji Kyokay Corp. , 346 F.3d 530, 535, 2003 AMC 24902, 2414 (5th 
Cir. 2003) at 2410 
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Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit also observed the dangers inherent in maritime 
commerce imposing tort liability on classification societies and emphasized that the 
finding in the noted case should be “strictly and carefully limited”.564 
  
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit made a sensible extension of well-settled US 
jurisprudence, by taking into consideration the decisions in Great Plain, First National, 
and Scottish Heritable Trust, in a novel way. The court when analysing the mentioned 
cases found a framework, which could easily be applied to the case in hand. It wisely 
restricted the reach of its decision recognizing that this was a unique case that fit section 
552 perfectly565, insuring that its decision would not be understood as attributing to 
classification societies the role of insurers of the vessel’s seaworthiness. Thus, 
classification society liability cases should be judged on a case by case basis, being fact 
specific. This suggests that the Fifth Circuit decision has not opened up a wide 
precedent for cases involving classification societies’ alleged liability to third parties.566 
 
It is important to note that even before the Otto Candies case, courts already 
recognized the applicability of the tort of negligent misrepresentation to classification 
societies. This should not be a surprise since general US maritime law, which governs 
all third party injury claims, recognized such a tort as formulated in the Restatement. 
For instance, in Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd V E. W. Sabolt & Co.567, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana recognized that a purchaser of fuel 
oil has a cause of action based upon negligent misrepresentation against an independent 
surveyor who issues an analysis of the purchased commodity at the request of the seller. 
The court based its decision on section 552 of the Restatement.  The tort has also been 
accepted in cases of strict liability, such as in Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia v. S.S. 
Ioannis Martino568s, The United States Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, 
                                                        
564 Ibid , at 534-35, 2003 AMC at 2412-13 
565 Otto Candies, 346 F.3d. at 532, 2003 AMC at 2410 
566  Rory B.O. Halloran, ‘Otto Candies, L.L.C. V Nippon Kaiji Kyokay Corp.: In a Novel Decision, the 
Fifth Circuit Recognizes the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation in Connection with Maritime 
Classification Societies and Third Party Plaintiffs’ in 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1377 2003-2004, p. 1398 
567 826 F.2d 424, 1988 AMC 207 (5th Cir.1987) 
568 1986 AMC 769 (E.D.N.C. 1984) 
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quoting section 552 of the Restatement, accorded a shipowner a cause against the cargo 
underwriter’s surveyor who allegedly failed to use due care in the detection of defects 
in the surveyed vessel.  
 
The importance of this recognition, as pointed out by Prof. Miller, and as can 
be noted from Otto Candies, is that “from a conceptual perspective, claims of injured 
third parties against classification societies fit the Restatement’s concept of negligent 
misrepresentation like a glove.”569, and the author concurs with this statement of 
Professor Miller. The private role of classification societies can be considered at a 
minimum to be a pivotal element for the ensuring of seaworthiness of vessels.   
Although the primary and ultimate responsibility for maintaining the vessel’s 
seaworthiness belongs to the shipowner, classification societies are the ones in charge 
of setting standards and rules that need to be met to ensure that the vessel is fit for its 
intended purpose. Moreover, classification societies are also in charge of ensuring if 
the shipowner is designing, constructing, maintaining and repairing its vessel in 
accordance with those rules and standards, acting as independent policemen of the sea. 
Thus, classification societies expect third parties to rely on their certificates that, 
undoubtedly, will be passed to them by the shipowner. And the same is true for 
certificates issued when CSs are performing their public role, acting as an RO – Third 
Parties shall rely on these certificates in determining if the vessel is in compliance with 
international conventions, as these certificates most of the time are considered prima 
facie evidence of compliance.  Indeed, one of classification societies’ primary purposes 
and functions is to provide assurance from an independent source to third parties. To 
this end, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) declared its mission to be: “To serve the 
public interest as well as the needs of our members and clients by promoting the 
security of life and property, and preserving the natural environment.”570(Emphasis 
                                                        
569  Machale A. Miller, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the perspective of United States Law’ 
in Tulane Maritime Law Journal Vo. 22, 1997, p. 104 
570 ABS, The Spirit of ABS, (ABS Publications 2013) 
<http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/publications/2013/SpiritofABS.pdf >, last accessed on 
08/08/2016 It must be noted that ABS mission also assist understanding the examples brought on this 
thesis and the use of a parallel with substandard shipping to determine third parties liability to cases of 
abandonment of seafarer.  
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added). Thus, it is undeniable that classification societies are aware of third party 
reliance on their services. 
 
Indeed, the applicability of Sections 311 and 552 of the Restatement (Second) 
of torts to the question of classification societies’ liability to third parties is undeniably 
appropriate. Section 311 expressly establishes that third parties shall have a cause of 
action when the party making a representation should expect to imperil a third party in 
case of a negligent or deficient representation.571 Whereas section 552 confers a cause 
of action upon a third party for pecuniary loss when the party making the negligent 
misrepresentation knows that the recipient intends to supply the information to a third 
party572, i.e. when a Classification Society is aware that a third party will rely on its 
survey, which as has been shown is nearly always the case. It is interesting to observe 
how the Restatement provides for torts committed against third parties. However, it is 
necessary to highlight that the third parties referred to by the Restatement are Third 
Parties in contract, not in tort.  
 
Nevertheless, not all sections of the Restatement when applied by the U.S. 
courts have found a favourable decision in establishing classification societies’ liability 
towards third parties. In the Amoco Cadiz573, the court applied section 324A of the 
Restatement and eventually ruled in favour of ABS, the Classification Society involved 
in the case. 574However, the Amoco Cadiz can be considered, to a certain extent, to be 
a unique case. 
 
The Amoco Cadiz was an oil tanker that ran aground off the coast of France and 
spilled its cargo of crude oil, Amoco affiliates subsequently being found liable for 
negligent design and construction of the vessel.575   The difference in the Amoco Cadiz 
                                                        
571 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (1965) 
572 Ibid. § 552 
573 Amoco I, 1984 AMC at 2188-89 and Amoco II, 1986 AMC at 1951 
574 Amoco II, 1986 AMC at 1952 
575  In Re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978 (“Amoco I”), 1984 
AMC 2123, 2124 (N.D. III) at 2191-94 
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case, and in this author’s opinion a significant one, was that the owner of the vessel, 
and not an injured third party, filed a claim against ABS seeking indemnity and 
contribution from the latter.  
 
When deciding on the merits of the case, the court concluded that ABS “did not 
contract with Amoco, impliedly or otherwise, to assume all the liability of the Amoco 
in the event of the ship’s failure.576”When addressing the claimant’s arguments for 
indemnity based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v Atlantic 
Steamship Corp577, the court reasoned that unlike “the situation in the Ryan, the 
workmanship which caused the injuries for which Amoco has been found liable was 
not entrusted solely to ABS.”578 Thus, granting summary judgement to ABS, 
consequently rejecting Amoco’s indemnity claim. 
 
However, the most important aspect of the Amoco case was the analysis of the 
claim under section 324A of the Restatement (Second) Torts, where the district court 
stated in relation to this section: 
 
“a party is liable to third parties only if its failure to exercise reasonable 
care increases the risk of harm, if it has undertaken to perform a duty owed 
by the other party to the third party[,] or if the harm is suffered because the 
other party or the third party relied upon the undertaking”579 
 
The court reasoned that risk is not increased “in the absence of some physical 
change to the environment or some material circumstances” and that “failure to detect 
already existing dangerous conditions cannot be said to increase the risk in any real or 
logical manner”.580  Moreover, the court reasoned that if the shipowner is aware of the 
                                                        
576 Amoco II, 1986 AMC at 1951 
577 In the Ryan, the court held that the shipowner was entitled to reimbursement from the contractor for 
the amount of the judgment against the shipowner on a third-party complaint against the contractor. 350 
U.S. 124, 1956 AMC 9 (1956) 
578Amoco II, 1986 AMC at 1952 
579 Ibid, at 1953 
580 Ibid 
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defects or deficiencies, he does not reasonably rely on the Classification Society survey 
hence there is no causation or recovery on tort claim.581 The court ruled that:  
 
“when the shipowner has prior knowledge of its vessel’s defects, 
certification by a Classification Society does not establish the 
seaworthiness of a ship or the lack of negligence on the part of the 
shipowner.”582 
 
Nevertheless, the court declined to grant summary judgment to ABS, because it 
concluded that there were unresolved “questions of fact exist regarding Amoco’s 
reliance on ABS’s undertaking.”583 
  
Indeed, the decision seems to be the correct application of section 324A of the 
Restatement, however the court failed to address the issue of Classification Society’s 
general liability towards third parties. The case makes one wonder if the decision may 
have been different if a third party would have filed the claim instead of the 
shipowner.584 It is the view of this author that the most likely answer to that is ‘yes’. 
The court essentially ruled that the shipowner could not avoid his responsibility in 
keeping the vessel seaworthy, which is a settled matter, but it recognized that there were 
doubts about ABS’s representation.  
 
It must be noted that section 324A of the Restatement is limited to “physical 
harm” to persons or their “things”, and it does not allow third parties to recover 
economic loss. Moreover, any liability under the section requires the defendant to 
recognize that its undertaking is “necessary for the protection of” persons other than 
                                                        
581 For further discussion see: France, Classification Societies: their liability – an American lawyer’s 
point of view in light of recent judgments, 1 I.J.S.L. 67(1996), at 74 
582 In the Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadis 954 F. 2d 1279 (7th Ci. 1992) 
583 Amoco II, 1986 AMC at 1954 
584  For further discussion on the case see: B.D. Daniel, ‘Potential Liability of Marine Classification 
Societies to Non Contracting Parties’ in 19 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 183 2006-2007, pp. 254- 56 and Nicolai I 
Lagoni, The Liability of Classification Societies, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs (Springer: 2007), 
pp 95-97 
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owners or their things. 585 The section addresses potential liability to third parties for 
“negligent performance of an undertaking” providing as follows: 
 
“ One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services 
to another which he should recognise as necessary for the protection of a 
third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for 
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
protect his undertaking: 
 
(a) His failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, 
or 
(c) The harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person 
upon the undertaking” 
 
Considering that classification societies do recognise the importance of their 
services for the safety of life at sea, the section could perhaps apply to cases of injured 
seafarers or ones whose lives were lost at sea.  Nevertheless, due to a lack of case law 
on the matter, this cannot be confirmed. Furthermore, some academics and practitioners 
might disagree about the applicability of the section due to the shipowner’s non-
delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel and considering the decision taken in the 
Amoco Cadiz. 586However, the decision of the Amoco has its particularities, as already 
pointed out, and the claim did not concern harm caused to others hence it leaves room 
for speculation regarding a different outcome in the case of a seafarer or his/hers family 
filing the suit. Plus, this author believes that the shipowner’s absolute and non-
delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel cannot always be used as an excuse or 
motivation for excluding liability of classification societies. Moreover, as already seen 
previously, U.S. Courts have already held that some decisions excluding third party 
                                                        
585Ibid, page 277 
586 Ibid, 276-77 
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liability of classification societies could have been decided differently if the claimant 
had been an injured third party.  
 
Due to the American Courts’ more linear position in holding classification 
societies liable in tort for losses caused to third parties and the prospect of punitive 
damages, it is not uncommon for non- U.S. citizens to bring such cases to American 
Courts. Therefore, it is no surprise that the American courts have applied many times 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in order to dismiss actions. This was the case of 
the Marika587, where Relatives and personal representatives of the deceased Greek crew 
members who died in the Liberian flagged vessel’s demise in international waters 
sought compensation from the shipowner and ABS (which is an American company) 
in U.S. Courts under the Death of High Seas Act (DOHSA) and general maritime law.  
The court reasoned that all the allegedly critical events responsible for the sinking of 
the vessel had taken place in Greece, as they had been conducted by the Greek ABS 
office. Thus, the action was dismissed by the District Court on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens. Furthermore, it could be said that it was not in the best interests of the 
United States to allow a case brought on behalf of Greek seafarers, employed by Greek 
shipowners, who sailed aboard a Liberian vessel and were exclusively engaged in 
carrying cargos to and from non- United States ports. 588 
 
 U.S. courts also applied foreign law to some cases, such as in the case of 
Carbotrade589.  The case concerned the loss of the vessel Star Alexandria. The charterer 
brought an action on its own behalf and as assignee of a subcharterer against Bureau 
Veritas (BV) to recover for loss of cargo after the vessel sank, alleging that BV should 
have withdrawn the vessel’s class due to the condition of the ship. Several instances of 
proceedings oversaw debate of the law applicable to the case. In the first instance, the 
                                                        
587 Ioannides et al.v Marika Maritime Corp. et. Al., 928 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
588 Ibid.at 377 ff. See Also  Basedow, Supra n. p 26  
589 Carbotrade v. Bureau Veritas, 901 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) –Carbotrade I 
Carbotrade v Bureau Veritas, 99  F. 3d 86 (2nd Cir. 1996) – Carbotrade II 
Carbotrate V. Bureau Veritas, 1999 WL 714126, no.92 Civ.1459 JKNG (S.D.N.Y. 1999) – Carbotrate 
III 
Carbotrade v Bureau Veritas, 216 F. 3d 1071 (2nd Cir. 2000) – Carbotrade IV 
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District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the applicable law should 
be of the Flag State. Thus, since the vessel was registered in Gibraltar, the applicable 
law should be British law, which provides that the Classification Society is not liable 
to the charterer and cargo owner under tort law. However, the court of Appeals of the 
Second Circuit disagreed and overturned the District Court decision. After carefully 
analysing the case and applying the Lauritzen test590, the court of Appeal decided that 
the law of Greece should be applied. The court took into consideration the fact that the 
defective certificate had been issued after inspection in Greece, carried out by Greek 
ABS office employees. Besides, the actual shipowners, different from the vessel’s 
paper owners, were Greek. Thus, upon remand the District Court applied Greek Law to 
the case and assessed liability hence applying article 914 of the Greek Civil Code. The 
                                                        
590 The Lauritzen test was set in the case Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571 (1953), where the United 
Supreme Court applied Danish Law utilizing a multifactor choice of law test. The court reasoned that 
seven factors determined the choice of law:  
● The place of the wrongful act; 
● The law of the flag; 
● The injured party’s allegiance or domicile; 
● The defendant shiponwer’s allegiance; 
● The place of contract; 
● The inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and the law of the forum 
Based on these factors the court decided that the “overwhelming preponderance [of factors] in favor of 
Danish law” (at 592, 1953 AMC at 1226) militated against the application of U.S. Law. (The case was 
about a Danish seafarer working for a Danish registered and owned vessel, who had suffered a 
negligent injury in the Port of Havana-Cuba while on board and employed on the ship. His contract of 
employment also provided for the applicability of Danish Law). After the case, U.S. Courts started to 
apply the Lauritzen test in order to determine the applicable law hence assessing the seven factors and 
determining which law they weighed in favour of.   
The Lauritzen test was applied in several maritime cases. In Romero v. International Terminal Operating 
Co., the court faced a similar situation as in Lauritzen,  foreign actors and locales seeking to invoke the 
Jones Act. The court ended up applying Spanish law by using the Lauritzen factors, which accordingly 
provided an ample framework for denying the application of U.S. Law.(358 U.S. 354, 383-84, 1959 
AMC 832, 855 (1959)). 
Nevertheless, in a later case, the Hellenic Lines Ltd. V Rhoditis (398 U.S. 306, 308, 309 1970 AMC 994, 
996 (1970)), the court found that the Lauritzen factors were not enough to solve the question of applicable 
law. The court clarified that the Lauritzen was not a “mechanical [test]”. Thus, the court added an eighth 
factor to the test: the shipowner’s base of operations. (at 309, 1970 AMC at 997-97) Since then lower 
courts have constantly applied the eight factor to determine maritime choice of law. (See: Cooper v. 
Meridian Yachts, Ltd, 575 F 3d, 1151, 1172, 2009 AMC 1652, 2677-78 (11th Cir, 2009) 
See also: Imran Naeemullah, A Decade Later, $1 Billion Saved: The Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime 
Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental and Economic damages in Reino 
Unido de Espana v American Bureau of Shipping, Inc., Tulane  Maritime Law Review Vol. 37:639, 
2013, p.64 
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court eventually dismissed the case on the merits since the plaintiffs failed to establish 
a causal link between the negligent act and the vessel’s demise.591 
 
 The Lauritzen test was also applied in a more internationally famous incident; 
the Prestige. The Prestige592 was an oil tanker that sank in 2002, 140 miles off the coast 
of Spain due to internal structural failure (a crack in its hull).  The vessel’s cargo, a 
hazardous fuel oil, spilled into the ocean, washing onto Spain’s beaches and coastline. 
Barred by shipowner liability limitations and seeking to recover compensation for the 
damages caused by the sinking of vessel, which were excessive, Spain filed a suit 
against the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), which had classified the vessel 
throughout her career on behalf of her owner.593 
 
 Spain claimed that ABS’s classification services, among other things, provided 
reassurance to the Prestige’s owner of the vessel’s integrity, in conformity with ABS’s 
“applicable rules and requirements”594, formalizing it by the issuance of a classification 
certificate. Moreover, Spain highlighted the role of classification societies, maintaining 
that organizations like ABS “form crucial links in the maritime safety chain” 595and as 
such owed a duty to perform classification surveys with due care. Spain acknowledged 
that policy considerations carried a presumption against the negligence claim hence it 
detailed five key action by ABS as proof of reckless conduct: 
 
1. Not implementing changes to ABS’s classification rules; 
2. Mishandling sophisticated computer reports; 
3. Proceeding with classification after a cursory review of a field of office 
report; 
4. Ignoring a “red alert” fax from the Prestige’s then master; 
                                                        
591 Carbotrade III, approved in Carbotrade IV. See Basedow Supra n., pp 26-27 
592 Reino de Espana v American Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 691 F.3d 461, 463, 467, 2012 AMC 2113, 
2116, 2122 (2d Cir, 2012) 
593 See also: Naeemullah, Supra n. , pp 639-640 
594 Ibid at 462, 464, 2012 AMC at 2114, 2116 
595 Ibid at 462-63, 2012 AMC at 2114-15 
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5. Operating with international management issues. 596 
 
The case was a particularly lengthy one, lasting almost ten years.  The case’s 
convoluted procedural history is important in this case, and was described by 
Naeemullah as “a tactful, yet firm, repudiation of Spain’s claim.597Five years after the 
initial filing in 2003, the District Court for the Southern District of New York finally 
granted summary judgment for ABS due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In the 
following year, the court of Appeal for the Second Circuit vacated by summary order 
the lower court’s decision. In 2010, in remand, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for ABS once again, based on the fact that U.S. maritime law did not impose 
on ABS the claimed tort duty in favour of Spain. In 2012, a decade later after the sinking 
of the Prestige, on a second Appeal, the Second Circuit held that Spain did not 
“establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether ABS recklessly breached any 
duty that [it] might owe to Spain”, reaffirming the lower’s court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment for ABS.598 
 
The Second Circuit held that a third party, in the case a Coastal State , failed to 
meets its burden of proof in establishing a claim of reckless conduct hence preventing 
a tort recovery from a Classification Society for the environmental and economic 
damages caused by the sinking of the vessel classed by them.599 First of all, the court 
noted that unspecified “policy interests”, accepted by the plaintiff, prevented the 
application of the ordinary negligence standard suggested by precedent, hence the use 
of a recklessness standard.600 The court proceeded to analyse the case in order to 
determine the applicable law by applying the Lauritzen test. Thus, it was established 
                                                        
596 Ibid at 462 - 74, 212 AMC at 2120. See also: Naemullah Supra n. p 640 
597 Imran Naeemullah, ‘A Decade Later, $1 Billion Saved: The Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime 
Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental and Economic damages in Reino 
Unido de Espana v American Bureau of Shipping, Inc.’ in Tulane  Maritime Law Review Vol. 37:639, 
2013, p. 640 
598 Reino de Espana VAmerican Bureau of Shipping. Inc, 691 F.3d 461, 476, 2012 AMC 2113, 2116 (2d 
Cir. 2012) 
599 Ibid at 463, 2012 AMC at 2115  
600 Ibid at 466-67, 2012 AMC at 2121 
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that “the Prestige was flagged in the Bahamas; that the injured party [was] domiciled 
in Spain [and] the ship operator [was] domiciled in Liberia” but operated out of Greece; 
and that ABS was a U.S. corporation with its principal place of business in the United 
States. The court noted that the Lauritzen test did not neatly point in a single direction 
but militated towards the application of U.S. law.601 Thus, the court dismissed ABS ‘s 
contentions that the law of the flag (Bahamas) was the applicable one and held that U.S. 
law should govern the case. The court observed that Spain’s choice of law argument, 
though advantageous as it would enable Spain the possibility of recovery under the 
more liberal U.S law rather than the law of a more restrictive jurisdiction602, was not a 
“mere litigation tactic” as pledged by the defendants.  603 
 
After determining the applicable law, the court started to analyse the merits, 
specifically whether Spain had produced enough evidence to support its claims in the 
face of the district court’s granting summary judgment for ABS. The court, in order to 
facilitate its analysis, assumed that a basis for recovery existed.604 Once this assumption 
had been established, the court cited the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan to define 
its standards of recklessness: “[Did] the defendant … disregard [] an unjustifiably high 
risk of harm to another caused by the defendants actions... that was obvious and thus 
should have been known to the defendant [?]” 605The following discussion focused on 
evaluating the facts accompanying Spain’s five primary contentions in the context of 
the recklessness standard. Remarkably, this particular discussion neglected an analysis 
of the facts, opting for using Classification Society precedents.606 
                                                        
601 Ibid at 467-68, 2012 AMC at 2122-23 
602  Spanish law protects Classification Societies to an even greater extent than the United State does, 
hence a judgement in favour of Spain would be less likely under its law. However, the court when 
determining choice of law attempted to protect Spanish relation and establish important choice of law 
precedent. The court although acknowledging ABS’s claim that the U.S. law was a “mere litigation tactic, 
it undertook the Lauritzen analysis however disregarding numerous conclusive factors in order to 
determine that U.S. law would apply. (Reino de Espana v American Bureau of Shipping, 691 F.3d at 
467-68, 2012 AMC at 2121 -23) 
603 Ibid at 468, 2012 AMC at 2124 
604 Ibid at 468-69, 2012 AC at 2124 
605 Ibid at 468, 2012 AMC at 2124 
606  See Imran Naeemullah, ‘A Decade Later, $1 Billion Saved: The Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime 
Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental and Economic damages in Reino 
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Initially, the court reviewed the charge that ABS had failed to implement 
proposed changes to its classification rules, examining three issues in particular: 
requiring annual inspections of ballast tanks, requiring two surveyors at special surveys, 
and mandating use of “SafeHull” computer technology. 607All three assertions were 
dismissed by the court, which reasoned that no reasonable jury could find recklessness 
or wrongful conduct, besides, insufficient evidence existed to support a jury’s finding 
on the point of recklessness. Furthermore, with regards to the last issue, the court noted 
that ABS’s failure to use SafeHull was standard industry practice.  This finding of the 
court weighed heavily against Spain.608 
 
The court followed by analysing Spain’s second key allegation that ABS 
recklessly handled results obtained from SafeHull analyses on similar vessels. The 
court reached the conclusion that Spain did not demonstrate sufficient similarity 
between the other ships and the Prestige to oblige the use of those particular analyses 
in relation to the handling of their vessel. 609 
 
Furthermore, the court decided that it was insufficient evidence that ABS 
reviewed a summary of the gauging report (which concerns the thickness of the steel in 
the vessel’s structure) from its field office in Hong Kong, instead of looking at the full 
detail of the report, to conclude that ABS’s conduct was reckless. The court found the 
three pieces of evidence Spain used in support of its assertions insufficient to prove 
anything other than mere negligence, whilst the test was ‘recklessness’.610 
 
 When analysing the fourth core allegation, i.e. the fax sent by the Prestige’s then 
master to ABS warning about the vessel’s mechanical and structural issues, the court 
                                                        
Unido de Espana v American Bureau of Shipping, Inc.’ in Tulane  Maritime Law Review Vol. 37:639, 
2013, pp 645-646 
607 Ibid at 469-71, 2012 AMC at 2125-28 
608 Ibid . See Also Naeemullah, Supra n. p. 646 
609 Ibid at 470-72, 2012 AMC at 2126-29 
610 Ibid at 472-73, 2012 AMC at 2129-30 
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focused on the master sending the fax to an ABS subsidiary, rather than directly to its 
executives.  The court dismissed Spain’s argument that the subsidiary’s knowledge 
should be imputed [to ABS]” based on the lack of evidence that the fax had been 
forward to the society’s appropriate management. The court reasoned, quite oddly, that 
even if it were assumed that the subsidiary was an ABS agent, there was no evidence 
that the fax fell within the scope of its responsibilities. Moreover, the court reasoned 
that even if it assumed otherwise, a jury would lack evidence to determine that the fax 
could “form the basis of any liability of ABS to Spain”.611 
 
 Finally, the court examined Spain’s contention of putative evidence of internal 
management disarray constituting reckless conduct. In order to reach a decision the 
court considered: the presence of the Prestige on an internal watch list; ABS’s failure 
to heed one of its surveyor’s recommendations; and a situation in one of ABS’s field 
offices where management did not support a surveyor in a dispute with the vessel’s 
operators over her condition.612 The court succinctly concluded that once again the 
evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on recklessness, 
either separate or in aggregate.  613 
 
 In conclusion, the court diplomatically acknowledged the injuries suffered by 
Spain, while ruling that there was not enough evidence to satisfy the standard for 
reckless conduct.  Thus, by applying the Farmer recklessness standard, the court 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favour of ABS. 
Nevertheless, the court carefully stated that it had not established a test for a third party, 
coastal nation, tort claim against a Classification Society, nor had it determined the 
viability of such a claim.614 
 
                                                        
611 Ibid, 2012 AMC at 2133-34 
612 Ibid, 2012 AMC at 2134 
613 Ibid at 474-75, 2012 AMC at 2134 
614 Ibid at 475-76, 2012 AMC at 2136 
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 The Second Circuit’s decision is consistent with the traditionally protective 
approach towards classification societies, and it seemed to take into consideration the 
fact that the price charged by a classification does not permit the imposition of 
disproportionate liability on classification societies.  Nevertheless, the decision in the 
Prestige strongly deviates from the court’s recent decisions and reasoning in favour of 
permitting third-part claims against them. It appears that the value of the damage 
pledged in classification society liability cases has a heavy weight in the court’s 
decision making process. The decision of the Prestige contrasts greatly with the 
decision taken in the Erika615. One of the relevant factors explaining this difference 
may be that the judgment in the Erika case took place in France, also being the place 
where the accident took place.616 
  
 Criticism regarding the Prestige decision contains various grounds. The fact 
that the court decided that U.S. law was the applicable law, disregarding numerous 
factors in a debatable diplomatic overture, might create a precedent for plaintiffs in 
similar cases trying to seek the advantages of U.S. law. Furthermore, the court’s 
reasoning was unorthodox, as it did not make use of the extensive case law on the 
subject, relying almost exclusively on a single Supreme Court case, giving the Second 
Circuit the option of employing a different method of analysis, hence leading to 
different results in future cases. For instance, the court neglected using benchmark cases 
such as Sundance Cruises and Otto Candies. The latter could have been particularly 
helpful as it examined the Great American duty of due care; thus the Fifth’s Circuit 
reasoning in this particular case could have been extremely helpful.617 
 
Nevertheless, commentators believe that the decision in the Prestige is unlikely 
to have a permanent impact on classification societies’ third part liability in cases of 
                                                        
615 The Erika will be analyzed further along this work 
616 See: : Imran Naeemullah, ‘A Decade Later, $1 Billion Saved: The Second Circuit Relieves a Maritime 
Classification Society of Unprecedented Liability for Environmental and Economic damages in Reino 
Unido de Espana v American Bureau of Shipping, Inc.’ in Tulane  Maritime Law Review Vol. 37:639, 
2013, p.648 
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case against a Coastal State. Naeemullah pointed out three reasons why this is likely to 
be the case: “first, choice of law considerations played a significant role in the court’s 
analysis; second, the court employed an unusual methodology in deciding this case by 
applying minimum precedent; and third, the court’s reasoning, examined in the context 
of precedent, suggests a different result in a future third party coastal nation due care 
claim”. 
 
Indeed, the Second Circuit has in previous cases demonstrated its willingness 
to expand classification society liability in a third-party context. As already discussed 
in this paper, in Sundance the court implied that a third party reliance claim might be 
viable. In Carbotrade, the Second Circuit sufficiently broadened the scope of 
classification societies’ liability to the extent that the Fifth Circuit was able to apply its 
reasoning in Otto Candies, holding a classification society liable to a third party claim.  
These courts decisions suggest that the Second Circuit could have ruled differently in 
the case of the Prestige, if Spain had produced more factual and evidential support. 618 
 
 Naeemullah suggests that the Prestige decision left the position of classification 
societies’ liability to third parties unclear in the U.S., as the court at the same time as it 
“continues a tradition protecting maritime classification societies from liability, adding 
some degree of stability”, also “upends its typical approach to deciding classification 
society cases, omitting a discussion of precedent that could have, for example, provided 
context for the court’s determination that a jury could not ascertain whether ABS acted 
recklessly in its handling of SafeHull analyses performed on vessels similar to the 
Prestige.”619 
  
 Regardless of the far from satisfactory decision reached in the Prestige case, 
from the above analysis, it can be perceived that the United States courts’ decisions are 
more flexible, while still giving significant consideration to similar concerns raised by 
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the UK Courts’ (i.e. reasonableness- specially considering cost and lack of insurance) 
approach to imposing third party liability on classification societies, especially 
regarding an injured third party, which an abandoned seafarer often will be.  
 
IV.2.3 – France 
 
 The position of the French courts does not seem to differ much from the position 
of the two already analysed jurisdictions, with French commentators having expressed 
strong concerns regarding the imposition of third party liability on classification 
societies. Their concerns seem to follow a similar but perhaps more disorganized path 
of reasoning to the concerns expressed by the UK and US Courts. Indeed, French 
commentators believe that the imposition of such liability could turn classification 
societies in a form of secondary insurer (assureur bis) of the shipping industry, and that 
basing classification society liability towards third parties on the general clause of the 
French Civil Code620 would be too severe, considering that the limitation of liability 
clauses negotiated by classification societies with their contracting parties may not be 
enforced vis-a-vis third parties. 621 Following this reasoning, some commentators 
suggest for classification societies to be placed under a quasi-contractual regime by 
relying on the doctrine of essemble contractualles, which provides that the duties 
towards a third party may be assessed in the light of a preceding contract even though 
the injured third party was not a party to the contract. 622  
 
A second stream of French commentary seems to suggest, sometimes with 
reference to German law, that since contracting parties may also have obligations 
towards particular third parties, they are entitled to damages when these are breached. 
However, since liability in this case would be based on a breach of a classification 
                                                        
620 Almost the entirety of French Tort Law rests on five articles of the French Civil Code, the most 
important being the general clause contained in article 1382, complemented by article 1383. The first 
article requires that the harm caused must be attributable to a faute, culpable behaviour on the part of the 
defendant. 
621  Boisson, ‘Responsibilite des societies de classification. Fault-it remettre en cause les principles du 
droit matime?’in [1995] DMF, pp. 109 -130 
622 Ibid 
228 
 
society’s agreement, this would in principle entitle it to raise limitation of liability 
clauses agreed therein as defences against an action for damages brought by third 
parties.623 In order to fully understand this argument it would be necessary to conduct 
a more thorough analysis of French Contractual law, which due to time constraints is 
not possible to be achieved in this thesis. At first, it is not clear how limitation of 
liability in the contract could apply to a third party, unless this was expressly provided 
in the contract. Indeed, it is difficult to make any type of assumption without a more 
detailed analysis of French law, however it seems to be a fragile attempt to avoid the 
argument that imposition of third party liability on a Classification Society would create 
an imbalance within the shipping industry.  
 
It is important to note, however, that French Courts have already held obiter 
that classification societies cannot invoke contractual limitation of liability clauses vis-
à-vis third parties.624 Therefore, French Courts seem to not concur with the above lines 
of reasoning.  
 
There seem to be some suggestions that French courts agree that classification 
societies have a legitimate interest in invoking limitation of liability against third parties 
as contained in their rules. Nevertheless, French Courts have emphasised that an 
exclusion or limitation of liability is not possible in cases of gross negligence or wilful 
intent in advance.625 
 
Concurring to a great extent with US Courts, in 1923, the French Supreme Court 
(Cour de Cassation) held in the Armor case that a classification society might be liable 
towards the buyers of the vessel.626 The case concerned the negligent issue of a class 
certificate by Bureau Veritas confirming the class of a vessel regardless of its clear non-
                                                        
623 Delebecque, ‘Noute sous CA Versailles, 21.3.1996’ [1996] DMF 721, 731 
624 CA Versailles 21 March 1996, [1996] DMF 223 – Energo with a case note by Le Clere.  
625 Rodiere/ du Pontavice, Droit Maritime (12th ed. Dalloz-Sirey 1997), no.46; ; Boisson, “The liability 
of Classification Societies in the Maritime Industry Context” in J. Lux (ed), Classification Societies 
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conformity with the class rules, the surveyor having been aware of the vessel’s pending 
sale, hence also aware of the buyer’s reliance on the class certificate. The court awarded 
FF 60,000 as damages ruling that the surveyor had acted with gross negligence.627 The 
judgement was later confirmed by the Cour de Cassation, which held that classification 
societies cannot exclude liability in advance in relation to their negligence or that of 
their agents when dealing with cases of gross negligence and wilful intent (faute lourde 
and dol). Such limitation is “illegal and contrary to public order” (illicite et contraire a 
l’ordre public).628 The decision was confirmed in following cases, such as the Tunis.629 
 
 Therefore, under French law, classification societies may be found liable to 
third parties if it is proven that their surveyors have acted with grossly negligence or 
wilful intent. Furthermore, French criminal courts have condemned classification 
societies and their employees respectively to indemnify seafarers’ families whose lives 
were lost at sea whilst aboard substandard vessels.630   
 
Indeed, French courts seem to be inclined to hold classification societies liable 
to third parties in cases of substandard shipping. In the Wellborn case, the court of 
Appeal held NKK liable to third parties (in this case the cargo insurers) for omission, 
as it failed to revoke the vessel’s class timely despite its degree of corrosion, which was 
far above the classification society’s rules. The court characterized the omission of the 
classification society as faute lourde, reasoning that if the class had been revoked in 
due time the ship would not have sailed and consequently not sank.  The court also held 
that the negligence of the shipowner could not exonerate the classification society for 
                                                        
627 CA Paris 11 February 1922, (1923) 3 DOR 384 ff. - Amor 
628 Supra. Cass 
629 CA tunis 23 February 1955, [1956] DMF 87, 93 – Chalutier C.T.2 
630  In the Cape-de –la-Hague CA Douai 6 July 1978, [1981] DMF 153 ff., a manager employed by 
Bureau Veritas was ordered to indemnify the family of a crew member who died in the sinking of the 
vessel. Following the same line the court of the Number One impose similar sanctions to NKK 
Classification Society – Tribunnal Correctionel de Saint Nazaire 18 March 2003, [2003] DMF 1068 – 
Number One with case note by Proutier-Maulion.  
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its wrongdoing.631 The decision taken in the Erika case reaffirms this position of the 
French Courts.  
 
The Erika incident has already been discussed in this chapter, and has been 
quoted numerous times, as it raises several different issues. The vessel was a nearly 25 
year old tanker, registered in Malta and controlled by two Liberian companies, being 
technically managed by an Italian company. The vessel’s class certificate had last been 
renewed on November 24, 1999. At the time of the accident, the vessel was time-
chartered by a Bahamian company to an intermediary subsidiary of a large French 
based oil company. Due to unfavourable weather conditions, the tanker broke apart on 
December 12th, 1999, just one day after leaving the Port of Dunkirk. The incident 
polluted over 400 kilometres of coastline. 632 
 
The incident is to this date one of the most commented upon substandard 
shipping cases. Due to its magnitude it should not be surprising that the Erika litigation 
took a mammoth eight years and four months to conclude its trial involving scores of 
witnesses, voluminous documentary evidence, and testimony from individual experts 
as well as detailed submissions from judge appointed boards of enquiry, with the 
judgment finally being rendered on 16 January 2008, nearly 10 years after the incident 
took place. 633 
  
 After thoroughly analysing all the aspects of the case, including the vessel’s 
ownership history, operation, management and inspections, the court found culpable 
conduct from not only the shipowner, but also from the Classification Society and the 
oil charterer. Thus, the court held the shipowner and the Classification Society 
criminally and civilly liable for the accident, ruling that they had deliberately acted 
                                                        
631 CA Versailles 9 December 2004, [2005] DMF 313 – Wellborn with case not by Delebecque 
632 The Erika, No. 9983895010 at 86, Erika Judgment at 86 
633 Ibid a 1,3, Erika Judgment at 1,3 
231 
 
together to reduce the amount of steel used for structural repairs in order to save costs, 
putting in jeopardy the safety of the vessel, her crew and the marine environment. 634 
 
 The court concluded that the shipowner could not have been unaware that the 
minimal steel repairs jeopardized the safety of the ship, creating the severe risk of an 
accident at sea, with the same being true for the Classification Society’s inspector, who 
had directly participated in approving the thickness measurements and retained the sole 
contractual power to grant a temporary Classification Society certificate.  Therefore, 
the court ruled that both had acted negligently in securing the vessel’s safety and 
structural integrity.635 
 
The Erika judgment exposed the unscrupulous practice of manipulating steel 
thickness measurements to reduce structural repairs and save costs on shipyards bills, 
a critical process that should have been closely supervised and controlled by the 
Classification Society. Thus, without the Classification Society’s complicity, the Erika 
would never have secured a class certificate, which was issued notwithstanding “serious 
anomalies”.636 
 
Commentators believe the Erika to be a ground-breaking case due to its non- 
reliance upon well-entrenched principles that have limited exposure for pollution 
liabilities to be placed upon shipowners and their insurers.637 This author believes that 
this is not necessarily the case, as the Erika ruling did not go against any well recognized 
maritime law principles, it merely kept the French courts’ approach that classification 
societies could not escape liability in cases of omissions or gross negligence.  
 
                                                        
634 Ibid, at 190, Erika Judgment at 205 -14 
635 Ibid 
636 Ibid at 213, Erika Judgment at 213 
637 See:  See: V. Foley and C. Nolan, ‘The Erika Judgment – Environmental Liability and Places of 
Refuge: A Sea Change in Civil Criminal Responsibility that the Maritime Community Must Heed’ in 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2008, Vol.33:41,  p. 45 
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Nevertheless, it is an undeniable truth, as can be seen from the analysis of the 
UK, American and even French cases, that courts have shown a reluctance to hold 
classification societies liable for rendering certificates to vessels which were later 
considered to be unseaworthy, mainly due to shipowners’ non-delegable duty to 
provide a seaworthy vessel. 638Therefore, due to the notoriety of the Erika case and its 
meticulous assessment made by the French courts, and the decision to hold 
classification societies, shipowners and others equally liable for the disaster, it is 
understandable why the case may be perceived as a warning to the shipping industry as 
a whole about the need to comply with the existing safety shipping measures, due to 
the risk of facing criminal charges and potentially limitless civil liability for 
endangering seafarers and harming the environment. 639However, this seems to be a 
very optimistic perception, as the Prestige decision which followed the Erika proved 
that courts are still reluctant to hold classification societies liable, and much more so to 
impose upon them limitless civil liability. 
 
 The court in the Erika case assessed four types of criminal offences: 
unintentional fault for failure to comply with an obligation of prudence or safety 
provided for by law or regulation, endangerment to others or directly exposing others 
to immediate risk of death or injury, wilfully omitting or failing to fight a disaster, and 
complicity in endangerment of others. Every offence, with the exception of the third 
(which was a case of omission), involved unintentional negligent conduct by the 
persons or entities that either caused the oil spill or “did not take the necessary actions 
to avoid it”. In its judgment, the court rejected the argument that the French criminal 
laws for pollution offences did not extend to other members of the maritime safety 
chain.640 
                                                        
638  See:  H. Honka, ‘The Classification Societies System and its Problems with Special Reference to the 
Liability of Classification Societies’ in 19 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, 13-30 (1994) 
639 See:  V. Foley and C. Nolan, ‘The Erika Judgment – Environmental Liability and Places of Refuge: 
A Sea Change in Civil Criminal Responsibility that the Maritime Community Must Heed’ in Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal, 2008, Vol.33:41,  p. 46 
640 Tribunal de Grande instance [T.G.I] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, l l eme ch., Jan. 16, 
2008, No.9934895010, slip op. at 90 (Erika) translated in the Language Works, Inc., Erika Judgment 90 
(Apr. 22, 2008), at 89-90 
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 Regarding the civil aspect of the claim, the court recognized that the 1992 CLC 
created a legal regime for oil pollution victims, expressly ruling that the Convention 
did not deprive the French Courts of its jurisdiction in claims for damages usually open 
to civil parties, since none of the parties to the claim was immune under the Convention. 
641 The decision differs from the American Court decision in the Reino Unido de 
Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping (Prestige) where it was ruled that the CLC 
deprived jurisdiction to adjudicate Spain’s claims against ABS642. However, as 
discussed in the previous section, this was a rather controversial decision especially 
since it was inconsistent with the case of In Re Amoco Cadiz, where the CLC was first 
taken into consideration, where the court recognized that the CLC did not bind the law 
of the USA, since the country is not a member state signatory, hence the convention 
could not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over U.S. based companies.643 
 
When analysing the Erika, the court considered that the shipowner’s liquidity 
problems should have been perceived as a clear warning to the Classification Society 
(RINA) that the shipowner would not be able to meet the maintenance expenses 
required to keep the vessel in the required condition for the issuance of class 
certificates. Regardless of this, the Classification Society continued issuing 
classification certificates hence certifying that the vessel was still suitable to carry 
petroleum based cargos, despite her substandard repairs.644Therefore, the court held 
that the Classification Society, together with the shipowner and the technical manager 
was jointly liable for endangering the safety of the vessel, exposing the crew, the ship 
and the environment to a particularly severe risk, confirmed by the sinking of the vessel 
and the oil pollution that followed.645 
 
                                                        
641 Ibid at 100, Erika Judgment at 100 
642 Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459-60, 2008 AMC 83, 89 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
643 In re Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Fr. On Mar. 16, 1978, MDL Docket No. 376, 1984 U.S.  Dist. 
Lexis 17480, at 129, 1984 AMC 2123, 2190 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 1984) 
644 Ibid, at 207, 213, Erika Judgment at 207, 213 
645 Ibid 
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The court noted several failures of classification while conducting its surveys, 
perhaps the major confirmation of the Classification Society’s negligence being the fact 
that only days before Erika’s final voyage, a second Classification Society inspector 
had identified serious corrosion issues and “suspicious” repair work that should not 
have existed, which was sixteen months after the survey of the repairs that the vessel 
had to undergo in order to remain in class had been issued. Notwithstanding this, RINA 
allowed an extension of the required period of examination of this serious corrosion, 
allowing the vessel to remain in class and carry on its habitual trade. The court 
considered the classification a neglectful act and a “fault of imprudence” that caused 
the accident at sea.646 
 
The court concluded that without the due repairs the Erika’s class certificate 
could never have been renewed. The renewal of the class certificate was considered by 
the court to have been a wilful violation of several safety obligations imposed by the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International 
Safety Management Code (ISM Code), hence the Classification Society was held to 
have directly exposed the crew members to an immediate risk of death by “shipwreck 
or drowning” and committed the offense of endangerment. 647 
 
Furthermore, the court rejected Flag State immunity as defence grounds for the 
Classification Society.648Also denying the Classification Society any protection under 
article III (4) (b) of the 1992 CLC because it did not participate in the navigational or 
nautical operation of the Erika’s voyage.649 
 
The Erika case’s judgment can easily be considered the most important 
judgment dealing with a classification society’s third party liability, due partly to its 
notoriety, but also because of the court’s careful and meticulous analysis in the case. 
                                                        
646 Ibid, at 203-217 
647 Erika, No. 9934895010 at 228, Erika Judgment at 228 
648 Ibid, at 176 
649 Ibid at 235 
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Nevertheless, it is not clear if the decision will have the desired impact as some would 
hope650 for in holding classification societies liable to third parties, as evidence suggest 
that the Erika was based on previous court precedent, and that courts worldwide still 
have a strong reluctance towards finding Classification Societies liable. In particular, 
the United Kingdom courts, which until today, have never held a Classification Society 
liable to third parties. It is unfortunate, however, that in the case of the Erika, no claim 
against the Classification Society was made concerning the affected crew members, 
which might be due to the international aspect of its crew, making it difficult (and 
expensive) for them to file a law suit in a French Court. Nonetheless, the decision is a 
clear precedent for possible seafarers’ claims against Classification Societies.  
 
IV.4 – Concluding Remarks 
 
 As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, Classification Societies are one of 
the most important stakeholders in the shipping industry, even setting up rules and 
standards to be followed. Their existence dates from before international regulations, 
and even the IMO, were established, and it can be said that they were the first 
institutions setting rules and standards to be followed in a harmonized manner within 
the shipping industry.  Their role developed throughout time, and with the advent of 
international regulations, they also became responsible for certifying vessel 
compliance. Currently, they can still be considered to be exercising a regulatory role, 
with the ICAS having a consultative status within the IMO, and an inspectional role, 
since they are in charge of certifying vessel compliance with rules and regulations, 
including international conventions. As such renowned shipping industry stakeholders, 
it would be difficult to imagine that they would not play a role in preventing 
‘abandonment of seafarers’ from happening.  
                                                        
650 Some American scholars believe that the Erika decision “provides compelling and persuasive 
authority for U.S. courts to continue to build upon existing precedent to hold classification societies liable 
for damages caused to third parties due to negligent and reckless conduct in in condoning substandard 
repair practices and issuing classification certificates to substandard ships” - V. Foley and C. Nolan, ‘The 
Erika Judgment – Environmental Liability and Places of Refuge: A Sea Change in Civil Criminal 
Responsibility that the Maritime Community Must Heed’ in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2008, 
Vol.33:41,  p. 71 
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 Indeed, Classification Societies through their inspection system can certify that 
a vessel is not substandard, and therefore is a safe place for the seafarer to work. It is 
well noted that these institutions cannot certify the vessel’s seaworthiness through the 
entire validity of their certificate, but they can (and should) point out deficiencies and 
assess the condition of the vessel at the time of the issuance of the certificate; a 
certificate negligently issued cannot be taken lightly. Furthermore, Classification 
Societies acting as ROs also certify the vessel’s compliance with the MLC, hence 
certifying that seafarers are having their minimum rights respected.  Thus, an act of 
negligence by a classification society may (and in most cases will) amount or lead to 
abandonment of seafarers. 651 
  
Nevertheless, despite the Classification Societies’ vital role, as the Chapter 
showed, their liability is often not something easily established by courts around the 
world. Every court seems to concur that seaworthiness is a non-delegable duty of the 
shipowner, and hence a Classification Society cannot be held liable for the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel.  However, it is important to note that this reasoning has 
so far only being obtained in cargo claims, covered by international instruments which 
provide for the non-delegable duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
Taking under consideration that there is no universal concept for seaworthiness, it is 
unclear if courts would sustain the same reasoning for claims other than cargo claims.  
Furthermore, this author believes that the shipowner duty of providing a seaworthy 
vessel should be interpreted as a duty to exercise due diligence in keeping the vessel 
                                                        
651 Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU acknowledging the intrinsic connection between classification societies 
and Flag States for several years have presented a submission to the IMO addressing the correlation 
between flags and ROs working on their behalf. This is also reflected in their annual Reports. See: Paris 
MoU, Press Release- ‘Launch of Concentrated Inspection Campaign on MLC,2006’ ( Paris MoU, 28th 
July 2016) <https://www.parismou.org/launch-concentrated-inspection-campaign-mlc2006> last 
accessed on 08/08/2016; 
Paris MoU, ‘Press Release – 2015 Annual Report Paris MoU on PSC’ (Paris MoU, 1st July 2016) < 
https://www.parismou.org/2015-annual-report-paris-mou-psc>, last accessed on 08/08/2016; and Paris 
MoU Reports available on the Paris MoU website. 
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seaworthy during the entire validity of the classification society certificate and 
accordingly classification societies’ liability should be assessed in a case by case basis. 
 
Accordingly, for Classification Societies’ liability to third parties to be 
recognized, it is necessary for causality to be established between the Classification 
Society’s act and the damage, it being also necessary for a duty of care to be established 
between it and the third party. Furthermore, policy considerations can weigh heavily 
against the imposition of a duty to care upon Classification Societies, and as the chapter 
demonstrated, the advent of the MLC amendments may make this imposition 
particularly difficult for some ‘abandonment’ circumstances. 
 
 English courts seem to have greater difficulty establishing a duty of care for 
CSs, indeed England is perhaps the most reluctant jurisdiction to establish 
Classification Society liability towards third parties. The analysis of France and the US, 
however, demonstrated that liability can be established if negligence is proven. 
 
It is important to note, as the above analysis showed, that currently there is no 
case law regarding a seafarer’s case against a Classification Society. Nevertheless, 
through the obiter dicta of Classification Society cases, or analogous cases, the courts 
have demonstrated that they may be more inclined to determine liability in the case of 
an injured third party. Therefore, it can be presumed that this would apply to seafarers. 
Furthermore, although Classification Societies can hardly be considered to be directors 
of a company, the recognition of states of the need to establish responsibilities and 
liabilities to ensure the health and safety of work environments cannot be taken lightly, 
considering the role that Classification Societies play in certifying vessel compliance 
with rules and regulations and therefore their safety.  Accordingly, it is difficult to 
imagine that no liability could be imposed upon a Classification Society that acted 
negligently in the issuance of a certificate, and hence assisted ‘abandonment’ to occur. 
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Chapter V - Insurance – Financial Funds/ Provisions 
 
 
It is a fact that an insurer’s responsibility mostly arises after an incident that 
triggers an insurance pay-out. However, as this chapter will demonstrate P&I Clubs 
have a much more important role within the shipping industry than merely 
compensating beneficiaries of insurance.  
 
As shall be demonstrated by the analysis of the origins of P&I Cubs and their 
history, similarly to Classification Societies, P&I Clubs existed before the IMO and any 
international maritime convention, and although they might not have the same 
regulatory role as Classification Societies, which set rules and standards, they do 
possess a consultative status within the IMO, and their opinions do possess significant 
weight in the decision making process.  For instance, the delay in setting the Financial 
Security system for abandonment of seafarer cases as provided by the MLC can be to 
some extent attributed to P&I Clubs’ scepticism towards it.652 
 
As this Chapter will demonstrate, P&I Clubs’ importance is widely recognized 
among the shipping industry and they are often more reliable and easy to be located 
than shipowners. Therefore, it makes sense for vessels to only be allowed to sail if 
properly insured, so requiring the establishment of insurance funds by international 
conventions. Insurance seems to have been the solution found to ensure that victims of 
an irresponsible shipowner will be compensated, even if the latter cannot be located or 
has gone bankrupt.  
 
As previously discussed in this thesis,653 one of the major causes of 
abandonment of seafarer is the shipowner’s insolvency or financial hardship, situations 
                                                        
652 See pp.272-273 
653 See pp.57-59 and 105 
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which will often affect insurance, since the payments of the insurance premium will 
likely cease.  Thus, insurances schemes such as compulsory insurance and the Financial 
Security system provided by the MLC provide for insurance to be in place, also and 
specifically in cases of insolvency. As this chapter will show, P&I Clubs might be the 
best way to establish this sort of insurance, as they work through memberships, it 
therefore being easy to establish a pooling system of insurance. 
 
However, compulsory insurance and most importantly the Financial Security 
system established by the MLC are limited to very specific situations, not covering the 
full gamut of abandonment situations a seafarer can be exposed to. Therefore, this 
chapter shall analyse P&I Clubs’ third party liability, as well as the ‘pay to be paid rule’ 
and its exceptions.  
 
Although P&I shall represent a great part of this chapter due to its importance 
in the shipping industry, other forms of insurance relating to seafarers, especially since 
the MLC Financial Security system does not require to be provided by P&I Clubs, shall 
also be analysed whenever relevant. 
 
Finally, a comparison between the MLC Financial Security Scheme and 
compulsory insurance in maritime law shall be drawn. The reason for this is, as this 
chapter will show, both types of insurance possess similarities of purpose and 
procedure. Therefore, an analysis of compulsory insurance shall show possible 
problems that the Financial Security Scheme may face, considering that it is not yet in 
force, and especially considering that in practice both type of insurance can be said to 
impose liability caps.  
 
V. 1 - P&I Clubs – their inception 
 
Unseaworthy/substandard vessels have always been a major concern of the 
shipping industry in general. However, perhaps more so than the loss of lives caused 
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by the practice, it is financial losses that have caused concern. This can be clearly 
perceived by the Westhope654, which sank in 1870 and would prove to be another 
milestone in the history of P&I insurance.  The vessel was carrying cargo bound to 
Cape Town, but instead of proceeding to its destination after loading, it deviated and 
loaded some additional cargo, and was later lost en route to Cape Town. If it were not 
for the deviation, the shipowners would have avoided any liability for the cargo, by 
virtue of the extensive exclusion clauses in the contract of carriage. The court held that 
due to the deviation the shipowners could not rely on the exclusion clauses hence being 
liable for the loss of the cargo. At the time, cargo liability was not covered by the 
protecting societies, as shipowners were normally able to escape responsibility for any 
cargo loss or damage by relying on exclusion clauses. However, the Westhope 
demonstrated that this defence was not infallible. As a response to the case, in 1874, 
the first indemnity Club was formed to provide cover liability for loss of/damage to 
cargo, then known as indemnity risk. Thus, the protecting societies amended their rules 
to provide indemnity cover henceforth becoming protection and indemnity (P&I) 
Clubs.655 
 
A P&I Club, in its current form, can be briefly explained as:  
 
“(…) an independent, non-profit making mutual insurance association, 
providing cover for its shipowner and charterer members against third 
                                                        
654 The Westenhope (1870) Unreported. Cited in  Mustill, Jonathan Gilman, QC; Professor Robert M 
Merkin; Claire Blanchard, QC; and Mark Templeman, QC (eds), Arnould: Law of Marine Insurance and 
Average, (18th edition, Vol. I, Sweet & Maxweel 2016) ISBN:  9780414034938, p.130 
655 The need for insurance for cargo liability was further reinforced in 1893 with the US Harter Act, 
forbidding the use of exclusion clauses in the Bill of Ladings, gaining international reinforcement  - , 
Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (5th Edition, Gard 2002),  p.67. 
It is worth noting that most P&I Clubs offer a small summary of their history and this will often include 
partial history of marine insurance. They often stress their importance in the shipping industry; 
“(…)during the Second World War all government instructions to Shipowners were sent in secret 
communications via the Club” & “The Club has an influential and authoritative position in maritime 
affairs, taking part in consultations with IMO, BIMCO and other organisations working in the maritime 
field, and playing a major role in the International Group of P&I Clubs” –  The London P&I Club, at: 
http://www.londonpandi.com/about/history/ See also: The Budd Group, at  http://www.budd-pni.com/pi-
Club-history-the-budd-group.asp and The shipowners’ Group at http://www.shipownersClub.com/160-
years/, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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party liabilities relating to the use and operation of ships. Each Club is 
controlled by its members through a board of directors or committee 
elected from the membership. 
Clubs cover a wide range of liabilities including personal injury to crew, 
passengers and others on board, cargo loss and damage, oil pollution, 
wreck removal and dock damage. Clubs also provide a wide range of 
services to their members on claims, legal issues and loss prevention, and 
often play a leading role in the management of casualties.”656 
 
According to Hazelhood Practical Guide on P&I Club, a typical Club provides 
indemnity insurance in respect of a member’s liabilities triggered by events such as: 
 
• Collisions and non contact damage  
• Damage to fixed and floating objects  
• Cargo claims  
• Property on board  
• Loss of life, personal injury and illness  
• Passengers  
• Crew liabilities  
• Supernumeraries and others on board  
• Fines  
• Inquiries and criminal proceedings  
• Quarantine expenses  
• Stowaways, etc.  
• Diversion expenses  
• Life salvage  
• Unrecoverable general average  
• Ship’s proportion of general average  
• Liabilities relating to the wreck of the entered vessel  
                                                        
656 G P&I website, online at: www.igpandi.org/., last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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• Pollution  
• Towage contracts  
• Expenses incurred pursuant to directions of the Club  
• The “omnibus rules” 657 
 
  P&I Clubs are a undeniably a good solution for shipowners to get insurance at 
low prices, since the Clubs work on a mutual and non-profit basis, characteristics which 
are similar to those of a Classification Society. Furthermore, the Clubs established a 
reinsurance system to deal with unexpected large claims and supplementary calls.658 
The first Club pooling agreement between six British Clubs was concluded on the 10th 
of April 1899, and they became known as the London Group, subsequently changing 
its name to International Group once it started allowing non-British Clubs to enter the 
agreement.659 The reinsurance system works by way of a pooling agreement, which 
means that the Clubs agree to pool claims in excess of a specified figure (an Excess 
Loss Pool). In summary, the members of a P&I Club (primary insurer) will pay up to a 
specified figure, and in case the claim exceeds this, the reinsurance will enter into 
action, with all the members of all the Clubs in the pool agreement sharing the risk and 
contributing up to a fixed (more generous) amount.660 
                                                        
657  Steven J Hazelwood and David Semark, P&I Clubs: Law and Practice, (4th  ed., Lloyd ́s List Press 
2010),  p.124 
658 Ibid, p 365. 
659There are thirteen separate and independent principal Clubs in the International Group:  
• American Steamshipowners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc  
• Assuranceforeningen Skuld  
• Gard P&I (Bermuda) Ltd.  
• The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited  
• The Japan Shipowners' Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association  
• The London Steam-Shipowners' Mutual Insurance Association  Limited  
• The North of England Protecting & Indemnity Association Limited   
• The Shipowners' Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association (Luxembourg)  
• The Standard Steamshipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Association (Bermuda) 
Limited  
• The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited  
• The Swedish Club  
• United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association  (Bermuda) Limited  
• The West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association  (Luxembourg)  
 For more information see: http://www.ukpandi.com/about-us/international-group-of-pi-Clubs/pooling-
reinsurance/ 
660 Steven J Hazelwood and David Semark, P&I Clubs: Law and Practice, (4th  ed., Lloyd ́s List Press 
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Therefore, members of the International Group Clubs (IG P&I Clubs), due to 
their share of claims through the Pooling system have a common interest in loss 
prevention and control, and in the maintenance of quality standards throughout the 
group. This follows parameters similar to the International Association of Classification 
Societies (ICAS), as seen in the previous section. The same is true of the fact that the 
IG P&I Clubs acknowledge that Clubs (as do Classification Societies) compete for 
business, and that the pooling system however makes it more attractive to shipowners 
to contract with the group’s members due to the larger cover potential of a broader 
‘insurance safety net’.661 Although the principal function of the IG P&I Clubs is to 
provide the insurance pool and arrange market reinsurance, as they represent 90 percent 
of the world ́s ocean tonnage (again in a similar mould to the ICAS), the members of 
the IG P&I Clubs use their position to defend their interests in international conventions 
and legislation that can affect shipowner liabilities. Moreover, the IG P&I Clubs, like 
the ICAS, can also be said to have consultative status within the IMO and even ILO. 
The group participated in the April meeting of the Maritime Labour Convention Special 
Tripartite Committee (STC) held at the International Labour Organisation that 
discussed the amendments of the MLC regarding contractual claims for death and 
injury and abandonment of seafarers, including payment of back wages and other 
                                                        
2010), p.325 
The International Pool Agreement: 
• Regulates how Clubs accept entries from owners who wish to move their fleet 
from one Club to another  
• Sets out how Clubs are to quote rates on renewal and what information the Clubs 
are allowed and obliged to share with each other  
• Imposes sanction in case of a member do not follow the rules stipulated in the 
IGA  
• Requires to the Clubs to disclose the ratio of their operating cost to their premium 
and investment income. 
The most recent version of the agreement is from 20 of February 2013, and can be download at: 
http://static.igpandi.org/igpi_website/media/article_attachments/International_Group_Agreement_2013
.pdf, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
661 “Although the Group Clubs compete with each other for business, it is to the benefit of all shipowners 
insured by Group Clubs for the Clubs to pool their larger risks.” See: http://www.igpandi.org/group-
agreements 
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entitlements, being a part of the International Shipping Federation delegation.662The IG 
P&I Clubs can be said to carry out this “consultative” function in relation to:  
 
• inter-governmental bodies such as IMO, UNCITRAL and OECD  
• national governments and the EU 663 
• other industry organisations such as Intertanko, BIMCO, OCIMF 
etc. 664  
 
V. 2 - P&I Clubs and Seafarers 
 
 As seen in Chapter I, until the advent of the Maritime Labour Convention, there 
were not any international conventions (or at least there were not any that did not have 
pending ratifications waiting to be enforced) directly governing liability in respect of 
illness, injury or death of seafarers. This is not to say that seafarers were left completely 
unprotected, since other International Instruments and national legislations already 
provided for their rights. Prior to the MLC, and the many International Instruments of 
which it comprised, the three principal sources of liability in respect of seafarers were 
found in contract, statute and common law.665 
 
 Shipowners, directly or through manning agents or shipowners’ associations or 
trade unions, generally entered into contractual arrangements with seafarers. The 
agreements covered not only direct terms of employment, such as pay and leave 
entitlement, but also compensation and assistance in case of illness, injury or death. 
Some of these arrangements (that can be classified as articles of agreements, individual 
contracts of employment and collective bargaining agreements - CBAs) provide that 
the shipowner must also arrange for insurance that would provide cover for such 
                                                        
662 See: http://www.igpandi.org/article/international-labour-organisation-agree-amendments-to-the-
2006-maritime-labour-convention, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
663 IG P&I Clubs website, online at: www.igpandi.org/About, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
664 See: http://www.igpandi.org/article/international-labour-organisation-agree-amendments-to-the-
2006-maritime-labour-convention, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
665  Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (5th Edition, Gard 2002), p.238 
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compensation obligations, which most of the time, unless additional insurance is 
required, P&I cover will suffice. 666 
 
Furthermore, certain fundamental labour rights are protected in international 
conventions,667 in the constitution, or other legislation of states. Thus, following this 
thesis’s premise that seafaring is a transnational form of employment hence being 
covered by both national and international legislation, even if not directly aimed at the 
maritime sector, these fundamental labour rights will definitely apply to seafaring. 
Therefore, even if not directly, every State will regulate seafaring, and the rights and 
benefits of these workers, but as is often the case, States recognize the particularity of 
such professions and dedicate specific regulations for the benefit of these workers, 
mostly based on international instruments provided by IMO and ILO. These 
legislations may be in the form of health and safety acts, workers’ compensation 
legislation, or compulsory social security schemes. 668 The latter often obliges 
employers to take out compulsory insurance to cover such obligations, P&I cover being 
the appropriate form of insurance in this respect. 669 
 
 In countries such the USA and the UK, a common law system operates 
alongside any statutory obligations.  For instance, in cases of negligence, common law 
liability can override the shipowner’s obligations to the seafarer under the individual 
contract or CBA. Therefore, a shipowner who has paid contractual compensation to a 
seafarer may also be liable to pay common law compensation in such jurisdictions, this 
being particularly true in the USA, where seafarers have a remedy in tort against the 
shipowner in respect of illness, injury or death caused by any unseaworthy condition of 
the ship. Thus, some cases can give rise to high compensation claims making insurance 
                                                        
666 See: D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.3-34 
667 See for example:  ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise (1948); ILO Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for 
Work of Equal Value (1951); and ILO Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect to Employment 
and Occupation (1958) 
668 D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.3-34 
669 Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (5th Edition, Gard 2002) pp.240 -241 
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essential. 670 
 
 It is important to note however that P&I Clubs do not provide injury or illness 
insurance to the seafarers themselves, but to their members671, most often shipowners, 
in respect of the liabilities that arise out of the contractual employment relation between 
themselves and the seafarers. Furthermore, P&I Clubs will normally expand their 
definition of seafarer672 in order to include families of the crew who visit on board or 
travel with them, as members may incur in liabilities to them in respect of loss of life, 
illness, personal injury, loss of effects, etc. Normal practice requires crew members and 
their families to have written permission of the member being approved by the Club 
prior to the voyage. 673 
 
As an example, according to GARD Rule 18 covering Liabilities in respect of 
crew, the association shall cover: 
 
“a) liability to pay hospital, medical, maintenance, funeral and other costs 
and expenses incurred in relation to the injury to, or illness or death of, a 
member of the Crew, including costs and expenses of repatriating the 
member of the Crew and his personal effects, or sending home an urn of 
ashes or coffin and personal effects in the case of death, and costs and 
expenses necessarily incurred in sending a substitute to replace the 
repatriated or dead man; b) liability to repatriate and compensate a 
member of the Crew for the loss of his employment caused in 
consequence of the actual or constructive total loss of the Vessel or of 
a major casualty rendering the Vessel unseaworthy and necessitating 
                                                        
670 Ibid 
671 Gard provides insurance to crew managers, as well as shipowners. See: 
http://www.gard.no/Content/19464395/Crew%20Cover%202013.pdf, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
672 “Seaman” is defined in the rules-book of Britannia as:  • A person (including the Master) engaged 
under articles of agreement or otherwise contractually obliged to serve on board an Entered Ship (except 
persons engaged only for nominal pay)   including a substitute for such person and also including such 
persons while proceeding to or from such Ship”- Definition from Britannia Class 3 Rule book 2011. 
673  Steven Hazelwood, P&I Clubs: Law and Practice, (3rd Ed. Lloyd’s Press 2000), p.167 
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the signing off of the Crew; c) liability to pay compensation or damages 
in relation to the injury to, or illness or death of, a member of the Crew; d) 
liability for costs and expenses of travelling incurred by a member of the 
Crew when the travelling is occasioned by a close relative having died or 
become seriously ill after the Crew member signed on, and costs and 
expenses necessarily incurred in sending a substitute to replace that Crew 
member; e) liability for wages payable to an injured or sick member of the 
Crew or on death to his estate; f) liability in respect of loss of or damage 
to the personal effects of a Crew member, provided that under this Rule 
18.1: 
i) where the liability arises under the terms of a crew agreement or other 
contract of service or employment, and would not have arisen but for those 
terms, the liability is not covered by the Association unless those terms have 
been previously approved by the Association; ii) references to personal 
effects shall exclude valuables and any other article which in the opinion of 
the Association is not an essential requirement of a Crew member. iii) the 
cover shall not include liabilities, costs or expenses arising out of the 
carriage of specie, bullion, precious or rare metals or stones, plate or other 
objects of a rare or precious nature, bank notes or other forms of currency, 
bonds or other negotiable instruments, whether the value is declared or not, 
unless the Association has been notified prior to any such carriage, and any 
directions made by the Association have been complied with; iv) there 
shall be no recovery in relation to liability which arises under a contract of 
indemnity or guarantee between the Member and a third 
party.”674(Emphasis added) 
  
  As may be noted from the above rules, liability to a seafarer which arises from 
                                                        
674 See Gard Rule 18.1, available at: 
http://www.gard.no/web/publications/document/chapter?p_subdoc_id=1268489&p_document_id=781
871, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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contractual clauses is not normally covered by the relevant P&I Club unless those 
particular terms have previously been approved by the Club. 675 In order to make a 
cover assessment, a copy of the contract will often not suffice and the Club may require 
additional information such as the nationality and number of crew members on board, 
and the trading pattern of the ship. 676 
 
 Furthermore, according to the individual Association, when additional 
insurance is required, it may, as agent, arrange for such cover, and may even offer non-
poolable Extended Cover. The Association will not itself, however, insure levels of 
insurance that are additional to the cover provided under the losses, costs or expenses 
covered under the additional insurance required under social security schemes, or the 
applicable law governing the contract, or collective bargain agreements. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the Association offers to reimburse a member for any 
expenses incurred in respect of “liabilities, losses, costs and expenses provided that the 
claims are reduced by whatever compensation is or should have been available under 
the applicable public or private insurance scheme.”677 
                                                        
675 See also Gard Rule 27 (i) 
676Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (5th Edition, Gard 2002) p.240 
677 See Gard Rule 71.1 
“…a person performing work in the service of the Ship covered by social insurance… (Rule 71.1.c) 
For the purposes of Rule 71.1.c, the term ‘social insurance’ means a national or state insurance scheme 
that entitles the claimant to claim benefits in the event of death, injury or illness. Cover is not available 
for liabilities, losses, costs or expenses that are covered by such insurance schemes, or which could have 
been covered by such social insurance if it had been put into effect.  
Cover is excluded under Rule 71.1.c for claims that are brought by any persons that are performing work 
in the service of the Ship, regardless of whether such persons are employed by the Member. Such persons 
include Crew members, stevedores, longshoremen, surveyors, pilots, repair workers and other 
independent contractors, and the purpose and aim of the Rule is to ensure that such persons make claims 
to the maximum extent that is possible under the appropriate social insurance scheme and not against the 
Member or the Association. However, the Association will usually reimburse a Member for claims that 
he has paid in respect of such liabilities, losses, costs and expenses provided that the claims are reduced 
by whatever compensation that is, or should have been available, under the applicable social insurance 
schemes.  
(I) …public or private insurance required by the legislation or collective wages agreement… (Rule 
71.1.c) 
The terms of an employment contract, or a collective bargaining agreement, or the applicable law that 
governs such contracts or agreements, may require a shipowner or charterer to take out public or private 
insurance to cover their liability for the death, injury or illness of Crew members or other persons that 
are working on board the ship. Cover is not available for liabilities, losses, costs or expenses that are 
covered by such insurance schemes, or which would have been covered by such insurance schemes if 
the Member had complied with his obligations to take out such insurance. However, the Association will 
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 Following similar lines, Britannia Rules provides that the Association for cases 
of illness, injury and death shall cover: 
 
“Medical, hospital, funeral and other expenses necessarily incurred and 
wages, maintenance, compensation and damages payable by reason of the 
illness or death of, or injury to, a Seaman. Notwithstanding the proviso to 
Rule 5(1), where a Member has failed to discharge or pay a liability for 
wages, maintenance, compensation or damages for the illness or death 
of, or injury to, a Seaman, the Association shall discharge or pay such 
liability on the Member’s behalf directly to such Seaman or dependent 
thereof. 
Provided always that 
(i) the Seaman or dependent has no enforceable right of recovery from any 
other party and otherwise would be uncompensated; (ii) subject to (iii) 
below, the Association shall in no circumstances be liable for any sum in 
excess of the amount which the Member would have been able to recover 
from the Association under these Rules and the Member’s terms and 
conditions of entry; 
(iii) where the Association is under no liability in respect of the claim by 
virtue of Rules 33(1) and 35(1),678 the Association shall nevertheless 
                                                        
usually reimburse a Member for claims that he has paid in respect of such liabilities, losses, costs and 
expenses provided that the claims are reduced by whatever compensation is or should have been available 
under the applicable public or private insurance scheme.” Available at: 
http://www.gard.no/web/publications/document/chapter?p_subdoc_id=20748044&p_document_id=20
747880, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
678 Both Rules deal with the cesser of the insurance. Rule 33 (1) deals with failure of payment :“having 
failed to pay when due and demanded by the Managers any sum due from him to the Association, he is 
served with a notice by or on behalf of the Managers or the Association requiring him to pay such sum 
and he fails to pay such sum in full on, or before, the date specified in such notice.” And Rule 35 (1) with 
the effect of the cesser: “If the cesser of insurance shall have occurred by virtue of Rule 33(1) (failure 
to pay) the Association shall not be liable for any claims under these Rules in respect of any ship which 
has been entered by the Member, whether the incident giving rise to such claim occurred before or after 
the cesser of insurance, unless the incident giving rise to such claim occurred during a Policy Year which 
had been closed at the time of the cesser of insurance.” Britannia Class 3 Rule book 2016. 
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discharge or pay the claim to the extent that it arises from an event occurring 
prior to the cesser of the insurance, but only as agent of the Member and 
the Member shall reimburse the Association in full.”679(Emphasis added) 
 
 Therefore, it is clear from the reading of the two P&I Club Rules chosen as 
examples, in particular the emphasised/highlighted parts, that these Associations offer 
insurance in cases where the seafarer is deemed to have been abandoned by the 
shipowner, when the latter fails to fulfill its obligations towards the former. Moreover, 
Gard Rule 18.b unequivocally demonstrates that an unseaworthy vessel will give rise 
to abandonment and the subsequent repatriation of the seafarer and compensation, the 
Club being liable for these expenses, confirming once again the direct connection 
between substandard shipping and abandonment of seafarers.  It is important to note, 
however, that the Rules are clear as to the fact that the Association is only required to 
pay up to the extent that the member has paid for the relevant insurance cover.680Thus, 
in cases of a member going insolvent and failing to fulfil their insurance payment 
obligations, it is easy to imagine that seafarers may not be fully compensated for their 
losses.  
  
V.2.1 – Repatriation 
 
 It is the opinion of this author, already expressed within this thesis, that 
repatriation is the most important liability that can arise from the abandonment of 
seafarers, due to the hardship that this imposes and due to it being one of the few risks 
exclusive to this type of employment. Therefore, the issue of repatriation would seem 
to merit particular discussion. 
 
 Repatriation is covered by Rules 19.1(G), 19.7 and more specifically 19(3) of 
                                                        
679 Britannia Class 3 Rule book 2016, Rule 19.1. Available at: 
http://www.britanniapandi.com/assets/Uploads/documents/Britannia-Rules-2016-PI.pdf, last accessed 
on 08/08/2016 
680 Britannia Rule book 2016, Rule 19.1 (iii),  
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the Britannia Rule Book 2016, according to these:  
  
“19.1 Repatriation (G) 
Repatriation expenses associated with liabilities covered under this Rule 
which are payable in accordance with Rule 19(7). 
19.7 The cost to a Member of maintaining, repatriating or deporting persons 
in circumstances which would entitle the Member to recover under Rule 
19(1), Rule 19(2), Rule 19(3), Rule 19(4) or Rule 19(5).” 
 
 The Britannia Rules regarding repatriation are rather generic, referring to all 
sorts of repatriations, involving passengers, third parties … In fact only Rule 19 (3) 
mentioned in the Rule 19 (7) deals with seafarer repatriation specifically, in a very 
limited manner nonetheless. In summary, Rule 19 (3) states that the Association will 
cover repatriation cases provided in the MLC 2006.681 
 
The Gard Rules do not seem to differ much from Britannia’s, but can be 
considered more comprehensive. Accordingly, Gard Rules 27.1 (b) and 18.2 provide 
that: 
 
“b) liability to repatriate and compensate a member of the Crew for the loss 
of his employment caused in consequence of the actual or constructive total 
loss of the Ship or of a major casualty rendering the Ship unseaworthy and 
necessitating the signing off of the Crew;”682 
 
and 
 
“The Association shall cover liability to repatriate a member of the Crew 
                                                        
681  Rule 19 (3), Britannia Rule Book 2016 -“The cover afforded to Members in respect of their liabilities 
under the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) or domestic legislation by a State 
implementing MLC 2006 are detailed in the relevant Certificate of Entry of the Entered Ship.” 
682 Gard Rule Book 2016, Rule 27.1 (b) 
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pursuant to any statutory enactment giving effect to the Maritime Labour 
Convention 2006 or any materially similar enactment, provided always that 
there shall be no recovery in respect of liabilities arising out of the 
termination of any agreement, or the sale of the Vessel, or any other act of 
the Member in respect of the Vessel, save and to the extent permitted by 
this Rule 18.2 in respect of the Member’s liability for such expense under 
the Maritime Labour Convention 2006.”683 
 
    As illustrated in the above provision of the Gard Rules, P&I Clubs do not cover 
normal repatriation at the end of a seafarer’s employment, upon the sale of the vessel, 
and when a seafarer is dismissed for misconduct. 684  In the latter case, the shipowner 
is also not liable to cover a seafarer’s repatriation expenses as the seafarer is the one 
responsible for the contractual breach.685  
                                                        
683 Gard Rule Book 2016, Rule 18.2 
684 Steven J Hazelwood and David Semark, P&I Clubs: Law and Practice, (4th  ed., Lloyd ́s List Press 
2010) , p 166.. 
685 The international position regarding repatriation seems to be a uniform one, placing the responsibility 
on the shipowner to cover the seafarers’ repatriation at the “unfair” termination of his employment 
contract, or in case of shipwreck. Prior to the MLC, there were two ILO conventions dealing exclusively 
with the subject, Convention 23 1926 and 166 1987.  
The ILO C23 1926 was ratified by forty-six countries, including the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Panama, 
China, Russia and Philippines among others, being fully in force. The Convention provides in its article 
3 (1) that: “Any seaman who is landed during the term of his engagement or on its expiration shall be 
entitled to be taken back to his own country, or to the port at which he was engaged, or to the port at 
which the voyage commenced, as shall be determined by national law, which shall contain the provisions 
necessary for dealing with the matter, including provisions to determine who shall bear the charge of 
repatriation”. Nevertheless, article 4 of the convention states that the repatriation shall not be a charge 
on the seafarer left behind in situations such: injury sustained in the service of the vessel, shipwreck, 
illness not due to his own wilful act or default, or discharge for any cause for which he cannot be held 
responsible. The list seems to be an exhaustive one. Therefore it would not be wrong to assume that in 
cases when the seafarer is fairly dismissed, the shipowner has no obligation to pay the seafarers’ 
repatriation expenses according to the convention since the convention is clear that the shipowner is 
responsible for the repatriations only in cases where the termination of the contract was not caused by 
the seafarer. 
Nevertheless, some Member States of the convention opted for a more broad approach, such as the UK. 
In the UK, the Merchant Shipping Repatriation Regulations 1979 article 2(a) provides that the shipowner 
is obliged to repatriate the seafarer “as soon as the seamen is available to return”, which makes fair to 
say that it does not matter what caused the contract to terminate, the shipowner carries in any case a 
repatriation obligation. The Regulation does provide in its article 3 for situations that would end the 
shipowner’s obligation to repatriate the seafarer. However, these situations are only able to happen after 
the termination of the contract and the repatriations arrangements made or if the seafarer gives up the 
right in writing.(Merchant Shipping Repatriation Regulations 1979 Article 3( c )) 
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The Philippines on the other hand opted to release the shipowner from his obligation to repatriate the 
seafarer in case the termination of contract was due to fair dismissal. Accordingly, section 19 (E) of the 
Standard terms and Conditions governing the employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board of ocean going 
vessels, the shipowner is entitle to deduct from the seafarer’ wages or other earnings the costs of 
repatriation when he/she was fairly dismissed.  
Panama took the same approach of the Philippines regarding repatriation by providing in Article 37 (b) 
of the Law Decree 8/98 that the shipowner is only responsible for the repatriation expensed in case the 
seafarer has been dismissed without a just cause, which means to say in cases of an unfair or wrongful 
dismissal. 
Russia is very specific in relation to when shipowners are responsible for seafarers’ repatriation expenses. 
According to the Russian Merchant Shipping Code, Article 58 s. 1 provides that seafarers are entitled to 
repatriation expenses when the employment contract is terminated upon initiative of the shipowner or a 
crew member in case of expiry of the term specified in the notice delivered in conformity with the 
contract; shipwreck, illness or injury requiring medical treatment outside the ship; shipowners inability 
to perform his legal responsibilities towards the seafarer as provided by law or by other acts of the 
Russian Federation or by the employment contract itself due to bankruptcy, sale of the ship or change of 
flag; allocation of the vessel to a military zone or zone of epidemiological hazard without crew members’ 
consent; or expiry of the maximum term of employment of a crew member established by the 
employment agreement. Since the list seems to be an exhaustive one, it is fair to say that the shipowner 
is not responsible for the seafarer’s repatriation in cases of fair dismissal. 
China and Ukraine (Olena Bokareva and other, Transport Law in Ukraine, (Kluwer Law International 
2011), page 24) do not have any domestic law provisions regarding the repatriation of seafarers. 
Therefore, we may assume that once again, a shipowner will not be responsible for seafarers’ repatriation 
in cases of fair dismissal. Furthermore, a typical supplemental clause in a seafarer’s employment contract 
in China is that if he/she has to be repatriated twice during the course of his employment for his/hers 
own reasons, the shipowner is entitle to terminate the contract. (D. Fitizpatrick and M. Anderson, 
Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), page 269) 
The ILO Convention 166 from 1986, in its turn was ratified by only thirteen countries, including Brazil 
and Turkey.  None of the above countries ratified the convention. The convention provides in its Article 
2(1) the situations entitling a seafarer to be repatriated. They are as follows: 
“(a) if an engagement for a specific period or for a specific voyage expires abroad; 
(b) upon the expiry of the period of notice given in accordance with the provisions of the articles of 
agreement or the seafarer's contract of employment; 
(c) in the event of illness or injury or other medical condition which requires his or her repatriation when 
found medically fit to travel; 
(d) in the event of shipwreck; 
(e) in the event of the shipowner not being able to continue to fulfil his or her legal or contractual 
obligations as an employer of the seafarer by reason of bankruptcy, sale of ship, change of ship's 
registration or any other similar reason; 
(f) in the event of a ship being bound for a war zone, as defined by national laws or regulations or 
collective agreements, to which the seafarer does not consent to go; 
(g) in the event of termination or interruption of employment in accordance with an industrial award or 
collective agreement, or termination of employment for any other similar reason.” 
The list is clearly an exhaustive one. Once again it seems that the drafter abstained to impose upon the 
shipowner the responsibility to repatriate the seafarer in cases of fair dismissal.  
Brazil implemented the Convention by Decree 2670/1988. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Commercial Code 
in its session concerning exclusively maritime labour is very vague in its provision dealing with 
repatriation. Thus, article 547 of the Code states only that if the voyage is interrupted due to orders of 
the owner of the vessel, Master, or other member of the crew, or by decree, the seafarer is entitled to 
repatriation regardless of the terms of their employment contract, being silent however with regard to the 
person or entity responsible for the repatriation costs. This provision leaves room for debate since a fair 
dismissal of seafarers could be regarded as an order of the shipowner or the master. Also, an interruption 
of the voyage caused by the proper seafarer (crew member) could also be perceived as a case of fair 
dismissal. The provision basically states that the seafarer is entitled to repatriation in any circumstance, 
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 It is important to note that even though Repatriation is dealt with rather 
generally by both Associations, these already provided for repatriation of seafarers prior 
to the MLC, in cases of: 
 
• Illness, injury  - P&I cover provided (and provides) for costs and expenses of 
necessary medical repatriation, in cases where the seafarer falls ill or injures 
himself/herself in the course of employment. However, the costs of repatriation 
will not be covered in case the medical condition does not require alteration of 
the original travel plans, as these will be considered operating costs. 
• Death – P&I Cover will provide for the basic funeral and burial expenses 
together with the return of the body or ashes and personal effects of the 
deceased, but not for wreaths and flower arrangements.  
• Major casualty – Clubs will cover the costs of repatriation when an incident 
occurs that results in actual and constructive loss of the vessel, or where there 
is a major casualty rendering the vessel unseaworthy, requiring the crew to be 
signed off, the costs of the repatriation of the crew shall be covered. 
Nevertheless, if at the time of such repatriation the seafarer’s period of service 
                                                        
but fails to say who has the responsibility over the repatriation. The application of this rather 
controversial provision will rely on the interpretation given to it by each particular court, as until now 
there is no settled jurisprudence regarding it. 
Furthermore, the USA did not ratify any of the two mentioned ILO Conventions, neither does it possess 
an express provision under general maritime law providing for repatriation. The doctrine of maintenance 
and cure is interpreted broadly to include transportation back home at the expense of the shipowner in 
cases of illness and injury of the seafarer. (Brunent v Taber. F Cas No 2054 (1854, DC Mass) However, 
it is well established that in cases of misconduct, desertion, mutual consent between the seafarer and the 
shipowner, even in the event of shipwreck, repatriation will be denied to the seafarer. (MJ Norris, Law 
of the Seamen, (4th ed, 19850, Ch 18, ‘ Transportation and Repatriation’ and U.S. Department of 
Foreigner Affairs Mannual Volume 7 – Consular Affairs, 7 FAM 750, Repatriation of Seamen)  
The MLC repatriation provision seems to be in agreement with the previous national and international 
provisions stated above. Regulation 2.5 of the Convention provides that seafarers have the right to be 
repatriated at no cost to themselves, except when the seafarer in found to be in serious default of their 
obligations according to national laws and collective bargaining agreements. (MLC Regulation 2.5 and 
Standard A2.5 paragraph 3) 
In conclusion, it seems that in the international and national arena (judging by the random selected 
jurisdictions above as examples), the shipowner is not responsible for covering the expenses relating to 
a seafarer’s repatriation in cases of fair dismissal. 
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under the employment contract had ceased, there will be no cover. Moreover, 
in case the seafarer is required to remain with the vessel to carry out repairs or 
for some other reason, the additional costs incurred and the ultimate repatriation 
may be recoverable under the vessel’s hull policies, in which case P&I is not 
available. Furthermore, and most importantly, in major casualty cases resulting 
in the early termination of the employment contract, the liability to pay 
compensation to the seafarer for loss of employment will be covered, such 
liability normally being provided for in the contract of employment, either by 
express or imply terms686, often providing for compensation equal to one month 
basic wage.  687 Therefore, in the cases of the Erika and Prestige, widely 
discussed in this thesis, the P&I would cover the costs of the seafarers’ 
repatriations and adequate compensation, to the extent of the insurance cover.   
 
V.3 -Direct actions against P&I Clubs according to English Law 
 
Although P&I Clubs cover the liability of shipowners regarding third parties, in 
particular crew members, these associations’ aim is to protect their members and 
indemnify them for possible losses that may occur out of their contractual breach with 
seafarers, hence not being an insurance policy directly concerned with the seafarer, but 
rather with the losses which its members may fall liable for. In summary, the P&I cover 
is a contractual arrangement between the Member and the Club, the seafarer being a 
third party external to this contractual relationship, even though the latter can be 
considered to be an indirect beneficiary of the policy. This raises the question of what 
will happen in extreme cases of abandonment of seafarers, when the shipowner cannot 
be located, and/or has fallen into bankruptcy.688 Indeed, the most common proximate 
                                                        
686 Section 21 in the Norwegian Seaman’s Act provides, inter alia, that the seaman is entitled to all of his 
contract wages if the duration of the voyage turns out to be shorter than that contemplated in the contract 
of employment. 
687  See Britannia Class 3 Rule book 2011 and Gold, Edgar, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance 5th 
Edition , Gard (Norway:2002) p.256-257 
688 This was the case of the Adriatic Tankers – The company went bankrupt leaving several seafarers not 
only without payment, as left to starve in different ports around the world for over two years in some 
cases. classification societies and P&I Clubs started to evade as the vessels started to be arrested, and 
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cause of seafarer abandonment is a shipowner’s hardship or insolvency.689 In these 
cases how will the seafarer be able to claim the cover, will the seafarer be able to 
subrogate the position of the member and take direct action against the P&I Club? 
 
In England690, situations like these are covered by The Third Parties (Rights against 
                                                        
soon the company’s vessels were deslisted from class and had their insurance cover cancelled. See: Denis 
Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in Jennifer 
Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 2014), 
pp.118-119  
689  This can be clearly perceived by the fact that in 2009, the number of abandonments (as understood 
by ILO) reached a peak, with 50 vessels being abandoned, and over 600 seafarers: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/seafarers/seafarersbrowse.details?p_lang=en&p_abandonment_id=179&p_sear
ch_id=130110200706., last accessed on 08/08/2016 
See Also:  Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for 
seafarers”, in Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, 
(Routledge 2014), p. 123 
690 England is not the only country possessing domestic legislation regulating direct actions against 
insurers.  Other countries also regulate the rights of third parties to claim directly from the insurer and 
sometimes in an even more comprehensive matter. For instance: 
● Sweden - Swedish Insurance Contracts Act (2005:104) (“ICA”) (i) (ii), a third party may 
claim indemnification directly from the insurer if the insured has a statutory obligation to 
have third party liability insurance covering the loss and if the insured has been declared 
bankrupt or an order has been issued for public composition;  
● Israel -Section 68 of the Israeli Insurance Contracts Law - 1981 (Insurance Contracts Law) 
allows a third party to bring a direct action against the liability insurer of the tortfeasor and 
to claim full compensation;  
● Poland - Article 822 § 4 of the Polish Civil Code provides that a person entitled to 
indemnity in connection with an event covered by a contract of third party civil liability 
insurance may vindicate claims directly from the insurer (action directa), being the 
provision applicable to of any liability insurance contract.  
● Taiwan - Article 94 Section 2 of the Taiwanese Insurance Act 2001 provides that: 
“Where the insured has been determined liable to indemnify a third party for loss, the third 
party may claim for payment of indemnification, within the scope of the insured amount 
and based on the ratio to which the third party is entitled, directly from the insurer.” 
● Turkey - Article 1478 of the Turkish Commercial Code which regulates the right of direct 
actions provides that: 
“The third party who incurred a loss, is entitled to claim its loss directly from the insurer 
subject to the insurance sum and the time limitation period applicable to the insurance 
contract. 
It is interesting that some countries, when regulating direct actions against insurers by third parties, 
specifically exclude marine insurance contracts. This is the case with Belgium, which regulates such a 
right in Article 86 of the Non-Marine Insurance Contracts Act of 25 June 1992 (Act). Unfortunately, a 
more comprehensive analysis of different domestic legislations regulating direct action against insurers 
by third parties is not within the scope of this research.  Nevertheless, such analysis could prove to be 
extremely valuable. For instance, a more in depth analysis of Belgian law could demonstrate that 
insurance covering liabilities relating to seafarers would not be considered a marine insurance contract, 
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Insurers) Act 2010, which came into force on 1 August 2016. 691However, before the 
2010 Act came into force, such cases were provided for by the Third Parties (Rights 
Against Insurers) Act 1930. Before the 1930 Act, the insurance coverage protected only 
the one who paid for it, who was a part of the contract of insurance. The purpose of the 
1930 Act was exactly to provide for situations like the ones described above, it is an 
Act “to confer on third parties rights against insurers of third-party risks in the event 
of the insured becoming insolvent, and in certain other events.”692 The Act provides 
for the insurer to be under the same liability to the third party as he would have been to 
the insured. 693 
 
The initial response of the P&I Clubs to The Third Parties (Rights Against 
Insurers) Act 1930 was that they were not under the scope of the Act, since the Act only 
applied to “contracts of insurance”, which according to the Clubs differs from the 
relationship between members and Clubs.694 After some years, however, it became 
                                                        
but an employment insurance contract, hence seafarers would be allowed to claim directly against the 
insurer. (For a more detailed, but still limited, discussion on  Direct Action Rights see: IBA Insurance 
Committee Substantive Project 2012, Direct Third-Party Access To Liability Insurance, International 
Bar Association, available at: http://www.ibanet.org., last accessed on 08/08/2016 
691http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/insurance-bill-becomes-law/. In the 25th of March 2016, the UK minister 
of Justice, Lord Faulks released a written statement indicating his intention of commencing the Act 
“reasonably soon” as amended. According to the written statement: “the draft Regulations have to be 
approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament before they can be made. Subject to that approval 
being given, I intend to make the Regulations without delay. I will announce the commencement date of 
the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”) as amended by both the Insurance 
Act 2015 and the Regulations in due course but the date will not be earlier than three months after the 
regulations have been made.” See: See: : Lord Faulks, ‘Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 
– regulations and commencement: Written statement’ – (HLWS542, 25/02//2016 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
statement/Lords/2016-02-25/HLWS542/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 See also:  
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/justice-
committee/news-parliament-20151/third-parties-act-chairs-statement-15-16//-, last accessed on 
08/08/2016 
692 The Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 – Introductory text 
693 Ibid, Section 1(4) 
694 As with other insurance contracts, a marine insurance contract is set in the form of a marine insurance 
policy, which establishes an agreement between the insurer and insured and is construed by ordinary 
means of contract law. Nevertheless, a marine insurance policy has distinctive features from regular 
commercial insurance policies. Marine insurance is divided into two categories, the first being dedicated 
to the insurance of cargo wholly or in part by sea and in the second, the subject of insurance is the ship 
itself. P&I insurance falls within the latter category.  Moreover, P&I Club, notably, are exposed to 
liabilities and losses arising out of many incidents and subject to a wide range of jurisdictions (For 
instance, in cases of crew insurance, the insurer may be exposed to the law of the flag state, that of the 
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clear that the P&I Clubs fell under the scope of the Act. Nevertheless, as stated in 
section 1(4) of the Act, insurers have the same defences whether against the third party 
or against the insured. Thus, P&I Clubs can rely on the Club Rules in refusing to cover 
a third party claim.695 Accordingly, the third party shall be treated by the Club as if he 
were the member, hence if the claim ́s origin was an act of wilful misconduct by the 
member the Club will not be liable. The 2010 Act retains this scheme, but introduces 
three new exceptions where claimants are not prevented from enforcing their rights. 
The first exception refers to the transfer of rights to the third party; if this satisfies a 
requirement under the insurance policy to meet a particular condition imposed on the 
insured, the insurer will not be able to rely on the non-performance of the policy 
condition. The second covers situations when the insured has been dissolved and is 
therefore unable to fulfil a condition requiring the insured to provide the insurer with 
information and/or assistance, in which case the insurer cannot rely on that breach. The 
third exception relates to ‘pay to be paid’ clauses.696 
 
The 2010 Act is expected to bring some very welcome changes to third parties 
in insurance contracts. For instance, under the 1930 Act, a third party was only allowed 
to issue proceedings against an insurer after obtaining a judgment against the insured, 
which can involve lengthy delays and unnecessary expenses whilst those proceedings 
take place (for seafarers these procedures can be extremely costly, not to mention 
complicated, considering that the UK may not be a seafarer’s place of domicile. hence 
he could see himself being forced to enforce a foreign judgment or award in the UK). 
The 2010 Act removes this requirement, allowing a third party claimant to issue 
proceedings directly against the insurer. The liability of the insured to the claimant and 
                                                        
country of nationality of the seafarer, the law governing the employment contract, the law where the 
casualty occurred, …). Another special feature is that the insurance industry plays an important role in 
the development of maritime law, being a major part of the business of underwriting, through the four 
top markets based in the UK, Japan, France, and the Scandinavian countries, especially Norway. Finally, 
due to its distinguishing characteristics, marine insurance is normally subject to special legislation. For 
instance, in England, it is regulated by the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which has recently been amended 
by the Insurance Act 2015. See:  Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance 5th Edition , Gard 
(Norway:2002), pp. 73-76 
695  Steven Hazelwood, P&I Clubs: Law and Practice, (3rd Ed. Lloyd’s Press 2000), pp.292-294 
696 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, Sec. 9 
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the extent of the cover afforded will be decided in the same proceedings, minimizing 
costs and number and duration of proceedings. 697Moreover, the Act also allows a third 
party to bring proceedings against insurers without first establishing the fact and 
amount of the insured’s liability. In such cases the third party may bring proceedings 
against the insurer for a declaration: 
 
• that the insured was liable to him; 
• that the insurers are therefore liable to him.698 
 
Another important feature of the 2010 Act is that it gives the claimant rights to 
information about the insurance policy, allowing him to make an informed decision at 
an early stage about the rights which are transferred to him and therefore decide whether 
to commence or continue litigation.  
 
Furthermore, the 2010 Act reflects the changes in insolvency law in England 
since 1930. 699Thus, a provision is included in the 2010 Act providing for rights to be 
transferred to a claimant where an insured is facing financial difficulties and enters into 
certain voluntary procedures and makes an agreement/composition with his or her 
creditors.700 This provision can be particularly useful for seafarers, whose 
abandonment, as seen previously, is often due to the shipowner’s financial hardship or 
insolvency, which leads to the ceasing of the P&I premiums paid, hence resulting in 
the insurance and membership of the group being cancelled. Moreover, by the time that 
a vessel (and subsequently the crew) is abandoned, the shipowner is no longer insured 
                                                        
697 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, Sec. 1(2) (3) 
698 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, Sec. 2 (2) 
699 It is interesting to note that whereas the UK only allows direct actions in cases where the insurer is 
insolvent, Germany only allows these types of actions where the insurance was compulsory, whereas 
France allows third party actions in all cases (Johanna Hjalmarsson, “Crewing Insurance under the 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006”, in ”, Jennifer Lavelle (ed) the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 
International Law redefined, (Routledge 2014), p. 106) 
700 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, Sec. 11 
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by the group hence not being able to receive the benefit of the insurance. 701 
Consequently, the provision is likely to be useful for seafarers, as it will allow them the 
possibility of knowing about any possible hardships faced by insured shipowners prior 
to engaging with a voyage. Pragmatically, it is not entirely certain how the provision 
will work as seafarers are often from countries other than the UK, and claims tend to 
be costly, added to the fact that communications with and from seafarers are not as easy 
as communication with land based workers due to obvious logistical reasons. 
 
V.4 - Identifying the insurer 
  
As previously mentioned in this thesis, shipowners are sometimes not easily 
identifiable702, and similar difficulties may be encountered in locating the insurer. 
Seafarers may struggle to identify which insurer provides cover for the duration of their 
employment contract. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the creation of the employer’s liability insurance 
register might assist seafarers facing these types of situations.  Since 2011, employers’ 
liability insurers703 in the UK are obliged to keep a register of the employers they insure 
                                                        
701  Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p. 123 
702   For more information on how is possible for the ship owner to keep his/hers anonymity, see the study 
carried out by The Maritime Transport Committee, Ownership and Control of Ships, OECD, Directorate 
for Science, Technology and Industry, March 2003, <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/9/17846120.pdf> 
703 The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 requires employers carrying on business 
in the UK to insure their liability to the employees for bodily injury or disease sustained in the course of 
their employment in the UK. (A separate scheme applies in Northern Ireland.) Although, the Act came 
into effect only 1 January 1972, not being compulsory prior to that, to have Employers’ Liability 
insurance, many employers arranged cover. This would seem to be the case with shipowners since third 
party liability and crew cover seem to have appeared many years before. It is important to note that the 
Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 is applicable to seafarers working on board of 
UK flagged vessels. Nonetheless, recognising that sometimes seafarers were already insured with a 
mutual insurance association of shipowners, sometimes known as Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P & 
I Clubs), the Act exempts the need of a specific Employer’s Liability Cover, recognising the first as an 
alternative to insurance under the Act. (FSA Consultation Paper 10/13, ‘Tracing Liability Insurers’, (FSA 
June 2010) <http://www.fca.org.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp10_13.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 and 
Department of Trade, Merchant Shipping Notice No. M.757, (Department of Trade, London August 
1976) 
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under the Financial Services Authority’s Employers’ Liability Insurance: Disclose by 
Insurers Instrument 2010.704  
 
The Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS), which is a part of the 
Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, setting out standards by which insures must 
conduct their business, provides in R.8.4 for Employers’ Liability Insurance, and in 
guideline 8.4.3 states that the purpose of this particular Rule is to: 
 
“assist individuals with claims arising out of their course of employment in 
the United Kingdom for employers carrying on, or who carried on, business 
in the United Kingdom, to identify an insurer or insurers that provided 
employers' liability insurance (other than certain co-insurance and excess 
cover arrangements) by requiring insurers to produce an employers' 
liability register and to conduct effective searches for historical policies. In 
particular it aims to assist ex-employees whose employers no longer exist 
or who cannot be located.” 
 
 Therefore, it is clear that the intention of the rules is to not leave the employee 
unassisted in case his/her employer cannot be located for any reason. By allowing the 
employee/ seafarer to locate the insurer, it enables him/her to file a direct claim against 
them.  Nevertheless, being able to locate the insurer might not assist seafarers in every 
abandonment situation. The Financial Services Authority’s Employers’ Liability 
Insurance: Disclose by Insurers Instrument 2010 is a consequence of the Employers’ 
Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969, which only makes provides insurance 
cover in the case of personal injuries and death, which seems to also to be the only 
exceptions to defences available to P&I Clubs, as it will be seen in the next topic. 
                                                        
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282077/msn757.pdf>, 
last accessed on 08/08/2016 
703 Amended by the Employer’s Liability Insurance: Disclosure by Insurers (no.2) Instrument (2012)  
704 Amended by the Employer’s Liability Insurance: Disclosure by Insurers (no.2) Instrument (2012) 
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 Even so, this UK policy might still assist seafarers in search of due 
compensation in the event of abandonment (even if only in specific cases), since P&I 
Clubs in the UK705 are part of the scheme, and given the major role these have in the 
shipping industry providing most insurance cover, seafarers on board non-UK 
registered vessels will also be able to benefit from the information of these registries 
and possibly, depending on the regulation and the governing law applicable to the 
insurance policy706, be able to file a direct claim against the insurer.707Furthermore, 
policies issued by UK insurers carry great importance within the shipping industry, 
hence this development can be said to be of “incomparable potential importance to 
seafarers with claims under past policies”708. It is important to note, moreover, that even 
                                                        
705 The Employer’s liability Register of the Britannia P&I Club encompasses as  many as 2785 pages, 
and a considerable number of vessels and policy years, whereas Steamship Mutual has taken the approach 
of issuing Employer’s Liability Registers on an annual basis ( Registers available at: 
http://www.britanniapandi.com/employers-liability-register-elr/, last accessed on 08/08/2016 and 
https://www.steamshipmutual.com/Liabilities-and-Claims/EmployersLiabilityRegister.htm. North P& I 
Club also makes its annual Employer’s liability Register available at , last accessed on 
08/08/2016http://www.nepia.com/policy-pages/employers-liability-insurance-register/ - Information 
about P&I Clubs Employer’s liability Register may also be obtained through the Employer’s Liability 
Tracing Office (ETLO) at http://www.elto.org.uk, last accessed on 08/08/2016) 
706Insurers are known to occasionally provide insurance on a policy without any reference to applicable 
law, and upon the assumption that the “law of the insured” will be applied in the event of a dispute. It is 
suggested that it would be advisable for insurers to choose the best applicable law to the policy, especially 
considering that many countries usually possess stringent mandatory requirements governing the 
insurance contract in order to protect insurance consumers and ‘weaker parties’, with seafarers falling 
into the latter category. (Johanna Hjalmarsson, “Crewing Insurance under the Maritime Labour 
Convention 2006”, in ”, Jennifer Lavelle (ed) the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law 
redefined, (Routledge 2014), p. 100). Nevertheless, insurance contracts, like employment contracts, at 
least in Europe, possess a ‘limited autonomy to determine the courts having jurisdiction’. (Council 
Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] 
OJ L351/1, Preamble Recital 14) – For a more detailed discussion on jurisdiction matters related to 
insurance see  Johanna Hjalmarsson, “Crewing Insurance under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006”, 
in ”, Jennifer Lavelle (ed) the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, 
(Routledge 2014), p. 100, pp.105-108 
707 Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, a comparative analysis of different national legislations is 
outside the scope of this thesis. It is important however to bear in mind that according to the UK courts, 
there is jurisdiction to cover claims of seafarers who can show they are peripatetic employees based in 
the UK, following decisions concerning aircrew. Diggins v. Condor Marine Crewing Services Ltd [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1133, [2010] ICR 213 
708  Johanna Hjalmarsson, “Crewing Insurance under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006”, in ”, 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed) the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p. 100, pp. 96-97 
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prior to the Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) policy, the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) and the Lloyd’s Market Association since 1999 had a voluntary Code of 
Practice for tracing Employment liability insurance policies but this was deemed to be 
unsatisfactory.709 
 
V.5 - Pay to be paid rule 
 
As mentioned, one of the defences available to P&I Clubs, and that deserves 
special analysis, is the “pay to be paid rule”.  This rule means that the member must 
pay and settle the claim before asking for the indemnification to the Club. This rule is 
stipulated in the Britannia rulebook as follows: 
 
“If a Member shall become liable as hereinafter set out in Rule 19, in 
damages or otherwise, or shall incur any costs or expenses in respect of a 
Ship which was entered in the Association at the time of the casualty or 
event giving rise to such liability, costs or expenses, such Member shall be 
entitled to recover out of the funds of this Class of the Association the 
amount of such liability, costs or expenses to the extent and upon the terms, 
conditions and exceptions provided by these Rules and by the Certificate of 
Entry. (...) Provided always that, unless the Committee in its discretion 
otherwise determines, it shall be a condition precedent of a Member’s 
right to recover from the funds of the Association in respect of any 
liability, costs or expenses that the Member shall first have discharged or 
paid them.”710 
 
  The “pay to be paid” defence was used in The Fanti” and The Padre Island 
[1990] 2Lloyd’s Rep 191. HL711, which was an appeal made by two independent third 
                                                        
709  FSA Consultation Paper 10/13, ‘Tracing Liability Insurers’, (FSA June 2010) 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp10_13.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
710 Britannia Class 3 Rule Book, rule 5.1. 
711 Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association (London) Ltd (The Fanti); 
Socony Mobil Oil Inc v West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association (The Padre Island) 
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party claimants seeking redress against P&I Clubs, posing the question whether the 
rights of a third party as against an insurer were still strictly subject to an original term 
in the policy, namely the ‘pay to be paid’ rule.  Thus, the cases started as independent 
claims that due to their similarities were heard together in court. “The Fanti” was a 
claim brought by salvors against a P&I Club under the Third Parties (Rights Against 
Insurers) Act 1930 to recover the costs of the salvage of a vessel and cargo that had 
been abandoned by the shipowner, whereas The Padre Island concerned claimed cargo 
where the claimants had successfully pressed against the owners  of the vessel, and on 
non-payment had an order made for winding up, later filing a claim against the P&I 
Club, also based on the 1930 Act.  In both cases the insurers refused payment based on 
the “pay to be paid” rule. In a decision considered surprising to some712, the House of 
Lords decided in favour of the P&I Clubs on the basis that the ‘pay to be paid’ rule was 
a term of the contract of insurance that had not been adhered to, hence it was not 
reasonable to confer on a third party to that policy of insurance, terms which were more 
favourable than the original contract intended. Nevertheless, Lord Justice Goff warned 
the Clubs not to use this defence in cases of loss of life or personal injury. 713 
 
 Therefore, one may conclude that in cases of abandonment of seafarer involving  
personal injury or even loss of life, P&I Clubs will not be able to rely on the “pay to be 
paid” rule, however this does not actually seem to be the case. In an arbitration claim 
concerning over 2000 US seafarers who fell ill during the course of their employment, 
the arbitrator ruled for the applicability of the ‘pay to be paid’ rule finding support for 
his decision in the speech of Lord Brandon (with whom the other four Lords Agreed) 
in the Fanti and the Padre Island in favour of the enforceability of such a clause, ruling 
that such clauses were not affected by section 1(3) of the 1930 act, as the rights of the 
insured were not altered by the insolvency event at all, only the ability of the member 
                                                        
[1991] 2 AC 1.  
712 See: Lindsay East, ‘What the Fanti/Padre Island didn’t decide’, (Maritime Risk International, June 
2000) 
713 See also: Susan Hodges, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance Law, (Routledge-Cavendish, 
1999), pp.548-550 and Shipowners' Mutual Protection And Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) V 
Containerships Denizcilik Nakliyat Ve Ticaret As (The “Yusuf Cepnioglu”) [2015] Ewhc 258 (Comm) 
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to exercise those rights being affected by the event, with the rights of the insured 
remaining the same before and after the event of insolvency, and so far as concerns 
entitlement to recover from the Club, the member never had more than a contingent 
right which depended on the prior discharge of any qualifying liability by the member 
himself.714 
 
Nevertheless, the above legal discernment comes to an end with the advent of 
the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010. The Act makes such clauses 
invalid, preserving the decision in The Fanti and the Padre Island for marine insurance 
cases but expressly excluding claims in relation to loss of life and personal injury.715  
 
As a result, it can be concluded that under the 2010 Act, seafarers in some 
specific case of abandonment, i.e. personal injury and loss of life (neither contained in 
the MLC provisions, but included within the broad definition of abandonment) will be 
able to claim directly from insurers, especially in insolvency cases, ensuring that the 
seafarer will be duly compensated.  The system can hardly be called ideal for seafarers, 
as it still mostly involves claims in a jurisdiction other than the seafarers’ place of 
residence (especially considering the location of most P&I Clubs and the nationalities 
of most seafarers), hence seafarers may still be forced to spend time and money in order 
to be adequately compensated for their losses.   
 
Nevertheless, hopes are that seafarers will never have to rely on these rights in 
order to get compensated for such claims.  This is because the International Group of 
P&I Clubs have waived the “pay-to-be-paid” requirement together with the rule 
concerning retrospective withdrawal coverage for the non-payment of premiums in 
relation to claims for death and personal injury brought by seafarers, since 20 February 
2009. 716 
                                                        
714 Ibid 
715 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, Sections 9(5) and (6) 
716  ILO-IMO-WGPS-FR-[2008-07-0117-1]-En.doc/v2, ‘Final Report - Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert 
Working Group on Liability and Compensation Regarding Claims for Death, Personal Injury and 
Abandonment of Seafarers’ (ILO Geneva, 21–24 July 2008), p.12 
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V.6 – P&I Clubs and the MLC 
 
The MLC does not possess a comprehensive insurance obligation, and does not 
expressly require insurance, but insurance cover is a convenient way to fulfill some of 
the convention’s requirements.717 Essentially, the MLC, as currently in force, only 
requires, in regulations 2.5 and 4.2, for Financial Security to be provided, failing to 
specify a particular form for it. Although insurance is not the only form of Financial 
Security, it is usually a convenient method of fulfilling the requirement.718 
 
Differently from the 1992 CLC and 2001 Bunker Convention, the MLC does 
not require “blue cards” as evidence of the Financial Security, and does not impose a 
right of direct action against the provider of Financial Security. It leaves to each 
Member State to not only determine the form of Financial Security it will adopt, but 
also to determine the form of evidence (such as proof that adequate insurance is in 
place) required to satisfy the requirement of Financial Security. Regarding the latter, 
member States seem to have accepted P&I Clubs’ certificates of entry as evidence.719 
 
V.6.1 – Repatriation  
 
Repatriation of seafarers, as seen in Chapter I is covered by MLC Regulation 
2.5 which provides for seafarers to be repatriated at no cost to themselves, except when 
he/she has unilaterally breached his employment contract, by being  in serious default 
of its obligations according to national laws and collective bargaining agreements.720  
 
                                                        
717  Johanna Hjalmarsson, “Crewing Insurance under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006”, in ”, 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed) the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p. 95 
718  It is suggested that the Financial Security may be in the form of a social security scheme or insurance 
or fund or other similar arrangements. (International Labour Standards Department, Maritime Labour 
Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006), Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), (Fourth Edition 2015, ILO)), p.54 
719 Gard, Entry into force of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC), Member Circular No. 
4/2013, March 2013 
720 See MLC Regulation 2.5 and Standard A2.5 paragraph 3 
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As already also seen in chapter I, the MLC is based on past ILO/ IMO 
instruments and undoubtedly this part of the Convention took into consideration the 
provisions contained in the ILO C166 - Repatriation of Seafarers Convention 1987. The 
convention was only ratified by 14 countries and is currently only in force in seven of 
them.721 However, the ILO C166 is itself nothing if not a revision of the ILO C023 - 
Repatriation of Seamen Convention, 1926722 which received forty-seven ratifications. 
The ILO conventions provide, in more detail, for the same repatriation rights as in the 
MLC, with the same conditions for seafarers, even placing the burden of it on the Flag 
State in case the shipowner fails to honor his/her obligations. The novel provision 
contained in the MLC is the fact that it provides for Flag States, members of the 
Convention, to provide evidence of Financial Security to ensure that seafarers are duly 
repatriated if the shipowner fails to fulfill his or her obligations.723 
 
 The placing of the obligation on the Flag State to repatriate the seafarer in the 
event that the shipowner fails to do so can hardly be considered to be a ‘novelty’, as 
this was perceived as an ‘implied’ obligation considering the responsibilities attributed 
to Flag States according to international instruments. Indeed, in most cases of 
abandonment of seafarer requiring repatriation, the Flag State is called upon to 
repatriate the stranded seafarer once the shipowner fails to do so. For instance, in an 
abandonment case from 2013, a short while prior to the MLC’s entry into force, the 
Flag State Liberia was contacted in order to provide assistance to the crew of the A 
Whale stranded in Suez, by ensuring the shipowner’s fulfilment of his/her obligations. 
According to reports, Liberia not only assisted by applying pressure on the shipowner 
to provide for the crew, but was willing to “step in to help the men get home if 
necessary”. 724Nonetheless, Flag States are not always keen to ‘step in’ and take the 
                                                        
721http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312
311, last accessed on 08/08/2016 Gard, Entry into force of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 
(MLC), Member Circular No. 4/2013, March 2013 
722 See the Preamble of the ILO C22 Convention 
723 Regulation 2.5 paragraph 2 
724 Debbie, ‘Flag-State Liberia Helps Out Stranded ‘A Whale’ Crew’, (Intermanager, 12 July 2013) 
<http://www.intermanager.org/2013/07/flag-state-liberia-helps-out-stranded-a-whale-crew/>, last 
accessed on 08/08/2016. The cause of the abandonment once again seems to have been the company 
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responsibility of affording the seafarers’ repatriation expenses regardless of having 
ratified the previous ILO Repatriation Conventions or not. This can be seen in the case 
of the Ladybug, a vessel owed by the same ‘bankrupted’ company as the A Whale, 
which had its crew stranded in the Port of Malta for eight months. The Flag State in the 
case of the Ladybug, Panama, did not seem to be as helpful as Liberia, leaving the crew 
on their own, having to rely on and wait for the sale of the vessel in order to receive 
their due wages and be repatriated.725 
 
The MLC, however, unquestionably makes Flag States responsible for 
repatriation costs in case the shipowner fails to do so; Standard A2.5.5 of the convention 
provides that: 
 
“If a shipowner fails to make arrangements for or to meet the cost of 
repatriation of seafarers who are entitled to be repatriated: 
(a) the competent authority of the Member whose flag the ship flies shall 
arrange for repatriation of the seafarers concerned; if it fails to do so, the 
State from which the seafarers are to be repatriated or the State of which 
they are a national may arrange for their repatriation and recover the cost 
from the Member whose flag the ship flies; 
(b) costs incurred in repatriating seafarers shall be recoverable from the 
shipowner by the Member whose flag the ship flies; 
(c) the expenses of repatriation shall in no case be a charge upon the 
seafarers, except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Standard” 
 
                                                        
insolvency, having the company even filed for bankruptcy protection in US courts in order to avoid 
fulfilling with their legal obligations towards the seafarers. Nonetheless, US courts eventually released 
sufficient funds to the crew of the A Whale to cover their unpaid wages and repatriation. (Tom Leander, 
‘A Whale crew will bank their wages and head home’, (23 July 2013, Lloyd’s list 
725  ITF, ‘C Ladybug crew finally paid, but not by shipowner’,  (4 september 2013 ITF) 
<http://www.itfseafarers.org/maritime_news.cfm/newsdetail/9452>,  last accessed on 08/08/2016, and 
World Maritime News Staff, ‘Abandoned Filipino sailors, members of the MV B Ladybug Finally 
Home’  (29 April 2014, Worldmaritimenews) 
<http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/122328/abandoned-filipino-sailors-from-mv-b-ladybug-
finally-home/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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Due to this undeniable ‘secondary’ Flag State responsibility to repatriate the 
seafarer, an insurer has launched a new product called Flag Liability Insurance against 
Exposure for Repatriation, or Flier. The insurance offers full coverage for legal 
liabilities relating to repatriation and medical costs following an abandonment (due to 
insolvency), which Flag States inherit as a result of the MLC. It is offered in association 
with fixed premium mutual provider Lodestar Marine, with market capacity of around 
$5m-$10m, provided by Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe.726 The problem with this 
insurance as highlighted, is that it is conditional. It only covers expenses in case of the 
shipowner’s insolvency. It is true that most cases of abandonment are due to 
shipowners’ insolvency/bankruptcy, however this is not always the case.727 
 
 In the same way that placing an ‘auxiliary’ responsibility on Flag States in 
repatriation cases is not necessarily new, P&I Clubs’ cover, prior to the MLC, in general 
already encompassed repatriation costs linked to death, injury or illness, or due to 
shipwreck.728 The difference in the MLC provisions is that they provide for the 
Financial Security to cover repatriation costs also: 
 
“(iii) in the event of the shipowner not being able to continue to fulfil their 
legal or contractual obligations as an employer of the seafarers by reason 
of insolvency, sale of ship, change of ship’s registration or any other similar 
reason; 
(iv) in the event of a ship being bound for a war zone, as defined by national 
laws or regulations or seafarers’ employment agreements, to which the 
seafarer does not consent to go, and 
                                                        
726  Insurance Journal, ‘Willis Launches New Policy to Cover Repatriation Costs for Stranded Seafarers’, 
(10 September 2013, Insurance Law Journal) 
<http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2013/09/10/304702.htm>, last accessed on 
08/08/2016 
727 See: IMO abandonment database 
728  MLC Guideline B2.5.1(b) (i) (ii). See: See: UK P&I Club, ‘MLC Club FAQs’, (16 August 2013,  UK 
P&I  Club) <http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/mlc-club-faqs-6133/>, last accessed on 
08/08/2016 and Gard, Entry into force of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC), Member 
Circular No. 4/2013, March 2013 
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(v) in the event of termination or interruption of employment in accordance 
with an industrial award or collective agreement or termination of 
employment for any other similar reason.”729 
 
Therefore, the Financial Security for repatriation provided by the MLC shall 
hopefully give the seafarer a broader sense of security that he or she will be repatriated 
in all circumstances. P&I Clubs, which are often those responsible for fulfilling such a 
requirement, have extended their cover to encompass all situations provided for by the 
MLC730. 
 
The question with this Financial Security is that the seafarer is not the insured 
per se, hence he/she will still have to rely on the goodwill of the shipowner to have 
his/her repatriation expanses paid promptly, as the right of direct action against the 
insurer is not guaranteed under the convention, and it might also not be guaranteed 
under national laws. The second question relies on the fact that the insurance only 
covers repatriation costs and seafarers will often refuse to be repatriated without being 
afforded their wages.731  
 
V.6.2 – Health Protection 
 
 Considering that this thesis contemplates the concept of “abandonment of 
seafarers”, not limited to the concepts provided by the MLC or IMO Resolution A.930 
(22), it should not be difficult to perceive how the lack of provision for medical 
                                                        
729 MLC Guideline B2.5.1(b)(iii) (iv) (v) 
730 UK P&I Club, ‘MLC Club FAQs’, (16 August 2013,  UK P&I  Club) 
<http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/mlc-club-faqs-6133/> and Gard, Entry into force of the 
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC), Member Circular No. 4/2013, March 2013 
Skuld Rule 7.1.7 now provides for repatriation under MLC as a covered risk. However, provision is also 
made that if repatriation costs relate solely to a claim under the Convention, which would not otherwise 
be covered under the Rules, the member will be liable to reimburse the Association. Thus, although the 
costs of repatriation following a casualty or one which relates to illness or injury will continue to be 
covered by the Association, if the Association is required to pay costs of repatriation following 
termination of employment or abandonment of the vessel, the member will be obliged to reimburse the 
Association. Skuld Rules, available at http://www.skuld.com, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
731 ITF Abandonment cases documents 
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assistance/care, which is a moral duty, apart from being a contractual breach, can 
constitute abandonment.732 Moreover, even disregarding the concept adopted in this 
thesis, it is a fact that in many abandonment of seafarers’ cases, medical care is required, 
since seafarers get stranded in ports for long periods of time.  Thus, the need for the 
provision of medical care is often a consequence of abandonment itself. 733 
 
The other MLC provision requiring Financial Security to be provided is found 
in Title 4, which covers  ‘Health protection, medical care, welfare and social security 
protection’.  Regulation 4.2 entitled ‘Shipowners’ liability’ requires Flag States to 
ensure that seafarers on board their ships have the “right of material assistance and 
support from the shipowner with respect to the financial consequences of sickness, 
injury or death occurring while they are serving under a seafarer’s employment 
agreement or arising from their employment under such agreement.”734  
 
Regulations 2.5, 4.2 are nothing if not revisions to an old ILO Convention. The 
MLC provision mirrors ILO Sickness Insurance (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No.56), 
which was only ratified by twenty countries, hardly a significant number, entering in to 
force in 1949735, and similarly with ILO Convention No 23, which can also be 
                                                        
732 Before any “abandonment of seafarer” definition had been set in place, in 1990/ 91, ITF reported the 
case of a Cape Verde’, involving a seafarer who suffered being injured during work and had been left 
uncared for in Rotterdam, having to rely on the mercy of the Dutch police and government who placed 
him a hospital. After a legal dispute, where the owners claimed that the accident was the seafarer’s fault, 
it was settled that the owners would pay the seafarer U$ 195,523, and pay for his repatriation and medical 
costs in full.  Attention should be given to the title given to ITF while reporting the case: “Severely 
injured and abandoned by owners, Evangelino gets Justice at last”. The title of the article in itself is a 
clear demonstration how the refusal of health care constitutes abandonment of seafarer.   ITF, ‘Severely 
injured and abandoned by owners, Evangelino gets Justice at last’, ITF Sefarers’ Bulletin No 6, 1991, 
page 22. 
733 In the middle of 2016, a seafarers’ charity (Apostleship of the sea) reportedly had to provide medical 
assistance to seafarers who had been abandoned following the shipowner’s bankruptcy and the 
consequent seizing of the vessel by banks. –International Shipping News, ‘Seafarers’ charity steps in to 
help abandoned Russian crew’, (Hellenic Shipping News, 26/07/2017)< 
http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/seafarers-charity-steps-in-to-help-abandoned-russian-crews/>, 
last accessed on 08/08/2016 
734 MLC Regulation 4.2.1. The term Financial Security is only mentioned in Standard A4.2(b). 
735 Following the MLC, the convention has been up to May 2016 denounced by fourteen countries. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:31220
1, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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considered more stringent than the MLC, since many of the rights assured in the former 
are mere guidelines in the latter.  
 
ILO Convention No. 56’s provisions read fairly similarly to the ones contained 
in Regulation 4.5, containing a few, but what some may consider significant, 
differences. In contrast to the MLC, ILO Convention No. 56 is very specific about the 
form of Financial Security to be provided, providing that this shall be under a 
“compulsory sickness insurance scheme”736, which shall be “administered by self-
governing institutions, which shall be under the administrative and financial 
supervision of the public authorities and shall not be carried on with a view to profit”.737 
 
It is important to highlight that the MLC provides for possible exclusions of 
liability in Standards A4.2.5 and A4.2.6: 
 
“5. National laws or regulations may exclude the shipowner from liability 
in respect of: 
(a) injury incurred otherwise than in the service of the ship; 
(b) injury or sickness due to the wilful misconduct of the sick, injured or 
deceased seafarer; and 
(c) sickness or infirmity intentionally concealed when the engagement is 
entered into. 
6. National laws or regulations may exempt the shipowner from liability to 
defray the expense of medical care and board and lodging and burial 
expenses in so far as such liability is assumed by the public authorities.” 
 
 In truth what the convention does is to recognize that national laws and 
regulations might provide for exclusions of liability since most employment 
legislations already recognize the situations listed in the Convention as exclusions of 
                                                        
736 ILO Convention No 56, Article 1 
737 Ibid, Article 9 
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liability in analogous situations.738 
 
  The fact is that Regulation 2.5 did not cause a major change in the industry, 
since prior to the MLC standard P&I covers already provided for compensation in the 
event of death or long term disability due to an occupational injury, illness or hazard739, 
with the only difference appearing to be that Clubs will now require evidence of these 
matters having occurred.  
 
V.6.3 – Abandonment of seafarer provisions 
 
Undoubtedly, the MLC’s provisions regarding abandonment have their roots in 
IMO Resolution A.930 (22) “Guidelines on Provision of Financial Security in Cases of 
Abandonment of Seafarers”. The Resolution not only defines abandonment of 
seafarers, but also provides for a Financial Security fund. According to the Resolution, 
the Financial Security system should be in the form of “inter alia, social security 
schemes, insurance, a national fund, or other forms of Financial Security”.740 The 
problem with the Resolution is that it only constitutes guidelines, there thus being no 
obligation to enforce or comply with it. 
 
 The MLC clearly followed the parameters of the above Resolution. According 
to the proposal for amendment of the Convention, the Financial Security system shall 
be sufficient to cover: 
 
(a) Outstanding wages and other entitlements due from the shipowner to 
the seafarer under their employment agreement, the relevant collective 
bargaining agreement on the national law of the Flag State, limited to 
                                                        
738 See Chapter III 
739  UK P&I Club, ‘MLC Club FAQs’, (16 August 2013,  UK P&I  Club) 
<http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/mlc-club-faqs-6133/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 and 
Gard, Entry into force of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC), Member Circular No. 4/2013, 
March 2013 
740 IMO Resolution A.930 (22)“Guidelines on Provision of Financial Security in Cases of Abandonment 
of Seafarers”, session 6.1 
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four months of any such outstanding wages and four months of any such 
outstanding entitlements; 
(b) All expenses reasonably incurred by the seafarer, including the cost of 
repatriation in accordance with paragraph 11; and 
(c) The cost of necessary maintenance and support from the act or omission 
constituting abandonment until the seafarers’ arrival at home741 
 
Therefore, the security system that will be provided by the MLC does not differ 
much from the Financial Security system provided for by IMO Resolution A.930 (2). 
The acclaimed (especially by trade unions) difference lies in the fact that the 
amendment to the MLC provides for seafarers to have direct access to this fund.742 
Therefore, essentially, shipowners will have to provide for their seafarers a ‘trust fund’, 
placing the seafarers as direct beneficiaries of it. In the author’s view this seems 
practicable. 
 
Nevertheless, since even before the adoption of IMO Resolution A.930 (22) in 
November 2001, P&I Clubs shared the view that it was impossible to provide cover 
insuring against the risk of abandonment, and that this was also unnecessary. At the 
time of IMO Resolution, P&I Clubs considered it to be not only of “doubtful utility”, 
but also of “doubtful practicality”. Representatives of the International Group of P&I 
Clubs claimed “they would be unable to issue notifications to individual seafarers. In 
addition, the International Group P&I Clubs have pointed out that claims for liabilities 
to seafarers are always subject to Club Rules and Terms of Entry (including 
deductibles) and that payments could not therefore be guaranteed to individual 
seafarers.”743 Furthermore, P&I Groups argued that:  
                                                        
741 Amendments to the Code implementing Regulation 2.5 – Repatriation of the MLC, 2006 (and 
appendices) adopted by the Special Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, adopted by the Special 
Tripartite Committee on 11 April 2014, Standard A2.5.2  
742 Ibid 
743  See: Swedish Club P&I Circulars, ‘International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Joint Guidelines to Seafarers’, (Swidish Club, Göteborg: February 1st 2002), 
<http://www.swedishclub.com/main.php?mcid=1&mid=106&pid=17307&newsid=282 >, last accessed 
on 08/08/2016 and West of England, ‘Notice to Members No. 9 2001/2002 - IMO/ILO - Resolutions and 
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● A dispassionate assessment of seafarers’ claims for death and personal 
injury, based on statistics provided by Group Clubs, clearly indicated 
that such claims do not give rise to significant problems. 
● Group Clubs handle seafarers’ claims fairly, efficiently and 
expeditiously. 
● IMO Resolution A.898 (21) and the accompanying Guidelines 
providing that vessels should carry evidence of liability insurance 
extended to seafarers’ claims. 
● There was therefore no need to develop additional Resolutions or 
Guidelines in relation to this issue.744 
 
Due to this sceptical position regarding the necessity and practicability of such 
insurance and the fact that abandonment provisions for years were nothing but 
guidelines, there was little commotion from P&I Clubs until the advent of MLC in 
finding ways to provide for such cover.  Unfortunately, this skeptical feeling still seems 
to exist among P&I Clubs. In 2013, the year of the entrfinany into force of the MLC, 
insurance brokers from Seacurus enumerated and explained the difficulties for P&I 
Clubs in providing Financial Security to cover abandonment. Apart from the normal 
difficulties of any crew cover, the ‘pay-to-be-paid’ rule and the right to take direct 
action, the brokers also pointed out that: 
 
1. Considering that the main cause of seafarer abandonment is a shipowner’s 
financial hardship and insolvency, which also leads them to stop paying 
their P&I premiums resulting in the cancelation of their insurance and 
membership of the Club, by the time a seafarer is abandoned the shipowner 
                                                        
Guidelines’ (December 2001, West of England Club) <http://www.westpandi.com/Publications/Notice-
to-Members/Archive/Notice-to-Members-No-9-20012002/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
744  West of England, ‘Notice to Members No. 9 2001/2002 - IMO/ILO - Resolutions and Guidelines’ 
(December 2001, West of England Club) <http://www.westpandi.com/Publications/Notice-to-
Members/Archive/Notice-to-Members-No-9-20012002/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
 
276 
 
may no longer be insured henceforth being unable to receive the benefit of 
the insurance.  
 
2. P&I Clubs offer third party liability insurance that covers seafarers’ 
repatriation in the event of illness or injury or as a consequence of a total 
loss or major casualty, provided that a shipowner has a legal liability and 
their premiums have been paid. However, P&I Clubs do not cover 
repatriation liabilities arising out of a breach of a contract of employment 
and abandonment after such a breach. It is suggested that losses arising 
from a breach of contract could be classed as ‘credit default’, “i.e. the 
failure through insolvency or otherwise to meet the costs of contractual 
commitments with respect to a crewmember’s repatriation and/or payment 
of salary”, and since P&I are not Financial Security systems they would be 
unable to provide cover for their member’s failure to meet the costs of 
contractual commitments as a result of their insolvency or otherwise, which 
ordinarily represents a barrier to the Clubs covering costs arising from 
crewmembers’ repatriation or payment of wages.  
 
3. There is the possibility of a conflict of interest, since the cover is provided 
on behalf of the shipowner member, hence, considering how P&I 
operates,745it cannot be expected from a Club for it to be an “impartial 
arbiter of the relationship between crew and employer”. Thus, a Club might 
be reluctant to act against a member in defence of seafarers, which could 
delay the seafarer’s repatriation, prolonging his/her stay on board the vessel 
or at the port where he is stranded, increasing the possibility of the 
shipowner becoming unable to pay its calls with the subsequent cancelation 
of cover. 746 
                                                        
745 P&I Clubs are controlled and operated by members and representatives are elected by their members. 
746  Seacurus, ‘Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group On Liability And Compensation 
Regarding Claims For Death, Personal Injury And Abandonment of seafarers - Seafarer Abandonment 
– An Insurance Solution Proposals by Seacurus Ltd’,(19-21 September 2005, Seacurus Ltd), p.6 and 
Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
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In 2014, when specifically commenting on the Amendment of the MLC 
designed to protect abandoned seafarers, Thomas Brown, managing director of 
Seacurus, while mentioning and at times explaining some of the difficulties listed 
above, devoted particular remarks to the difficulty of having insolvency risk 
mutualized, which would be a possible (if not the sole) way to comply with the 
requisites of Financial Security provided by the MLC, since insolvency of shipowner 
was seen in most cases to lead to abandonment. Indeed, according to Brown “if the 
Clubs are to intervene in the case of seafarer abandonment, they must be willing to use 
the mutual funds of their solvent members to enable them to act as financial guarantors 
to cover the debts of their insolvent members.” However, the hurdle lies in the fact that 
by “mutualising the risk of financial insolvency, the industry risks tilting the playing 
field against well-founded, financially solvent shipowners who, at significant financial 
cost, employ best practice throughout their operations.” 747Thus, especially considering 
that abandonment of seafarers as provided by the MLC can hardly be perceived as a 
‘common practice’ among shipowners, and such cases might be considered 
exceptions748, a possible mutualisation of the risk of insolvency could represent the bad 
subsiding the good. This concern seems to be shared by other P&I’ representatives, 
such as Jonathan Hare, Chairman of the Compulsory Insurance subcommittee, who 
when reviewing the amendments of the MLC, stated that: 
 
“A transfer of what has historically been a financiers’ risk to the marine 
insurer, particularly where a mutual Club is involved, raises difficult issues 
of principle quite apart from practical concerns such as cover limits and 
                                                        
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), pp. 123-124 
747Thomas Brown, ‘Should Insolvency Risk be Mutualised’ (Tradewinds Opinion Piece - 30 January 
2014) <http://crewseacure.com>, last accessed on 08/08/2016   
748 International Chamber of Shipping Press Release, Agreement Reached for Amendments to the 
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 to Address Abandonment of Seafarers and Crew Claims, 11 April 
2014, available at: http://www.ics-shipping.org/news/press-releases/view-
article/2014/04/11/agreement-reached-for-amendments-to-the-maritime-labour-convention-2006-to-
address-abandonment-of-seafarers-and-crew-claims, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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pooling.”749 
 
  Nevertheless, P&I Clubs have already demonstrated their willingness to extend 
the Financial Security cover they already provide to meet the extended MLC 
requirements. Currently, the Boards of the International Group of P&I Clubs are 
considering the available options.750 So far, the majority have voted that the pooling 
agreement should not be amended to support cover of all MLC liabilities to the extent 
of those that exceed the scope of current Club cover and retentions. Thus, it can be 
understood that Clubs in the International Group are in the process of exploring 
reinsurance options which will likely take the form of USD 90 million excess of the 
Club’s $US 10 million retention per fleet, with Clubs with very large fleets, or cruise 
Clubs, likely to require some additional reinsurance on top of the initial USD 100 
million, being currently in the process of working with their members and brokers to 
calculate their maximum exposures for these fleets.751 
  
 Despite P&I Clubs’ scepticism regarding how to extend the current cover to 
accommodate the MLC amendments regarding Financial Security in the case of 
abandonment, this is not impossible to be provided.  Indeed, proof of this is the fact that 
in 2013 itself, Seacurus launched what it called an insurance solution; the 
CrewSEACURE.752 
 
                                                        
749 Jonathan Hare, ‘Maritime Labour Convention’ (IG Annual Review 2014-2015) 
<http://www.skuld.com/Documents/Library/Annual%20Reviews%20IG/Annual%20Review%20IG%2
02014-15.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
750  Skuld, ‘Insight: Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006 – Future Amendments’ (Skuld, 2 October 
2015) <http://www.skuld.com/topics/people/mlc-2006/insight/insight---mlc-2006/future-
amendments/>, last last accessed on 08/08/2016 
751 Aon Risk Solutions, ‘P&I One- Q1 bulletin, 2016 P&I Review’, (Aon Risk Solutions, 2016) 
<http://www.aon.com/unitedkingdom/products-and-services/industry-
expertise/attachments/marine/Aon-PandI-Q1%20Bulletin.pdf>, p.7, last accessed on 08/08/2016See 
also: Tysers & Co Limited, ‘Tysers P&I Report 2015’ (Tysers & Co, 2015) 
<http://www.tysers.com/publications/index.html >, p.16 
752 Seacurus, ‘UK: Seacurus Hails Lloyd’s Inclusion of Insurance Covering Seafarer Abandonment’ 
(World Maritime News, 8 May 2013) <http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/83489/uk-seacurus-
hails-lloyds-inclusion-of-insurance-covering-seafarer-abandonment/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 For 
further information on the CrewSeacure see: http://crewseacure.com 
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 The definition of abandonment contained in the CrewSEACURE policy can be 
considered consistent with the definition contained in the MLC and the 2001 IMO 
resolution. According to the policy abandonment will have occured when: 
 
(a) The shipowner fails to fulfill its legal obligations as an employer and 
leaves the ship without the financial means to continue the ship’s 
operations; and 
(b) The seafarer’s remuneration is overdue; or 
(c) The shipowner fails to provide the crew with basic needs such as food, 
water, accommodation or medical care; or 
(d) The shipowner fails to repatriate seafarers within 30 days (or earlier if 
their employment contract so provides) of a right to repatriation 
arising.753 
  
When attempting to explain that requirements (b), (c) and (d) merely assist in 
defining a case of abandonment, even though they seem to narrow the scope of the 
policy, a broker of Seacurus stated that only contractual breaches relating “to wages, 
provision of basic needs and the right to repatriation in specified circumstances will, 
subject to requirement (a), signal abandonment.” 754Oddly, the broker’s explanation 
seems to emphasize the somewhat narrow scope of the policy. The explanation seems 
to make sure to explain that despite the wording of the first part of requirement (a), not 
every shipowner’s employment contract breach will give rise to abandonment, just the 
specific ones listed in requirements (b), (c) and (d) and it emphasizes that abandonment 
is conditional upon the ship being left “without the financial means to continue the 
ship’s operation”. This “condition” at first glance seems not only to be limiting but 
problematic as it is not clear what is deemed necessary for it to be fulfilled, specially 
since the ship may still operate without the shipowner having fulfilled its contractual 
                                                        
753 Cl.1.1 CrewSEACURE policy wording 
754  Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p.130 
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obligations with the seafarers. It seems that the policy was designed specifically to 
cover abandonment in cases of shipowner insolvency, which is indeed the most 
common cause of abandonment. It seems simplistic, however, to reduce abandonment 
only to cases where the shipowner has gone insolvent, as many times small owners 
running substandard vessels are very likely to abandon their crew. It is questionable if 
such wording is not in fact too limiting.  
 
 Additionally, it does not seem wrong to assume that the cover was drafted for 
the purposes of covering abandonment only following a shipowner’s insolvency, since 
Lloyd’s of London when including such an insurance under the exceptions within the 
Financial Guarantee insurance scheme755, which is forbidden by the Club756, stated: 
 
“From 1
st 
January 2014, a new risk code SA was created for Seafarer 
Abandonment. This provides cover in the event of the shipowner not being 
able to continue to fulfil their legal obligations as an employer of the 
seafarers by reason of insolvency.”757(Emphasis added) 
  
 Nevertheless, the losses covered by the policy in case of abandonment seem to 
go beyond the requirements of the Financial Security fund provided by the MLC. For 
instance, the policy covers: 
 
● Medical expenses incurred from the date of abandonment of the seafarer 
                                                        
755 Seafarers’ Abandonment Insurance fits perfectly within the definition of Financial Guarantee 
Insurance, as seen in Lloyd’s Market Bulletin Y4821 dated 14 September 2014. 
756 Lloyd’s Market Bulletin Y4396 dated 7 May 2010. Due to the practice been forbidden by Lloyds 
since 1924, Seacurus sought the approval of LLoyd’s Performance  Directorate of the insurance prior of 
making it available to members (Seacurus, ‘UK: Seacurus Hails Lloyd’s Inclusion of Insurance Covering 
Seafarer Abandonment’ (World Maritime News, 8 May 2013) 
<http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/83489/uk-seacurus-hails-lloyds-inclusion-of-insurance-
covering-seafarer-abandonment/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016) Although, the SA risk code is now 
exempt from the rules governing Finance Guarantees, its application is still restricted; “individual 
syndicates will need to obtain express approval from Lloyd’s Performance Management Directorate 
(PMD) to write this business” (Lloyd’s Market Bulletin Y4694, dated April 2013, para 1.2 
757 Lloyd’s Market Bulletin Y886, dated 2 April 2015 
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for up to 90 days after he has been repatriated (cl.2.1) 
● Personal accident cover for crew occurring within 30 days of 
abandonment (cl 2.2) 
● Unpaid remuneration up to six months (cl.2.3) 
● Subsistence and repatriation costs, covering adequate food, water, 
accommodation, medical care and repatriation itself. The repatriation 
will be by ‘the most appropriate and expeditious means (normally by 
air)’ and will include ‘additional transportation costs of 30kg of 
personal effects’ (cl 2.4) 
● Emergency subsistence and evacuation costs (cl.2.5) 
● Claims handling, legal fees and expenses, which are unlimited 
(cl.2.6)758 
 
This insurance solution of making the seafarers the insureds (although it is the 
shipowner who takes out and pays for the policy), resolved the problem of direct access 
to insurance funds, as it allows seafarers the direct right of action against the insurer.  
Nevertheless, the insurance policy provides for all disputes arising out of or under it to 
be subject to the laws of England and Wales, with the courts of England and Wales 
having exclusive jurisdiction. The jurisdiction clause can represent an obstacle to 
seafarers, since most seafarers are non-residents of England and Wales. Filing claims 
in others jurisdictions is usually troublesome and costly, even if these costs are 
recoverable later on759. The rationale behind the choice of law and jurisdiction is the 
fact that the CrewSEACURE product has assets in England, making easier the 
enforcement of judgments, England also being the home of international organizations 
that seek to enforce seafarers’ rights such as ITF.760 It is important to note nonetheless, 
that a notice of abandonment can be given by the seafarer himself or by an interested 
third party, such as seafarers’ welfare organizations and unions, as well as immigration 
                                                        
758 CrewSEACURE Policy 
759 Ibid, cl.2.6 
760  Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), pp. 129- 130 
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and port officials761, with the possibility of the notice being given online through the 
CrewSEACURE website.762 
 
Furthermore, there are limits and sub-limits under the heads of claims. Thus, 
abandonment cases are limited to USD 10 million, and a seafarer’s claim to unpaid 
wages is limited to USD 75,000 and USD 5,000 for repatriation and subsistence, with 
personal accident and medical expenses having higher sub-limits of USD 500,000 and 
USD 1 million per seafarer respectively.763 The policy also contains various exclusions 
seeking to limit the insurer’s liability in certain circumstances, such as when there is 
cover provided by another type of insurance.764 
 
The CrewSEACURE policy might be able to satisfy the obligations provided 
by the MLC, and IMO Resolution A.930 (22), regarding abandonment of seafarer cases, 
providing a ‘Certificate of Seafarer’s Abandonment Insurance’ and in some respects, 
as mentioned, covering beyond the strict requirements of the Convention. 765The policy 
also takes into consideration the broad definition of shipowners given by the 
Convention,766 hence allowing Shipowners, Crew Management Companies and 
                                                        
761 Ibid, p. 132 
762 See: http://crewseacure.com/seafarers/, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
763   Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p. 131 
764 For instance, clauses 4.1 and 4.3 of the policy wording exclude losses occurring prior to abandonment 
and situations involving piracy. These situations are already covered by standard P&I insurance. See:  
Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p. 131 
765 Ibid, p.132 
766 The MLC’s broad definition of shipowner, intends to cover not only the ‘traditional shipowners’ but 
also manning agencies, charterers (…), anyone that would had assumed the responsibility of the 
operation of the ship from the owner.  According to the MLC a shipowner is:  
“(…)the owner of the ship or another organization or person, such as the manager, agent or bareboat 
charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the ship from the owner and who, on 
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over the duties and responsibilities imposed on 
shipowners in accordance with this Convention, regardless of whether any other organization or persons 
fulfill certain of the duties or responsibilities on behalf of the shipowner.”( MLC, Article II. 1 (a)) 
The definition has raised a lot of debate, as some believed that it did not make it very clear who the 
shipowner should be, since apparently according to it a shipowner could be a third-party manager even 
if another entity carries out certain MLC shipowner duties and responsibilities.  However, this confusion, 
according to Dr Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry (ILO department of standards director) seems to be due to a 
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Seafarer Recruitment and Placement Services to buy the insurance policy.767 
 
Nevertheless, the cover is not immune to the most common difficulty/problem 
faced by ‘crew insurances’ in general, namely cost.  As previously discussed, 
shipowners are more inclined to ‘abandon’ their crew when facing financial hardship, 
and in such times they cannot increase the costs of their operations. Especially 
considering that the premium of such insurance is payable in one installment, in order 
to avoid the policy being cancelled by non-payment of premiums, requiring the 
shipowner to have a considerable amount of financial resources at the time of hiring 
the policy. This can prove problematic in times of financial hardship. Moreover, the 
product is also priced by reference to various factors that indicate the ‘health’ of the 
shipowner’s business, hence a shipowner facing financial hardship or with a fleet in a 
deteriorating condition may have to pay more. 768Thus, it is most likely that shipowners 
with a substandard fleet would not be able to afford such cover, which is sensible, and 
                                                        
misunderstanding when reading the ‘regardless’ part of the definition. According to Dr. Doumbia-Henry 
the “regardless ...” phrase simply clarifies that the entity identified as an MLC shipowner, whether the 
owner of the ship, shipmanager or other entity, may indeed not be the one fulfilling all the duties and 
responsibilities of the shipowner under the MLC (Liz MacMahon, ‘ILO stands by labour convention’s 
shipowner’ (lloydslist, August 2013) 
According to the IMO Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006) Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ) document; “this comprehensive definition was adopted to reflect the idea that irrespective of the 
particular commercial or other arrangements regarding a ship‘s operations, there must be a single 
entity, ―the shipowner, that is responsible for seafarers‘ living and working conditions. This idea is also 
reflected in the requirement that all seafarers‘ employment agreements must be signed by the shipowner 
or a representative of the shipowner”.(IMO, Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006) Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQ) (Online revised Edition, 2012) < www.ilo.org/mlc>) 
This definition could indeed represent a significant change for seafarers attempting to have their rights 
enforced, since sometimes the owner of the ship might not be as easily located as the charterer or the 
manning agency. Nonetheless, shipmanagers could not disagree more with the understanding that they 
might be considered to be shipowners for the purposes of the MLC as the Director of V.Ships group Mr. 
Matt Dunlop stated: “We fail to understand how anybody can consider how a service provider, such as 
a third-party manager, can come under the definition of MLC shipowner. There is no ambiguity in the 
definition”. (Liz MacMahon, ‘MLC 2006: Who is the shipowner and why does it matter?’ (lloydslist, 
August 2013). It is up to Member States of the MLC to clarify the definition of the shipowner when 
implementing the convention.  
767 Seacurus, CrewSECURE Product Development Update, February 2014, available at: 
http://www.seacurus.com/newsletter/product-development-update.pdf and  
http://crewseacure.com/products, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
768  Denis Nifontov, “Seafarer Abandonment insurance: a system of financial security for seafarers”, in 
Jennifer Lavelle (ed), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, (Routledge 
2014), p. 132 
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would be yet another form of combatting substandard shipping. 
 
  Yachtowners769, an Offshore Syndicate of the Shipowners’ Club770, have 
launched somewhat similar cover to CrewSEACURE. The ‘Yachtowners Insurance for 
Seafarers’ Unpaid Wages Following Abandonment’ however can be considered an 
extension of current P&I covers, since it only provides for the unpaid wages required 
by the MLC amendment. Similarly to CrewSEACURE, the Yachtowners policy 
provides for the seafarer to have direct rights to the cover and this has a limit: 
US$ 50,000 for an 8-week period or US$ 100,000 for a 16-week period. Differently 
from the former however, the latter policy does not allow crew manning agents to 
contract the policy, only allowing yacht owners to do so. 771Furthermore and most 
interestingly, the Yachtowners’ policy is clear that for its purposes, abandonment is 
conditional upon the shipowners’ insolvency:  
 
“For the purposes of this unpaid wages insurance cover, abandonment 
occurs when the Club has determined that our Member has no realistic 
prospect of continuing to meet their obligations towards their seafarers, due 
to their insolvency.”772 
 
  Accordingly, it is clear that although there is a willingness of the industry in 
providing the form of insurance and Financial Security required by the MLC in cases 
                                                        
769  Yachtowners also fall within the scope of the MLC. For more on the subject see Matheuz Bek, 
“Yachting and the Maritime Labour Convention 2006”, in Jennifer Lavelle (ed) the Maritime Labour 
Convention 2006 International Law redefined (Routledge 2014)  , “Yachting and the Maritime Labour 
Convention 2006”, in the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 International Law redefined, Edited by 
Jennifer Lavelle, London: 2014, Routledge,  pp.69-94 
770  Shipowners’ Club, ‘The Shipowners’ Club launches dedicated yacht syndicate’ (22 September 2014, 
Shipowners Club) <http://www.shipownersclub.com/shipowners-club-launches-dedicated-yacht-
syndicate/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
771  Yachtowners, ‘Insurance For Seafarers’ Unpaid Wages Following Abandonment As A Result Of A 
Members’ Insolvency - Know Your Cover’ (November 2015, Shipowners Club) 
<http://www.shipownersclub.com/media/2015/11/Yachtowners-Insurance-for-Seafarers-Unpaid-
Wages-Following-Abandonment-Know-Your-Cover.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
772  Yachtowners, ‘Insurance For Seafarers’ Unpaid Wages Following Abandonment As A Result Of A 
Members’ Insolvency - Know Your Cover’ (November 2015, Shipowners Club) 
<http://www.shipownersclub.com/media/2015/11/Yachtowners-Insurance-for-Seafarers-Unpaid-
Wages-Following-Abandonment-Know-Your-Cover.pdf>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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of abandonment of seafarers, cover is generally deemed to be limited to cases where 
the shipowner has become insolvent.773 
 
 The position of P&I Clubs regarding how this new form of insurance can be 
provided is still not clear, as their rules are yet to be amended, nor are the Member 
States of the Convention’s positions regarding the chosen method of providing for the 
Financial Security in cases of abandonment clear, since the Convention does not require 
this to be necessarily in the form of insurance, 774however, insurance is considered to 
be the most suitable solution by industry experts. 
 
  It is important to note however that the International Group of P&I Clubs 
already expressed its opinion that the word ‘due’ contained in the Convention 
requirement for “outstanding wages and other entitlements due from the shipowner”775, 
means wages and entitlements that have already been accrued but not been paid, hence 
excluding future earnings provided by the remaining contractual period. 776 
 
 Consequently, it is clear that even when P&I Clubs extend their cover to 
accommodate the MLC amendments regarding Financial Security in cases of 
abandonment, this will guarantee that the seafarer will be duly compensated, 
considering that his/her employment contract was unilaterally breached by the 
shipowner. Furthermore, the Convention itself provides for a limitation of liability since 
                                                        
773 Nevertheless, Yan Ferns, Business Development Manager of the Club, stated that the policy “Rather 
than being triggered by insolvency, which is the norm used by other products, as soon as the crew detect 
that their employer may be failing in its duty to meet their agreed wage payments, the Club can be called 
upon to act. The declaration of the employer’s insolvency may, of course follow long after the crew has 
been abandoned.  Their need is for immediate help.” (MarineLink, ‘Shipowners' Club P&I Offers MLC 
2006 Wage Insurance’, (24 February 2014, Marinelink) http://www.marinelink.com/news/shipowners-
offers-club364611.aspx, last accessed on 08/08/2016)  It is unclear however how this would actually 
work in practice. 
774 The MLC amendments provide that the Finance Security “may be in the form of a social security 
scheme or insurance or a national fund or other similar arrangements.” MLC Amendments relating to 
Standard A2.5.3 
775 MLC Amendments relating to Standard A2.5.9 
776 Aon Risk Solutions, ‘P&I One- Q1 bulletin’, (2016 P&I Review,  Aon) 
<http://www.aon.com/unitedkingdom/products-and-services/industry-
expertise/attachments/marine/Aon-PandI-Q1%20Bulletin.pdf>, p.6, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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it limits the Financial Security to covering the payment of outstanding wages for a 
maximum period of four months.777  Therefore, although this new Financial Security 
system will undoubtedly heighten the protection given to seafarers, it is still doubtful 
whether they will get all the compensation actually owed to them. 
 
V. 7 –Comparative analysis between Compulsory Insurance in Maritime Law and 
MLC’s Financial Security 
 
 The Financial Security required by the MLC possesses similar characteristics to 
other forms of Financial Security/insurance provided for by International Maritime 
Conventions which have been in force for around two years.  Indeed, the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) 1992, Art 7; the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker oil Pollution Damage 2001, Art 
7; International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection 
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention) 
2010, Art 12; and The Nairobi Convention on the Removal of Wrecks 2007, Art. 12 
have similar provisions. For illustration purposes, Art. 7 (1) and  (2) of the CLC reads: 
 
“1. The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying more 
than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo shall be required to maintain insurance 
or other Financial Security, such as the guarantee of a bank or a certificate 
delivered by an international compensation fund, in the sums fixed by applying 
the limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability 
for pollution damage under this Convention.  
 
2. A certificate attesting that insurance or other Financial Security is in force 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention shall be issued to each 
ship after the appropriate authority of a Contracting State has determined that 
the requirements of paragraph 1 have been complied with. With respect to a 
                                                        
777 MLC Amendments relating to Standard A2.5.9 
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ship registered in a Contracting State such certificate shall be issued or 
certified by the appropriate authority of the State of the ship’s registry; with 
respect to a ship not registered in a Contracting State it may be issued or 
certified by the appropriate authority of any Contracting State. This certificate 
shall be in the form of the annexed model and shall contain the following 
particulars:  
 
(a)  name of ship and port of registration;  
(b)  name and principal place of business of owner;  
(c) type of security;  
(d)  name and principal place of business of insurer or other person giving 
security and, where appropriate, place of business where the insurance or 
security is established; (e) period of validity of certificate which shall not be 
longer than the period of validity of the insurance or other security.” 
 
The CLC provisions are very similar to the MLC Amendments Standard A2.5.2 
(1) (3) (4) (7) and Appendix A2-I.  The difference between the Conventions’ provisions 
can be said to be a matter of wording. While the first provides for “insurance or other 
type of Financial Security” the latter provides that the Financial Security may be in the 
form of insurance. Thus, essentially both Conventions provide that the Financial 
Security can be achieved through insurance. Furthermore, in both conventions the 
affected third party is to have direct access to the financial security. 
 
All the above named Conventions have had their Financial Security requirement 
fulfilled by way of ‘compulsory insurance’ provided by P&I Clubs. Thus, considering 
that compulsory insurance in the maritime industry has been in existence since 1969 at 
the time of the CLC778, and has been used since that time to fulfil similar requirements 
of other conventions, this was most likely the form of Financial Security that the MLC 
                                                        
778  For more on the history of P&I ‘compulsory insurance’ see: Ling Zhu, Compulsory Insurance and 
Compensation for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, (Springer 2007) ISBN 978-3-540-45900-2, pp.49-80 
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drafters had in mind.  This conclusion can also be drawn by reference to the joint 
IMO/ILO ad hoc expert working group on liability and compensation regarding claims 
for death, personal injury and abandonment of seafarers discussions, during which not 
only seafarers but also the State delegations held the view that compulsory insurance 
would be the most appropriate mechanism to offer seafarers adequate protection in such 
circumstances.779Indeed, the use of compulsory insurance to fulfill the MLC 
requirement of Financial Security seems in line with what is considered to be “a new 
regulatory approach in international unification of liability law”, as Professor Eric 
Rosaeg notably stated: 
 
“The increasing interest in compulsory insurance coincides with a new 
regulatory approach in the international unification of liability law. While 
the conventions in the first half of the century really only aimed at 
unification, public interests have become more and more dominant. 
Interests of third parties, the environment and governments themselves 
have become the focus of the international lawmakers. In particular this is 
so in the International Maritime Organization. The Comité Maritime 
International has ceased to play its previously so important role there. In 
this way, compulsory insurance is a reflection of government involvement 
and government interests.”780 
 
 Professor Rosaeg also pointed out some rationales that make compulsory 
insurance so attractive: 
 
1. Concerns that claimants will not obtain the compensation due to them 
after maritime casualties due to the shipowner’s insolvency. 
2. Accessibility – Claimants, especially weaker parties or small claimants 
                                                        
779 ILO, Joint IMO/ILO ad hoc expert working group on liability and compensation regarding claims for 
death, personal injury and abandonment of seafarers. (Report JMC/29/2001/4, International Labour 
Office, 2001) 
780  Erik Rosaeg, ‘Compulsory Maritime Insurance’ in Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law 
Yearbook 2000 <http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/insurance/ simply.pdf>  , p. 2 
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as in seafarers’ cases, must be helped to overcome the problems of 
pursuing a claim against a paper company in a remote jurisdiction. It has 
been proven that sometimes it can be difficult to assess who the 
beneficial owner of the vessel is, and consequently where its funds are 
allocated, hence making it nearly impossible or at least impractical to 
enforce a judgment in these conditions. Giving claimants direct action 
against the insurer under a compulsory insurance regime can overcome 
these hurdles.  
3. It is believed that third party providers of Financial Security generally 
will contribute to higher standards on board vessels (in order to keep 
their own costs down), hence compulsory insurance will assist in 
increasing standards within the shipping industry generally since ideally 
a substandard vessel would not get insured, and, compulsory insurance 
being a requirement, such a vessel would be prevented from sailing.  
4. Without an international compulsory insurance regime, national 
legislations may create a number of different schemes for evidence of 
financial responsibility, putting at risk the relatively high degree of 
uniformity of maritime law. This would probably be problematic in 
relation to Port Control, which would be obliged to deal with different 
documentation certifying the existence of insurance. 
5. It avoids unfettered competition, since irresponsible shipowners will be 
unable to avoid the costs associated with providing insurance 781 
 
The above rationales not only justify the attractiveness of compulsory 
insurance, but these considerations are likely what the MLC drafters, more specifically 
the MLC tripartite committee, had in mind when drafting the Financial Security 
requirement, and they affirm most of the discussion raised in this chapter and more 
broadly in this thesis. 
 
                                                        
781 Ibid, pp.3-4 
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 Differently from the MLC, the above mentioned Conventions provide for a 
‘blue card’ system to evidence the existence of the required compulsory insurance. The 
‘blue cards’ are certificates of insurance confirming that necessary cover is in place, 
which are handed to Flag state authorities to issue certificates of compliance.782This is 
apparently the reason why some P&I Clubs claim that the Financial Security required 
by the MLC is not compulsory insurance.783 
 
 The ‘blue card’ system explained above can even be said to perhaps have been 
ITF’s source of inspiration when designing the ‘ITF blue/green cards’ certificates. 
These certificates are issued by trade unions to vessels covered by an ITF approved 
agreement, which requires among other things for the shipowner to “ensure there is 
appropriate insurance to cover the company against all liabilities in the relevant ITF 
agreement”.784 These certificates attest compliance with ITF conditions and as such 
they avoid unnecessary delays at Port caused by inspections. 
 
Taking into account everything discussed in this section, it is difficult to 
understand why P&I Clubs still seem reluctant in providing the Financial Security 
required by the MLC since it has been offering compulsory insurance for nearly three 
decades.785 Particularly considering that despite the fact that the MLC does not limit 
                                                        
782 Petar Kragic, ‘Compulsory insurance for shipowner’s cargo liability- A heresy or logical step?’, 
(UKPANDI,6 August 2009)  <http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/compulsory-insurance-for-
shipowners-cargo-liability-845/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 and UK P&I Club, ‘Circular 24/10: 
(January 2011): Compulsory Insurance – “Blue Cards”’ (UK P&I Club, 01 January 2011) 
783  Alexander McCooke, ‘An Introduction to the Maritime Labour Convention 2006’ (UK Chamber of 
Shipping, 1 February 2016) <https://www.ukchamberofshipping.com/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 See 
also: ITF Seafarers’ bulletin 1986, page 3 
784ITF Agreements, available at http://www.itfseafarers.org/itf_agreements.cfm. See also: ITF Glossary 
of terms, http://www.itfseafarers.org/glossary.cfm,; Turner & Willian S.A., ‘ITF Blue Card' (Turner & 
Willian, 2013) <http://www.turner-williams.com/itf.html>, last accessed on 08/08/2016; Shipping 
Inspection, ITF (International Transport Workers' Federation), 
http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php/chartering-terms/75-i/4737-itf-international-transport-workers-
federation; Petar Kragic, ‘Compulsory insurance for shipowner’s cargo liability- A heresy or logical 
step?’, (UKPANDI,6 August 2009)  <http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/compulsory-
insurance-for-shipowners-cargo-liability-845/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 and ITF, Flags of 
convenience - Avoiding the rules by flying a convenient flag, (ITF) 
http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-convenience-campaign/, last 
accessed on 08/08/2016 
785  Compulsory insurance however has not been free of criticism since its inception. See C.M.I. 
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the security to a specific value, it provides other limits, i.e. payment of up to 4 months 
wages, and these will very unlikely reach the limits established by the other mentioned 
conventions. Furthermore, Clubs do not seem to have a problem pooling in those cases, 
mutualizing the risks, which in the case of the MLC has been pointed out as a problem, 
even though the justification of such mutualisation finds support in relation to the other 
conventions (as substandard vessels and irresponsible shipowners are more likely to 
not only abandon their crew, but also to cause pollution).  
 
V.7.1 - A critical analysis of the CLC 1969 and the IOPC Fund  
 
As seen in the previous section, the Financial Security required by the MLC has 
similar characteristics to the Financial Security required by the CLC 1969. Taking into 
account these similarities and the fact that the Financial Security requirement provided 
by the MLC is not yet in force786, whereas the CLC requirement has been in force for a 
few decades, an analysis of the latter might prove fruitful not only to demonstrate the 
efficiency of Financial Security, but also its ‘flaws’. Indeed, the Financial Security 
provided by both conventions provides for limitations of liability, and there shall be 
unfortunate cases (even if rare) where such limitation might lead to victims of incidents 
not being adequately compensated. The forthcoming analysis shall demonstrate the 
difficulties in ‘bending’ this limitation of liability.  Moreover, this more in depth 
analysis of the CLC 69 (together with the IOPC Fund) will also demonstrate that its 
origins and inceptions are in a number of ways similar to those of the MLC. 
 
 The Torrey Canyon787 incident in 1967 led to creation of the International 
                                                        
Documentation 1968-I and Petar Kragic, ‘Compulsory insurance for shipowner’s cargo liability- A 
heresy or logical step?’, (UKPANDI,6 August 2009)  
<http://www.ukpandi.com/knowledge/article/compulsory-insurance-for-shipowners-cargo-liability-
845/>, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
786 The Amendments are set to come into force on 18 January 2017 
787 The Torrey Canyon was a crude-oil tanker, which ran aground on March 18, 1967 on the Seven Stones 
Reef at the western entrance to the English Channel—eighteen miles west of Land's End and eight miles 
south of the Scilly Isles. The vessel was manned by an Italian crew, owned by the Barracuda Tanker 
Corporation, a Liberian-based subsidiary of the Union Oil Company of California, and was en route from 
Mena al-Ahmadi, Kuwait, to Milford Haven, England, under charter to the British Petroleum Company.  
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Convention for Oil Pollution Damage (“CLC 1969”) under which shipowners are 
strictly liable for defined pollution damage. The case involved a large crude oil tanker 
carrying some 117,000 tons of oil that sank causing devastating consequences to the 
Scilly Isles and the south-west of England as well as the Brittany coast of France.  At 
the time of the accident, there was little technical knowledge available on how best to 
deal with the clean-up of such a large volume of oil, hence, regardless of the 
government’s best efforts, significant pollution and damage occurred.788 Moreover, 
there was no effective compensation available for the victims, third parties, who 
suffered damages and economic loss as a result of the oil spill. The case demonstrated 
the need for the international community to realize the necessity of establishing a 
consolidated liability regime to compensate victims of oil pollution incidents.789  
 
Furthermore, in the same year that the MARPOL protocol was drafted, 1978, 
the International Convention on Establishment of an International Fund for 
                                                        
The master of the vessel was considered by the investigators the sole person responsible for the accident 
since he had kept the ship on automatic steering and steaming at its top speed of nearly sixteen knots, 
failing to change course when advised to do so both by his third officer and by signals from the Seven 
Stones lightship. 
After only three day after the incident, an estimated 37 million gallons of the tanker's 118,000-ton cargo 
of oil had spilled. Despite all the containment and clean up attempts, the oil spread across 120 miles of 
southern England and 55 miles of the coast of Brittany in northwest France.  
Furthermore, at the time of the accident, only the UK was a party to the 1957 Convention on the 
Limitation of Liability. Thus, its claimants (including the government) could have sought to recover costs 
against limitation amounts set by this convention, viz approximately US$4.75 million (£1.72 million) 
against more than £14 million of quantifiable claims in the UK and France. France, like the USA and 
Japan, had a much more restrictive national legislation hence French claimants had only the possibility 
of recovery from the total value of the remains of the ship and its cargo after the incident, bearing in 
mind that the only property salvaged from the Torrey Canyon was one lifeboat, it can easily been 
concluded that the claimants had no chance to be compensated by the damage sought. 
The Torrey Canyon is considered to be the world's first major disaster involving one of the new breed of 
supertankers, having a devastating effect on the environment. - Torrey Canyon. (1997). In L. Paine, Ships 
of the world, Houghton Mifflin. (Houghton Mifflin, 1997) and John Wren, ‘Overview of the 
Compensation and Liability Regimes Under the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC)’ 
in  Spill Science & Technology Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000 , p.46 See also: Patrick Griggs, ‘“Torrey 
Canyon”, 45 Years on: Have we Solved All the Problems?’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) 
Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p.227 
788  John Wren, ‘Overview of the Compensation and Liability Regimes Under the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC)’ in  Spill Science & Technology Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000 , 
p.46 
789 See also: IMO, Liability and Compensation, Available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Pages/LiabilityAndCompensation.aspx 
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compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (“1971 Fund Convention”) came into 
force. The convention together with the CLC 1969 accomplished the very innovative 
two-tier-liability and compensation system for tanker oil pollution damage.  
 
The Fund, unlike the Civil Liability Convention, which places the onus on 
shipowners, is made up of contributions from oil importers. The rationale behind the 
Fund is that if an accident at sea results in pollution damage exceeding the 
compensation available under the Civil Liability Convention, the Fund will be available 
to pay an additional amount, while spreading more evenly the burden of compensation 
between shipowner and cargo interest. The cap on the fund in the two conventions was 
further raised through amendments adopted by a conference held in 1992, and again 
during the Legal Committee's 82nd session held from 16-20 October 2000. 
Furthermore, in May 2003, a Diplomatic Conference adopted the 2003 Protocol on the 
Establishment of a Supplementary Fund for Oil Pollution Damage. The Protocol 
establishes an International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund, 
intending to provide an additional, third tier of compensation for oil pollution damage. 
Nevertheless, participation in the Supplementary Fund is optional and is open to all 
Contracting States to the 1992 Fund Convention. 790 The establishment of the Fund is 
very much acclaimed as it removed the risk of liability being restricted to the value of 
property of the owner which is situated within the jurisdiction, plus it eliminated the 
prospectus of sharing with other non-pollution claimants, a general limitation fund set 
up under the 1976 Limitation Convention. 791 
 
V.7.2 – The limitations of liability provided by the CLC and IOPC Funds, 
similarly to the MLC 
 
During the 1950s and 60s, in order to avoid or “get around” inconvenient 
limitation provisions, claimants began suing individuals who were somehow involved 
                                                        
790 Ibid 
791  Patrick Griggs, ‘“Torrey Canyon”, 45 Years on: Have we Solved All the Problems?’ in Baris Soyer 
and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p.227  
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in the relevant accident but who were not covered by limitation provisions, as could be 
seen in the Himalaya case792. Following the case, it became customary when drafting 
international instruments involving rights of limitation to widen the definition of those 
entitled to benefit from limitation of liability. Therefore, in the 1957 Limitation 
Convention the right to limit was extended from the shipowner to include the charterer, 
manager and operator of the vessel, together with the master, members of the crew and 
other servants of the owner, charterer, manager and operator. Nevertheless, attempts to 
get around the limitation persisted, as in the case of Annie Hay793, where the claimant 
argued without success that the negligence of the master of the vessel and the owner’s 
subsequent vicarious liability had forfeited the right to limit liability. 
 
The CLC and the Fund, other than giving a wide definition of those who can 
limit their liability, adopted a different method of ensuring that rights of limitation 
extended to all persons involved with the ship, called “channeling”.  This method 
provides for all the claims under the Conventions to be made against the registered 
owner of the vessel, and by article III (4) of the CLC claims were prohibited against the 
                                                        
792 Adler V Dixon (The Himalaya) [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep 267, [1955] 1 QB. The Himalaya case, a case of 
carriage of passenger by sea, established the possibility of suing someone outside the contractual 
relationship in 1955. Mrs Adler, a passenger on the Himalaya was injured falling from the gangway, 
which can be considered to be an expected incident under the circumstances. The importance of the case 
is found in the fact that Mrs Adler sued the master and the boatswain of the vessel, instead of the 
company, in order to escape limitation and exemption clauses in the contract with the cruise ship. 
The court of Appeal held that the master and the boatswain could not rely upon the defences available to 
their employer, the carrier, under the contract of carriage. The decision created tension in the ship 
industry, with carriers’ employees and subcontractors demanding to have an indemnity from the carrier 
in order to protect themselves against this extra burden. Furthermore, it must be noted that allowing 
claimants to sue these parties, in order to avoid the shipowners limitation of liability, would only create 
an overburden of lawsuits, considering that the employee could go after his employer for indemnity, who 
according to employment law should be held vicariously liable for his employee’s action while in the 
course of his/her employment. Thus, if looked at from a technical perspective, lawsuits like the Himalaya 
would only serve as tools to overturn the statutory limitations of liability, since at the end the same result 
would be obtained. Indeed, in the Himalaya case, the carrier was “commercially obliged” to grant 
indemnity for a burden he was not directly responsible for.  
The commotion around the case gave origin to what is known as the Himalaya Clause, a clause inserted 
in the bill of lading essentially extending the carrier’s limitation of liability to the carrier`s employees 
and subcontractors, therefore including in the contract itself provisions regarding Third Parties. (For a 
more detailed discussion on the case, please see:  Robert Merkin, Privity of Contract, The Impact of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Party Acts) (Lloyd's Commercial Law Library), (Informa Law from 
Routledge, 2000), pp. 68-72 
793 [1968] P.341, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 141 
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servants or agents of the owner including crew members, pilots, people performing 
services for the ship, charterers, managers and salvors together with their respective 
agents. 794 The channeling method provided the shipowners confidence that as long as 
they played according to the rules, although such increased their own potential liability, 
this remained limited to acts caused by them, and did not include those of their agents. 
 
Nevertheless, as the Erika case showed, even a more generous liability regime 
might not be enough.  The claims which arose from the Erika exceeded the maximum 
amount of compensation payable under the CLC and the Fund Conventions. The French 
government decided to allow private claimants to have priority in the fund.  However, 
as the clean-up expenses started to pile up, the government decided to explore 
alternative ways of recovering in excess of the fund available in these conventions, and 
since in civil claims they would find themselves limited by the funds, they decided to 
resort to criminal law. Therefore, fifteen defendants involved in the accident were 
charged with imprudence contributing to the incident and the resulting pollution, with 
four of them eventually being found guilty, i.e. Mr. Savarese, the beneficial owner of 
Tevere Shipping Co (which owned the vessel); Mr Pollara, the president of Panship 
Management & Services SrL (the technical managers of the vessel); Total SA (owners 
of the cargo and charterers of the ship); and RINA Spa, the vessel’s Classification 
Society. Moreover, the court ruled that the four did not fall with the Article II (4) list, 
thus not being able to take advantage of the CLC channeling provision to avoid civil 
liability.795 
 
The court of Appeal in Paris held in the context of the Article III (4) defence, 
that the owner acted recklessly and imprudently when he decided to minimize repairs 
to the vessel, amounting to inexcusable conduct, depriving him the right to rely on 
Article III (4). In relation to Mr Pollara, the court upheld the guilty finding and 
                                                        
794 Patrick Griggs, ‘“Torrey Canyon”, 45 Years on: Have we Solved All the Problems?’ in Baris Soyer 
and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p.229 
795  The Erika, Trinunal de Grande Instance, Paris, judgments of 16 January 2008 
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concluded that he, as the person in charge of Panships796, was outside the protection of 
the Article. This is a decision which has been highly criticized considering that Article 
III (4) clearly states that no claim shall be made against a “manager or operator of the 
ship”, also extending protection to all his “servants and agents” hence the article 
undoubtedly includes Mr Pollara in the group of people who can benefit from the 
limitation of liability provided by the fund.797 The court held the defendants liable to 
pay € 200.6 million to the civil parties over and above compensation made available 
under the CLC/ Fund. 798 
 
The Erika clearly demonstrates that there are still ways to get around the Fund 
provisions, and that this might not be enough to cover all types of casualties dealing 
with pollution, regardless of how generous it might be. The Fund was also not enough 
to cover all the claims caused by the Prestige accident, leading Spain to follow France’s 
footsteps in attempting get around potential limitations on liability.  
 
The recent Spanish judgment in the Prestige incident can be considered in many 
ways more controversial than the French courts’ decisions in the Erika. First and 
foremost, the Spanish Supreme Court held the Master of the vessel criminally liable for 
the incident, giving him a two year prison sentence, as ordering him to pay a twelve 
month fine at a daily rate of 10 euros, as well as ordering an 18-month disqualification 
from the exercise of his profession as a ship’s captain, plus payment of one twelfth part 
of the costs of the trial at first instance, and making him also civilly liable to pay 
compensation. As if the master’s sentencing was not controversial enough, the Spanish 
Supreme Court also held the insurance company, London Steamshipowners Mutual 
Insurance Association (the London P&I Club) directly liable for the incident and the 
Mare Shipping Inc. (the beneficial owner) subsidiary liable for it also. 799 
                                                        
796 Cour d’Appel, Paris, Judgment of 30 March 2010 
797  See:   Patrick Griggs, ‘“Torrey Canyon”, 45 Years on: Have we Solved All the Problems?’ in Baris 
Soyer and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), 
p.227 
798 Cour d’Appel, Paris, Judgment of 30 March 2010 
799 Cassation Appeal No.:1167/2014, Judgment No.: 865/2015, Incidents Involving The IOPC Funds – 
1992 Fund – Prestige, Available At: Http://Www.Iopcfunds.Org, last accessed on 08/08/2016 
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Apparently dissatisfied with the American Courts’ decision of not holding ABS 
liable for the incident, the Spanish Court decided to attribute liability to the remaining 
“actors”. In the case of the P&I Club, the Spanish Court ignored the non-existence of 
an insurance policy and the pay-to-be-paid rule, as well as the 2013 decision held by 
the English Court,800 which enforced the arbitration awards declaring the Club not 
liable to pay compensation either to France nor Spain, and recognizing the applicability 
of English Law and English jurisdiction to the insurance contract that the Club had with 
the shipowner.801 Therefore, the Spanish Supreme Court, questionably, declared the 
insurer civilly liable to pay for the clean-up costs that exceeded the two-tier liability 
system offered by the CLC 69 and the IOPC Fund. The decision gives an entirely new 
perspective to P&I Clubs’ liability, and should currently be considered a leading 
authority on the issue.802 
 
Nevertheless, cases like the Erika and the Prestige should be perceived as 
exceptions and not the rule for when the multi-tier liability scheme created by the 
CLC/IOPC is not sufficient to cover all losses. These developments, which increase the 
amount of compensation available to claimants in the event of a pollution accident, 
were intensively discussed and agreed over a period of years between owners and their 
liability underwriters, being the consequence of pressure from governments and the 
international community (including the MLC). Likewise, abandonment of seafarers as 
defined by the MLC is, as discussed previously, considered to be exceptional. Thus, 
extreme cases of abandonment surpassing the limitations imposed by the MLC 
Financial Security should be even rarer. Nonetheless, as the two quoted cases point out, 
compensation in cases of seafarers’ claims exceeding the amount available under the 
Financial Security Fund might be sought through third parties involved in the incident. 
                                                        
800The London Steam-Shipowners' Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain, The 
French State [2013] EWHC 3188 (Comm).. 
801 The obiter dicta of the case is extremely interesting as it is diametrically contrary to the Spanish 
Court’s reasoning. 
802  Patrick Griggs, ‘“Torrey Canyon”, 45 Years on: Have we Solved All the Problems?’ in Baris Soyer 
and Andrew Tetterborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, (1st Edition, Routledge, 2012), p.227 
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These Third Parties shall be defined on a case by case basis, since the causes of 
abandonment and its consequences differ from one case to another. 
 
Despite the CLC/Fund conventions’ clear limitations, the multi-tier liability 
system proposed by both can be considered to have been extremely successful. 
Therefore, little doubt should exist about the future success of the MLC Financial 
Security.  
 
V.8 – Concluding Remarks 
 
 This Chapter demonstrated the role of P&I Clubs in ensuring that seafarers have 
their rights protected. Although P&I Clubs cannot generally be considered as bearing 
any responsibility for preventing abandonment of seafarers from occurring, they have 
a responsibility to ensure that seafarers have their rights enforced through insurance 
schemes.  
 
 Despite P&I Clubs’ scepticism regarding the necessity and implementation of 
the Financial Security Scheme provided by the MLC in cases of abandonment of 
seafarers, as discussed in this chapter, Clubs are already finding ways to set the scheme 
in place. Furthermore, it may be observed that such scepticism seemed to be misplaced, 
considering that the Scheme bears a lot of similarities with compulsory insurance, the 
IOPC/ CLC funds, already offered by Clubs for the past decades, the necessity of which 
is evident, considering that most cases of abandonment of seafarers are a consequence 
of the shipowners’ insolvency, so, in many cases, abandoned seafarers could find 
themselves (except in cases involving personal injuries) prevented from payment due 
to the “pay to be paid” rule. Therefore, regardless of the criticism surrounding the MLC 
Financial Security Scheme (of being the “bad subsiding the good”), the necessity of it 
in order to provide seafarers with a further guarantee of their rights being enforced is 
clear, especially since it is not guaranteed that national legislations will have such 
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guarantees for employees in cases of employer insolvency.803 
 
 One of the main criticisms that one might have regarding the Financial Security 
Scheme is that in essence it represents a limitation cap, which might prevent abandoned 
seafarers from receiving compensation for their losses. Even in the case of seafarers 
going around the cap and suing possible third parties involved, such as Classification 
Societies, assuming that at least one of the causes of abandonment was the lack of 
proper accommodation, the limitation cap might make Courts believe that it would not 
be fair, just or reasonable to impose such liability onto a third party.  
 
 Accordingly, this chapter has shown that P&I Clubs are essential private actors 
in abandonment of seafarer cases. Although not having a role in preventing 
abandonment from occurring, by ensuring that abandoned seafarers receive (at least 
part) of what is owed to them, they insure that seafarers have their rights enforced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
803 Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 provides for Member States to ensure that a 
security scheme is set up to cover employees’ claims in case of the employer’s insolvency. It is important 
to note that article 5 of the Directive reads:  
“Member States shall lay down detailed rules for the organization, financing and operation 
of the guarantee institutions, complying with the following principles in particular: (a) the 
assets of the institutions shall be independent of the employers' operating capital and be 
inaccessible to proceedings for insolvency; 
(b) employers shall contribute to financing, unless it is fully covered by the public 
authorities; 
(c) the institutions' liabilities shall not depend on whether or not obligations to contribute 
to financing have been fulfilled.” 
Therefore, as confirmed in C 292/ 14,  Elliniko Dimosio v Stefanos Stroumpoulis and others, “there does 
not have to be any link between the employer’s obligation to contribute and mobilization of the guarantee 
fund” (at paragraph 68).  
Taking the European Directive as an example, it can be concluded that some national legislations might 
include, within their legislative provisions, Financial Security schemes similar to the one provided for 
by the MLC. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis demonstrated that the terminology ‘abandonment of seafarer’ is not 
something new, with its origins preceding IMO/ILO Regulation A.930 (22) and the 
MLC, and which was used to raise awareness of the importance of seafarers’ work 
conditions. Indeed, as has been shown, the word ‘abandonment’ has been used to refer 
to seafarers long before they had their work regulated, due to the harsh and peculiar 
conditions imposed by a seafaring career. In truth, the terminology “abandonment of 
seafarers” itself implies a lot more situations than merely the ones described in the 
MLC.  Nevertheless, a reading of the terminology used to describe some situations that 
seafarers may face, as provided by IMO/ILO Regulation A.930 (22) and the 
Convention, makes clear that abandonment is not only a contractual breach, but also a 
breach of responsibilities and obligations, which can be cleared perceived by the use of 
the expression “severance of ties” by the Resolution.804 
 
 Chapter I demonstrated the transnationality of seafaring, and more specifically 
of abandonment of seafarers. The chapter showed how the profession changed from an 
unregulated career, to one regulated by national laws followed by international laws, 
and the importance of Private Actors in assisting in its regulation.  It was proved that 
seafarers’ rights are constituted by national and international law, as well as by the 
intervention of Private Actors/ Stakeholders, that usually play a vital role in developing 
policies and regulations that will directly impact seafarers. Most importantly, the 
chapter showed that stakeholders are indispensable in assuring that seafarers have their 
rights respected and enforced. In fact, the importance of Private Actors preventing 
“abandonment of seafarer” from occurring has been demonstrated throughout this 
thesis. 
 
 The link between substandard shipping and abandonment of seafarers has also 
been confirmed throughout this thesis. Although abandonment of seafarer is not 
                                                        
804 See pp. 12/13 
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conditional upon the presence of substandard shipping, a seafarer on board a 
substandard ship is deemed to have been abandoned, since the vessel cannot be 
considered a safe working place.  Furthermore, the main cause of abandonment, as it 
has been demonstrated, is the shipowner’s financial hardship, and a shipowner with a 
substandard fleet is more likely to be subject to such hardship.805 
 
 The importance of members of the maritime safety chain in preventing 
substandard shipping has also been confirmed throughout this thesis. Most importantly, 
it has been demonstrated that they are primordial stakeholders within the ship industry 
in enforcing regulations and providing standards, especially for safety at sea, and that 
they have an undeniable role in “abandonment of seafarer” cases, hence confirming this 
thesis’ hypothesis. This thesis has shown that the network of cooperation which exists 
between the selected stakeholders not only helps prevent substandard shipping, but also 
abandonment of seafarers.806 
 
 This thesis showed that although Flag States bear more responsibilities and 
obligations than Port and Coastal States, the latter two stakeholders assist in assuring 
that International Conventions are enforced. They play a vital role certifying that 
vessels comply with the conventions through inspections, which may be followed by 
detentions. Their importance has been recognized even by the MLC, which provided 
for a system of compliance involving Port and Flag States. 807 
 
Although Flag States have always received more focus when dealing with 
maritime law, including maritime labour law, carrying more obligations and 
responsibilities, it was demonstrated that the assistance provided by the Port and 
Coastal States in assuring compliance with international conventions has been proven 
essential in improving conditions at sea. Accordingly, this network of responsibilities 
within States, in different roles, is in indispensable in preventing abandonment of 
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seafarer from occurring.  Port and Coastal States through inspections have means to 
assure the safety of vessels, and according with the criteria set out in International 
Instruments, they also need to assure that seafarers receive adequate treatment. 
Therefore, even if a Flag State has failed in complying with its responsibilities in 
verifying a vessel’s compliance with international instruments, Port and Coastal States 
can ensure through inspections followed by detentions that the situation of the vessel is 
regulated, including the payment of seafarers and adequate provision for them.808 
 
Furthermore, as shown in this thesis, international law leaves very little space 
for direct claims against States, it being up to States to raise complaints and actions 
against each other. Indeed, it is unlikely that a seafarer will ever even consider filing a 
lawsuit against a State since generally this represents a lengthy and costly process.  
Therefore, most acts of non-compliance among States is dealt with in a diplomatic 
manner. Although Flag States’ responsibilities regarding abandonment of seafarers has 
been accepted and recognized for a long time, non-compliance is often dealt with on a 
diplomatic basis rather than a legal one. Thus, Port and Coastal States have a better 
chance of insuring that Flag States adhere to their responsibilities towards seafarers, 
than seafarers themselves. 809 
 
The analysis made in this thesis also demonstrated that courts might not 
recognize the exclusive jurisdiction over a vessel attributed to Flag States by virtue of 
UNCLOS and customary law, when dealing with seafarers’ claims. Therefore, when 
dealing with claims concerning seafarers, especially their rights, national courts may 
use other criteria in determining the applicability of a legislation to seafarers other than 
that of the Flag State. 810 
 
The thesis also proved that classification societies might have some 
responsibilities and liabilities regarding abandonment of seafarers. Classification 
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Societies’ role and therefore their responsibilities and possible liabilities need to be 
assessed on a case by case basis. As this work has shown, not every “abandonment of 
seafarer” case will trigger a classification society’s liability, as their responsibilities and 
obligations are limited to certain cases. For instance, an abandonment case merely 
dealing with seafarers’ owed wages, will not raise any classification society liability. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the focus of the research is 
abandonment of seafarers in its broader sense, focusing in particular on abandonment 
cases where the seafarer’s life was put at risk.811 
  
 Classification Societies play a vital role in developing standards, in particular 
safety standards, to be followed by the shipping industry. Accordingly, they became 
essential in the development of policies in the shipping industry, having even obtained 
a consultative status within the IMO, being perceived as essential members of the 
maritime safety chain. The fulfilment of their responsibilities has a direct impact on 
seafarers, as they ensure that vessels meet the required standards, and often they are the 
ones conducting inspections on behalf of the Flag State, hence insuring that the vessel 
complies with international and national legislations. 812 
 
 Although, classification societies cannot guarantee that the vessel is kept up to 
standard until the end of the validity of its classification certificate, it is questionable if 
a certificate issued negligently will not give rise to successful tort claim, especially in 
cases involving personal injury. 813 
 
 Undeniably, as shown in this thesis, the establishment of a duty of care as well 
as a chain of causation between the classification society’s action and the abandonment 
of seafarer, is not something easily achieved. As shown in Chapter IV, courts seem to 
take different approaches in assessing classification societies’ liabilities; there is no 
exact formula for doing so. Perhaps the only thing that the UK, USA and French courts 
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seemed to have in common was that they all concurred that seaworthiness was a non-
delegable duty of the shipowner. However, through reading the obiter dicta in the cases 
analyzed, this fact in itself should not be sufficient to relinquish a classification society 
of any liability in cases of negligence. In fact, courts seem to take a lot more into 
consideration, such as how fair, just and reasonable it would be to impose a duty of care 
on the classification society, especially considering that many times the shipowner 
himself can benefit from a limitation of liability provided by international conventions, 
including the Maritime Labour Convention, which can be perceived as providing a 
limitation of liability in cases of abandonment of seafarers.  814 
 
Unfortunately, as explained in the thesis, currently there are no cases of seafarer 
claims against classification societies, hence making impossible a more specific 
analysis, forcing conclusions to be drawn based on reasoning conducted in similar tort 
claims. Therefore, although the jurisdictions analysed might have shown some 
reluctance in holding a classification society liable in the tort of negligence, it is not 
certain that the same approach would be true in dealing with certain “abandonment of 
seafarers”’ claims, as already mentioned, especially with claims involving personal 
injury. Furthermore, it needs to be borne in mind that the cases analysed in this work 
involved a classification society performing its private role, i.e. on behalf of a 
shipowner, and not performing its public or dual role. Considering that a classification 
society’s public role has a great impact on abandonment of seafarers, it is unclear 
whether this public aspect may also have an effect on the decision of potential seafarer 
claims. As was shown, classification societies performing their public role may benefit 
from Flag State immunity, however this may be gotten around by the courts, similarly 
to how the exclusive jurisdiction of Flag States has been considered not to necessarily 
be conclusive as to applicable law when dealing with seafarers’ claims.  
 
The research carried out in this thesis confirms that although P&I Clubs differ 
from other stakeholders analysed, as they bear no responsibility in preventing 
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abandonment of seafarers from occurring, they are essential in assuring that protection 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure that seafarers have their rights respected and 
enforced in case abandonment does occur. It was shown that like Classification 
Societies, P&I Clubs have a consultative status within IMO, hence assisting in 
developing policies to enhance seafarers’ protection. They are such important players 
in assuring seafarers’ protection, as the research has shown, that it does not seem wrong 
to consider their scepticism the reason for the delay in the acceptance of the MLC 
provisions regarding the Financial Security Scheme in cases of abandonment of 
seafarers. 
 
 P&I Clubs are the stakeholders who ensure that abandoned seafarers will 
receive their due compensation and be duly repatriated through insurance scheme 
mechanisms. As this research shows, even prior to the MLC, P&I Clubs already offered 
insurance to seafarers, in particularly for repatriation and health.  Nevertheless, ‘pay to 
be paid’ rules would prevent P&I Clubs from paying in cases of a shipowner’s 
insolvency and the consequent non-payment of the insurance premium. Thus, in order 
to guarantee that abandoned seafarers would still receive adequate protection, it was 
necessary to put in practice a scheme covering insolvency cases, considering that most 
cases of abandonment of seafarers are a consequence of shipowners’ financial hardship. 
This was duly the coverage to be provided by the MLC’s Financial Security Scheme. 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that this research has also shown that some 
national legislations already provided for similar types of insurance schemes. 815 
 
 Accordingly, P&I Clubs in most situations will be the ones providing for 
seafarers’ rights when abandonment has occurred. As this research highlighted, there 
may be cases where the abandoned seafarers might face difficulties filing direct claims 
against P&I Clubs. However, at least according to English Law, it seems that in most 
abandonment cases, seafarers will be able to file direct claims against the P&I Club, 
hence expediting the process. 
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 By showing the need for the selected stakeholders to assist in preventing 
abandonment of seafarers from happening, and to establish mechanisms to ensure that 
abandoned seafarers will have their rights preserved, this thesis has validated its 
hypothesis that seafarers are transnational employees, and that accordingly 
abandonment of seafarers should be considered a transnational phenomenon. 
 
Suggestions for further research 
 
Further research into the role of seafarers’ states of origin or nationality, in 
relation to abandonment of seafarer issues, would also be beneficial not only in 
supporting this thesis’s hypothesis, but also to consider further whether and to what 
extent seafarers are duly protected by their countries of origin. Such research would 
entail the further consideration of national legislative provisions, and accordingly a 
comparative analysis between different national legislations would also prove to be 
useful in evaluating current abandonment of seafarer provisions and how this issue is 
dealt with on a country by country basis. Further research is also recommended into the 
role of international organisations such as IMO, ILO and ITF in abandonment of 
seafarers.  
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